J     THIS    BOOK    IS    THE    PROPERTY      S 


I  Dr.  J.B.ANDREWS. 

i  Sup  t  of  the 


BUFFALO   STATE    ASYLUM 


LINCOLN  ROOM 

UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 
LIBRARY 


MEMORIAL 

t/x  Class  of  1901 

founded  by 

HARLAN  HOYT  HORNER 

and 

HENRIETTA  CALHOUN  HORNER 


,  /r?"3 


THE 

OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION 


CAMPAIGNS   OF    THE   CIVIL    WAR.—\. 


THE    OUTBREAK 


EEBELLION" 


JOHX   G.   mCOLAY 

PRIVATE    BECKETABT   TO   PRESIDENT   LINCOLN 


NEW   YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 

743  AND  745  Broadwat 

1881 


COPYKIOHT    BY 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S   SONS 
1881 


Trow's 

Printing  and  Bookbinding  Comtany 

201-213  East  \ith  Street 

NEW   YORK 


H 


n  ' 


PEEFAOE. 


Upon  urgent  and  repeated  request  from  the  publishers, 
the  author  consented  to  lay  aside  temporarily  a  larger  and 
more  important  literary  task,  to  wi-ite  for  them  this  initial 
volume  of  the  "  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War."  Personal 
observation  and  long  previous  investigation  had  furnished 
him  a  great  variety  of  new  material  for  the  work  ;  and  this 
was  opportunely  supplemented  by  the  recent  publication  of 
the  Official  War  Eecords  for  1861,  both  Union  and  Confed- 
erate, opening  to  comparison  and  use  an  immense  mass  of 
historical  data,  and  furnishing  the  definite  means  of  verify- 
ing or  correcting  the  statements  of  previous  writers. 

Under  these  advantages  the  author  has  written  the  pres- 
ent volume,  basing  his  work  on  materials  of  unquestioned 
authenticity — books,  documents,  and  manuscripts — and,  in- 
deed, for  the  greater  part,  on  official  iniblic  records.  His 
effort  has  been  a  conscientious  and  painstaking  one,  making 
historical  accuracy  his  constant  aim.  If,  unfortunately,  he 
has  committed  any  errors,  he   hopes  they  may  prove  only 


vi  PREFACK 

such  as  from  the  meagi'eness  or  conflicting  nature  of  the 
evidence  any  one  might  fall  into.  He  would  gladly  have 
appended  to  his  pages  full  references  and  citations,  but  want 
of  space  absolutely  forbade. 

So  many  kind  friends  have  encouraged  and  aided  him, 
that  he  finds  it  impossible  to  acknowledge  theii*  sendees  in 
detail,  and  therefore  takes  this  occasion  to  return  to  one  and 
all  his  sincere  thanks.  Government  oflScials,  especially,  of 
all  gi'ades,  have  with  uniform  courtesy  aflPorded  him  eveiy 
facility  in  their  power.  "Without  free  access  to  the  various 
departments  and  archives — and,  above  all,  to  the  vast  histori- 
cal treasures  of  the  Libraiy  of  Congress — it  would  have  been 
exceedingly  diflBcult  to  gather  and  verify  the  numerous  facts, 
quotations,  names,  and  dates,  which  his  narrative  required. 

Washington,  D.C. 

February  26,  1881. 


COIsTTEKTS. 


CHAPTER  I.  PACK 

Secession, 1 

CHAPTER  II. 
Chakleston  Harbor, 17 

CHAPTER  III. 
The  Confederate  States'  Rebellion,  .        ...    39 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Lincoln, 45 

CHAPTER  V. 
Sumter, 56 

CHAPTER  VI. 
The  Call  to  Arms, 69 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Baltimore, ;        .        .    82 

CHAPTER  VIII.  • 

Washington, 91 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Ellsworth, 105 


yiii  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  X.  PAGE 

Missouri, 115 

CHAPTER  XL 
Kentucky, 126 

CHAPTER  XIL 
West  Virginia, 137 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
Patterson's  Campaign, 155 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
Manassas, 169 

CHAPTER  XV. 
Bull  Run, 181 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
The  Retreat 197 

CHAPTER  XVII. 
Conclusion, 206 


LIST   OF  MAPS. 


PAGE 

Charleston  Harbor, 21 

Route  of  the  Massachusetts  Sixth  through  Balti- 
more,       85 

Routes  of  Approach  to  Washington,    .        .        .        .93 

Field  of  the  West  Virginia  Battles,  ....  148 

Patterson's  Campaign, 159 

Bull  Run — The  Field  of  Strategy,      ....  177 

Bull  Run — Battle  op  the  Forenoon,  ....  184 

Bull  Run — Battle  of  the  Afternoon,         .        .        .  189 


THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 


CHAPTER  L 

SECESSION. 

The  fifth  day  of  October,  1860,  is  the  initial  point  of  the 
American  Rebellion.  Its  conception,  animus,  and  probably 
its  plans,  lay  much  farther  back.  It  had  been  seriously 
proposed  once  or  twice  before,  but  it  was  then  that  its  for- 
mal organization  was  begun.  On  that  day  Governor  Gist, 
of  South  Carolina,  wrote  a  confidential  circular  letter,  which 
he  despatched  by  the  hand  of  a  special  messenger,  to  the 
governors  of  what  were  commonly  designated  the  Cotton 
States.  In  this  letter  he  asked  an  interchange  of  opinions 
which  he  might  be  at  liberty  to  submit  to  a  consultation  of 
leading  men  of  South  Carolina.  He  said  South  Carolina 
would  unquestionably  call  a  convention  as  soon  as  it  was 
ascertained  that  a  majority  of  Lincoln  electors  were  chosen 
in  the  then  pending  presidential  election.  "If  a  single 
State  secedes,"  he  said,  "  she  will  follow  her.  If  no  other 
Btate  takes  the  lead.  South  Carolina  will  secede  (ia  my  opin- 
ion) alone,  if  she  has  any  assurance  that  she  will  be  soon 
followed  by  another  or  other  States ;  otherwise  it  is  doubt- 
ful."    He  asked  information,  and  advised  concerted  action. 

North  Carolina  was  first  to  respond.  The  people  would 
1 


•2  THE  OUTliUEAK   OF  REBELLION. 

not,  so  wTote  the  governor  under  date  of  October  18th,  con. 
sider  Lincohi's  election  a  sufficient  cause  for  disunion,  and 
the  Legislature  would  probably  not  call  a  convention.  The 
Governor  of  Alabama,  under  date  of  October  '25th,  thought 
Alabama  would  not  secede  alone,  but  would  secede  in  co- 
operation with  two  or  more  States.  The  Governor  of  Mis- 
sissippi, under  date  of  October  2Gth,  wrote  :  "If  any  State 
moves,  I  think  Mississippi  will  go  with  her."  On  the  same 
day  the  Governor  of  Louisiana  answered  :  "  I  shall  not  ad\-ise 
the  secession  of  my  State,  and  I  will  add  that  I  do  not  think 
the  people  of  Louisiana  will  ultimately  decide  in  favor  of 
that  course."  The  Governor  of  Georgia,  under  date  of  Octo- 
ber 31st,  advocated  retaliatory  legislation,  and  ventured  his 
opinion  that  the  people  of  Georgia  would  wait  for  some 
overt  act.  Florida  alone  responded  with  anything  like  en- 
thusiasm, but  only  after  the  lapse  of  a  month.  Her  gover- 
nor said  that  Florida  was  "ready  to  wheel  into  line  with  the 
gallant  Palmetto  State,  or  any  other  Cotton  State  or  States," 
and  thought  she  would  unquestionably  call  a  convention. 

The  discoui-aging  tone  of  these  answers  establishes,  beyond 
controvei-sy,  that,  excepting  in  South  Cai-olina,  the  rebellion 
was  not  in  any  sense  a  popular  revolution,  but  was  a  con- 
spiracy among  the  prominent  local  office-holdei"s  and  politi- 
cians, whith  the  jjcople  neither  expected  nor  desii-ed,  and 
wliich  they  were  made  eventually  to  justify  and  uphold  by 
the  iisual  arts  and  expedients  of  conspiracy. 

Directly  and  in(Urectly,  the  South  had  practically  con- 
trolled the  government  during  its  whole  existence.  Excited 
to  ambition  by  this  success,  she  sought  to  perpetuate  that 
control.  The  extension  of  slavery  and  the  creation  of  addi- 
tional Slave  States  was  a  necessaiy  stej)  in  the  scheme,  and 
became  the  well-defined  single  issue  in  the  presidential  elec- 
tion.    But  in  this  contest  the  South  for  the  tirst  time  met 


SECESSION.  3 

oveiTV'lielming  defeat.  The  choice  of  Lincohi  was  a  conclu- 
sive and  final  decision,  in  legal  form  and  by  constitutional 
majorities,  that  slaveiy  should  not  be  extended  ;  and  the 
l^opular  vote  of  1860  transfen-ed  the  balance  of  power  irre- 
vocably to  the  Free  States. 

In  the  political  discussions  throughout  this  presidential 
campaign,  as  well  as  in  pi'eceding  years,  the  South  had  made 
free  and  loud  use  of  two  leading  arguments,  always  with' 
telling  eflfect :  the  fii'st,  to  intimidate  the  North,  was  the 
thi-eat  of  disunion ;  the  second,  to  "fire  the  Southern  heart," 
was  the  entirely  unfounded  alarm-ciy  that  the  North,  if  suc- 
cessful, would  not  merely  exclude  slavery  from  federal  ten-i- 
tories,  but  would  also  destroy  slaveiy  in  the  Slave  States. 
The  unthinking  masses  of  the  South  accepted  both  these 
arguments  iu  theii*  literal  sense ;  and  Southern  public  opin- 
ion, excited  and  suspicious,  became  congenial  soil  in  which 
the  intended  revolt  easily  took  root. 

The  State  of  South  Carolina,  in  addition,  had  been  little 
else  than  a  school  of  treason  for  thii'ty  years.  She  was, 
moreover,  peculiarly  adapted  to  become  the  hotbed  of  con- 
spiracy by  the  fact  that  of  all  the  States  she  was  least  re- 
publican in  both  the  character  of  her  people  and  the  form 
of  her  institutions.  She  was  exclusive,  aristocratic,  reaction- 
ary ;  had  a  narrow  distmst  of  popular  participation  in  gov- 
ernment, and  longed  for  the  distinctions  of  caste  and  pii\-i- 
lege  in  society. 

It  would  seem  that,  before  the  governors'  replies  were  all 
received,  the  consultation  or  caucus  for  which  they  were 
solicited  was  held,  and  the  i^rogi'amme  of  insuiTection  agi-eed 
upon.  Circumstances  rendered  a  special  session  of  the 
South  Carolina  Legislature  necessaiy.  The  election  was 
held  during  the  month  of  October.  Local  fanaticism  toler< 
ated  no  opposition  party  in  the  State,  and  iinder  the  manipu- 


4         THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

lation  of  the  conspirators  the  prevailing  question  was,  who 
was  the  most  zealous  "resistance"  canditlate.  To  a  legis- 
lature elected  from  this  kind  of  material,  Governor  Gist,  on 
November  5th,  sent  a  defiant,  revolutionaiy  message — the 
first  official  notice  and  proclamation  of  insun-ection.  He 
declared  that  "our  institutions"  were  in  danger  from  the 
hostility  of  the  "  fixed  majorities"  of  the  North  ;  and  recom- 
mended the  calling  of  -a  State  convention,  and  the  i^urchase 
of  aims  and  material  of  war. 

A  lingeiing  doubt  about  the  result  of  the  presidential 
contest  ai^pears  in  the  foi-mal  choice  bv  the  Legislature,  of 
electoi*s  who  woiild  vote  for  Breckenridge  and  Lane.  But 
that  doubt  was  short-lived.  The  morning  of  November  7th 
brought  the  certain  news  of  the  election  of  Lincoln  and 
Hamlin  on  the  pre\'ious  day,  and  the  rejoicings  which 
would  have  been  uttered  over  their  defeat  became  jubila- 
tions that  their  success  oflfered  the  long-coveted  pretext  for 
disunion. 

From  this  time  forth  everything  was  managed  to  swell  the 
revolutionary  furor.  The  Legislature  immediately  ordered 
a  convention,  made  approj^riations,  passed  military  bills. 
The  federal  office-holders,  with  much  public  flourish  of  their 
patriotic  sacrifice,  resigned  their  offices.  Military  companies 
enrolled  themselves  in  the  city ;  organizations  of  minute- 
men  si^rang  up  in  the  rui-al  neighborhoods.  Drills,  parades, 
meetings,  bonfires,  secession  harangues,  secession  cockades, 
palmetto  flags,  purchase  of  fire-anns  and  powder,  singing 
of  the  Mai-seillaise — there  is  not  room  to  enumerate  the  fol- 
lies to  which  the  general  populace,  especially  of  Charleston, 
devoted  their  days  and  nights.  There  was  universal  satis- 
faction :  to  the  conspiratoi-s,  because  their  schemes  were 
progressing ;  to  the  rabble,  because  it  had  a  continuous 
liolidav. 


SECESSION.  5 

Amid  unflagging  excitement  of  tliis  character,  wliich  re- 
ceived a  daily  stimulus  from  similar  proceedings  beginning 
and  growing  in  other  Cotton  States,  November  and  the  first 
half  of  December  jiassed  away.  Meanwhile  a  new  governor, 
Fi-ancis  W.  Pickens,  a  revolutionist  of  a  yet  more  radical 
type  than  his  predecessor,  was  chosen  by  the  Legislature 
and  inaugurated,  and  the  members  of  the  Convention  au- 
thorized by  the  Legislatiu-e  were  chosen  at  an  election  held 
on  December  6th.  The  South  Carolina  Convention  met  at 
Columbia,  the  capital  of  the  State,  according  to  apj^oint- 
ment,  on  December  17,  1860,  but,  on  account  of  a  local  eiji- 
demic,  at  once  adjourned  to  Charleston.  That  body  was, 
like  the  Legislature,  the  immediate  outgrowth  of  the  cur- 
rent conspiracy,  and  doubtless  counted  many  of  the  conspira- 
tors among  its  members.  It  therefore  needed  no  time  to 
make  up  its  mind.  On  the  fourth  day  of  its  term  it  passed 
unanimously  what  it  called  an  Ordinance  of  Secession,  in 
the  following  words : 

"We,  the  people  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina,  in  convention 
assembled,  do  declare  and  ordain,  and  it  is  hereby  declared  and  or- 
dained, that  the  ordinance  adopted  by  us  in  convention  on  the  23d 
day  of  May,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  178S,  whereby  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  of  America  was  ratified,  and  also  all  Acts  and  parts 
of  Acts  of  the  General  Assembly  of  this  State  ratifying  amendments 
of  the  said  Constitution,  are  hereby  repealed  ;  and  that  the  Union 
now  subsisting  between.  South  Carolina  and  other  States,  under  the 
name  of  the  United  States  of  America,  is  hereby  dissolved." 

Conscious  that  this  document  bore  upon  its  face  the  plain 
contradiction  of  their  pretended  authority,  and  its  own  pal- 
jjable  nullity  both  in  technical  fomi  and  essential  principle, 
the  convention  undertook  to  give  it  strength  and  jDlausi- 
bility  by  an  elaborate  Declaration  of  Causes,  adopted  a  few 
days  later  (December  24:th) — a  sort  of  half -parody  of  Jeflfer- 


6         THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

soil's  masterinece.  It  coulil,  of  course,  quote  no  direct 
warrant  from  the  Constitution  for  secession,  but  sought  to 
deduce  one,  by  imiilication,  from  the  language  of  the  Decla- 
ration of  Independence  and  the  Xth  Amendment.  It  re- 
asserts the  absurd  paradox  of  State  supremacy — jjersistently 
miscalled  "  State  Eights  " — which  reverses  the  natural  order 
of  governmental  existence ;  considers  a  State  suijerior  to  the 
Union ;  makes  a  part  greater  than  the  whole ;  turns  the 
pyramid  of  authority  on  its  ajjex ;  plants  the  tree  of  liberty 
Avith  its  branches  in  the  ground  and  its  roots  in  the  air. 
The  fallacy  has  been  a  hundred  times  analyzed,  exposed,  and 
refuted ;  but  the  cheap  dogmatism  of  demagogues  and  the 
automatic  machineiy  of  faction  peqietually  conjures  it  up 
anew  to  astonish  the  sucklings  and  terrify  the  dotards  of 
politics.  The  notable  point  in  the  Declaration  of  Causes  is, 
that  its  complaint  over  giievances  past  and  present  is  against 
certain  States,  and  for  these  remedy  was  of  coui-se  logically 
barred  by  its  own  theoiy  of  State  supremacy.  On  the  other 
hand,  all  its  allegations  against  the  Union  are  concerning 
dangers  to  come,  before  which  admission  the  moral  justiti- 
cation  of  disunion  falls  to  the  ground.  In  rejecting  the 
remedy  of  future  elections  for  future  wrongs,  the  conspiracy 
discarded  the  entire  theory'  and  principle  of  republican  gov- 
ernment. 

One  might  suiijjose  that  this  exhausted  their  coiuiterfcit 
philosophy — but  not  yet.  Greatly  as  they  groaned  at  un- 
friendly State  laws — seriously  as  they  pretended  to  fear 
damage  or  si^oliation  under  futiu'e  federal  statutes,  the  bur- 
den of  their  anger  rose  at  the  sentiment  and  belief  of  the 
North.  "All  hope  of  remedy,"  says  the  manifesto,  "is  ren- 
dered vain  by  the  fact  that  the  iiublic  oi)inion  at  the  North 
has  invested  a  groat  political  error  with  the  sanctions  of  a 
laoro  erroneous  religious   belief."     Tliis   is   language   one 


SECESSION.  7 

might  exiDecfc  from  the  Pope  of  Rome  ;  but,  that  an  American 
convention  should  denounce  the  Liberty  of  oijinion,  is  not 
merely  to  i-ecede  from  Jefferson  to  Louis  XTV. ;  it  is  flying 
from  the  town-meeting  to  the  Inquisition. 

Nor  can  the  final  and  persistent,  but  false  assumjition  of 
the  South,  be  admitted,  that  she  was  justified  by  prescriptive 
privilege ;  that,  because  slavery  was  tolerated  at  the  forma- 
tion of  the  government,  it  must  needs  be  protected  to  perpe- 
tuity. The  Constitution  makes  few  features  of  our  system 
perpetually  obligatory.  Almost  everything  is  subject  to 
amendment  by  three-fourths  of  the  States.  The  New  World 
Eeimblic  was  established  for  reform — not  for  mere  blind 
conservatism,  certainly  not  for  despotic  reaction.  The 
slavery  question,  especially,  was  ever  since  1808  broadly 
imder  the  control  of  the  j)eople.  On  the  one  hand.  Congress 
had  legal  ijower  to  tolerate  the  African  slave  trade  ;  on  the 
other,  thi'ee-foiu-ths  of  the  States  might  lawfully  abolish 
slavery,  as  was  done  near  the  close  of  the  Rebellion.  To 
effect  necessary  and  salutary  political  changes,  in  the  ful- 
ness of  time,  by  lawful  and  j)eaceful  election  through  con- 
stitutional majorities,  as  a  prudent  alternative  to  the  violence 
and  horror  of  revolution,  is  one  of  the  many  signal  blessings 
which  republican  representative  government  confers  on  an 
intelligent  nation. 

The  Ordinance  of  Secession  of  South  Carolina  was  passed 
in  secret  session,  a  little  after  mid-day,  on  December  20th. 
The  fact  was  immediately  made  ijublic  by  huge  placards 
issued  from  the  Charleston  printing-offices ;  and  by  special 
direction  of  the  convention,  the  event  was  further  celebrated 
by  filing  guns,  ringing  bells,  and  other  jubilations.  To 
cany  this  studied  theatrical  effect  to  its  fullest  extent,  a 
session  of  the  convention  was  held  that  same  night,  to  which 
the  members  marched  in  procession,  where  the  formal  sign- 


8         THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

ing  of  the  Ordinance  was  sought  to  be  magnified  into  a 
solemn  public  ceremony;  after  which  the  chairman  pro- 
claimed South  Carolina  an  "independent  commonwealth." 
TN'ith  all  their  aflectation  of  legality,  formality,  and  present 
justification,  some  of  the  members  were  honest  enough  to 
acknowledge  the  true  character  of  the  event  as  the  culmina- 
tion of  a  chronic  conspiracy,  not  a  spontaneous  revolution. 
"  The  secession  of  South  Carolina,"  said  one  of  the  chief 
actors,  "  is  not  an  event  of  a  day.  It  is  not  anything  pro- 
duced by  Mr.  Lincoln's  election,  or  by  the  non-execution  of 
the  Fugitive  Slave  Law.  It  is  a  matter  which  has  been 
gatheiing  head  for  thirty  years."  This,  Asith  many  similar 
avowals,  crowns  and  completes  the  otherwise  abundant  proof 
that  the  revolt  was  not  only  against  right,  but  that  it  was 
without  cause. 

The  original  suggestion  of  Governor  Gist  in  his  circular 
lettev,  for  a  concerted  insun-ection,  fell  upon  fmitful  soil. 
The  events  which  occun-ed  in  South  Cai-olina  were  in  sub- 
stance duplicated  in  the  neighboring  States  of  Georgia, 
Florida,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  Louisiana.  These  States, 
however,  had  stronger  and  more  f  onnidable  union  minorities 
than  South  Carolina ;  or  rather,  if  the  tnith  could  have  been 
ascertained  with  safety,  they  had  each  of  them  decided  ma- 
jorities averse  to  secession,  as  was  vii-tually  acknowledged  by 
their  govemoi-s'  replies  to  the  Gist  circular.  But  during  the 
presidential  camj^aign,  the  three  Southern  parties,  for  fac- 
tional advantage,  had  ried  with  each  other  in  their  denuncia- 
tions of  the  hated  "Black  Republicans" — they  had  berated 
each  other  as  "  submissionists  "  in  secret  league  or  sympathy 
with  the  Abolitionists.  The  partisans  of  Breckenridge— 
generally  either  active  or  latent  disunionists — were  ready, 
positive,  and  relentlessly  aggressive ;  the  adherents  of  Bell 
and  of  Douglas  were  demoralized  and  suspicious.     When 


SECESSION.  9 

Lincoln's  election  was,  so  unexpectedly  to  many,  rendered 
certain,  they  could  not  recover  in  time  to  evade  the  search- 
ing question  which  the  conspirators  immediately  thrvist  at 
them,  "whether  they  would  submit  to  Black  Eepublican 
inile."  A  false  shame  and  the  inexorable  tyi-anny  of  South- 
ern public  opinion  made  many  a  voter  belie  the  honest  con- 
victions of  his  heart,  and  answer  No,  when  at  the  very  least 
he  would  gladly  have  evaded  the  inquuy. 

The  prominent  office-holders,  governors,  senators,  con- 
gressmen, judges,  formed  in  each  State  a  central  clique  of 
conspiracy.  The  governors  had  official  authority  to  issue 
proclamations,  to  convene  legislatures,  to  call  out  and  com- 
mand such  militia  as  existed.  Had  their  authority  been 
wielded  in  behalf  of  the  Union,  no  general  revolt  would 
have  been  possible  ;  but,  exercised  without  scrapie  or  rest  to 
promote  secession,  insurrection  began  with  an  official  pres- 
tige which  swei^t  the  hesitating  and  the  timid  irresistibly 
into  the  vortex  of  treason.  Even  then  it  was  only  by  per- 
sistent nursing,  management,  and  in  many  cases  sheer  deceit 
that  a  semblance  of  majorities  was  obtained  to  justify  and 
apparently  indorse  the  conspirators'  plots.  Legislatures 
were  convened,  commissioners  sent  from  State  to  State,  con- 
ventions called,  military  bills  passed,  minute-men  and  vol- 
unteer companies  organized.  Deliberative  bodies  were  ha- 
rangued by  the  conspirators'  emissaries,  and  showered  with 
inflammatoiy  telegrams.  After  the  meeting  of  Congress  the 
fii'e-eaters  of  Washington  held  almost  nightly  caucuses,  and 
sent  addresses,  solicitations,  and  commands  from  the  capital. 
Individual  opinion  was  overawed ;  the  government  was  not 
only  silent,  but  constantly  yielding ;  legislative  deliberation 
became,  in  secret  session,  legislative  intrigue  ;  pretexts  were 
invented  to  defer  and  omit  all  proper  scratiny  of  election  re- 
turns.    The  "State"  was  the  idol  of  the  hour.     "The  State 


10         THE  OUTBREAK  OK  REUELLION. 

commands  "  was  as  desjiotic  a  foiToiila  as  "  The  king  com- 
mands " ;  and  the  voter's  personal  judgment,  the  very  hasis 
and  life-gi\'ing  princ'ii)lc  of  republics,  was  ol)literatcd  between 
the  dread  of  jjroscription  and  the  blighting  mildew  of  the 
doctrine  of  supreme  State  allegiance. 

Certain  features  of  the  stniggle  desei'S'e  special  exidana- 
tion.  The  " in-ein-essible  conflict"  between  Korth  and 
South,  between  freedom  and  slavery,  was  not  confined  to  the 
two  sides  of  Mason  and  Dixon's  line  ;  it  found  a  certain  ex- 
pression even  in  the  Cotton  States  themselves.  Most  of 
these  States  embi-ace  tenitoiy  of  a  i*adically  different  quality. 
Their  southern  and  sea-coast  front  is  a  broad  belt  of  sea- 
islands,  marshes,  river-swamps,  and  low  alluvial  lands,  ex- 
ceedingly unhealthy  from  malarial  fevers  in  the  hot  season, 
but  of  unsui*passed  fertility,  and  i)ossessing  the  jiicturesque 
aspects  of  an  exuberant  half-tropical  vegetation.  This  is  the 
region  of  the  great  cotton,  rice,  and  sugar  plantations  which 
have  made  the  South  rich  aud  famous ;  here  the  St.  Claira 
and  Legrees  of  real  life  counted  their  slaves  by  hundreds, 
and  aspired  to  sybaritic  lives  in  amj^le,  hospitable  mansions, 
surrounded  by  magnificent  and  venerable  live-oak  and  mag- 
nolia groves,  avenues  of  stately  palms,  princely  gardens  of 
native  and  exotic  bloom,  and  illimitable  hedge-lines  of  the 
Cherokee  rose  ;  a  swarm  of  house-servants  to  minister  to  pam- 
pei'ed  indolence  and  disi^ense  a  lavish  hospitality ;  a  troop 
of  field-hands  to  fill  the  cotton,  rice,  or  sugar  houses  ;  a  blend- 
ing of  Ai'cadian  simplicity  and  feudal  pretension  ;  every  plan- 
tation with  its  indulgent  master,  its  exacting  overseer,  its 
submissive  slaves.  These  were  the  lights  of  the  jncture ; 
abler  pens  have  painted  the  horrible  backgi-ound  of  bloody 
slave-whips,  barbarous  slave-codes,  degrading  slave-auctions, 
yellow  fever,  cypress-swamjis,  the  bloodhound  hunt,  and 
the  ever-present  di'ead  of  servile  insmi'ection.     From  such 


SECESSIOX.  11 

surroundings  came  the  morbid  dreams  of  an  unholy  leagiic 
between  perpetual  bondage  and  free  trade,  which  should  rear 
a  gigantic  slave  empire,  before  which  the  intellect,  the 
power,  the  splendor,  and  the  government  of  all  preceding 
ages  and  nations  should  fade  and  wane. 

The  northern  half  of  the  Cotton  States  was  very  different ; 
here  were  thin,  sandy  uplands  of  meagre  productiveness ; 
monotonous  forests  of  pine  and  sciiib-oak,  running  again  in- 
to the  more  varied  and  romantic  scenery  of  the  subsiding 
spurs  of  the  Alleghanies ;  blue  crags,  bright  streams,  shin- 
ing waterfalls,  and  the  changing,  deciduous  foliage  of  the 
North.  Great  slave-plantations  could  not  floui-ish  here ; 
white  population  predominated;  agriculture  was  varied  ;  the 
husbandman  had  a  sterner  stniggle  with  nature  ;  and  com- 
munities were  burdened  with  all  the  economic  and  social 
detriments  of  the  slave  system,  having  none  of  its  delights. 

A  dense  slave  population  and  ultra  secessionism  were, 
therefore,  the  mle  in  the  southern,  and  white  majorities  and 
union  feeling  in  the  northern  districts  of  the  Cotton  States. 
Therefore,  also,  political  power  lay  in  the  slave  region,  which 
again  was  allied  to  the  comm.ercial  interests  clustering  about 
southern  seaports.  All  the  leverage  was  in  the  hands  of 
treason — offices,  ostracism,  advantage  in  representation,  com- 
mercial ambition,  party  ascendancy.  The  wonder  is,  not  that 
secession  succeeded  in  the  struggle,  but  that  there  was  any 
serious  contest  at  all.  With  all  this,  there  is  strong  ground 
for  belief  that  insuiTection  gained  its  ends  at  last  only 
through  chicane,  deceit,  and  fraud.  Not  a  single  Cotton 
State  but  Texas  dared  to  submit  its  Ordinance  of  Secession 
to  a  direct  vote  of  the  people. 

The  struggle  assumed  its  most  determined  phase  in  Geor- 
gia. She  was  the  Empire  State  of  the  South,  and,  therefore, 
indispensable  to  the  conspiracy,  in  which  distinguished  citi- 


12         THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

zeus  of  liei*s — Governor  Brown,  Secretaiy  Cobb,  Senators 
Toombs  and  Iverson,  and  others — were  conspicuous  ring- 
leadei-s.  The  more  rabid  fire-eaters  desired  that  the  Legis- 
lature should  at  once  pass  an  act  of  secession ;  Stephens  and 
other  conservatives  opposed  this  course.  "  The  Legishiture 
were  not  elected  for  siich  a  pui^pose,"  said  he.  "  They  came 
here  to  do  their  duty  as  legislator.  They  have  swom  to 
support  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  They  did 
not  come  here  to  disruj^t  this  government.  I  am,  therefore, 
for  submitting  all  these  questions  to  a  convention  of  the  peo- 
ple." In  due  time  a  convention  was  called  by  iinanimous 
vote  of  the  Legislature.  Then  followed  a  spirited  campaign 
to  elect  delegates.  It  early  became  evident  that,  wliile  the 
people  of  Georgia  were  irritated  to  the  point  of  demanding 
new  guai*antees  for  slaverv',  they  were  decidedly  against  dis- 
union. Thereupon  the  conspirators  invented  a  bold  trick. 
"  The  tnith  is,"  exjilains  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  "  in  my 
judgment  the  wavering  scale  in  Georgia  was  turned  by  a  sen- 
timent the  key-note  to  which  was  given  in  the  words,  '  We 
can  make  better  tei-ms  out  of  the  Union  than  in  it.'  .... 
This  one  idea  did  more,  in  my  opinion,  in  carrying  the  State 
out,  than  all  the  arguments  and  eloquence  of  all  others  com- 
bined. Two-thii'ds  at  least  of  those  who  voted  for  the  Ordi- 
nance of  Secession,  did  so,  I  have  but  little  doubt,  with  a 
view  to  a  more  certain  refomiation  of  the  Union."  The 
heresy  of  supreme  State  allegiance  was,  however,  the  final 
and  all-conquering  engine  of  treason.  Mr.  Stephens  him- 
self, in  his  memorable  speech  in  defence  of  the  Union,  is 
the  striking  illusti-ation  o^Gulliver  helpless  in  the  cobwebs 
of  Lilliput.  To  secede,  he  declared,  was  to  break  the  Con- 
stitution. Good  faith  required  the  South  to  abide  the  elec- 
tion in  peace.  Lincoln  could  do  her  no  hann  against  an  ad- 
verse House  and  Senate.     He  adjured  them  not  to  rashly  try 


SECESSION.  13 

the  expeiiment  of  change  ;  for  liberty,  once  lost,  might  never 
be  restored.  These  were  words  of  sober  wisdom,  and,  fear- 
lessly adhered  to  by  a  few  fli-m  men,  they  might  have  para- 
lyzed the  revolt.  Yet  in  the  same  speech  he  declared  that, 
if  Georgia  seceded,  he  should  bow  to  the  will  of  her  people 
— in  other  words,  break  the  Constitution,  break  faith,  and 
lose  liberty.  On  this  "  easy  descent "  Georgia  slid  to  her 
min.  Under  such  examples  the  convention  passed  the  se- 
cession ordinance,  208  to  89. 

While  thus  in  the  States  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Ala- 
bama, Florida,  INIississippi,  and  Louisiana,  the  conspiracy 
made  pretentious  efforts  to  clothe  rebellion  in  the  robes  of 
law,  and  hide  it  behind  the  shield  of  constitutional  forms,  it 
pursued  an  altogether  bold  and  unblushing  course  of  usur- 
pation in  the  State  of  Texas.  The  famous  and  somewhat 
eccentric  General  Houston  was  governor.  His  own  long 
straggle  to  bring  Texas  into  the  Union  made  him  loth  to 
join  in  its  destruction.  He  resisted  the  secession  c-onspir- 
acy ;  but  his  southern  pro-slavery  prejudices  also  imbued 
him  with  the  prevalent  antagonism  to  the  Republican  party. 
He  therefore  nursed  a  scheme  to  carry  Texas  back  into  inde- 
pendent sovereignty,  and,  with  her  temtoiy  and  population 
as  a  basis,  to  undertake  the  conquest  and  annexation  of 
Mexico. 

Biit  the  conspii'ators,  ignoring  all  restraint,  without  a 
shadow  of  legality,  assembled  a  revolutionaiy  State  conven- 
tion, and  on  FebiTiaiy  1st  passed  an  ordinance  of  secession, 
with  a  provision  submitting  it  to  a  popular  vote.  Houston, 
pursuing  his  side  intrigue,  approved  a  joint  resolution  of 
the  State  Legislature  (Febiaiary  -Itli)  to  legalize  the  conven- 
tion, but  accompanied  his  approval  with  a  protest  that  it 
should  have  no  effect  except  to  elicit  public  decision  on  the 
single  question  of  adherence  to  the  Union.     "When  in  due 


14         THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

iime  an  alleged  vote  (taken  on  February  23d)  ratifying  the 
ordinance  was  submitted  to  liim,  he  refused  to  recognize  fur- 
ther acts  of  the  convention  ;  whereuijon  the  enraged  conven- 
tion (March  IGth)  declared  his  office  vacant,  and  empowered 
the  lieutenant-governor  to  seize  the  executive  authority. 

Meanwhile  General  Twiggs,  commanding  the  Federal 
troojis  in  Texas,  by  treasonable  connivance,  on  Febniaiy 
18th  suiTendered  the  military  posts  and  property  to  a  hasty 
collection  of  about  a  regiment  of  rebels  in  ai-ms,  purjiorting 
to  act  by  authority  of  the  convention,  and  set  the  various 
scattered  detachments  of  the  army  in  motion  to  evacuate  the 
State.  Before  this  had  taken  place,  the  newly  inaugui-ated 
Lincoln  administration  sent  a  messenger  to  Houston,  who 
was  still  rejiuted  by  i)ublic  iixmor  to  be  loyal,  and  offered  to 
concentrate  a  strong  body  of  the  United  States  trooj^s  under 
the  new  commander,  Colonel  Waite,  fonn  an  entrenched 
camp,  and  sustain  his  authority  as  governor.  Houston, 
however  (March  29th),  refused  the  offer ;  and  having  neither 
the  United  States  Government  nor  the  people  of  Texas  to 
lean  ui)on,  the  conspii'ators  relentlessly  pushed  him  into  an 
ignoble  obscuxity  and  transferred  the  State  to  the  militaiy 
domination  of  the  Rebellion. 

Thus,  by  easy  stages  and  successive  usurpations  of  author- 
ity, rebellion  accomplished  the  first  step  of  its  operations 
unmolested  and  unopposed.  South  Carolina,  as  we  have 
seen,  seceded  on  December  20,  1860  ;  Mississippi  on  January 
9,  18G1  ;  Florida  on  January  10th  ;  Alabama  on  January  11th ; 
Georgia  on  Januaiy  19th ;  Louisiana  on  January  2Gth ;  and 
Texas  on  Febniaiy  1st.  The  various  ordinances  are  in  sub- 
stance that  devised  and  adopted  by  South  Carolina.  All  the 
States  put  on  the  airs  of  independent  republics,  though  this 
l)rctence  was  of  short  duration,  as  was  designed  and  arranged 
by  the  conspiracy. 


SECESSION.  15 

But  the  mere  perversion  of  elections,  the  adoption  of  a 
secession  ordinance,  and  the  assumption  of  independent  au- 
thority, was  not  enough  for  the  Cotton  Republics.  Though 
they  hoped  to  evade  ci\"il  war  by  shrewd  intrig-ue,  they  well 
understood  they  had  no  certain  immunity  from  it.  It  was 
therefore  essential  to  possess  the  anns  and  military  posts 
within  their  borders.  There  were  in  the  seceded  States  one 
quite  extensive  na^-y-yard,  at  Pensacola,  Florida ;  twelve  to 
fifteen  harbor-forts  along  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts,  capa- 
ble of  mounting  a  thousand  guns,  and  having  cost  over  five 
millions ;  half  a  dozen  arsenals,  containing  an  aggregate  of 
one  hiindred  and  fifteen  thousand  ai'ms,  transfeiTed  there 
from  northern  arsenals  by  Secretai-y  Floyd  about  a  year  be- 
foi'e,  on  pretence  of  danger  from  slave  insuiTections.  In  ad- 
dition there  were  three  mints,  four  important  custom-houses, 
three  revenue-cutters  on  duty  at  the  several  seaports,  and  a 
variety  of  other  miscellaneous  property.  This  estimate  does 
not  include  the  already  mentioned  public  property  surren- 
dered by  General  Twiggs  in  Texas,  which  of  itself  formed  an 
aggregate  of  eighteen  military  posts  and  stations,  and  arms 
and  stores  to  a  large  amount  and  value. 

This  property  had  been  purchased  with  the  money  of  the 
Federal  Government ;  the  land  on  which  the  buildings  stood, 
though  perhaps  in  some  instances  donated,  was  vested  in 
the  United  States,  not  only  by  the  right  of  eminent  domain, 
but  also  by  formal  legislative  deeds  of  cession  from  the 
States  themselves. 

It  was  now  assumed  that  the  heresy  of  State  supremacy, 
through  which  the  States  pretended  to  derive  their  authority 
to  pass  secession  ordinances,  also  restored  to  them  the  right 
of  eminent  domain,  or  that  they  had  always  retained  it ;  that 
therefore  they  might,  under  the  law  of  nations,  justifiably 
take   possession,  holding  themselves  responsible  in  money 


16         THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

damages  to  be  settled  by  negotiatiou.  The  liyiiothcsis  and 
its  parent  dogma  were  of  course  both  jjalpably  false  and 
absurd.  The  Government  of  the  United  States,  unlike  other 
great  nations,  has  steadily  ojjposed  the  maintenance  of  a  large 
military  force  in  time  of  j)eace.  The  whole  regular  anny 
amounted  to  only  a  little  over  seventeen  thousand  men. 
These,  as  usual,  were  mainly  occupied  in  defence  of  the  west- 
ern frontier  against  hostile  Indian  tribes.  Consequently,  but 
three  of  these  southern  forts  were  gan-isoned,  and  they  by 
only  about  a  company  each.  An  equal  force  was  stationed 
for  the  protection  of  the  arsenals  at  Augusta,  Ga.,  Mt. 
Vei-non,  Ala.,  and  Baton  Eouge,  La. 

As  a  necessaiy  part  of  the  conspiracy,  the  governors  of  the 
Cotton  States  now,  by  official  order  to  their  cxtempoiized 
militia  companies,  took  forcible  possession  of  these  forts, 
arsenals,  navy-yard,  custom-houses,  and  other  property,  in 
many  cases  even  before  their  secession  ordinances  were 
l^assed.  This  was  nothing  less  than  le\7"ing  actual  war 
against  the  United  States,  though  as  yet  attended  by  no  vio- 
lence or  bloodshed.  The  ordinaiy  process  was,  the  sudden 
ai)i5earance  of  a  superior  armed  force,  a  demand  for  sur- 
render in  the  name  of  the  State,  and  the  compliance  under 
protest  by  the  officer  in  charge — salutes  to  the  flag,  jieaceable 
evacuation,  and  unmolested  transit  home  being  gi-acioiisly 
permitted  as  military  courtesy.  To  this  coui-se  of  proced- 
ure three  exceptions  occiiiTed :  first,  no  attempt  was  made 
against  Foi-t  Taylor  at  Key  West,  Fort  JeflFei*son  on  Tortugas 
Island,  and  Fort  Pickens  at  Pensacola,  on  account  of  the  dis- 
tance and  danger ;  second,  part  of  the  troops  in  Texas  were 
eventually  refused  the  promised  transit  and  captured ;  and 
third,  the  forts  in  Charleston  Harbor  undei-went  i)eculiar  vi- 
cissitudes,  to  be  specially  naiTated  in  the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  n. 

CHARLESTON  HARBOR. 

Conspiracy  was  not  confined  to  Soutli  Carolina  or  tlie  Cot- 
ton States ;  unfortunately,  it  had  established  itself  in  the 
Mghest  official  circles  of  the  national  administration.  Three 
members  of  President  Buchanan's  cabinet — Cobb  of  Georgia, 
Secretary  of  the  Treasuiy,  Floyd  of  Virginia,  Secretary  of 
War,  and  Thompson  of  Mississippi,  Secretary  of  the  Interior — 
had  become  ardent  and  active  disunionists.  Grouped  about 
these  three  principal  traitors  were  a  number  of  subordinate 
and  yet  influential  functionaries,  all  forming  together  a 
central  secession  cabal,  working,  in  daily  and  flagrant  viola- 
tion of  their  official  oaths,  to  jjromote  the  success  of  the 
Southern  conspiracy.  After  the  meeting  of  Congress,  on  the 
first  Monday  of  December,  the  Senators  and  Rejaresentatives 
from  the  Cotton  States  were  in  Washington  to  counsel, 
prompt,  and  assist  this  cabinet  cabal,  and  the  President  was 
subjected  to  the  double  influence  of  insidious  stiggestion 
from  within,  and  personal  pressure  from  without  his  adminis- 
tration, acting  in  regulated  concert. 

No  taint  of  disloyal  jjuri^ose  or  thought  aj^pears  to  attach 
to  President  Buchanan ;  but  his  condition  of  mind  predis- 
posed him  in  a  remarkable  degi'ee  to  fall  under  the  control- 
ling influence  of  his  disloyal  coimsellors.  He  possessed  the 
opposing  qualities  of  feeble  will  and  stubborn  prejudice ; 
advancing  years  and  decreasing  vigor  added  to  his  irresolu' 


18        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

tion  and  embarrassed  his  always  limited  capabilities.  In  the 
defeat  of  Breckenridge,  whom  he  had  championed,  and  in 
the  sweeping  success  of  the  Republicans,  he  had  suffered 
scorching  rebuke  aud  deep  humiliation.  His  administration 
was  condemned,  his  policy  was  overthrown ;  his  proud  party 
Avas  a  hoj^eless  Avreck.  He  had  no  elasticity  of  mind,  no 
buoyancy  of  hojie  to  recover  from  the  shock.  ^Vithal  he 
had  a  blind  disbelief  in  the  ijopular  judgment ;  he  refused 
to  recognize  the  fact  of  an  advei-se  decision  at  the  ballot-box. 
After  his  long  affiliation  with  Southern  men  in  thought  and 
action,  he  saw,  as  it  were,  tlu'ough  Southern  eyes ;  his  mind 
dwelt  i^ainfuUy  on  the  fancied  wrongs  of  the  South.  His 
natural  impulse,  therefore,  was  to  embarrass  and  thwart  the 
Reiniblican  victoiy  by  siich  official  utterance  and  adminis- 
tration as  would  occur  in  his  brief  remainder  of  office  ;  and 
this  was  probably  also  the  first  and  natui-al  feeling  of  even 
the  loyal  membei-s  of  his  Cabinet,  who  were  prominent  and 
devoted  Democratic  jmrtisans. 

The  presidential  election  decided,  it  was  necessaiy  to  be- 
gin the  preparation  of  his  annual  message  to  Congress, 
which  would  convene  in  less  than  a  month.  Just  about  this 
time  came  the  thickening  reports  of  Southern  insurrection 
and  the  ostentatious  resignations  of  the  Charleston  Federal 
officials.  The  first  exj^ressions  from  loyal  members  of  the 
Cabinet  were  that  rebellion  must  l)e  put  down.  But  this 
remedy  gi-ated  harshly  on  Buchanan's  partisan  prejudices. 
He  had  aided  these  Southern  malcontents  to  intrigue  for 
slavery,  to  comjilain  of  oppression,  to  threaten  disunion. 
To  become  the  public  accuser  of  his  late  allies  and  friends, 
under  disaster  and  defeat,  doubtless  seemed  desertion  aud 
black  ingratitude.  The  Cabinet  traitoi-s  had  no  such  scru- 
ples. They  were  ready  enough  to  desert  the  President,  but 
thov  wanted  firet  to  use  him. 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR.  19 

When,  on  December  3d,  the  President's  message  was  laid 
before  Congress,  it  was  found  to  contain  the  most  unjust 
and  indefensible  allegations,  the  most  glaringly  inconsistent 
and  in'econcilable  doctrines,  the  most  childish  and  useless 
suggestions.  He  charged  that  Southern  discontent  was 
caused  by  "  long-continued  and  intemperate  interference  of 
the  Northern  jDeople  wdtli  the  question  of  slavery  in  the 
Southern  States,"  in  face  of  the  well-luiown  fact  that  South- 
ern interference  in  free  territory  was  the  cause  of  the  crisis. 
He  declared  that,  while  a  State  had  no  right  to  secede,  the 
Constitution  gave  no  right  to  coerce  a  State  into  submission 
when  it  had  withdra'svn,  or  was  attempting  to  witlnb-aw,  from 
the  confederacy.  This  was  raising  a  false  issue.  The  ques- 
tion was  not  of  acting  against  a  State  for  either  constitu- 
tional or  unconstitutional  efforts,  but  of  suppressing  insur- 
rection and  punishing  indiWduals  for  violation  of  United 
States  laws.  Finally,  he  argued  that,  to  enforce  United 
States  laws,  a  United  States  Court  must  first  issue  a  wi-it 
and  a  United  States  Marshal  execute  it ;  and  that  where 
judges  and  marshals  had  resigned,  and  a  universal  pojiular 
feeling  ojjposed,  such  execution  became  impossible.  In 
this  he  ignored  the  fact  that  he  had  power  to  instantly 
appoint  new  judges  and  marshals,  and  make  the  whole  army, 
navy,  and  militia  of  the  nation  a  jwsse  comitatus  to  execute 
their  process ;  and  within  one  month  after  signing  this  mes- 
sage, he,  himself,  actually  nominated  a  citizen  of  Pennsylva- 
nia Collector  of  the  Port  of  Charleston,  in  signal  defiance  of 
his  own  theory.  As  a  fitting  climax  to  such  puerile  reason- 
ing, he  urged  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution  that  would 
give  slaveiy  the  veiy  concession  in  repudiation  of  which  the 
l^eople  had  just  ovei"whelmingly  elected  Lincoln.  As  a 
specimen  of  absurdity,  stupidity,  and  wilful  wi'ong-headed- 
ness,  this  message  is  not  equalled  in  American  political  lit- 


20  THE  OUTBREAK  OF   REBELLION. 

erature.  For  this  extraordinary  state  paper,  which  eflfectu- 
ally  tied  the  hands  of  the  administration  and  opened  to  re- 
bellion a  pathway  free  from  obstruction  or  danger,  the  trio 
of  consjiirators  in  the  Cabinet,  Cobb,  Floyd,  and  Thompson, 
may  be  reasonably  held  responsible.  How  they  beguiled  a 
I'resident  of  waning  mental  powers  and  naturally  feeble  pur- 
pose, may  be  easily  enough  imagined ;  but  how  they  silenced 
the  honest  logic  of  their  loyal  colleagues,  is  yet  one  of  the 
riddles  of  history. 

The  first  and  chief  solicitude  of  the  South  Carolinians  was 
to  gain  pos.session  of  the  Charleston  forts.  To  secede,  to 
organize  their  little  State  into  a  miniature  rei^ublic,  was  in- 
deed a  vast  achievement  in  their  own  eyes ;  but  they  were 
shrewd  enough  to  perceive  that  their  claim  to  independence 
and  sovereignty  would  be  ridiculed  by  the  family  of  nations 
if  they  could  not  control  their  outi  and  only  seaport.  That 
alone  would  give  them  a  free  highway  to  the  world  at  large ; 
with  that  they  could  offer  the  benefits  of  commerce,  security 
from  tempests,  refuge  from  the  perils  of  war,  to  ships  of 
other  nations ;  could  negotiate  advantageous  treaties,  and 
jierhaps  conclude  powerful  alliances.  "  We  must  have  the 
forts "  was  therefore  the  watchword  of  the  secret  caucus ; 
and  before  long,  from  every  street -corner  in  Charleston,  came 
the  impatient  echo,  "The  forts  must  be  ours." 

The  city  of  Charleston  lies  on  a  tongiie  of  land  between 
the  Ashley  and  Cooper  rivers ;  from  theii"  confluence  the 
bay  extends  eastward  some  four  miles  to  the  open  sea. 
Three  foiis  defend  the  harbor.  The  first  and  smallest  is  Cas- 
tle Piuckney,  an  old-time  stnicture  of  brick,  and  of  insignifi- 
cant strength  in  modem  warfare.  It  lies  one  mile  from  the 
city ;  it  was  capable  of  holding  a  war  gaiiison  of  100  men ; 
and  its  aionament  of  twenty-two  guns  was  at  the  time  com- 
plete.    Farther  out  is  the  second  in  size  and  importance^ 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR. 


21 


Fort  Moultrie,  situated  on  Sullivan's  Island,  some  foiir  miles 
from  the  city,  very  near  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  on  its 
northern  side.  It  dates  back  in  name  and  heroic  repittation 
to  the  Revolution,  when,  however,  it  was  little  else  than  an 
extemporized  batteiy  of  j)almetto-logs  and  sand.  In  mod- 
ern times  it  has  been  rebuilt  in  brick,  under  scientific  con- 
struction, and  though  lying  disadvantageously  low,  it  had 
been  changed  into  an  effective  channel  defence,  capable  of 
mounting  fifty-five  guns  en  barbette  and  holding  a  garri- 
son of  300  men.     The  third  and  most  important  work  was 


Map  of  Charleston  Harbor. 


Fort  Sumter,  also  of  brick,  but  of  more  imposing  size.  It 
was  situated  about  the  middle  of  the  harbor  entrance,  and 
back  half  a  mile  from  its  mouth ;  it  was  erected  on  a  shoal 


22        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

raised  to  an  artificial  island  ;  the  walls  were  eight  feet  thick 
and  forty  feet  high,  with  two  tiers  of  casemates ;  it  was  five- 
sided,  enclosing  a  sjjace  of  about  300  by  350  feet,  and  in  its 
casemates  and  on  its  ramimrt  it  was  designed  for  140  guns  ; 
its  proper  war-garrison  was  650  men.  In  addition  to  these 
forts  in  the  harbor,  there  were  two  government  buildings 
in  the  city  of  Charleston :  the  Custo-n-House  and  the  Uni- 
ted States  Ai'senal,  the  latter  containing  a  total  of  22,4:o0 
arms. 

To  guard  and  hold  possession  of  this  i:)roperty,  there  were 
in  the  arsenal  a  niilitaiy  storekeeper  and  fourteen  enlisted 
men.  Castle  Pinckney  was  occupied  only  by  an  ordnance 
sergeant  and  his  family ;  Fort  Sumter  by  one  or  two  engi- 
neer officers,  employing  one  hundred  and  ten  workmen  in  re- 
pairs ;  Fort  Moultrie  alone,  in  addition  to  another  party  of 
fifty  workmen  employed  by  the  engineer  officer  in  charge, 
had  a  gan'ison  of  sixty-nine  soldiers  and  nine  officers  under 
Major  Eobert  Anderson,  who  had  command  of  the  whole 
harbor  and  all  the  forts.  The  walls  of  Moultrie  were  low, 
and  at  one  place  almost  submerged  in  the  drifting  sand- 
banks of  Sullivan's  Island ;  a  storming  party,  the  comman- 
dant reported,  could  ran  like  rats  over  the  ram^jarts.  Par- 
ties of  Charlestonians  frequently  visited  it  to  spy  out  its 
weak  points  ;  volunteer  companies  were  organized  in  the 
city  for  the  expedition  of  capture  ;  scaling-ladders  were  pre- 
pared to  make  the  attempt  a  certainty  ;  the  talk  of  the  street- 
labble  and  the  newspapers  made  no  concealment  of  their 
exulting  confidence  that  they  held  Moultrie  in  the  hollow 
of  their  hand.  Hospitable  fire-eaters  went  even  so  far  as  to 
invite  Major  Anderson  to  comfortable  dinners,  and  to  tell 
him,  in  confidential  frankness  over  their  wine,  that  they  re- 
S2)ected  liim  as  an  officer  and  loved  him  as  a  Soiitherner,  but 
that  thov  "must  have  tlio  fort." 


CHARLESTON   HARBOR.  23 

For  the  time  being,  however,  the  inner  councils  of  the  con- 
spiracy seem  to  have  frowned  upon  any  rash  or  premature 
attempt  upon  Moultrie,  and  to  have  sagely  relied  on  obtain- 
ing possession  through  intrigue  and  negotiation,  since  the 
latter  method  would  not  carry  with  it  any  danger  of  reprisal 
or  punishment.  A  most  important  advantage  in  this  direction 
had  already  been  gained  by  Mr.  Buchanan's  adoption  of  the 
doctrine  of  non-coercion  ;  the  next  essential  step  was  to  pre- 
vent any  reinforcements  from  coming  into  Charleston  Harbor. 

Though  not  perhaps  susceptible  of  historical  i^roof,  strong- 
inference  warrants  the  belief  that  Floyd,  Secretary  of  War, 
inspired  by  the  "Washington  cabal  of  traitors,  procured  the 
appointment  of  Anderson  to  the  command  with  the  hope  that 
as  a  Southern  man  he  would  lend  himself  to  an  easy  surren- 
der of  the  forts.  To  Floyd,  also,  seems  to  have  been  com- 
mitted the  further  siiiaenasion  of  the  intrigues  res^jecting 
them.  He  still  avowed  himself  a  unionist ;  but  he  disproved 
^his  public  declarations  by  a  steady  series  of  sei'vices  and 
favors  to  the  rebellion,  of  whose  design  he  could  not  have 
remained  in  ignorance. 

Congress  had  met,  the  message  had  been  delivered,  the 
fatal  doctrine  of  non-coercion  conceded  by  the  President  and 
adopted  as  an  administration  policy.  Under  its  protecting 
promises  treason  not  only  proceeded  with  accelerated  or- 
ganization in  the  Cotton  States,  but  made  its  avowals,  its 
boasts,  and  its  threats  in  Congress.  South  Carolina  and  se- 
cession were  the  topics  of  the  hour — Moultrie  and  Anderson 
the  central  and  growing  objects  of  anxiety ;  and  at  length 
the  North,  through  its  senators  and  representatives,  and  still 
more  loudly  through  its  newspaper  press,  began  to  bring  its 
influence  upon  the  President  for  reinforcement  and  jDrepara- 
tion.  At  the  same  time  the  secessionists  congTegated  at 
Washington  were  no   less  alert  and   active  ;  they  obtained 


24        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

Biiclianan's  tacit  inomiso  that  he  would  send  no  reinforce- 
ments unless  Moultrie  were  attacked,  and  had  hampered 
Anderson  with  confidential  instmctions  from  Floyd,  to  take 
no  otTensive  measiires  until  in  the  nature  of  things,  through 
a  sudden  assaiilt,  he  would  be  overwhelmed  and  powerless. 

These  conflicting  eflbrts  brought  on  a  Cabinet  crisis  and 
forced  the  President  to  a  direct  official  decision.  Geneml 
Cass,  the  Secretary  of  State,  had  his  home  in  Michigan  ;  and 
feeling  the  stiliening  influence  of  Northwestern  sentiment, 
and  ha\'ing,  besides,  his  own  somewhat  sluggish  though 
patriotic  blood  roused  by  the  high-handed  and  unchecked  ' 
intrigues  of  the  conspirators,  began  to  in.sist  that  reinforce- 
ments be  sent  to  Charleston.  Buchanan  becoming  also  a 
trifle  anxious  over  the  situation,  sent  for  Floyd.  Floyd, 
suave  and  deceitful,  dallied,  evaded,  pooh-poohed  the  danger, 
had  resoi-t  to  chivali-ic  bombast.  The  South  Carolinians,  he 
said,  were  honorable  gentlemen.  They  would  scorn  to  take 
the  forts.  They  must  not  be  imtated.  At  length,  finding 
the  President  growing  unusually  obstinate  in  his  new  fancy, 
Floyd  sought  refuge  in  the  suggestion  that  General  Scott  be 
consulted.  Scott  was  a  Virginian ;  Floyd  secretly  thought 
he  would  fall  in  with  the  cun-ent  secession  drift,  and  perhaps 
ofiicially  ad\'ise  the  surrender  or  evacuation  of  the  forts  to 
"  conciliate  "  South  Carolina. 

General  Scott,  scarcely  able  to  rise  from  his  sick  bed  in 
New  York,  hastened  to  Washington  on  December  12th.  Floyd 
liad  hitherto  with  studied  neglect  kept  him  excluded  from 
knowledge  of  War  Department  affairs  ;  but  now,  for  the  fii-st 
time  consulted,  and  recognizing  the  gravity  of  the  situation, 
the  Genei-al  heartily  joined  Cass  in  recommending  that  rein- 
forcements be  instantly  sent. 

Floyd  was  suqjrised,  disapjiointed,  disconcerted.  He 
summarily  rejected  the  advice  of  Scott,  as  he  had  o})i)osed 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR.  25 

that  of  Cass.  Seizing  adroitly  upon  a  phrase  of  Buclianan's 
message,  wliicla  affirmed  the  duty  of  the  President  to  protect 
public  property,  he  said :  True,  it  is  simply  a  question  of 
property.  You  need  no  army  to  assert  that.  Place  an  ord- 
nance sergeant  in  the  fort ;  he  will  represent  the  sovereignty 
and  the  projirietary  rights  of  the  United  States  as  well  as  a 
regiment.  This  was  a  subtle  and  skilful  thrust.  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan's slow  intellect  was  both  flattered  and  confused  by 
ha\dng  his  own  misstatement  of  a  vital  political  principle 
quoted  and  turned  upon  him.  He  had  not  the  wit  to  rejoin 
that  neither  political  sovereignty  nor  proprietary  right  were 
longer  complete  if  possession  was  once  lost.  Nevertheless, 
Buchanan  had  a  dim  consciousness  of  treachery.  He  con- 
tinued to  plead  with  his  secretary  that  he  ought  to  send  re- 
inforcements ;  warning  him  that  a  loss  of  the  forts  under 
the  circumstances  would  cover  the  name  of  Floyd  "with 
an  infamy  that  all  time  can  never  eiface." 

Floyd  was  well  nigh  in  despair.  He  turned  upon  the 
President  all  his  florid  Southern  rhetoric,  all  the  tinal  armoiy 
of  ofiended  Southern  dignity,  and  the  ever-ready  threats  of 
Southern  resort  to  violence.  Send  troops  to  Charleston,  he 
concluded,  and  the  swarming  and  enraged  South  Carolinians 
would  not  leave  one  brick  of  Moultrie  upon  another.  Nor 
was  Floyd  content  to  risk  the  issue  ui^on  his  own  eloquence. 
He  gave  the  note  of  alarm  to  every  i^rominent  traitor  in 
Washington,  and  without  delay  they  flocked  around  the 
doubting,  hesitating  President — Hunter,  Mason,  Jefferson 
Da-^-is — the  whole  busy  cabal  of  plotting,  caucusing  conspir- 
ators, filling  him  alternately  with  such  deceitful  promises 
of  good  behavior  and  such  terrible  visions  of  revolutionary 
violence,  that  Mr.  Buchanan  was  both  frightened  and  soothed 
into  a  reluctant  compliance  with  their  advice.  It  was  the 
scene  of  the  wilv  Yivieu  and  the  vielding  Merlin  re-enacted ; 


26        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

and  while  the  Sage  of  Wheatland  slept  in  doting  confidence, 
every  conspiring  secessionist  cried  "Fool ! "  and  wrought 

"the  cbarm 
Of  woven  paces  and  of  wavinj^  hands," 

'to  complete  their  secret  web  of  conspiracy. 

The  issue  was  decided  in  the  Cabinet  meeting  of  December 
13th ;  after  a  spirited  re-argument,  the  President  told  his 
Secretary  of  State  that  he  was  soiTy  to  differ  with  him,  but 
that  he  could  not  order  reinforcements  to  Charleston  ;  where- 
upon General  Cass  tendered  his  resignation  and  retired  from 
official  life.  Cobb  had  resigned  from  the  Cabinet  a  few  days 
before.  Black,  the  Attorney -General,  was  now  made  Secre- 
tary of  State  ;  Thomas  of  Mainland,  Secretary-  of  the  Treas- 
uiy  ;  and  Edwin  M.  Stanton  appointed  Attorney-General. 

If  Mr.  Buchanan  flattered  himself  that  his  concession  to 
Floyd,  Davis,  and  the  cabal,  would  stay  the  tide  of  disunion 
in  the  South,  he  was  quickly  undeceived.  At  the  veiy  time 
the  Cabinet  meeting  was  holding  its  final  discussion  of  the 
question  of  reinforcements,  a  mysterious  jiaper  was  being 
circulated  for  signature  throxigh  the  two  houses  of  Congi-ess, 
and  on  the  second  day  following,  the  newspapei-s  which  an- 
nounced the  retirement  of  Cass  also  contained  the  first  defi- 
nite and  authentic  proclamation  of  concerted  revolution  by 
the  Cotton  States,  and  the  proposal  to  fomi  a  Southern  re- 
public*   It  was  a  brief  document,  but  pregnant  with  all  the 


*  "TO   OrR   CONSTITUENTS. 

"  Washington,  December  14,  18(iO. 
"Theargnment  is  exhaustetl.  All  hope  of  relief  in  the  Union,  through  the 
agency  of  committees,  congressional  legislation,  or  constitutional  amendments,  is 
extinguished,  and  we  trust  the  South  will  not  be  deceived  by  nppoaninccs  or  the 
pretence  of  new  guarantees.  In  our  judgment  the  Republicans  are  resolute  in 
the  purpose  to  grant  nothing  that  will  or  ought  to  satisfy  the  South.  We  are 
satisfied  the  honor,  safety,  and  independence  of  the  Southern  people  require  the 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR.  27 

essential  purposes  of  the  conspiracy.  It  was  signed  by  about 
one-half  the  Senators  and  Representatives  from  the  States  of 
North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Missis- 
sippi, Louisiana,  Florida,  Texas,  and  Arkansas,  and  is  the 
"  official "  beginning  of  the  subsequent  "  Confederate  States," 
just  as  Gist's  October  circular  was  the  "  official"  beginning 
of  South  Carolina  secession. 

On  the  fifth  day  after  the  publication  of  this  manifesto,  the 
South  Carolina  Convention  passed,  signed,  and  published  its 
ordinance  of  secession,  as  already  related  ;  and  now  it  was 
resolved  to  demand  j^ossession  of  the  Charleston  forts  as  an 
incident  of  sovereignty  and  independence.  It  was  assumed 
that  the  President  would  not  refuse  to  yield  them  up  after 
peaceful  diplomatic  negotiation,  and  upon  an  offer  to  ac- 
count for  them  as  property  in  a  regular  business  settlement 
between  the  two  governments.  The  convention,  acting  up- 
on this  theory,  appointed  three  commissioners  to  proceed 
to  "Washington  to  treat  for  the  deliveiy  of  the  forts,  maga- 
zines, light-houses,  and  other  real  estate,  for  an  apportion- 
ment of  the  public  debt,  for  a  division  of  all  other  property, 
and  generally  to  negotiate  aboiit  other  measures  and  ar- 
rangements. 

All  this  proceeded  with  the  decontm  and  mock  solemnity 

organization  of  a  Southern  confederacy — a  result  to  be  obtained  only  by  separate 
State  secession — that  the  primary  object  of  each  slaveholding  State  ought  to  be  its 
epcpdy  and  absolute  separation  from  a  Union  with  hostile  States." 
(Signed  by  : 

Representatives  Pugh,  Clopton.  Moore,  Curry,  and  Stallworth,  of  Alabama  ; 
Senator  Iverson  and  Representatives  Underwood,  Gartrell,  Jackson,  Jones, 
and  Crawford,  of  Georgia  ;  Representative  Hawkins,  of  Florida  ;  Represent- 
ative Hindman,  of  Arkansas ;  Senators  Jefferson  Davis  and  A.  G.  Brown, 
and  Representatives  Barksdale,  Singleton,  and  Reuben  Davis,  of  Mississippi ; 
Representatives  Craige  and  Ruffin,  of  North  Carolina  ;  Senators  SlidcU  and 
Benjamin,  and  Representative  Landrum,  of  Louibiana ;  Senators  VVigfall 
and  Hemphill,  and  Representative  Reagan,  of  Texas;  Representatives  Bon- 
ham,  Miles,  McQueen,  and  Ashmore,  of  South  Ciirolina.) 


28        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

in  -which  children  play  at  kings  and  queens.  The  commis- 
sioners reached  Washington  on  December  26th,  and  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan, with  all  the  curiosity  and  palpitation  of  an  actor  in 
a  new  di-ama,  seems  to  have  looked  upon  it  not  as  the  miser- 
able farce  of  consi^iracy  which  it  was,  but  as  a  real  piece  of 
government  business.  The  commissioners  immediately  made 
their  jiresence  known,  and  the  President  ajjpointed  an  inter- 
view for  them  at  one  o'clock  next  day.  Before  that  hour  ar- 
rived, however,  news  of  a  totally  unlooked-for  event  gave  their 
intended  negotiation  an  entirely  new  direction  and  result. 

That  event  was  the  sudden  militaiy  movement  by  Major 
Andei-son,  transfening  his  entire  gan-ison  from  Fort  Moul- 
trie to  Fort  Sumter,  in  Charleston  Harbor,  on  the  night  of 
the  commissioners'  an'ival  in  Washington,  December  26. 
Daily  observation  left  him  no  doubt  that  Moultrie  was  to  be 
assaulted ;  every  day  strengthened  the  design,  increased  the 
preparation,  augmented  the  drilled  and  undrilled  forces  to 
be  joined  in  the  undertaking.  There  was  no  longer  hope 
that  the  President  would  heed  his  repeated  calls  and  send 
him  reinforcements.  There  was,  however,  one  resource  yet 
available.  Sumter  was  the  real  key  to  the  harboj-.  Cap- 
tain Foster  and  his  engineer  force  of  workmen  and  mechan- 
ics had  now  prepared  it  for  occupancy,  and  could  soon  make 
ib  ready  for  defence.  Its  guns  commanded  Moultrie.  There 
was  no  approach  to  it  except  by  boats,  and,  for  a  time,  at 
least,  he  would  be  beyond  the  reach  of  the  C!harleston  mob 
and  its  improvised  scaling-ladders.  Thoughts  like  these, 
long-present  and  familiar  to  his  mind,  were  once  more  care- 
fully revolved  and  re-examined,  when  on  Christmas  night  he 
returned  from  a  neighboring  holiday  merrymaking  to  his 
somewhat  cheerless  quarters  in  Moultrie  ;  and  before  he  re- 
tired to  his  sleep,  he  took  his  secret  resolve  to  abandon 
Moultrie  and  take  i)ost  in  Sumter. 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR.  29 

The  26th  of  December  was  a  busy  day  for  the  comman- 
dant. There  were  vessels  to  be  hired,  and  an  excuse  invented 
to  send  away  the  families,  the  baggage,  the  unnumbered  im- 
jyedimenta  of  the  garrison.  For  this,  one  or  two  chosen  stafif- 
officers  must  be  let  into  the  secret.  Finally,  boats  must  be 
provided  and  concealed  on  the  beach,  in  which  to  cross  the 
men.  Anderson's  personal  care  was  extended  to  every  detail, 
and  every  item  of  preparation  moved  like  clock-work.  The 
families  and  baggage  were  got  off  in  the  afternoon.  A  sunset 
parade  of  the  men  was  ordered,  ostensibly  to  be  on  the  alert 
against  assault,  a  species  of  exercise  with  which  the  garri- 
son had  become  somewhat  sorely  familiar.  The  supper  stood 
smoking  on  the  officers'  mess-table,  when  Captain  Doubleday, 
second  in  command,  was  hastily  called  to  Major  Anderson, 
who  now  for  the  first  time  told  him  that  he  must  have  his 
company  under  arms  and  ready  to  march  to  the  beach  in 
twenty  minutes.  Everything  proceeded  as  had  been  ar- 
ranged, without  delay  and  without  accident ;  even  the  rebel 
guard-boats,  which  had  recently  been  set  to  patrolling  the 
bay  to  render  such  a  movement  impossible,  failed  to  make 
any  discovery.  By  nine  o'clock  that  night  the  transfer  was 
an  assured  success ;  the  officers  sat  down  to  eat  the  supper 
in  Sumter  which  had  been  cooked  for  them  in  Moultrie.  A 
small  detail  of  men  and  an  officer  were  left  behind  to  spike 
guns,  burn  carriages,  cut  down  the  flag-staff,  and  to  com- 
jjlete  during  the  night  the  removal  of  needed  supplies ;  they 
finished  their  work  and  joined  their  comrades  in  Sumter  a 
little  after  sunrise  next  morning. 

This  movement  filled  the  Union  sentiment  of  the  country 
with  the  liveliest  exultation.  It  Avas  a  spontaneous,  uncalcii- 
lating  act  of  jjatriotism  which  will  enslu'ine  the  name  of  An- 
derson in  grateful  recollection  so  long  as  American  histoiy 
shall  be  read.     Advance  news  of  the  event  was  sent   from 


30        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

Charleston  to  the  commissionei"s  ou  the  morning  of  December 
'27th;  and  they  immediately  communicated  it  to  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan, whom  it  threw  into  a  most  emban-assing  peq^lexity. 
He  i)osti)oned  the  commissioners'  interview,  and  summoned 
his  Cabinet  to  consider  the  situation.  Floyd  at  once  declared 
the  movement  to  be  in  violation  of  orders ;  and  the  Presi- 
dent himself,  in  his  chagiin  that  his  Southern  friends  should 
have  a  new  burden  of  complaint,  was  half-inclined  to  peremp- 
torily order  Anderson  back  to  Moultrie.  He  was  pnident 
enough,  however,  to  suspend  his  judgment  until  Anderson 
could  be  heard ;  for  he  had  lately  become  cognizant  of  the 
eijuivocal  and  double-tongued  insti-uctions  which  Floyd, 
■without  his  knowledge,  had  sent  liini,  and  which  he  infen'ed 
might  at  least  technically  justify  Anderson's  movement. 

On  Friday,  December  28th,  he  gave  the  commissioners 
their  promised  interview.  Mr.  Buchanan,  himself,  writes 
that  "  on  their  introduction  he  stated  that  he  could  recog- 
nize them  only  as  jirivate  gentlemen,  and  not  as  commission- 
ers from  a  sovereign  State  ;  that  it  was  to  Congress,  and 
to  Congress  alone,  they  must  appeal.  He  nevertheless  ex- 
pressed his  willingness  to  communicate  to  that  body,  as  the 
only  competent  tribunal,  any  propositions  they  might  have 
to  offer."  He  does  not  appear  to  have  realized  that  this  jn-o- 
posal  was  in  reality  a  quasi-recognition  of  South  Carolina's 
claim  to  independence,  and  a  misdemeanor  meriting  im- 
peachment. 

What  is  a  thousand  times  more  astounding,  however,  is 
that,  on  their  part,  the  commissioners  were  too  stupid  to 
perceive  the  vast  advantage  of  this  concession  and  offer.  It 
would  have  placed  the  President  before  the  public,  and  be- 
fore foreign  powers  especially,  in  the  attitude  of  their  apolo- 
gist, if  not  their  advocate.  It  would  have  committed  him  to 
refrain  from  any  hostile  action  against  Soixth  Carolina  dur- 


CHARLESTON   HARBOR.  31 

ing  the  pendency  of  such  debate  as  the  proposition  might 
provoke  in  Congress.  It  would  have  thrust  a  firebrand  into 
Congress,  to  complicate  and  divide  every  faction  and  element 
in  politics  except  their  own  friends  ;  in  short,  it  would  have 
made  Washington  City  the  principal  centime  of  revolution. 
Fortunately  for  the  country,  their  blindness  lost  to  secession 
its  only  jiossible  chance  of  peaceful  success. 

Under  the  impression  that  Mr.  Buclianan  was  completely 
within  the  domination  of  the  Cabinet  cabal,  the  commis- 
sioners made  an  angry  complaint  against  Anderson,  and 
haughtily  demanded  "explanations,"  threatening  that,  if 
these  were  not  satisfactory,  they  would  suspend  their  nego- 
tiations. Such  a  threat  from  applicants  for  i-ecognition  and 
favor  was  the  very  acme  of  stupidity  and  maladdress. 

Andei-son  little  suspected — perliaps  never  knew — how  nar- 
rowly he  escajjed  disavowal  and  disgi-ace  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States,  for  his  act  of  fidelity  and  ijatiiotisni. 
The  conspirators  had  shrewdly  calculated  on  their  influence 
over  Mr.  Buchanan.  For  two  days  he  hesitated,  leaning  evi- 
dently to  the  counsels  of  his  secession  advisers.  There  were 
protracted  Cabinet  sessions,  acrimonious  debates,  and  a  final 
struggle  between  the  President's  disloyal  counsellors  from 
the  South  and  the  loyal  ones  from  the  North,  over  the  pos- 
.sGssion  and  Control  of  their  temporizing,  vacillating  chief. 
It  was  not  till  the  latter  were  on  the  point  of  resigning  that 
the  President  was  brought  to  a  direct  decision  against  the 
conspirators ;  even  then,  but  for  an  outside  complication, 
the  resiilt  might  have  been  doubtful.  For  about  a  week 
Floyd  and  Thompson  had  both  been  in  bad  odor.  A  ti-ans- 
action,  in  which  near  a  million  dollars'  worth  of  Indian 
Trust  Bonds  were  abstracted  from  a  safe  in  the  Interior  De- 
partment and  replaced  by  Floyd's  premature  acceptances, 
looked  so  much  like  official  theft  that  it  was  occupying  the 


32  THE  OUTBREAK  OF   REBELLION. 

attention  of  the  courts  and  greatly  exercising  the  mind  of 
the  President. 

The  spell  was  finally  broken  on  December  31st,  when  Mr. 
Buchanan  accepted  Floyd's  resignation,  which  the  latter  re- 
luctantly tendered  on  the  29th ;  he  also  sent  the  commissioners 
their  definite  answer,  namely :  that,  whatever  might  have  been 
his  first  inclination,  the  Governor  of  South  Carolina  had,  since 
Anderson's  movement,  forcibly  seized  Fort  Moultrie,  Castle 
Pinckney,  and  the  Charleston  Arsenal,  Custom-House,  and 
Post-Oflice,  and  covered  them  with  the  Palmetto  flag ;  that 
under  such  circiunstances  he  could  not  and  would  not  with- 
draw the  Federal  troops  from  Sumter.  This  ended  the  rebel 
mission.  They  departed  abruptly  for  home,  leaving  behind 
them  an  insolent  rejoinder  to  the  President's  letter,  charging 
him  with  tacit  consent  to  the  scheme  of  peaceable  secession. 

Governor  Pickens  (newly  chosen  by  the  Legislature,  De- 
cember 14th)  was  i^erhaps  the  most  daring  revolutionist 
in  South  Carolina,  and  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  State 
forces  he  at  once  assumed  and  exercised  dictatorial  powers. 
"Within  three  or  four  days  after  his  seizure  of  the  forts  he  or- 
dered the  selection  of  suitable  points  on  the  islands  foi-ming 
the  bay,  and  the  commencement  of  batteries  to  command  the 
ship-channels  against  reinforcements.  It  was  the  beginning 
of  the  long  and  eventful  siege  of  Sumter.  Moultrie  was  soon 
restored  to  its  offensive  powers ;  Castle  Pinclcney  passed  into 
his  hands  imdamaged ;  wilh  a  working  force  of  volunteers 
impelled  by  fanatical  zeal,  supplemented  by  the  more  effi- 
cient labor  of  large  gangs  of  slaves  freely  furnished  from  the 
city  and  jjlantations  of  the  neighborhood,  batteiy  after  bat- 
teiy  rose  around  Anderson's  sti'onghold,  Tinmolested  and  un- 
checked for  thi-ee  long  months,  until,  in  an  encompassing  ring 
of  tire,  and  under  the  sheer  overweight  of  metal  and  num- 
bers, the  proud  flag  of  Sumter  went  down  in  temporary  hu- 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR.  33 

miliation.  And  that  the  drama  should  not  lack  its  interludes 
of  grotesque  farce,  all  through  tliis  continuation  of  contu- 
macy, insurrection,  rampart-building,  guu-j)lanting,  and  ac- 
tual repeated  firing  on  the  flag  of  the  United  States,  the  "Re- 
public "  of  South  Carolina,  through  its  governor,  its  legisla- 
ture, its  convention,  and  its  partisans,  clamorously  insisted 
and  reiterated  that  the  Government  was  waging  war  upon  it. 

The  Cabinet  crisis  of  December  31st,  and  the  retirement  of 
Floyd,  greatly  changed  the  attitude  of  the  Government  to- 
ward rebellion.  Holt  was  made  Secretary  of  War,  and  be- 
came at  once  the  Hercules  of  the  national  defence.  Black, 
though  as  Attorney-General  he  had  in  November  written  an 
official  opinion  against  coercion,  was  so  far  changed  that  he 
now  zealously  advocated  the  reinforcement  of  Sumter.  All 
the  unionists  of  the  Cabinet — Black,  Holt,  Stanton,  even 
Toucey  in  a  mild  way,  and  not  long  afterward  Dix  with 
memorable  %agor — joined  heartily  in  preparation  to  vindicate 
the  national  authority.  General  Scott  was  placed  in  military 
control ;  and  the  President,  being  for  a  period  kept  by  loyal 
ad\'ice  in  a  more  patriotic  mood,  permitted  various  precau- 
tionaiy  measures  to  be  taken,  among  which,  a  well-designed, 
though  finally  abortive  effort  to  reinforce  Sumter,  was  per- 
haps the  most  noteworthy. 

Various  plans  to  send  men  and  provisions  to  Anderson  wei'e 
discussed,  and  it  was  at  last  decided  to  attempt  stratagem. 
A  swift  merchant-steamer,  the  "  Star  of  the  West  "  was  char- 
tered in  New  York,  loaded  with  the  needed  supplies  and  two 
hundred  and  fifty  recruits  ;  thus  prepared,  she  sailed  on  her 
errand  on  the  night  of  January  5,  1861.  The  eff'ort  to  keep 
the  expedition  an  entire  secret  had  not  succeeded.  Notice  of 
her  departure  went  to  Charleston  from  New  York;  and  in 
addition  to  this,  Thompson,  the  conspiring  Secretaiy  of  the 
Interior,  who  at  the  last  moment  learned  the  fact  in  Cabinet 

a 


31        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

meeting,  also  warned  Lis  Charleston  friends  of  her  coming. 
Anderson  does  not  seem  to  have  received  his  notice,  though 
he  gathered  from  newspapers  that  some  such  enteiiariso 
was  being  matured.  He  was,  therefore,  not  gi-eatly  sur- 
prised, when  on  the  morning  of  January  9th  he  was  liastily 
infomied  that  a  strange  vessel  was  entering  the  harbor, 
and  hurrying  upon  the  rampart,  saw  her  steaming  up  the 
chamiel  in  the  direction  of  Sumter.  She  presented  no  war- 
like api^earance ;  men  and  supplies  were  hidden  below  decks. 
But  in  these  nine  days  of  January  the  rebels  had  rejmired 
Moultrie  and  completed  one  or  two  sand-batteries  at  the 
harbor  entrance,  and,  thoroughly  infonned  of  the  character 
and  destination  of  the  vessel,  they  began  a  vigorous  fire 
ujion  her  as  soon  as  she  came  within  range.  At  this,  finding 
concealment  no  longer  important,  her  captain  ran  up  a  large 
United  States  flag,  a  signal  which  dispelled  all  doubts  An- 
dei"son  may  have  had  that  she  indeed  came  to  bring  him  the 
wished-for  relief.  He  gave  orders  to  man  his  guns  and  jjre- 
jiare  to  fire  on  the  batteries  ;  meanwhile  the  steamer,  tho\igh 
hit  once  or  twice,  had  passed  the  first  batteries  without 
serious  damage.  Now,  however,  the  course  of  the  channel 
would  oblige  her  to  steam  directly  toward  the  ready  guns 
of  Moultrie,  and  the  sight  of  this  new  peril  seems  to  have 
daunted  the  courage  of  the  officer  in  charge.  Anderson  saw 
with  deep  chagrin  that,  just  as  he  was  ready  to  cheer  and 
gi'eet  the  new-comer  by  returning  the  I'ebel  fire,  the  steamer 
suddenly  slackened  her  speed,  then  put  about,  and  ran  once 
more  unharmed  i)ast  the  rebel  batteries  and  through  the  hos- 
tile cannon-balls  out  to  sea. 

Anderson's  blood  was  hot  with  the  insult  his  own  eyes  had 
witnessed  to  the  flag  and  sovereignty  of  the  United  States. 
He  sat  down  and  wrote  a  brief  note  to  the  Governor  of  South 
Carolina,  demanding  to  know  if  the  firing  on  the  vessel  and 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR.  35 

tlieflag  had  Ijeen  by  his  order,  and  declaring  that,  iinless  the 
act  wex'e  dischiimed,  he  would  close  the  harbor  with  the  guns 
of  Sumter.  It  would  have  been  better  to  have  left  the  threat 
unuttered.  Governor  Pickens  was  more  than  a  match  for 
him  in  bravado ;  he  immediately  avowed  and  justified  the 
act.  Anderson  in  a  second  note  so  far  receded  as  to  say  that 
he  had  made  up  his  mind  to  first  ask  his  government  for 
instiiictions,  and  requested  safe-conduct  for  a  bearer  of  dis- 
patches. This  emboldened  the  governor  to  a  second  trial  of 
bluster ;  next  day  he  sent  Anderson  a  formal  demand  for  the 
surrender  of  Sumter.  Anderson  replied  rather  meekly  that 
he  could  not  comply  with  the  demand ;  but  that,  if  the  gov- 
ernor saw  fit  "  to  refer  this  matter  to  Washington,"  he  would 
depute  an  officer  to  accompany  the  messenger. 

The  Charleston  conspirators,  never  at  a  loss  to  talk  or 
intrigue,  were  really  not  yet  ready  to  fight.  They  caught 
eagerly  at  this  truce  which  Anderson  offered  them  ;  it  would 
renew  the  negotiations  which  their  commissioners  had  so 
unceremoniously  abandoned ;  above  all,  it  would  afibrd  them 
ample  time  to  complete  their  harbor  batteries  and  collect 
troops  against  further  expeditions  of  reinforcement  or  attack. 
On  Januaiy  12tli,  therefore,  I.  W.  Hayne,  the  Attorney- 
General  of  South  Carolina,  proceeded  to  Washington  as  an 
envoy  to  carry  to  President  Buchanan  the  governor's  demand 
for  the  surrender  of  Sumter,  with  authority  to  give  in  return 
the  pledge  "that  the  valuation  of  such  property  will  be  ac- 
counted for  by  this  State  upon  the  adjustment  of  its  relations 
with  the  United  States." 

Hayne  had,  however,  scarcely  reached  his  destination 
when  a  superior  influence  took  control  of  him  and  his  mis- 
sion. By  the  middle  of  Januaiy  most  of  the  Cotton  States 
had  passed  ordinances  of  secession,  seized  the  undefended 
military  posts  within  their  limits,  and  were  addressing  each 


36  THE  OUTBREAK   OF   REBELLION. 

other  as  independent  States.  But  no  amount  of  official  va- 
poring or  local  ostentation  could  convince  even  themselves 
of  either  dignity  or  power ;  especially  it  could  not,  in  the 
eyes  of  the  world,  magnify  petty  cotton  republics  into  serious 
importance  or  influence.  However  they  might  temporarily 
paralyze  the  laws  of  the  Union,  the  constitutional  rights  of 
the  nation  were  unbroken,  and  the  military  power  of  the 
Government  slumbered  like  a  mighty  giant.  To  brave  his 
ten-ible  awakening  the  necessity  of  early  combination  in 
some  system  of  common  defence  was  too  apparent  to  need  ar- 
gument. The  senators  and  representatives  of  seceded  States, 
though  some  of  them  had  already  withdi-awn  from  Congress, 
■were  yet  lingering  in  Washington  as  the  most  central  point 
for  obsen-ation  and  consultation.  The  formation  of  a  South- 
ern confederacy  was,  from  the  first,  a  recognized  pui-pose, 
announced  in  their  manifesto  of  December  llth,  and  again 
repeated  in  letters  from  a  secret  caucus  held  Januaiy  5th. 

Indeed,  the  whole  programme  probably  dated  back  to  the 
early  days  of  the  session,  when  it  may  be  presumed  the  plan 
was  elaborated  by  a  few  of  the  leading  spirits.  So  far, 
though  some  of  their  combinations  had  failed,  yet  in  the 
main  the  scheme  had  moved  on  with  ever-growing  strength 
from  success  to  success.  By  the  middle  of  January  the  con- 
spirators in  Washington  realized  that  they  must  hurry  the 
completion  of  their  organization  during  the  brief  continu- 
ance of  the  expiring  administration.  Even  the  belligerent 
Governor  Pickens  was  made  to  understand  the  advantage  of 
such  a  course.  "  Mr.  Lincoln,"'  he  wrote,  "  cannot  possibly 
do  more  for  us  than  Mr.  Buchanan  has  done."  When  there- 
fore, most  unexpectedly.  South  Carolina  obtained  through 
Anderson's  off'er  a  new  chance  to  propose  negotiation,  the 
central  cabal  at  Washington  resolved  to  make  it  the  means 
of  gaining  time  to  set  a  common  provisional  government  in 


CHARLESTON  HARBOR  37 

motion,  without  on  theii"  part  furnishing  the  pretext  for  any 
miiitaiy  movement  which  might  threaten  or  check  their 
plans.  They  therefore  met  in  a  caucus,  and  appointed  a 
committee  consisting  of  Senators  Fitzpati'ick,  Malloiy,  and 
Slidell ;  this  committee  began  and  earned  on  a  dilatory  cor- 
respondence with  Mr.  Hayne  and  with  the  President,  which 
they  managed  to  prolong  into  Febmary,  all  that  while  keep- 
ing open  the  Anderson  truce  by  the  assumption  that  nego- 
tiations were  jjending.  Mr.  Buchanan,  always  indisposed  to 
act,  always  welcoming  any  excuse  to  postpone  decision,  fell 
easily  into  the  toils  of  this  side  intrigue  for  delay.  Some  of 
his  counsellors  must  have  seen  through  the  transparent 
game  w'ith  much  impatience,  for  the  whole  affair  was  at  last 
rather  abruptly  ended.  On  Febmary  6th,  Secretaiy  Holt 
wrote  for  the  President  to  Hayne,  that  neither  the  proposed 
sale  of  Fort  Sumter,  nor  its  relinqiiishment  under  South 
Carolina's  claim  of  eminent  domain,  could  for  a  moment  be 
thought  of,  since  it  was  not  a  mere  question  of  property,  as 
had  been  assumed,  but  involved  political  rights  of  the  high- 
est national  importance.  This  closed  the  correspondence, 
and  Hayne  went  home  to  report  the  second  failure  to  obtain 
the  forts  by  dijjlomacy. 

But  the  conspirators  had  gained  their  main  point.  This 
negotiation  paralyzed  and  postponed  all  the  plans  and  prepa- 
rations to  send  help  to  Anderson,  upon  which  some  of  the 
Cabinet  members  had  labored  with  zeal  and  earnestness ; 
while  on  the  other  hand,  on  February  4th,  two  days  preced- 
ing Hayne's  dismissal,  the  Provincial  Congress  of  the  rebel 
States  assembled  at  Montgomery,  Ala.,  and  by  the  18th 
of  that  month  had  comj)leted  and  inaiigiirated  the  provi- 
sional government  under  which  the  local  insurrections  of  the 
Cotton  States  became  an  organized  rebellion  against  the 
government  of  the  Union. 


38  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

Nor  was  tliis  the  only  advantage  which  the  consinracy  had 
secured.  Since  the  12th  of  Januaiy  a  condition  of  things 
existed  in  the  harbor  of  Pensacola,  Fla.,  similar  to  that 
at  Charleston.  The  insurgents  had  threatened,  and  the  offi- 
cer in  charge  had  surrendered  the  Pensacola  Navy  Yard. 
Lieutenant  Slemmer,  of  the  army,  with  a  little  ganison  of 
foi"ty-six  men,  held  Fort  BaiTancas.  Finding  he  could  not 
defend  his  post,  nor  Fort  McRee,  also  on  the  mainland, 
he,  with  a  loyal  courage  which  will  ever  render  his  name  il- 
lustrious, repeated  the  strategy  of  Andereon,  and  moved  his 
slender  command,  augmented  by  thirty  ordinary  seamen 
from  the  na%-y  yard,  on  the  morning  of  January  10th,  to 
Fort  Pickens,  a  large  and  more  defensible  work  standing  at 
the  harbor  entrance,  on  the  western  end  of  Santa  Rosa  Isl- 
and. The  Government  hurriedly  sent  a  few  ahips  of  war 
to  assist  him,  while  the  rebels  began  gatheiing  an  army  to 
assault  the  fort.  Under  cover  of  the  Hayne  negotiation.  Sen- 
ator Mallory  managed  to  draw  the  President  into  an  agi-ee- 
ment,  embodied  in  formal  orders  dated  January  29th,  that 
Fort  Pickens  should  not  be  reinforced  unless  it  were  as- 
saulted by  the  rebels,  or  preparations  were  made  to  do  so. 

The  Hayne  business  disposed  of,  there  was  once  more  a 
little  flurry  of  war  consultations  at  the  Executive  Mansion  to 
devise  and  dispatch  a  new  expedition  to  reinforce  Sumter. 
This  time  a  few  small  vessels  belonging  to  the  Coa.st  Survey 
were  to  be  assembled  and  placed  under  command  of  Captain 
Ward,  of  the  navA',  for  that  purpose ;  the  details  of  the  plan 
do  not  ajipear  to  have  transpired.  But  the  President's  ener- 
getic moods  were  lamentably  short ;  by  the  23d  of  Febi-uary 
this  scheme,  also,  was  definitely  abandoned,  probably  for 
the  ovemiling  reason  that  but  nine  days  remained  of  Mr. 
Buchanan's  presidential  term. 


CHAPTER  m. 
THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES'  REBELLION. 

On  the  fourth  day  of  Febniary,  1861,  while  the  Peace  Con- 
ference *laet  in  Washington  to  consider  propositions  of  com- 
promise and  concession,  the  delegates  of  the  seceding  States 
convened  in  Montgomery,  Ala.,  to  combine  and  solidify  the 
general  conspiracy  into  an  organized  and  avowed  rebellion. 

Such  action  had  been  arranged  and  agi-eed  upon  from  the 
beginning.  The  congressional  manifesto  from  Washington, 
as  far  back  as  December  llth,  advised  that  "we  are  satisfied 
the  honor,  safety,  and  independence  of  the  Southern  people 
require  the  organization  of  a  Southern  confederacy — a  re- 
sult to  be  obtained  only  by  sejjarate  State  secession."  This 
agreement  of  the  Washington  caucus  was  steadily  adhered 
to.  The  specious  argument  invented  in  Georgia,  that  "  we 
can  make  better  terms  outside  of  the  Union  than  in  it,"  and 
the  public  declaration  of  Mississii:)2ii's  commissioner  in  Bal- 
timore, that  secession  "  was  not  taken  with  the  view  of  break- 
ing up  the  i^resent  government,  but  to  assure  to  her  (Missis- 
sippi) those  guarantees  and  i^rinciples  of  liberty  which  had 
been  pledged  to  her  by  the  fathers  of  the  Revolution,"  were 
but  tricks  of  the  conspiracy  for  local  use  and  effect.  The 
managers  well  understood  that  if  the  States  were  once  com- 
mitted to  secession,  the  mere  revolutionary  momentum  of 
the  crisis  would  cany  them  to  whatever  combination  they 
might  devise. 


40  THE  OUTBREAK   OP  REBELLION. 

The  whole  plan  appears  to  have  been  more  fully  matured 
and  adopted  in  a  Washington  caucus  held  on  the  night  of 
Januaiy  5,  18G1,  at  which  time  four  important  points  were 
arranged  :  1st,  the  Cotton  States  should  immediately  secede  ; 
2d,  that  delegates  should  be  chosen  to  meet  in  Montgomery, 
"  to  organize  a  confederacy,"  not  later  than  February  loth ; 
3d,  that  the  conspirators  would  remain  in  Congress  as  long 
as  possible,  to  obstruct  coercive  legislation  ;  and  4th,  that 
Jeflferson  Davis,  Slidell,  and  Malloiy  be  appointed  a  com- 
mittee to  cany  out  the  objects  of  the  caucus.  Thus,  more 
than  a  month  before  his  inauguration  as  rebel  president,  the 
leader  of  the  consjiiracy  was  entrusted  with  the  sujjervision 
and  management  of  the  plot.  The  caucus  progi-amme  was 
executed  with  but  slight  delation.  The  States  seceded, 
appointed  delegates  to  Montgomery,  and  the  conspiratore 
withdrew  from  Congress  at  the  last  moment  to  assume  the 
more  active  control  of  the  rebellion  in  theii*  respective 
States. 

As  events  progressed  it  became  evident  to  the  leaders  that 
it  was  important  to  complete  their  new  government  before 
the  expiration  of  INIr.  Buchanan's  teim.  They  understood 
perfectly  his  temper  and  purpose.  Though  he  denied  them 
the  treasonable  complicity  they  had  hojied  and  asked,  and 
discontinued  the  important  concessions  with  which  be  began, 
he  still  stood  committed  to  non-coercion.  What  his  successor 
might  decide  was  uncertain.  Repeated  efforts  had  been 
made  to  draw  from  Lincoln  some  expression  of  liis  intention 
— some  forecast  of  his  policy,  but  they  had  been  unifonnly 
unsuccessful. 

Accordingly  the  secession  delegates  met  in  Montgomerv- 
on  February'  4th,  instead  of  the  15th,  as  had  been  first  ar- 
ranged, and  organized  a  pro\'isional  Congress,  and  a  few 
days   thereafter  (Febniaiy  8,   1861)  adopted   a   proN-isional 


THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES'  REBELLION.  41 

government,  to  be  known  as  "  Tlie  Confederate  States  of 
America."  There  was  little  difficulty  in  amving  at  this  re- 
sult ;  most  if  not  all  tlie  seceders'  State  conventions  had  de- 
clared a  wish  that  their  proposed  new  government  should  be 
modelled  on  that  of  the  United  States. 

From  this  they  proceeded  to  the  work  of  framing  a  per- 
manent constitution.  This  was  a  somewhat  slower  process, 
though  it  was  also  comjjleted  and  adopted  by  the  provisional 
Congress  on  March  11,  1861.  Few  changes  from  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  were  made.  The  new  consti- 
tution professed  to  be  established  by  "  each  State  acting  in 
its  sovereign  and  independent  character,"  instead  of  simply 
by  "We  the  people."  It  provided  that  in  newly  acquired 
tenitory  "  the  institution  of  negi'o  slaveiy,  as  it  now  exists 
in  the  Confederate  States,  shall  be  recognized  and  protected 
by  Congress  and  by  -the  Territorial  Government " ;  also  for 
the  right  of  transit  and  sojourn  for  "  slaves  and  other  jjrop- 
erty,"  and  the  right  to  reclaim  "slaves  and  other  j)ersons" 
to  service  or  labor.  It  did  not,  as  consistency  required,  i^ro- 
vide  for  the  right  of  secession  or  deny  the  right  of  coercion ; 
on  the  contrary  all  its  imjilications  were  against  the  former 
and  in  favor  of  the  latter,  for  it  declared  itself  to  be  the 
supreme  law  of  the  land,  binding  on  the  jiidges  in  every 
State.  It  pro\'ided  for  the  punishment  of  treason ;  and  de- 
clared that  no  State  should  enter  into  any  treaty,  alliance,  or 
confederation,  grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal,  coin 
money,  lay  duties,  keep  troops  or  ships  of  war  in  time  of 
peace,  make  any  compact  with  another  State  or  with  a  foreign 
power — a  sweeping  practical  negation  of  the  whole  heretical 
dogma  of  State  supremacy  upon  which  they  had  built  their 
revolt. 

The  day  after  the  rebel  Congress  adopted  its  pro^dsional 
government,  it  elected  (Februaiy  9,  1861)  Jefferson  Davis, 


42  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

of  Mississippi,  President,  and  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  of 
Georgia,  Vice-President  of  the  new  Confederacy.  The  re- 
ported vote  for  Davis  is  unanimous ;  but  it  is  historically 
related  by  Stephens  that  Howell  Cobb  and  Robert  Toombs 
were  also  asjiirants,  and  that  Davis  himself  preferred  the 
chief  command  of  the  rebel  armies.  For  the  moment,  how- 
ever, offices  were  plenty,  and  each  of  the  leaders  received  a 
prominent  station.  Cobb  remained  presiding  officer  of  the 
rebel  Congress ;  Toombs  became  Secretary  of  State ;  and  if 
not  completely  satisfied,  all  acquiesced  in  the  distribution  of 
honors.  Da^'is  Avas  sent  for  and  inaugurated  at  Montgomery, 
on  Monday,  February  18th.  In  his  inaugural  address  he  in- 
timated that  they  would  i^ermit  the  non-seceded  Slave 
States  to  join  their  confedei-acy  ;  "  but,  beyond  this,"  he  con- 
tinued, "  if  I  mistake  not  the  judgment  and  will  of  the  peo- 
ple, a  reunion  ■with  the  States  from  which  we  have  separated 
is  neither  practicable  nor  desirable." 

If  the  remotest  doubt  remained,  from  in-evious  indications 
and  this  official  hint,  that  the  whole  jjui-pose  and  animus  of 
the  revolt  was  the  establishment  of  a  powerful  slaveocracy, 
tliat  doubt  was  removed  by  the  public  declaration  of  Mi\ 
Stephens,  the  new  Vice-President.  In  a  speech  which  he 
made  at  Savannah,  Ga.,  on  the  21st  of  March,  he  defined 
the  raling  idea  of  the  conspiracy  in  the  following  frank  lan- 
guage : 

'■  The  prevailing  ideas  entertained  In-  liim  (Jefferson)  and 
most  of  the  leading  statesmen  at  the  time  of  the  formation 
of  the  old  constitution,  were  that  the  enslavement  of  the 
African  was  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  nature ;  that  it  was 
wrong  in  principle,  socially,  morally,  and  politically.  It  was 
an  evil  they  knew  not  well  how  to  deal  with  ;  but  the  gen- 
eral opinion  of  that  day  was,  that  somehow  or  other,  in  the 
order  of  Providence  the  institution  would  be  evamescent  and 


THE  CONFEDERATE   STATES'    REBELLIO:Nr.  43 

pass  away.  Tliis  idea,  tliougli  not  incorporated  in  the  Consti- 
tution, was  the  jirevailing  idea  at  that  time.  The  Constitu- 
tion it  is  tme,  secured  every  essential  guarantee  to  the  insti- 
tution while  it  should  last,  and  hence  no  argument  can  be 
justly  urged  against  the  constitutional  guarantees  thus  se- 
cured, because  of  the  common  sentiment  of  the  day.  Those 
ideas,  however,  were  fundamentally  wrong.  They  rested 
upon  the  assumption  of  the  equality  of  races.  This  was  an 
error.  It  was  a  sandy  foundation,  and  the  government  built 
-upon  it  fell  when  the  storm  came  and  the  wind  blew.  Our 
new  government  is  founded  u^jon  exactly  th^  opposite  idea ; 
its  foundations  are  laid,  its  comer-stone  rests,  upon  the  great 
truth  that  the  negro  is  not  equal  to  the  white  man  ;  that  slave- 
ry, subordination  to  the  superior  race,  is  his  natural  and 
normal  condition.  This,  our  new  government,  is  the  first  in 
the  history  of  the  world,  based  upon  this  great  jjliysical, 
philosophical,  and  moral  truth." 

Mr.  Stephens  was  no  less  enthusiastic  in  his  estimate  of 
the  material  resources  of  the  new  confederacy.  "  We  have 
all  the  essential  elements  of  a  high  national  career,"  con- 
tinued he.  "  The  idea  has  been  given  out  at  the  North,  and 
even  in  the  Border  States,  that  we  are  too  small  and  too  weak 
to  maintain  a  separate  nationality.  This  is  a  great  mistake. 
In  extent  of  ten'itory  we  embrace  564,000  square  miles  and 
upwards.  This  is  upwards  of  200,000  square  miles  more  than 
was  included  within  the  limits  of  the  original  thirteen  States. 
It  is  an  area  of  countiy  more  than  double  the  tenitoiy  of 
France  or  the  Austrian  Empire.  France,  in  round  numbers, 
has  but  212,000  square  miles  ;  Austria,  in  round  numbers,  has 
but  248,000  square  miles.  Ours  is  greater  than  both  com- 
bined. It  is  greater  than  all  France,  Spain,  Portugal,  and 
Great  Britain,  including  England,  Ireland,  and  Scotland  to- 
gether.    In  pojiulation  we  have  upwards  of  5,000,000,  accord- 


44        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

ing  to  the  census  of  1860  ;  this  includes  white  and  black. 
The  entire  population,  including  white  and  black,  of  the 
original  Thirteen  States  was  less  than  4,000,000  in  1790,  and 
still  less  in  1770,  when  the  independence  of  our  fathers  was 
achieved.  If  thev,  with  a  less  population,  dared  maintain 
their  independence  against  the  greatest  power  on  earth,  shall 
we  have  any  apprehension  of  maintaining  otu-s  now  ?  " 


CHAPTER  IV. 

LINCOLN. 

From  tlie  false  political  principles  and  the  perilous  official 
neglect  of  the  old  administration — from  the  dissensions  and 
impotence  of  Congress,  and  from  the  threatening  attitude 
and  the  hostile  preparations  of  the  South,  all  parties  and 
persons  now  turned  to  the  President-elect  and  the  incoming 
administration.  During  the  winter  many  earnest  but  over- 
hasty  patriots  had  besought  him  to  intervene  by  some  pub- 
lic declaration.  But  Mr.  Lincoln  preserved  a  discreet  si- 
lence, though  in  confidential  letters  to  responsible  personal 
friends  of  opposing  politics  he  rejjeated  his  former  assertions 
that,  while  adhering  tenaciously  to  the  Eepublican  doctrine 
of  "  No  extension  of  slavery,"  he  bore  no  ill-will  to  the 
South,  meditated  no  aggression  on  her  rights,  and  would  on 
the  contrary  treat  her  with  liberal  indulgence  in  matters  of 
minor  controversy. 

x\s  the  day  of  inauguration  approached,  various  legisla- 
tures of  the  Free  States  by  formal  resolutions  in\'ited  liim 
to  visit  their  cajiitals  on  his  way  to  Washington  ;  a  call  which 
liis  deep  popular  sympathy  moved  him  to  accept.  Starting 
from  home  on  the  11th  of  Februai-y,  he  accordingly  pass.od 
through  the  principal  cities  between  Springfield  and  New 
York,  and  between  New  York  and  Washington. 

Unprecedented  crowds  came  forth  to  see  the  new  Chief 


46  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

Magistrate.  Could  the  quick  intelligence  of  the  American 
people  be  othei-wise  than  intensely  curious  to  behold  this 
remarkable  man,  whose  strange  career  they  had  heard  out- 
lined in  the  recent  election  speeches?  His  obscure  birth  in 
the  deep  seclusion  of  the  Kentucky  forests ;  how  he  read 
Weems'  Life  of  Washington  by  the  flickering  firelight  in  an 
humble  pioneer  cabin  in  Indiana ;  how,  as  a  tall  emigrant- 
boy,  he  sjilit  rails  to  fence  his  father's  clearing  in  Illinois ; 
how,  launching  his  solitary  canoe  on  the  Sangamon,  he  sought 
his  own  fortune,  becoming  flatboatman,  postmaster,  deputy 
county  surveyor,  and  captain  of  volunteers  in  the  Black 
Hawk  Indian  War;  how,  commencing  with  a  boiTowed 
Blackstone,  he  argued  cases  before  neighborhood  juries,  fol- 
lowed itinerant  Circuit  Courts  from  county  to  county,  and 
gradually  became  the  first  law^'er  in  his  State ;  how  in  a 
primitive  community,  where  politics  dealt  with  every  office 
from  postmaster  to  President,  he  rose  in  iiublic  service  from 
Eejiresentative  in  the  Vandalia  Logislature  to  President- 
elect of  the  nation. 

The  peoijle  had  also  heard  how  this  elevation  was  tried  by 
the  touchstone  of  sleepless  rivalry,  of  unscrupulous  criticism, 
of  a  mighty  political  conflict  of  party  and  of  jirinciple.  How, 
in  the  momentous  slaver^'  discussion  of  the  day,  he  was  the 
champion  who  had  overcome  Douglas,  the  hitherto  victori- 
ous Philistine  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill ;  his  matchless 
definition  of  the  j)olitical  injustice  of  slaveiy,  applicable  to 
all  nations  and  ages :  "  When  the  wliite  man  governs  liimself, 
that  is  self-government  ;  but  when  he  governs  liimself  and 
also  governs  another  man,  that  is  more  than  self-govern- 
ment— that  is  despotism  ; "  his  irrefutable  statement  of  the 
natural  right  of  evers*  man  "  to  eat  the  bread,  without  leave 
of  anybody  else,  which  his  own  hand  earns  ; "  his  j^rojihetic 
statesmanship,  in  declaring  that  "the  Union  cannot  perma- 


LINCOLN.  47 

nently  endure  half  slave  and  half  free,"  ionv  months  befoivv 
Wm.  H.  Seward  proclaimed  the  "  irrepressible  conflict." 

So  much,  the  newspapers,  campaign  documents,  and 
stump  speakers  had  told  the  country.  The  remainder,  which 
his  intimate  Illinois  neighboi's  could  have  related,  the  peo- 
ple half  divined  from  what  they  heard.  That  he  had  risen 
from  obscurity  to  fame,  from  ignorance  to  eloquence,  from 
want  to  ralership,  uncontaminated  by  vice,  undefiled  by 
temptation,  without  schools,  without  family  influence,  with- 
out wealtli ;  championed  by  no  clique,  fraternity,  or  sect ; 
clinging  to  no  skirt  of  corporation,  interest,  or  combination  ; 
conspicuous  without  affectation,  winning  popularity  without 
art,  and  receiving  consideration  without  parade  ;  rendering 
his  party  not  only  every  service  it  requested,  but,  l)y  his  tal- 
ent, leading  it  from  despondency  to  success,  and  from  suc- 
cess to  renown ;  meanwhile,  at  every  stage  of  his  career, 
walking  among  his  fellow-men  with  such  irreproachable  per- 
sonal conduct,  that  his  very  name  grew  into  a  proverb  of  in- 
tegrity, and  passed  among  the  people  of  his  entire  State  as 
the  genuine  coin-cun-ent  and  i-ecognized  token  of  social, 
moral,  and  i^olitical  uprightness. 

Malicious  gossip  and  friendly  jest  had  both,  during  the 
campaign,  described  the  "  railsplitter  "  candidate  as  possess- 
ing great  personal  ugliness  ;  this  was  now  seen  to  be  au  utter 
mistake.  The  peoj^le  beheld  in  the  new  President  a  man  six 
feet  four  inches  in  height,  a  stature  which  of  itself  would  ho 
hailed  in  any  assemblage  as  one  of  the  outward  signs  of 
leadership ;  joined  to  this  was  a  spave  but  muscular  frame, 
and  large  and  strongly  marked  features  coiTesponding  to  his 
unusual  stature.  Quiet  in  demeanor,  but  erect  in  bearing, 
his  face  even  in  repose  was  not  unattractive  ;  and  when  lit  up 
by  his  open,  genial  smile,  or  illuminated  in  the  utterance  of 
a  strong  or  stirring  thought,  his  countenance  was  positively 


48  THE   OUTBREAK   OF  REBELLION. 

handsome.  His  voice,  latched  in  leather  a  liigli  key,  but  of 
great  clearness  and  penetration,  made  his  public  remarks 
audible  to  a  wide  circle  of  listeners.  His  speeches  were 
shoi*t ;  but  his  pithy,  epigrammatic  sentences,  full  of  logical 
directness  and  force,  j^resented  the  questions  of  the  hour  in 
new  and  unwonted  aspects,  which  the  exhaustive  discussions 
of  the  campaign  had  not  yet  reached. 

It  would  be  impossible  within  any  short  space  to  give  an 
analytic  summary'  of  the  twenty  to  thirty  short  addresses  he 
delivered  on  this  journey.  But,  so  long  as  the  nation  shall 
live,  every  American  ought  to  remembor  liis  thrilling  key- 
note of  that  crisis,  uttered  in  his  very  first  speech  at  Indian- 
apolis ;  an  admonition  equally  valuable  to  statesmen  or  peo- 
ple in  every  emergency  which  the  future  may  bring.  "  The 
people,"  said  he,  "  when  they  rise  in  mass  in  behalf  of  the 
Union  and  the  liberties  of  their  country,  tiiily  may  it  be  said, 
'  The  gates  of  hell  cannot  prevail  against  them.'  In  all  try- 
ing i^ositions  in  which  I  shall  be  jjlaced — and  doubtless  I 
shall  be  j^laced  in  many  such — my  reliance  will  be  upon  you 
and  the  people  of  the  United  States ;  and  I  wish  you  to  re- 
member, now  and  forever,  that  it  is  your  business  and  not 
mine  ;  that  if  the  Union  of  these  States  and  the  liberties  of 
this  people  shall  be  lost,  it  is  but  little  to  any  one  man  of 
fifty-two  years  of  age,  but  a  great  deal  to  the  thirty  millions 
of  jieople  who  inhabit  these  United  States,  and  to  their  pos- 
terity in  all  coming  time.  It  is  your  business  to  rise  up  and 
jireserve  Union  and  liberty  for  yourselves,  and  not  for  me." 

For  one  thing  Mr.  Buchanan  and  his  Cabinet  should  be  re- 
membered with  gratitude.  All  winter  long  there  had  been 
fears  and  rumors  that  the  conspirators  were  maturing  a  plot 
to  seize  the  capital,  the  public  buildings,  and  the  archives, 
forcibly  prevent  the  inauguration  of  Lincoln,  and  thus  make 
themselves  the  de  facto  successors  of  the  Buchanan  adrainis- 


LINCOLN.  49 

tration.  Tliere  were  indeed  many  threats,  boasts,  and  warn- 
ings, to  justify  apprehension  on  this  score,  but  an  investiga- 
tion held  by  a  Committee  of  Congress,  disclosed  no  traceable 
combination.  Under  such  api^rehension,  however,  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan authorized  General  Scott  to  assemble  sufficient 
troops  at  Washington  to  insure  both  a  peaceable  count  of 
the  electoi*al  votes  on  Febmary  13th,  and  the  peaceable  in- 
auguration of  the  President-elect,  which  latter  event  took 
place  with  due  formalities,  and  in  the  presence  of  great 
crowds,  on  the  4th  of  March,  1861. 

Mr.  Lincoln's  inaugural  address  made  a  frank  declaration 
of  his  policy  on  the  leading  points  of  controversy.  He  re- 
peated that  he  had  no  purpose,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  in- 
terfere with  the  institution  of  slavery  in  the  States  where  it 
existed.  But  he  also  asserted  that  the  Union  is  perpetual ; 
that  secession  resolves  or  ordinances  are  legally  void ;  that 
acts  of  violence,  within  any  State  or  States,  against  the  au- 
thority of  the  United  States,  are  insurrectionary  or  revolu- 
tionary ;  and  that  to  the  extent  of  his  ability  he  should  cause 
the  laws  to  be  faithfully  executed  in  all  the  States.  The 
Union  would  defend  itself,  hold  its  property  and  places,  and 
collect  the  duties  and  imposts ;  "  but,  beyond  what  may  be 
necessary  for  these  objects,  there  will  be  no  invasion,  no 
using  of  force  against  or  among  the  people  anywhere." 
There  should  be  no  bloodshed  or  violence,  unless  forced  up- 
on the  national  authority.  Temporary  discontent  he  would 
tolerate ;  the  exercise  of  offices  in  disaffected  districts  he 
would  forego ;  he  would  continue  to  furnish  the  mails  unless 
repelled ;  he  would  endeavor  to  preserve  that  sense  of  per- 
fect security  most  favorable  to  calm  thought  and  renewed 
allegiance.  An  unanswerable  argument  against  disunion 
and  an  earnest  appeal  to  reason  and  lawful  remedy,  he  fol- 
lowed by  a  most  impressive  declaration  of  peace  and  good- 
4 


50         THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

will :  "  In  your  hands,  my  dissatisfied  fellow-countrymen, 
and  not  in  mine,  is  the  momentous  issue  of  civil  war.  The 
Government  will  not  assail  you.  You  can  have  no  conflict 
\vithout  being  yourselves  the  aggressors.  You  have  no  oath 
registered  in  heaven  to  destroy  the  Government ;  while  I 
shall  have  the  most  solemn  one  to  presen-e,  jjrotect,  and 
defend  it." 

Unhappily  the  burden  and  difficulty  of  adniinisti^ation  was 
already  header  than  he  or  the  public  were  aware.  He  had 
come  into  office  sharing  the  general  belief  that  IVIajor  Ander- 
son was  secure  in  his  stronghold  of  Sumter  until  the  rebel 
batteries  should  become  jjowerful  enough  to  diive  him  out. 
On  the  contrary,  a  subtler  and  more  imfailing  enemy  than 
the  rebels — stai'vation — was  rajiidly  forcing  the  brave  little 
garrison  to  surrender.  On  the  morning  after  inaugiuation 
letters  from  Sumter  were  put  into  the  President's  hands, 
showing  that  the  fort  contained  pro%T5ious  for  only  a  little 
more  than  a  month  longer,  and  adding  the  i^rofessional 
opinion  of  Anderson  and  his  officers  that  a  well-appointed 
fleet  and  an  army  of  twenty  thousand  men  would  be  needed 
to  raise  the  siege,  so  formidable  had  the  encircling  rebel 
batteries  already  become. 

Such  a  fleet  and  such  an  army  were  not  in  existence,  nor 
could  they  be  organized  for  many  months.  After  mature 
considei-ation  General  Scott  advised  the  President  that  it  was 
practically  impossible  to  relieve  or  reinforce  Sumter,  and 
that,  as  a  mere  military  question,  it  was  necessary  to  order  its 
evacuation. 

To  Mr.  Lincoln,  who  had  only  a  few  days  before  publicly 
promised  the  nation  that  he  would  "  hold,  occupy,  and  pos- 
sess, the  property  and  places  belonging  to  the  Government," 
this  was  indeed  a  tiTing  alternative.  He  ordered  a  rc-ex- 
amination  of  the  whole  subject,  and  Cabinet,  militaiy,  and 


LINCOLN.  51 

naval  officers  joined  in  its  discussion.  Among  the  plans  of 
relief  was  one  urged  by  Captain  G.  V.  Fox,  who,  even  under 
General  Scott's  adverse  criticism,  convinced  the  President 
and  a  majority  of  the  Cabinet  that  he  could,  by  means  of 
open  boats  and  small  tugs,  in  a  dark  night  throw  a  small 
quantity  of  provisions  and  a  few  men  into  the  fort.  The  po- 
litical aspects  of  the  case,  however,  remained  still  to  be  con- 
sidered. The  President,  therefore,  on  March  15th  propounded 
to  his  Cabinet  the  written  question,  "  Assuming  it  to  be 
possible  to  provision  Fort  Sumter,  is  it  wise  under  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  case  to  attempt  to  do  so  ? "  To  this 
the  Cabinet  made  written  replies,  five  members  arguing 
against  the  policy  of  attempting  relief,  and  only  two  in  its 
favor.  The  majority,  led  by  Mr.  Seward,  argued  that  any 
possible  relief  would  only  be  temporary,  and  that  a  disastrous 
failure,  and  the  eventual  loss  of  the  fort  would  produce  more 
damaging  political  results,  than  to  give  it  up  at  once  under 
the  imperative  military  necessity  already  existing,  and  for 
which  the  new  administration  was  in  no  wise  responsible. 

Two  or  three  collateral  questions  connected  themselves 
with  the  main  one.  The  exposed  situation  of  Fort  Pickens 
had  become  known  to  Lincoln,  and  one  of  his  earliest  official 
acts  was  to  order  its  reinforcement  from  the  fleet ;  but  of  the 
conditions  of  the  January  truce  he  was  not  informed.  He  was 
therefore  waiting  in  painful  anxiety  to  receive  news  that  his 
order  had  been  executed  and  Pickens  reinforced,  for  the  suc- 
cessful strengthening  of  that  point  would  have  an  important 
influence  in  deciding  the  question  of  Sumter. 

Another  secondary  consideration  was  the  attitude  of  Vir- 
ginia. Rebel  influences  in  her  Legislature  had  ordered  a 
State  convention,  to  which  convention  her  people  had  elected 
a  large  majority  of  professedly  loyal  members.  Their  loyal- 
ty, however,  was  of  a  qualified  sort,  deeply  tinctured  with 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  ait«in»» 


52         THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION, 

factional  prejudice,  and  irritated  with  the  imaginary  wrongs 
of  the  South.  Upon  this  element,  rebel  intrigue  and  con- 
spiracy were  woi-king  with  telling  effect ;  and  instead  of  de- 
claring and  jiractisiug  frank  and  direct  adherence  to  the 
Government,  the  union  members  were  fulminating  baseless 
complaints,  demanding  impossible  guarantees,  and  pleading 
indulgent  excuses  for  the  course  of  South  Carolina  and  the 
Cotton  Eepublics.  And  tliis  condition  of  misdirected  and 
unstable  loyalty  was  also  wide-spread  among  the  leaders  and 
people  of  the  Border  States  of  Maryland,  Kentucky,  and 
Missouri. 

How  to  deal  vnth  such  a  morbid  and  disturbed  public  sen- 
timent— how  to  treat  this  unnatural,  contradictory,  and  half- 
hearted allegiance,  was  a  i^roblem  of  direct  bearing  on  the 
Sumter  question.  Mr.  Seward,  optimist  by  nature,  believed 
and  argued  that  the  revolution  throughout  the  South  had 
spent  its  force  and  was  on  the  wane  ;  and  that  the  evacuation 
of  Sumter,  and  the  manifestation  of  kindness  and  confidence 
to  the  Rebel  and  Border  States,  would  undemiine  the  con- 
spii-acy,  strengthen  the  union  sentiment  and  union  majori- 
ties, and  restore  allegiance  and  healthy  political  action  with- 
out resort  to  civil  war. 

Mr.  Lincoln  shared  Seward's  pacific  inclinations,  but  not 
his  optimism.  He  deferred  his  decision  ;  gathered  informa- 
tion from  Anderson,  from  Charleston,  from  Richmond,  waited 
in  anxious  suspense  for  news  from  Pickens.  No  substantial 
encouragement,  however,  reached  him  from  any  quarter. 
Anderson  had  no  faith  in  a  relief  expedition.  All  union  sen- 
timent had  disappeared  from  South  Carolina.  The  Virginia 
Convention  was  e\adently  playing  fast  and  loose  with  treason  ; 
and  finally,  General  Scott  was  so  far  wrought  upon  by  the 
insane  cry  for  concession  to  gratify  the  morbid  patriotism 
which  yet  found  expression  in  the  South,  that  he  advised 


LINCOLN.  53 

the  evacuation  of  Pickens  as  well  as  Sumter.  To  crown  all, 
news  came  that  the  commander  of  the  fleet  at  Pcnsacola  had 
refused  to  allow  the  reinforcement  of  Fort  Pickens  from  the 
ships,  because  of  Buchanan's  January  truce,  and  of  the  tech- 
nical objection  that  General  Scott's  order  had  not  come 
through  the  regular  channels  of  the  Navy  Department. 

Amid  these  gi'owing  difficulties  and  dangers  Mr.  Lincoln 
felt  that  the  time  for  decisive  action  had  an-ived.  On  March 
29th  a  second  and  final  cabinet  discussion  was  held,  in  which 
there  appeared  a  change  of  sentiment.  Four  of  his  seven 
counsellors  now  voted  for  an  attempt  to  relieve  Anderson, 
and  at  the  close  of  the  meeting  the  President  ordered  the 
preparation  of  the  expedition  proposed  by  Captain  Fox. 
Three  shijDs  cf  war,  with  a  transport  and  three  swift  steam- 
tugs,  a  supply  of  open  boats,  pro%dsions  for  six  months,  and 
two  hundred  recruits,  were  fitted  out  in  New  York  with  all 
possible  secrecy,  and  sailed  from  that  port,  after  unforeseen 
delays,  on  April  9th  and  10th,  under  sealed  orders  to  ren- 
dezvous before  Charleston  Harbor  at  daylight  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  11th. 

Coincident  wdth  this,  the  President,  deeming  the  safety  of 
Fort  Pickens  no  less  essential  than  that  of  Sumter,  at  once 
sent  new  and  peremptory  orders  to  the  commander  of  the 
fleet,  and  also  ordered  the  secret  prejjaration  of  another  and 
separate  naval  expedition  to  still  further  strengthen  that 
post.  The  simultaneous  prej^aration  of  the  two  produced  a 
certain  confusion  and  mutual  embarrassment ;  but  the  latter 
was  got  off  first,  and,  aniving  safely,  increased  the  garrison 
of  Fort  Pickens,  including  those  already  landed  from  the 
fleet,  to  858  men,  with  provisions  for  six  months,  thus  ren- 
dering it  impregnable  to  rebel  assault. 

If  we  may  credit  abundant  indications,  the  authorities  at 
Montgomery  did  not  believe  they  would  need  to  resort  to 


54  THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION. 

their  guns.  As  soon  as  the  provisional  government  was  or- 
ganized, three  rebel  commissioners  were  appointed  to  pro- 
ceed to  Washington  to  negotiate  for  "  recognition,"  for  "  ad- 
justment of  differences,"  and  for  possession  of  the  federal 
forts.  Two  efforts  to  obtain  Sumter  by  intrigue  had  failed  ; 
nevertheless,  they  still  had  faith  a  third  attempt  might  suc- 
ceed with  the  new  administration. 

Through  a  conspirator  who  still  professed  loyalty,  they 
presented  their  application  to  Mr.  Seward,  Secretary  of 
State.  Mr.  Seward  answered  courteously,  but  decidedly, 
that  the  new  administration  could  have  nothing  to  do  either 
with  the  rebel  government  or  its  emissaries  ;  and  to  a  written 
paper  sent  to  the  State  Department  by  the  commissioners, 
he  wrote  an  unofficial  "memorandum"  reply  of  the  same 
purport.  This  properly  finished  the  negotiation ;  but  the 
commissioners,  authorized  to  do  so  by  the  government  they 
affected  to  represent,  sought  excuse  to  delay  their  departure, 
and  Associate  Justice  Campbell,  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  volunteered  to  act  as  an  unofficial  intermedi- 
ary in  continuing  to  press  their  eiTaud  upon  the  Secretary  of 
State.  Campbell  had  at  the  beginning  publicly  opposed  se- 
cession and  still  professed  loyalty  ;  and  in  that  friendly  and 
patriotic  guise  was  admitted  by  the  Secretary  of  State  to  an 
intimacy  he  could  never  have  gained  under  his  true  colors. 
It  seems  that  Seward,  in  this  unofficial  intimacy,  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  tell  Campbell  of  his  own  willingness  to  give  up  Sum- 
ter, and  of  his  belief  that  the  President,  upon  the  recom- 
mendation of  General  Scott,  would  order  its  evacuation. 
This  was  about  the  time  of  the  first  Cabinet  discussion  of 
the  direct  proposition,  when  five  members  voted  for  evacua- 
tion and  only  two  against  it,  and  the  general  situation  of 
affairs  strongly  siapported  Mr.  Seward's  coui"se  of  reasoning. 

Whatever  may  have  been  his  language,  a  patriot  could  not 


LINCOLN.  55 

have  misunderstood  it.  But  Campbell  liad  meanwhile  be- 
come so  far  committed  to  the  cause  of  the  conspiracy,  that 
he  conveyed  his  information  to  the  commissioners  as  a  vir- 
tual pledge  of  the  evacuation  of  Sumter,  and  they  sent  the 
news  to  Montgomery  in  high  glee. 

As  a  matter  of  fact.  President  Lincoln  had  not  at  that  date 
decided  the  Sumter  question  ;  he  was  following  his  own  sa- 
gacious logic  in  aniving  at  a  conclusion,  which  was  at  least 
partially  reached  on  the  29th  of  March,  when,  as  we  have 
seen,  he  made  the  order  to  prepare  the  relief  expedition. 
By  this  time,  Campbell,  in  extreme  impatience  to  further  re- 
bellion, was  importuning  Seward  for  exjjlanation  ;  and  Sew- 
ard, finding  his  former  prediction  at  fault,  thought  it  best 
not  to  venture  a  new  one.  Upon  consultation,  therefore,  the 
President  authorized  him  to  caiTy  to  Campbell  the  first  and 
only  assurance  the  Administration  ever  made  with  regard  to 
Sumter — namely — that  he  would  not  change  the  military 
status  at  Charleston  without  giving  notice. 

This,  be  it  obsei-ved,  occuiTed  on  the  1st  of  April,  about 
which  time  the  policy  of  Seward  favoring  delay  and  concilia- 
tion finally  and  formally  gave  way  before  the  President's 
stronger  self-assertion  and  his  carefully  matured  purpose  to 
force  rebellion  to  put  itself  flagrantly  and  fatally  in  the 
wrong  by  attacking  Fort  Sumter. 


CHAPTER  V 

SUMTER. 

GovEKNOK  Pickens,  of  South  Carolina,  began  about  the  1st 
of  Januaiy  to  build  batteries  to  isolate  and  reduce  Fort 
Sumter;  and  the  newly  made  General  Beauregard  was  on 
the  1st  of  March  sent  by  the  rebel  government  to  Charleston 
to  assume  dii'ection  of  military  affaii*s  and  to  complete  the 
IDrejjai-ations  for  its  capture.  The  Governor  had  been  ex- 
ceedingly anxious  that  the  capture  should  be  attempted  be- 
fore the  expu'ation  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  presidential  term — 
that  is,  between  the  12th  of  Febmai-y  and  the  4th  of  March. 
"Mr.  Buchanan  cannot  resist,"  wrote  the  Governor  to  Jeffer- 
son Davis,  "because  he  has  not  the  power.  Mr.  Lincoln 
may  not  attack,  because  the  cause  of  quaii-el  will  have  been, 
or  may  be  considered  by  him,  as  past."  But  the  rebel  Presi- 
dent doubtless  thought  it  unwise  to  risk  offending  and  alien- 
ating his  -pai-tj  friends  at  the  North  by  placmg  the  responsi- 
bility of  such  an  affront  and  loss  upon  theii-  admmistration. 
Even  when  General  Beauregard  came,  the  Governor  was  ad- 
monished that  no  attack  must  be  attempted  without  mature 
preparation,  as  a  failure  would  seriously  demoralize  and  per- 
haps prematurely  WTeck  the  rebellion. 

Beauregard  found,  as  he  reports,  that  Sumter  was  natu- 
rally "  a  jierfect  Gibraltar,"  and  that  only  the  weakness  of 
the  ganison  rendered  its  capture  reasonably  feasible.     He 


SUMTER.  57 

therefore  set  himself  to  work,  first  of  all,  to  devise  obstruc- 
tions and  defences  against  expected  reinforcements,  and  sec- 
ondly, to  build  batteries  to  breach  the  walls.  He  was  him- 
self a  skilful  engineer ;  many  of  the  works  were  already  well 
advanced ;  there  was  an  ample  supply  of  guns  and  mortars ; 
he  had  but  to  make  requisitions  to  obtain  unlimited  slave 
labor  to  do  the  dnidgery  of  ditching  and  raising  embank- 
ments ;  his  improvised  volunteer  army  could  give  all  their 
time  to  drill  and  artillery  practice  ;  and,  most  favorable  of  all, 
this  work  went  on  in  certain  immunity  from  any  molestation 
except  through  the  chance  of  a  relieving  expedition  to  come 
by  sea.  The  commander  was  ambitious,  the  men  were  en- 
thusiastic, and  the  Governor  untiring  in  his  revolutionary 
ardor  and  impatience.  It  is,  therefore,  little  wonder  that, 
after  a  month  of  laborious  effort  and  co-operation,  Beaure- 
gard telegraphed  (April  1st)  to  Montgomery ;  "  Batteries 
ready  to  open  Wednesday  or  Thursday.    What  instructions?" 

Up  to  this  time  the  rebel  government  indulged  the  jsleas- 
ing  hope  that  Lincoln  would  give  up  the  fort  and  save  them 
the  dreaded  ordeal  of  war.  Justice  Campbell  had  ingeni- 
ously misrejiorted  the  sense  and  purport  of  Seward's  conver- 
sations ;  and  the  commissioners  and  their  Washington  cronies, 
with  equally  blind  zeal,  sent  rosy  despatches  on  the  strength 
of  exaggerated  street-rumors.  So  confident  were  they  of 
such  a  result  that  Governor  Pickens,  Secretary  Walker,  and 
General  Beaiiregard  found  some  difficulty  in  settling  among 
themselves  the  exact  conditions  upon  which  they  would  per- 
mit Anderson  and  his  garrison  to  depart  when  the  order  to 
evacuate  Sumter  should  be  sent  him. 

The  illusion  began  to  fade  away  on  the  1st  of  April,  when 
Commissioner  Crawford  telegraphed  to  Governor  Pickens : 
"  I  am  authorized  to  say  this  Government  will  not  undertake 
to  supply  Sumter  without  notice  to  you."     This  language 


58        THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION. 

did  not  resemble  the  order  for  evacuation  they  had  been  im- 
patiently expecting,  and  the  rebel  authorities  at  once  deter- 
mined to  make  Anderson  feel  the  pressure  of  the  siege. 
Next  day,  orders  were  issued  to  stop  all  courtesies  to  the 
garrison ;  to  prohibit  all  supplies  from  the  city ;  to  permit 
no  one  to  depart  from  the  fort,  and  to  establish  the  rigid 
surveillance  of  hostile  lines. 

Anderson  himself,  relying  upon  rebel  rumors  and  Craw- 
ford's baseless  despatches,  appears  to  have  made  up  his  mind 
that  the  garrison  would  be  withdrawn;  and  he  expresses 
himself  as  being  "  greatly  surprised  "  when  on  April  7th  he 
received  a  confidential  letter,  drafted  by  Lincoln,  but  copied 
and  signed  by  Cameron,  under  date  of  April  4th,  informing 
him  that  a  relie%-ing  expedition  would  be  sent ;  requesting 
him  to  hold  out,  if  possible,  till  its  arrival ;  stating  also, 
however,  that  the  President  desired  to  subject  him  and  his 
command  to  no  unusual  danger  or  hardship  beyond  those 
common  in  militai-y  life,  and  therefore  authorizing  him  to 
capitulate  when  in  his  judgment  it  might  become  necessary. 
One  of  the  few  faults  chargeable  to  Anderson  is  that  to  this 
thoughtful  and  considerate  instruction,  framed  by  Lincoln 
himself  (but  which  he  supposed  to  be  the  language  of  Cam- 
eron), he  replied  in  a  petulant  and  ill-natured  spirit,  writing: 
"I  frankly  say  that  my  heart  is  not  in  the  war  which  I  see  is 
to  be  thus  commenced."  His  subsequent  gallantry,  and 
steadfast  loyalty,  however,  justify  his  countrymen  in  a  lib- 
eral forgiveness  of  the  passing  indiscretion.  It  turned  out 
curiously  enough  that  Anderson's  letter  was,  through  a  dis- 
honorable trick  of  the  rebels,  captured  by  them  and  sent 
to  Montgomery,  where  during  the  whole  war  it  remained 
buried  in  the  Confederate  archives,  and  hence  the  offensive 
sentence  never  came  to  the  knowledge  of  the  kind-hearted 
and  generous  Lincoln. 


SUMTER.  59 

Following  the  notice  received  throiigh  Crawford,  the  re- 
bels were  for  about  a  week  in  a  tantalizing  fever  of  sus- 
pense and  uncertainty.  The  most  contradictory  telegrams 
came  from  their  commissioners  and  secret  advisers  in  Wash- 
ington ;  the  most  perplexing  and  misleading  rumors  reached 
them  from  New  York.  The  war  powers  of  the  Union  were 
clearly  enough  astir ;  troops  were  moving  and  ships  were 
loading  ;  but  for  what  object  ?  Was  their  destination  Sum- 
ter or  Pickens,  New  Orleans,  or  St.  Domingo?  Different 
circumstances  pointed  to  any  or  either  of  these  places,  but 
the  most  subtle  espionage  failed  to  obtain  the  certain  clue. 

The  mystery  was  finally  solved  on  the  evening  of  April  8th. 
A  government  messenger  arrived  in  Charleston,  repoi-ted 
himself  to  Governor  Pickens,  and  was  immediately  admitted 
by  him  to  an  interview  at  which  General  Beauregard  was 
jjresent.  The  messenger  read  to  them  an  official  communi- 
cation, di'afted  by  President  Lincoln.     It  ran  as  follows  : 

"  I  am  directed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  to 
notify  you  to  expect  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  sujpply  Fort 
Sumter  with  provisions  only,  and  that  if  such  attempt  be 
not  resisted,  no  effort  to  throw  in  provisions,  arms,  or  am- 
munition will  be  made  without  further  notice,  or  in  case  of 
an  attack  upon  the  fort." 

The  next  morning  after  this  notice  was  read  to  Governor 
Pickens  and  General  Beauregard  in  Charleston,  the  main 
portion  of  the  relieving  expedition,  under  command  of  Cap- 
tain G.  V.  Fox,  sailed  from  New  York  Harbor.  It  consisted 
of  the  transport  Baltic  with  the  pro-sdsions  and  contingent 
reinforcements,  the  war-steamers  Pawnee,  Pocahontas,  Har- 
i-iet  Lane,  and  the  steam-tugs  Uncle  Ben,  Yankee,  and  Free- 
born. The  fleet  had  orders  to  rendezvous  ten  miles  east  of 
Charleston  Harbor  on  the  morning  of  April  11th.  The  in- 
structions to  Captain  Fox  were  short,  but  explicit :  "  You  will 


60        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

take  charge,"  wrote  the  Secretary  of  War,  "  of  the  transpoi-ts 
in  New  York,  having  the  troops  and  supplies  on  board,  and 
endeavor  in  the  first  instance  to  deliver  the  subsistence.  If 
you  are  ojiposed  in  this,  you  are  directed  to  report  the  fact 
to  the  senior  naval  officer  of  the  harbor,  who  will  be  in- 
structed by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  use  his  entire  force 
to  open  a  passage,  when  you  will,  if  possible,  effect  an  en- 
trance, and  place  both  troops  and  supplies  in  Fort  Sumter." 
Lincoln's  notice  having  been  communicated  to  the  Con- 
federate authorities  in  Montgomeiy,  Jeffereon  Davis  and  his 
compeers  in  revolution  resolved  to  begin  the  war  without 
further  delay.  To  permit  provisions  to  be  sent  to  Andereon, 
after  three  months  of  battery-building,  would  jeopardize  the 
confidence  and  adhesion  of  the  ultra  fire-eatere,  and  suffer 
the  insurrection  to  collapse.  The  notice  was  received  on 
the  evening  of  April  8th  ;  next  day,  the  9th,  appears  to  have 
been  spent  in  delibei-ation  and  in  verifying  the  situation  by 
inquiries  from  the  rebel  commissioners  in  Washington ;  on 
the  10th,  Beauregard  was  instructed  to  demand  the  evacua- 
tion of  Sumter,  and,  in  case  of  refusal,  to  reduce  it.  At  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  following  day  (April  11th),  he 
sent  two  of  his  aids  to  make  the  demand,  in  answer  to  which 
Anderson,  with  the  unanimous  concurrence  of  his  officei-s, 
wrote  a  prompt  refusal.  The  occasion  seems  to  have  called 
out  some  general  conversation,  in  the  course  of  wliich  An- 
derson said  to  the  aids  :  "I  will  await  the  first  shot,  and  if 
you  do  not  batter  us  to  pieces,  we  will  be  stai-ved  out  in  a 
few  days."  The  remark  repeated  to  Beauregard  and  to 
MontgomeiT,  caused  the  impression  that  Anderson  desired 
to  capitulate,  and  another  message  was  sent  him,  offeiing  to 
permit  him  to  do  so  at  his  own  convenience,  if  he  would 
designate  the  time,  and  agi*ee  in  the  meanwhile  not  to  use 
his  guns  against  the  rebels  imless  they  should  fire  on  Sum- 


SUMTER.  61 

ter.  Anderson  was  shrewd  enougli  to  see  that  this  would 
leave  their  gnns  free  to  beat  back  the  fleet,  and  shaped  his 
reply  accordingly.  He  stated  that  he  would  evacuate  the 
fort  by  noon  on  the  15th  of  April,  "  and  that  I  will  not,  in 
the  meantime,  open  my  fires  upon  your  forces,  unless  com- 
pelled to  do  so  by  some  hostile  act  against  this  fort  or  the 
flag  of  my  Government,  by  the  forces  under  your  command, 
or  some  portion  of  them,  or  by  the  peiiaetration  of  some  act 
showing  a  hostile  intention  on  your  part  against  this  fort  or 
the  flag  it  bears,  should  I  not  receive,  prior  to  that  time, 
controlling  instructions  from  my  Government,  or  additional 
supplies."  This  reply  was,  of  course,  unsatisfactory  to  the 
rebels. 

The  interchange  of  these  several  messages  had  consumed 
the  afternoon  and  night  of  April  11th,  and  at  3:20  a.m.,  of 
the.  morning  of  April  12th,  Beauregard's  aids  handed  Ander- 
son a  note  stating  that  he  would  open  fire  upon  Sumter  in 
one  hour  from  that  time. 

The  inhabitants  of  Charleston  had  now  for  more  than 
three  months  followed  the  development  of  secession  and  re- 
bellion with  unflagging  zeal  and  daily  interest,  until  they 
began  to  regard  the  afiairs  of  Sumter  as  their  own  pet  and 
exclusive  drama.  It  had  afforded  them  excitement  upon  ex- 
citement— speeches,  meetings,  drills,  parades,  flag-raisings, 
bonfires,  salutes,  music,  and  banners ;  reaching  into  their 
social  and  family  life,  it  had  carried  their  fathers,  sons, 
brothers,  and  friends  away  into  the  camps  and  trenches. 
Sumter  had  been  their  daily  talk  and  nightly  dream ;  and 
this  interest  grew  into  a  morbid  curiosity  as  the  drama  ap- 
proached its  long-predicted  climax.  There  had  been  little 
or  no  efi'ort  to  conceal  the  changing  aspects  of  preparations 
and  orders  during  the  last  few  days ;  and,  as  a  result,  the 
general  popiilace  of  the  city  became  informed,  almost  as  well 


62  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

as  the  officers,  of  the  precise  hour  when  the  bombardment 
would  begin.  In  the  gray  and  yet  uncertain  twilight  of  this 
April  morning,  therefore,  the  Charlestonians  of  all  ages  and 
sexes  came  thronging  down  the  streets  to  the  whai-ves  of  the 
city,  to  find  favorable  locations  for  \'iewing  the  coming  spec- 
tacle, in  something  of  the  spirit  in  which  Rome  of  the 
Caesars  crowded  to  the  Coliseum  to  witness  the  savage  and 
sanguinaiy  combats  of  the  arena. 

At  half-past  four  o'clock,  on  the  morning  of  April  12th, 
1861,  while  yet  the  lingering  night  lay  upon  the  waters  of 
the  bay,  leaving  even  the  outline  of  Fort  Sumter  scarcely 
disceiTiible,  the  assembled  spectators  saw  a  flash  from  the 
mortar  battery  near  old  Fort  Johnson,  on  the  south  side  of 
the  harbor,  and  an  instant  after  a  bombshell  rose  in  a  slow, 
high  curve  through  the  air,  and  fell  upon  the  fort.  To  the 
beholders  it  was  the  inauguration  of  the  final  scene  in  their 
local  drama ;  to  the  nation  and  world  at  large,  it  began  a 
conflict  of  such  gigantic  i^roportions  and  far-reaching  conse- 
quence, that  it  will  forever  stand  as  one  of  the  boldest  land- 
marks in  history.  Gun  after  gun  responded  to  the  signal, 
until,  in  the  course  of  another  hour,  all  the  encircling  rebel 
batteries  were  in  the  heat  and  acti%dty  of  a  general  bombard- 
ment. 

Universal  wonder  was  created  at  the  time,  and  continiied 
curiosity  has  been  excited  since,  by  the  fact  that  this  bom- 
bardment, ending  in  the  suiTender  of  the  fort,  should  have 
continued  for  the  space  of  thirty-six  hours  without  the  loss 
of  a  single  life  in  the  besieged  garrison.  The  apparent  mys- 
tery is  easily  enough  understood  when  we  come  to  study 
and  comprehend  the  exact  conditions  and  coui'se  of  the 
fight. 

Fort  Sumter  was  a  work  dating  from  compai'atively  recent 
times,  built  of  brick  upon  an  artificial  island  fonned  in  the 


SUMTER.  63 

shallows  nearly  midway  at  the  entrance  of  Charleston  har- 
bor. It  was  a  five-sided  structure,  about  three  hundred  by 
three  hundred  and  fitty  feet  in  size ;  its  walls  were  some 
eight  feet  thick  and  forty  feet  high.  It  was  capable  of 
mounting  one  hundred  and  forty  guns,  two  tiers  in  case- 
mates and  one  behind  the  parapet.  When  Anderson  took 
possession  of  it  the  preceding  Christmas,  the  casemates 
were  in  an  unfinished  condition,  and  only  a  few  guns  were 
mounted.  Captain  Foster,  the  accomplished  engineer  of  the 
fort,  had,  however,  since  then,  by  the  many  expedients 
known  to  military  science,  and  by  help  of  a  considerable 
force  of  workmen  and  laborers,  pushed  its  defences  forward 
to  a  state  of  relative  completeness,  even  with  the  limited 
means  and  materials  within  the  fort.  Most  of  the  embra- 
sures of  the  lower  tier  of  casemates  were  closed.  A  total 
armament  of  forty-eight  guns  was  ready  for  use.  Of  these 
twenty-one  were  in  the  casemates,  and  twenty-seven  on  the 
rampart,  en  barbette.  The  garrison  consisted  of  nine  com- 
missioned officers,  sixty-eight  non-commissioned  officers  and 
privates,  eight  musicians,  and  forty-three  non-combatant 
workmen,  to  whom,  during  the  last  ten  days,  the  besiegeis 
had  refused  permission  to  depart,  in  order  that  they  might 
help  consume  Anderson's  small  stock  of  provisions,  and  thus 
hasten  the  process  of  reducing  the  fort  by  starvation. 

The  rebels  had  built  their  siege-works  on  the  approaching 
points  of  the  islands  forming  the  harbor.  These  lay  in  a  sort 
of  triangle  about  the  fort :  Sullivan's  Island,  containing  Fort 
Moultrie,  to  the  northeast  at  a  distance  of  1,800  yards  ;  Cum- 
ming's  Point,  on  Morris  Island,  to  the  south  at  a  distance  of 
1,300  yards  ;  and  on  James  Island,  near  old  Fort  Johnson,  to 
the  west  at  a  distance  of  2,500  yards.  Their  total  armament 
embraced  forty-seven  guns. 

Thus,  in  numbers,  the  armaments  appeared  about  equal, 


64        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

but  the  existing  conditions  created  an  immense  disparity. 
Anderson's  fire  was  diffused  ;  the  rebel  fire  was  concentrated. 
Anderson's  barbette  guns,  more  than  half  his  pieces,  were 
exposed ;  most  of  the  rebel  guns  were  sheltered  in  bomb- 
proofs  of  palmetto  logs  and  sand  ;  some  protected  with  slop- 
ing roofs  of  railroad  iron.  Anderson  had  only  a  gan-ison  of 
128  souls  all  told ;  while  a  volunteer  force  of  from  four  to 
six  thousand  supjDorted  the  rebel  batteries.  The  greatest 
difference,  however,  was  in  the  quality  of  the  ordnance. 
Anderson's  guns  could  only  deliver  a  horizontal  fire  against 
the  besiegers'  earth-walls  and  bomb-proofs.  But  seventeen 
of  the  rebel  pieces  were  mortars,  delivering  what  is  termed 
a  vertical  fire ;  that  is,  throwing  their  bursting  shells  by 
means  of  a  high  cui-ve  through  the  air,  so  as  to  drop  down 
uj)on  the  parapet  and  inside  the  walls  of  the  besieged  fort. 

The  garrison  of  Sumter,  notwithstanding  its  tedious  con- 
finement, was  in  excellent  spirit,  and,  since  the  long  ajipre- 
hended  contest  had  finally  come,  was  quite  ready  to  make  a 
manful  resistance.  Even  the  forty-three  non-combatant 
workmen  caught  the  impulse  of  fight  and  freely  volunteered 
their  help.  The  needful  preparations  had  been  already 
made,  and  since  the  10th  eveiy  one  had  by  order  changed 
his  quarters  into  the  gun  casemates.  Here  they  were  se- 
curely housed  when  at  4.30  a.m.  the  rebel  cannonade  began. 
It  was  not  yet  daylight,  and  for  some  hours  the  fort  made 
no  reply,  but  lay  in  the  morning  twilight  as  silent  and  ap- 
parently as  unconcerned  as  if  it  were  tenantless.  The  ra- 
tions had  ah'eady  become  uncomfortably  short ;  the  last  bar- 
rel of  flour  was  issued  two  or  three  days  before,  and  now 
there  was  little  left  to  subsist  upon  except  pork  and  water. 
On  this  mainly  the  command  made  a  breakfast,  and  at  about 
seven  o'clock  Captain  Abner  Doubleday  fired  the  first  gun 
from  the  fort  at  an  iron-clad  battery  on  Cumming's  Point. 


SUMTER.  65 

Reliefs  were  .stationed  at  other  guns,  and  soon  Sumter  was 
sending  back  a  spii-ited  reply. 

The  three  hours  of  unopposed  bombardment  from  the 
rebel  batteries  had  by  this  time  already  determined  one  im- 
portant phase  of  the  tight.  Carefully  Avatching  the  effect  of 
the  enemy's  cannonade,  it  was  apjaarent,  without  further  ques- 
tion, that  under  the  concentrated  missiles  of  their  guns,  and 
particularly  because  of  the  precision  of  their  vertical  fire,  it 
would  be  folly  to  expose  the  gunners  on  the  ramj)ai't  or  the 
ojaen  parade  of  the  fort.  Had  Sumter  contained  a  full  war 
garrison,  new  men  could  have  replaced  those  killed  or  dis- 
abled ;  but,  with  his  slender  force,  Anderson  decided  that  he 
could  not  afford  this  risk,  and  therefore  at  once  ordered  an 
abandonment  of  all  the  barbette  guns  and  a  few  mounted  on 
the  parade  to  throw  shells,  restricting  the  men  rigidly  to  the 
casemates.  Thus  at  one  swoop  his  fighting  armament  was 
reduced  more  than  one-half.  This,  however,  was  not  the 
worst ;  it  practically  annihilated  the  oflfensive  strength  of  the 
fort.  Of  the  twenty -one  casemate  guns  but  four  were  forty- 
two  pounders ,  the  rest  only  thirty-twos,  a  weight  of  metal  of 
little  avail  against  the  enemy's  strong  earthworks  and  iron 
roofs. 

In  this  way  the  cannonade  went  actively  on  during  the 
forenoon  of  Ajjril  12th,  without  much  damage  or  effect,  ex- 
cept upon  the  buildings  in  both  Sumter  and  Moultrie,  ordi- 
narily occupied  as  baiTacks  and  quarters.  Sumter  suffered 
most  in  this  respect :  the  balls  striking  the  face  of  its  walls 
merely  buried  themselves  in  the  brick-work,  without  passing 
through;  but  fhose  which  nearly  or  quite  grazed  the  para- 
pet, in  their  fall  took  the  buildings  or  wall  in  reverse,  com- 
ing as  they  did  from  three  sides.  The  men,  however,  while 
sheltered  in  casemates,  were  beyond  the  reach  of  these  mis- 
siles. So  too  of  the  bombs.  Falling  on  the  parapet  and  the 
5 


GG        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

open  parade  of  Sximter  and  exploding,  their  destructive  force 
spent  itself  upon  mere  inanimate  material. 

About  noon  Anderson's  men  found  they  had  been  working 
with  too  much  ardor ;  that  their  stock  of  700  cartridges  would 
soon  be  exhausted.  They  set  themselves  to  work  to  remedy 
this  deficiency,  though  with  small  speed,  for  they  had  only 
six  needles  in  the  fort  with  which  to  sew  up  cartridge-bags. 

Toward  one  o'clock  a  new  hope  cheered  them ;  they  saw 
two  ships,  and  soon  after  a  thii-d,  beaiing  the  stars  and 
stripes,  appear  off  the  harbor ;  it  was  a  part  of  the  relieving 
expedition  they  had  been  warned  to  expect.  Unfortunately, 
it  proved  unable  to  succor  the  fort  either  on  that  or  the  suc- 
ceeding day.  Through  a  confusion  of  orders,  the  flagship  of 
the  squadi'on  with  its  commanding  officer,  and  the  instruc- 
tions for  this  emergency,  and  having  on  board  also  the  sail- 
ors who  were  required  to  man  the  boats  to  carry  the  supjilies 
and  soldiers  to  Sumter,  had  been  detached  from  this  duty 
and  sent  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  A  severe  storm  delayed 
some  of  the  vessels,  and  prevented  the  tugs  from  reaching 
the  harbor ;  and  this  storm  also  prevented  the  officers  from 
making  use  of  the  limited  resources  remaining.  Therefore, 
to  their  chagrin,  they  and  their  men  were  forced  by  these 
untoward  cii'ciimstances,  and  through  no  neglect  of  their 
own,  to  remain  for  twenty-four  hours  little  else  than  specta- 
tors of  the  bombardment  to  its  close. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  first  day  Sumter  kept  up  its 
fire,  though  with  gi'eatly  slackened  speed.  Only  six  guns 
were  kept  in  action  for  the  remainder  of  the  day :  two 
against  Cumming's  Point  on  the  south,  and  four  against  Fort 
Moidtrie  and  other  batteries  on  Sullivan's  Island  to  the 
noi-th.  At  nightfall  even  these  ceased,  as  also  did  most  of 
the  guns  in  the  rebel  batteries ;  their  mortal's,  however, 
keeping  up  a  sullen  and  steady  discharge  of  bombs  upon 


SUMTER.  67 

the  fort  at  intervals  of  about  ten  minutes,  the  whole  of  the 
dark  and  stormy  night  which  followed. 

On  the  morning  of  the  second  day,  April  13th,  the  rebels 
began  their  general  cannonade  with  both  increased  vigor 
and  increased  precision ;  to  which  the  garrison,  after  its 
breakfast  of  pork  and  water,  and  having  somewhat  replen- 
ished its  stock  of  cartridges,  again  made  a  "  spiteful"  reply. 
It  is  impossible  to  estimate  how  long  this  mere  interchange 
of  shot  and  shell  might  have  continued,  had  not  other  ele- 
ments intervened  to  bring  the  combat  to  a  close. 

On  three  of  the  five  sides  of  Sumter,  just  inside  the  walls, 
stood  long  and  substantial  buildings  used  as  ban-acks,  offi- 
cers' quarters,  and  for  other  jDurposes.  These  had  been  sev- 
eral times  set  on  fire  by  hot  shot  during  the  first  day,  though 
as  often  readily  extinguished  by  the  garrison.  The  rebels 
had  not  failed  to  notice  the  effect ;  and  on  the  second  morn- 
ing their  use  of  these  missiles  became  more  frequent.  About 
nine  o'clock  of  the  second  day  these  buildings  were  once 
more  in  a  blaze,  and  this  time  the  fire  caught  in  a  portion 
of  the  roof  of  the  officers'  quarters  which  it  was  not  imme- 
diately possible  for  the  men  to  reach.  The  flames  were 
quickly  beyond  control ;  and  now  the  serious  problem  was 
to  remove  as  much  powder  from  the  magazine  as  might  be 
needed  for  use,  before  that  proceeding  should  become  im- 
possible. Fifty  barrels  were  thus  obtained  and  distributed 
about  the  casemates,  when  it  was  necessary  to  close  and  se- 
cure the  door  of  the  magazine. 

Thus,  by  noon  of  the  second  day,  the  inmates  of  the  fort 
were  exposed,  not  alone  to  the  peril  of  the  enemy's  shot  and 
shell,  but  also  to  the  immediate  discomfort  and  danger  of  a 
serious  conflagration.  Within  the  limited  area  of  the  fort 
the  heat  became  intense ;  the  air  was  filled  with  floating 
cinders ;  and,  blown  downward  bv  the  current  of  the  sea- 


68        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

breeze,  a  stifling,  blinding  smoke  finally  drove  the  men  into 
the  casemates,  and  even  to  these  retreats  the  floating  fire- 
flakes  pursued  them.  The  situation  became  too  dangerous 
to  keep  the  fifty  barrels  of  powder  rescued  from  the  maga- 
zine ;  by  order  of  Anderson,  all  but  five  were  rolled  out  of 
the  embrasures  into  the  sea. 

About  one  o'clock  the  flagstaff  of  the  fort  was  shot  away, 
having  been  hit  a  number  of  times  preNaously  ;  and,  although 
the  flag  was  soon  after  again  raised  on  a  jury-mast  on  the 
parapet,  the  clouds  of  smoke  concealed  it  from  the  rebel 
view.  Seeing  the  great  conflagration,  the  disaiojiearance  of 
the  flag,  and  a  total  cessation  of  fire  from  Sumter's  guns, 
they  not  unreasonably  concluded  that  the  garrison  was 
ready  to  sun-ender.  The  eccentric  Senator  Wigfall,  doing 
duty  as  a  volunteer  aid  on  one  of  the  islands,  was  sent  by  a 
subordinate  officer  to  ascertain  the  fact ;  and,  being  brought 
before  the  commander,  with  more  grandiloquence  than  au- 
thority, offered  to  peiTnit  Anderson  to  name  his  own  terms  of 
evacuation.  Anderson  replied  that  he  would  accept  the 
teiTBS  offered  liim  by  Beauregard  at  the  time  of  his  fii-st 
summons,  on  the  11th.  Wigfall  thereupon  returned  to  his 
post,  where,  in  turn,  with  more  enthusiasm  than  memoiy,  he 
reported  an  unconditional  sun-ender.  Meanwhile,  three  aids 
arrived  direct  from  Beauregard,  with  an  offer  of  assistance 
to  extinguish  the  flames,  and  the  misunderstaniling  became 
apparent.  Anderson,  in  some  anger,  was  disposed  to  renew  his 
fight ;  upon  suggestion  of  the  aids,  however,  he  waited  till  the 
blunder  could  be  refeiTed  to  Beauregard.  This  commander 
reconciled  all  difficulty  by  agi'eeing  to  Anderson's  iiroposal ; 
and  at  noon  of  the  following  day,  Sunday,  April  14, 1861,  the 
faithful  commander  and  his  faithful  ganison,  with  an  impres- 
sive ceremony  of  prayer  and  salute,  hauled  down  the  flag  of 
the  United  States,  and  evacuated  Fort  Sumter. 


CHAPTEK  VI. 

THE  CALL    TO    ARMS. 

The  assault  upon  Fort  Sumter  had  doubtless  been  ordered 
by  the  rebel  government  under  the  hope,  if  not  the  belief, 
that  it  would  not  provoke  immediate  or  widespread  civil 
war.  It  is  probable  that  they  anticipated  it  would  biing  on 
military  movements  and  measures  of  a  local  and  defensive 
character ;  but  neither  the  size  of  the  Federal  army,  nor  the 
very  limited  war  organization  set  on  foot  by  the  rebel  con- 
gress,, pointed  as  yet  to  hostilities  on  an  extended  scale. 
The  South  well  knew  that  the  frontier  could  not  be  entirely 
stripped  of  regulars ;  they  assumed,  or  so  pretended,  that 
existing  laws  authorized  no  call  of  the  militia ;  and,  judging 
from  the  neglect  of  Congress,  at  its  recent  session,  to  pass  a 
force  bill,  they  might  reasonably  infer  that  it  would  be  dif- 
ficult for  the  new  administration  to  obtain  coercive  legisla- 
tion. Most  of  all,  however,  they  relied  upon  a  friendly  feel- 
ing toward  the  South  from  their  late  Democratic  party 
allies.  Throughout  the  last  presidential  election,  Northern 
Democrats  had  magnified  Southern  complaints  as  insuifer- 
able  grievances,  and  predicted  the  coming  revolution  as  a 
terror  to  obstinate  voters.  President  Buchanan  even  went 
so  far  in  his  annual  message  as  to  asseri  that  a  neglect  of 
Northern  States  to  repeal  their  personal  liberty  laws  would 
justify  the    South  in   revolutionary  resistance.     The   news- 


70  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

paper  press  was  full  of  kindi-ed  echoes.  Potent  public 
voices  had  declared  that  the  North  would  not  entertain — 
nay,  would  not  permit,  a  policy  of  subjugation.  Ex- Presi- 
dent Fi-anklin  Pierce — Buchanan's  predecessor — had  given 
Jefferson  Da^•is  very  broad  confidential  assurances  on  this 
head.  "Without  discussing  the  question  of  right,"  WTote 
he,  Januaiy  6,  1860,  "  of  abstract  power  to  secede,  I  have 
never  believed  that  actual  disraption  of  the  Union  can  occur 
without  blood;  and  if,  through  the  madness  of  Northern 
Abolitionism,  that  dire  calamity  must  come,  the  fighting 
will  not  be  along  Mason's  and  Dixon's  line  merely.  It  [will] 
be  within  our  own  borders,  in  our  own  sti-eets,  between  the 
two  classes  of  citizens  to  whom  I  have  referred.  Those  who 
defy  law  and  scout  constitutional  obligations  will,  if  we  ever 
reach  the  arbitrament  of  arms,  find  occupation  enough  at 
home." 

As  the  oracle  of  another  faction,  Douglas  had  made  an 
elaborate  argument  in  the  Senate  to  show  that  the  President 
possessed  no  right  of  coercion ;  repeating  the  theory  of  Bu- 
chanan's message,  that  the  army  and  na\7'  and  the  militia  of 
the  States  could  not  move  except  behind  a  marshal  with  Ms 
WTit,  and  that  both  the  tongue  and  the  arms  of  justice  were 
dead  in  South  Carolina.  Similar  encouragement  came  from 
many  individuals  of  lesser  note.  It  even  appeared  tliat  the 
spirit  of  secession  was  finding  a  lodgment  in  the  North.  A 
member  had  declared  on  the  floor  of  Congress  that  the  Em- 
pii'e  State  would  set  up  her  own  separate  sovereignty  ;  while 
in  a  still  more  radical  ambition  the  Mayor  of  New  York  City, 
in  an  official  message,  proposed  the  secession  of  that  me- 
tropolis, and  its  assumption  of  territorial  independence  as  a 
"  free  city."  The  firing  on  the  Star  of  the  "West,  in  January, 
had  in  a  slight  degi-ee  touched  the  national  pride,  and  some- 
what checked  the  gathering  current  of  seditious  uttei*ance  ; 


THE  CALL  TO   ARMS.  71 

but  there  was  no  lack  of  cliques  and  coteries  in  the  gi'eat 
cities  of  the  North  who  secretly  nursed  plots  and  projects 
contingent  on  possible  insurrectionary  commotions  and 
chances.  One  of  the  rebel  commissioners  to  Washington,  in 
the  interim  during  which  Justice  Campbell  relieved  them  of 
their  labors  of  diplomatic  intrigue,  visited  New  York,  where 
he  was  waited  upon  by  the  spokesman  of  one  of  these  North- 
ern cabals,  who  poured  into  the  ears  of  his  credulous  lis- 
tener the  recital  of  a  most  marvellous  scheme  of  local  con- 
spiracy. Two  hundred  of  New  York's  best  citizens,  he  said, 
were  at  that  moment  elaborating  a  jalan  to  secede  from  both 
the  Union  and  the  State,  seize  the  navy  yard  at  Brooklyn, 
and  the  forts  in  the  harbor,  and  declai'e  New  York  a  free 
city.  The  informant  was  perhaps  an  adventurer  anxious  to 
pocket  a  liberal  subsidy ;  yet,  as  an  echo  of  Mayor  Wood's 
official  proposition,  the  incident  was  not  without  its  signifi- 
cance, and  the  eager  commissioner  repeated  the  tale  by  let- 
ter to  Jefferson  Davis,  countersigned  by  his  own  personal 
faith  that  there  was  "  something  in  it." 

Jefferson  Davis  was  by  far  too  shrewd  a  leader  to  look  for 
a  literal  fulfilment  of  any  of  these  extravagant  predictions 
or  projects  ;  but  they  afforded  him  a  substantial  basis  for  the 
belief  that  this  class  of  sentiment  would  at  least  oppose  and 
thwart  the  new  administration  in  any  quick  or  extended 
measures  to  suppress  the  "  confederate  "  revolt. 

On  the  part  of  the  North,  also,  there  had  been  grave  mis- 
apprehension of  the  actual  state  of  Southern  opinion.  For 
ten  years  the  Southern  threats  of  disunion  had  been  empty 
bluster.  The  half-disclosed  conspiracy  of  1856  did  not 
seem  to  extend  beyond  a  few  notorious  agitators.  The  more 
serious  revolutionaiy  signs  of  the  last  three  months— the  re- 
tirement of  Southern  members  from  Congress,  the  secession 
of  States,  the  seizure  of  federal  forts  and  the  formation  of 


72  THE   OUTBREAK   OF  REBELLION. 

the  Montgomery  provisional  goveniment — were  not  realized 
in  their  full  force  by  the  North,  because  of  the  general  con- 
fusion of  politics,  the  rush  and  hurry  of  events,  the  delusive 
hopes  of  compromise  held  out  by  Ck)ngressional  committees 
and  factions,  and  the  high-sounding  professions  of  the 
Washington  i)eace  conference.  More  potent  than  all  was 
the  underlying  disbelief  of  the  North  that  the  people  at 
large  in  the  South  felt  the  stress  of  any  real  grievance.  The 
loss  of  slave  runaways  was  their  most  tangible  accusation. 
Would  that  evil  be  cured  by  moving  the  Canada  line  down 
to  the  Ohio  ?  If  separate  nationality  was  the  object,  could 
ten  millions  overcome  twenty  millions? — could  precarious 
Southern  credit  cope  with  the  solid  accumulations  of  North- 
em  capital  ? — could  a  monotonous  Southern  agriculture  try 
expedients  with  the  famous  mechanical  skill  of  the  Free 
States  ? — could  cotton  crops  feed  armies  like  the  great  com, 
wheat,  hay,  pork,  and  cattle  regions? — and  finally,  would  the 
great  West  peimit  a  foreign  flag  to  close  or  cover  the  mouth 
of  the  Mississippi  ?  The  bare  suggestion  seemed,  and  was, 
nonsense.  They  indeed  saw  clearly  enough  the  ambition, 
treachery,  and  desperation  of  certain  Southern  leaders ;  but 
the  North  did  not  believe  that  these  leaders  could,  in  Yan- 
cey's language,  "  precipitate  the  Cotton  States  into  a  revolu- 
tion "  ;  that  passing  chagiln  over  a  lost  election  could  goad 
the  whole  Southern  people,  without  substantial  cause,  into 
the  horror  and  ruin  of  a  hopeless  ci\-il  war. 

The  firing  on  Sumter  cleared  up  the  political  atmos- 
phere as  if  by  magic.  The  roar  of  Beauregard's  guns 
changed  incredulity  into  fact.  There  was  no  longer  room 
for  doubt.  This  was  no  mere  emeute.  Seven  seceding 
States,  \s-ith  their  machinery  of  local  government  and  the 
crazy  zeal  of  an  inflamed  reaction,  stood  behind  the  guns. 
The  cool  deliberation  of   the  assault  betokened  plan,  pur- 


THE  CALL  TO   ARMS.  73 

pose,  and  confidence.      The  conspiracy  had  given  way  to 
revohition. 

The  news  of  the  assault  on  Sumter  reached  Washington 
on  Saturday,  Apiil  13th ;  on  Sunday  morning,  the  llth,  the 
President  and  Cabinet  were  met  to  discuss  the  surrender 
and  evacuation.  Sunday,  though  it  was,  Lincoln  with  his 
own  hand  immediately  drafted  the  following  proclamation, 
which  was  dated,  issued,  telegraphed,  and  published  to  the 
whole  country  on  Monday  morning,  April  15th. 


"  PROCLAMATION 

"BY  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

"'Whereas,  the  laws  of  the  United  States  have  been  for  some  time 
past  and  now  are  opposed,  and  the  execution  thereof  obstructed  in  the 
States  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Florida,  Mississippi,  Lou- 
isiana, and  Texas,  by  combinations  too  powerful  to  be  suppressed  by 
the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  procaedings,  or  by  the  powers  vested  in 
the  marshals  by  law  :  now  therefore,  I,  Abkaham  Li>xolx,  President 
of  the  United  States,  in  virtue  of  the  power  in  me  vested  by  the  Con- 
stitution and  the  laws,  have  thought  fit  to  c-all  forth,  and  hereby  do  call 
forth  the  militia  of  the  several  States  of  the  Union,  to  the  aggregate 
number  of  seventy-five  thousand,  in  order  to  suppress  said  combina- 
tious  and  to  cause  the  laws  to  be  dulj^  executed. 

"  The  details  for  this  object  will  be  immediately  communicated  to  the 
State  authorities  through  the  War  Department.  I  appeal  to  all  loyal 
citizens  to  favor,  facilitate,  and  aid  this  effort  to  maintain  the  honor, 
the  integrity,  and  existence  of  our  National  Union,  and  the  perpetuity 
of  popular  government,  and  to  redress  wrongs  already  long  enough  en- 
dured. I  deem  it  proper  to  say  that  the  first  service  assigned  to  the 
forces  hereby  called  forth  will  probably  be  to  repossess  the  forts, 
places,  and  property  which  have  been  seized  from  the  Union ;  and  in 
every  event  the  utmost  care  will  be  observed,  consistently  with  the  ob- 
jects aforesaid,  to  avoid  any  devastation,  any  destruction  of,  or  inter^ 
4 


74  THK  OL'TUUEAK   OF  REBKLXJON. 

ference  with  property,  or  any  disturbance  of  peaceful  citizens  in  any 
part  of  the  country ,  and  I  hereby  command  the  persons  composing  the 
combinations  aforesaid  to  disperse  and  retire  peaceably  to  their  respec- 
tive abodes  within  twenty  days  from  this  date. 

■'  Deeming  that  the  present  condition  of  public  afTairs  presents  an  ex- 
traordinary occasion,  I  do  hereby,  in  virtue  of  the  power  in  me  vested 
by  the  Constitution,  convene  both  Houses  of  Congress.  Senators  and 
Representatives  are  therefore  summoned  to  assemble  at  their  re- 
spective chambers  at  twelve  o'clock,  noon,  on  Thursday,  the  fourth  day 
of  July  next,  then  and  there  to  consider  and  determine  such  measures 
as,  in  their  wisdom,  the  public  safety  and  interest  may  seem  to  de- 
mand. 

'"In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused  the 
seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

"  Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  this  fifteenth  day  of  April,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  sixty-one,  and  of  the 
independence  of  the  United  States  the  eighty-fifth. 

"ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
"  By  the  President. 

"  Wji.LiAM  H.  Seward,  Sm-ftary  of  Stale." 

The  possible  contingency  foreshatlowed  bv  Lincoln  in  liis 
Trenton  address  bad  come ;  and  he  not  only  I'edeemed  his 
promise  to  "  put  the  foot  dowTi  fiiTnly,"  but  he  took  care  to 
place  it  on  a  solid  foundation.  Nominally  the  call  of  the 
militia  was  based  on  the  Act  of  1795.  But  the  broad  lan- 
guage of  the  i^roclamation  was  an  "  ai)peal  to  all  loyal  citi- 
zens to  favor,  facilitate,  and  aid  this  effort  to  maintain  the 
honor,  the  integrity,  and  existence  of  our  National  Union,  and 
the  perpetuity  of  pojnilar  government."  The  President  had 
taken  care  to  so  sliape  the  issue — so  to  strip  it  of  all  provo- 
cation or  ingenious  excuse,  as  to  show  the  recldess  malignity 
of  the  rebellion  in  showering  red-hot  shot  on  a  standing  gar- 
rison ;  he  now  asked  the  people  to  maintain  their  a.ssanlted 
dignity  and  outraged  authority ;  touching  not  merely  the 
machinery  of  forms  and  statutes,  but  invoking  directly  that 


THE  CALL  TO  ARMS.  75 

spirit  of  free  government  to  preserve  itself,  against  which  in 
his  opinion  "  the  gates  of  hell "  could  not  prevail. 

The  correctness  of  his  faith  was  equal  to  the  wisdom  of 
his  policy ;  for  now  there  was  seen  one  of  those  mighty 
manifestations  of  national  will  and  national  strength  that 
mark  the  grand  epochs  of  civilized  histoiy.  The  whole 
country  seemed  to  awaken  as  from  the  trouble  of  a  feverish 
dream,  and  once  again  men  entered  upon  a  conscious  recog- 
nition of  their  proper  relations  to  the  Government.  Cross. 
puipose  and  ijeiplexed  counsel  faded  from  the  public  mind. 
Parties  vanished  from  politics.  Universal  opinion  recog- 
nized but  two  rallying-points — the  camps  of  the  South 
which  gathered  to  assail  the  Union,  and  the  armies  of  the 
North  that  rose  to  defend  it. 

From  eveiy  Governor  of  the  Free  States  came  a  prompt  re- 
sponse of  readiness  to  furnish  to  the  President  the  desired 
quota  of  militia.  In  almost  eveiy  county  of  the  North  was 
begun  the  enlistment  of  volunteers.  Meetings,  speeches, 
and  pai*ades  voiced  the  public  exhortation  to  patriotism. 
Flags  and  badges  symbolized  an  eager  and  universal  loyalty. 
Munificent  individual  donations,  and  subscriptions,  and  lib- 
eral apiDropriations  from  State  Legislatures  and  municipal 
councils,  poured  forth  laWsh  contributions  to  arm,  clothe, 
and  equip  the  recniits.  More  than  double  the  number  of 
men  required  tendered  their  sei-vice.  Before  the  lapse  of 
forty-eight  hours,  armed  comjianies  and  regiments  of  volun- 
teers were  in  motion  toward  the  expected  border  of  conflict. 
Public  opinion  became  intolerant  of  dissent  and  cavil ;  in 
many  instances  tumultuous  mobs  silenced  or  destroyed 
newspapei-s  which  had  ventured  to  print  disloyal  or  treason- 
able language.  There  was  not  the  slightest  sign  or  move- 
ment of  the  ijredicted  division  of  Northern  sentiment.  New 
York  joyfully  ranged  herself  imder  tlie  flag  in  a  monster 


76        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

meeting  of  two  hundretl  thousand  of  her  i)eoiile.  Before 
the  surging  crowds  that  filled  the  streets,  and  drowned  all 
noises  in  their  huzzas  for  the  Union,  the  Neio  York  Herald 
displayed  the  stars  and  stripes,  and  changed  its  editorials 
from  a  tone  of  sneering  lament  to  a  fierce  and  incessant 
war-ciy.  Every  prominent  individual  in  the  whole  North 
was  called  or  came  voluntarily  to  prompt  espousal  of  the 
Union  cause  by  public  letter  or  speech.  Ex-President 
Buchanan,  ex-President  Piei'ce,  Edward  Everett,  Genei"al 
Cass,  Archbishop  Hughes,  Mayor  Fernando  Wood,  John  A. 
Dix,  Wendell  Phillips,  Eobei-t  J.  Walker,  Wm.  M.  Evarts, 
Edward  D.  Baker,  Da^'id  Dudley  Field,  John  J.  Crittenden, 
Caleb  Cushing,  Hannibal  Hamlin,  Democrats  and  Republi- 
cans, conseiTatives  and  radicals,  natives  and  foreigners, 
Catholics  and  Protestants,  Maine  and  Oregon,  all  uttered  a 
common  call  to  their  countrymen  to  come  to  the  defence  of 
the  Constitution,  the  Government,  and  the  Union.  Of  all 
these  recognized  public  leaders,  however,  the  most  energetic 
and  powerful,  next  to  Lincoln,  was  Stephen  A.  Doiiglas,  who 
in  the  late  election  had  received  1,128,049  Northern  votes, 
and  163,525  Southern  votes  for  President.  As  already  men- 
tioned, he  had,  in  a  bold  Senate  sjieech,  announced  himself 
as  opposed  to  a  policy  of  coercion.  But  the  wanton  bom- 
bardment of  Sumter  exhausted  his  party  patience,  and 
stirred  his  patriotic  blood  to  fresher  and  healthier  impulses. 
On  Sunday,  April  14th,  when  the  proclamation  had  not  yet 
been  many  hours  \ATitten  and  signed,  he  sought  his  life- 
long political  antagonist,  Abraham  Lincoln,  now  President  of 
the  United  States,  and,  in  a  long,  confidential  iuter^-iew,  as- 
sured him  of  his  readiness  to  join  him  in  unrelenting  war- 
fare against  rebellion.  The  next  morning's  telegi-ai)hic  de- 
spatches gave  the  countiy  an  authorized  notice  of  the  patri- 
otic alliance.     In  a  few  davs  he  started  to  his  home  in  lUi- 


THE  CALL  TO  ARMS.  77 

nois ;  and  everrwlaere  on  his  journey,  and  until  his  sudden 
death  a  few  weeks  later,  he  scarcely  ceased  his  eloquent  ap- 
peal to  his  fellow-citizens  to  rise  in  vindication  of  good 
faith,  of  system,  of  order  in  government ;  declaring,  with  sen- 
tentious vigor,  "every  man  must  be  for  the  United  States  or 
against  it ;  there  can  be  no  neutrals  in  this  war — only  pa- 
triots and  traitors." 

Such  was  the  gi-and  uprising  of  the  North.  The  South, 
ah'eady  for  three  months  past  in  the  turmoil  of  insuiTection, 
was  once  more  quickened  to  a  new  activity  in  her  fatal  enter- 
prise. She  felt  that  the  assault  on  Sumter  was  her  final  cast 
of  the  die.  Her  people  are  proud  and  impetuous,  stronger 
in  physical  than  in  moral  courage,  more  prone  to  daring  in 
behalf  of  error  than  of  suffering  to  sustain  truth.  This  qual- 
ity was  shi-ewdly  recognized  by  one  of  the  conspu'ators  when 
he  gave  his  hesitating  confederates  the  bratal  watchword : 
"You  must  sprinkle  blood  in  the  faces  of  the  peoijle." 
Sumter  was  a  bloodless  conquest,  but  it  nevertheless  filled 
the  South  with  the  intoxication  of  combat.  All  sentiment 
adverse  to  secession  and  Southern  independence  had  long 
since  disappeared  under  the  repression  of  a  despotic  public 
opinion  ;  but  now  the  fei-vor  of  a  fanatical  crusade  transfused 
the  whole  Southern  population ;  and  their  motley  array  of 
palmetto  banners,  rattlesnake  flags,  and  almost  as  eccentric 
varieties  of  "  stars  and  bars,"  became,  in  their  wild  i^olitical 
lunacy,  the  symbols  of  a  holy  deliverance. 

The  Sumter  bombardment,  Lincoln's  proclamation,  and 
the  enthusiastic  war-spirit  of  the  North,  left  the  Confeder- 
ate authorities  at  Montgomeiy  no  further  hope  of  obtaining 
peaceable  separation  by  diplomacy  or  intrigue.  In  their 
scheme  of  independence,  while  counting,  with  much  gi-eater 
accuracy  than  outsiders,  upon  the  latent  military  resources 
of  the  South,  they  nevertheless  seem  to  have  based  their 


78        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

ultimate  reliance  upon  foreign  intervention  in  their  belialf. 
"  Cotton  is  king,"  they  argued  ;  Europe  cannot  exist  without 
it ;  therefore,  when  American  civil  war  locks  up  that  daily 
food  of  European  looms,  and  takes  the  means  of  earning 
daily  bread  from  foreign  labor,  dividends  from  foreign  capi- 
tal, and  activity  from  foreign  commerce,  Eui'opean  govern- 
ments must  open  our  jiorts  by  recognizing  and  protecting 
our  flag,  especially  if,  in  addition  to  their  needed  manufac- 
tuiing  staple,  we  temj^t  them  with  the  commercial  han'est 
of  free  trade. 

As  the  entering  wedge  to  this  i^olicy,  Jefferson  Da"\-is,  on 
the  17th  of  Ajjril,  issued  his  proclamation,  offering  letters  of 
marque  and  reprisal,  "under  the  seal  of  these  Confederate 
States,"  to  armed  privateers  of  any  nation.  The  commercial 
classes  of  England  had,  since  the  secession  of  South  Caro- 
lina, manifested  a  strong  sympathy  for  the  rebellion,  and  he 
doubtless  expected  that  the  seas  would  soon  swaiTU  viith  pred- 
atory adventurers  under  shelter  of  the  "  stars  and  bar^."  A 
few  vessels  of  this  character*  did,  in  the  subsequent  years  of 
the  war,  inflict  incalculable  damage  upon  shii^ping  sailing 
under  the  Federal  flag ;  but  the  extravagant  scheme,  of 
which  this  privateering  proclamation  was  the  key-note,  with- 
ered in  an  early  blight.  Two  days  after  its  appearance 
President  Lincoln  issued  a  countef-ijroclamation,  instituting 
a  rigid  blockade  of  the  insurgent  jjorts,  and  threatening  that 
Jefferson  Da^ds'  privateers  should  be  "  held  amenable  to  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  for  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  piracy  " — a  warning  which,  from  motives  of  public 
policy  and  the  humane  personal  instincts  of  the  President, 
was  not  literally  enforced.  The  unexampled  increase  of  the 
United  States  NaN-y,  the  cxtraordinaiy  efficiency  of  the  block- 
ade, the  \-igilant  foreign  diplomatic  sei-vice  of  the  adminis- 
ti-ation,  and,  above  all,  its  >agorous  prosecution  of  the  war, 


THE   CALL  TO   ARMS.  79 

left  foreign  powers  no  sufficient  excuse,  and  overawed  all 
passing  temptations  to  intervene.  And  when  tlie  hour  of 
distress  and  trial  finally  came  to  the  industrial  classes  of 
England,  the  noble  devotion  of  the  Manchester  cotton  oper- 
atives to  universal  liberty  put  to  shame  and  impotence  the 
greedy  cuj^idity  of  the  cotton  merchants  of  LiveiTpool. 

In  addition  to  the  six  or  seven  thousand  rebel  troops  as- 
sembled at  Charleston  to  aid  in  the  reduction  of  Sumter,  and 
the  four  or  five  thousand  sent  to  Pensacola  to  undertake  the 
capture  of  Fort  Pickens,  Jeffei-son  Da\'is'  Secretary  of  War 
had,  in  anticipation  of  the  results  of  the  bombardment,  on  the 
8th  of  April  called  upon  the  seceded  States  for  a  contingent 
of  20,000,  to  which  there  was  again,  on  the  16th  of  April,  added 
a  further  call  of  34,000  volunteers.  In  seizing  the  Southern 
arsenals  the  seceded  States  had  become  possessed  of  over  one 
hundred  thousand  "serviceable"  arms;  at  least  thirty  thou- 
sand others  had  been  secured  by  purchase  fi'om  Secretary 
Floyd.  The  arsenals  also  contained  considerable  quantities  of 
miUtaiy  equipments.  A  variety  of  military  stores  were  among 
the  property  surrendered  by  Twiggs  in  Texas  ;  the  seaboard 
forts,  particularly  those  in  Charleston  Harbor,  furnished  a 
supply  of  heavj'  guns.  Southern  recmits  were  abundant ; 
and  out  of  these  ready  materials  the  Montgomery  authorities 
proceeded  as  rapidly  as  possible,  with  the  assistance  of  many 
skilful  officers  resigned  or  deserted  from  the  Federal  service, 
to  improA-ise  an  army.  Diplomatic  agents  were  sent  in  haste 
to  European  courts.  Measures  were  taken  to  thoroughly 
fortify  the  coast ;  pennission  was  sought  from  the  neighbor- 
ing States  to  blockade  the  Mississii^iji  Eiver  as  high  as  Vicks- 
burg  and  Memphis.  The  Confederate  Congi-ess  was  con- 
vened in  sjjecial  session ;  and  on  April  29th  Jefferson  Davis 
sent  them  his  message,  announcing  that  he  had  "  in  the  field, 
at  Charleston,  Pensacola,  Forts  Morgan,  Jackson,  St.  Philip, 


80  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

and  Pulaski,  uineteen  tliousand  men,  and  sixteen  thousand 
are  now  en  route  for  Virginia."  Also,  that  ho  further  pro- 
posed "  to  organize  and  hold  in  readiness  for  instant  action," 
an  annj  of  one  hundred  thousand  men. 

Between  the  fall  of  Sumter,  however,  and  the  date  of  this 
message,  the  whole  revolution  had  undergone  a  remarkably 
rapid  development,  which  essentially  changed  the  scope  and 
character  of  the  contest.  Hitherto  the  Border  Slave  States, 
as  they  were  called — Maiyland,  Yii'ginia,  North  Carolina, 
Tennessee,  Kentucky,  Arkansas,  and  Missouri — though  from 
the  beginning  also  deeply  agitated,  had  taken  no  decisive 
action.  Their  people  were  divided  in  symj)athy  and  interest ; 
they  favored  slavery,  but  they  also  loved  the  Union.  Every 
expression  through  a  popular  vote  indicated  strongly  pre- 
l)onderant  loyalty ;  but  with  one  excejjtion  their  State  offi- 
cials were  already  secretly  leagued  with  the  secession  con- 
spu-ators.  Uiion  them,  too,  the  bombardment  of  Sumter  fell 
like  a  sudden  touchstone.  The  proclamation  of  President 
Lincoln,  and  the  requisition  of  the  Secretaiy  of  War  for 
their  quota  of  Union  volunteers,  left  them  no  further  chance 
of  concealment.  Compelled  to  take  sides,  their  various  gov- 
ernors replied  to  the  call  in  an  insulting  and  contumacious 
refusal.  From  that  time  foi-ward  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
Tennessee,  and  Arkansas  were  practically  part  and  parcel  of 
the  rebellion,  though  some  of  these  did  not  immediately 
make  a  jjretence  of  formal  adhesion  by  ordinances  or  mili- 
tary leagues.  It  would  be  both  '  tedious  and  needless  to 
detail  the  various  steps  and  j^hases  of  their  seeming  revolt ; 
i'  is  a  record  of  bold  conspiracy,  shameless  usui^pation,  and 
despotic  military  domination,  made  possible  by  the  sudden 
rush  of  popular  excitement  and  jjassion  consequent  ujjon 
the  fall  of  Sumter.  The  three  others,  Man-land,  Kentucky, 
and  Missouri,  and  also  the  western  half  of  Virginia,  were 


THE  CALL  TO  ARMS.  81 

eventually  saved  to  the  Union,  partly  by  the  inherent  loyalty 
of  their  peoi^le,  partly  by  the  quick  and  sustaining  presence 
of  the  Union  forces. 

By  these  adhesions  the  revolution  at  a  single  bound  aug- 
mented its  area  almost  one-half,  and  nearly  doubled  its  sup- 
porting population,  its  material  resources,  its  claim  to  the 
serious  attention  of  foreign  nations.  Its  cliiefs  and  leaders 
were,  of  course,  corresiDondingly  elated  and  hopeful.  "With 
a  tei-ritory  nearly  four  times  as  large  as  France ;  with  five 
and  a  half  millions  of  whites,  and  three  and  a  half  millions  of 
blacks  ;  producing  by  her  agriculture  a  single  staple,  cotton, 
valued  at  two  hundred  million  dollars  annually ;  with  a  greatly 
diversified  climate  ;  with  a  long  sea-coast,  with  several  impor- 
tant harbors  and  many  navigable  rivers ;  with  mountains,  with 
mines,  with  forests  containing  the  most  valuable  ship-timber 
in  the  world  ;  with  a  greater  variety  of  field  and  garden  pro- 
ducts than  usually  falls  to  the  lot  of  a  single  people — they  be- 
lieved that  they  possessed  the  substantial  elements  of  a  homo- 
geneous, j)rosperous,  and  powerful  nation. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

BALTIMORE. 

Of  all  the  Border  Slave  States,  Virginia  held  the  most 
equivocal  and  deceptive  attitude.  Beyond  all  doubt  a  ma- 
jority of  her  people  desired  to  adhere  to  the  Union,  and  at 
an  election  for  members  of  a  State  convention  held  in  Feb- 
ruary the  majority  of  professedly  Union  men  chosen  was  as 
three  to  one.  But  when  this  convention  met,  it  appeared 
that  many  of  these  so-called  Unionists  had  trifled  with  their 
constituents,  and  finally  betrayed  their  trust ;  they  were 
Unionists  only  upon  conditions  to  which  the  Union  would 
never  consent.  Governor  Letcher,  of  Vij-ginia,  also  labored 
in  secret  activity  to  promote  secession.  There  was  a  pestif- 
erous clique  of  radical  disunionists  about  Richmond,  and, 
under  an  outward  show  of  qualified  loyalty,  the  conspiracy 
was  almost  as  busy  and  as  potent  in  the  "  Old  Dominion"  as 
in  the  Cotton  States  themselves.  When  Sumter  fell,  all  this 
hidden  intrigue  blazed  out  into  open  insurrection.  The 
convention,  notwithstanding  many  pre\'ious  contraiy  votes, 
held-a  secret  session  on  April  17th,  and  passed  an  ordinance 
of  secession,  eighty-eight  to  fifty-five.  The  gradual  but  sys- 
tematic arming  of  the  State  militia  had  been  going  on  for  a 
year  past.  Governor  Letcher  insultingly  refused  the  Presi- 
dent's call  for  troops  on  the  16th,  and  immediately  set  mili- 
taiy  expeditions  in  movement  to  seize   the  United   States 


BALTIMORE.  83 

"Navy  Yard  at  Norfolk,  and  tlie  United  States  Armory  at  Har- 
per's Ferry.  The  convention  made  a  pretence  of  submitting 
the  question  of  secession  to  a  popular  vote,  to  be  taken  on 
May  23d  follo-«-ing ;  and  then,  as  if  in  mockery,  entered  at 
once  into  a  secret  militaiy  league  vcith.  the  "  Confederate 
States  "  on  April  24th,  placing  Jefferson  Davis  in  control  of 
all  her  armies  and  militaiy  affaii's,  and  filling  the  State  •with. 
"foreign"  regiments  from  the  South. 

In  the  Border  State  of  Maryland  the  situation  was  some- 
what different.  The  Unionists  were  also  in  the  majority, 
with  an  active  and  influential  minority  for  secession.  Here, 
&"  elsewhere,  consjiiracy  had  been  at  work  for  months,  and 
gained  many  of  the  prominent  leaders  iu  politics.  The  Le- 
gislature was  believed  to  be  unreliable.  Treason  had  so  far 
taken  a  foothold  in  the  populous  city  of  Baltimore,  that  a 
secret  recruiting  office  was  sending  enlisted  men  to  Charles- 
ton. But  all  local  demonstration  was  as  yet  baffled  by  the 
unwaveiing  loyalty  of  the  Governor  of  Mai-yland,  Thomas 
Holliday  Hicks.  He  had  refused  and  resisted  all  the  subtle 
temptations  and  schemes  of  the  traitors,  csi^ecially  in  declin- 
ing to  call  the  Legislature  together  to  give  disunion  the 
cloak  of  a  legal  starting-point. 

To  understand  correctly  the  series  of  siidden  and  startling 
events  which  now  occiu-red  in  quick  sitccession,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  bear  in  mind  that  the  ten  miles  square  of  Federal 
teiTitory  known  as  the  District  of  Columbia,  in  which  the 
capital  of  the  countiy,  Washington,  is  situated,  lies  between 
Virginia  and  Maryland,  and  was  fonned  out  of  the  original 
tenitoiy  of  those  States. 

In  all  wars,  foreign  or  domestic,  the  safety  of  the  capital, 
its  buildings,  archives,  and  officers,  is,  of  course,  a  constant 
and  a  paramount  necessity.  To  guard  the  City  of  Washing- 
ton against  a  mmored  plot  of  seizure  by  the  conspirators. 


84        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

President  Buchanan  liad  in  Januaiy  permitted  Secretary 
Holt  and  General  Scott  to  concentrate  a  small  number  of 
re^lar  troops  in  it.  Some  of  these  had  ever  since  remained 
there.  As  soon  as  President  Lincoln  decided  to  send  pro- 
visions to  Sumter,  he  had,  in  anticipation  of  coming  dangers, 
ordered  General  Scott  to  take  additional  measures  for  the 
security  of  the  capital,  and  to  that  end  authorized  him  to 
muster  into  the  sei-vice  of  the  United  States  about  fifteen 
companies  of  District  militia.  ^Mien  Sumter  fell  and  the 
proclamation  was  issued,  as  a  still  further  precaution  the 
first  few  regiments  were  ordered  dii'ectly  to  Washington. 

To  the  Massachusetts  Sixth  belongs  the  unfading  honor 
of  being  the  first  regiment,  armed  and  equipped  for  service, 
to  respond  to  the  President's  call.  Musteiong  on  Boston 
Common,  on  Tuesday  morning,  April  IGth,  it  embarked  on 
railroad  cars  on  Wednesday  evening,  Ai^ril  17th,  and,  after  a 
continuous  popular  ovation  along  the  route,  it  reached  Phila- 
delphia Thiu-sday  evening,  April  18th.  Friday,  April  19  th, 
Avas  the  anniversaiy  of  the  battle  of  Lexington,  famous  in 
American  histoiy.  Early  that  morning,  after  a  short  bivouac, 
the  regiment  was  once  more  on  its  way.  It  had  been  warned 
of  danger  in  Baltimore  ;  the  unruly  populace  was  excited  by 
a  series  of  secession  meetings ;  part  of  an  unarmed  Pennsyl- 
vania regiment  had,  in  its  ti*ansit,  been  hooted  and  stoned 
the  evening  before.  As  the  train  ajjproached  the  city,  Col- 
onel Jones,  commanding  the  Sixth,  ordered  his  men  to  load 
and  cap  their  rifles,  and  instructed  them  to  pay  no  attention 
to  insults  or  even  ordinaiy  missiles,  but  to  vigorously  return 
any  attack  with  firearms. 

A  misunderstanding  existed  about  the  method  of  proceed- 
ing. Colonel  Jones  expected  that  his  regiment  would  march 
in  a  body  through  the  open  streets,  and  had  made  his  dispo- 
sitions accordingly.     When,  therefore,  the  train  halted,  he 


BALTIMORE. 


85 


was  surprised  and  disconcerted  to  find  that  the  cars  were 
suddenly  detached  from  tlie  train  and  from  each  other,  and, 
with  the  troojjs  still  in  them,  were  rapidly  diuwn  by  horses 
through  the  streets  on  a  track  iiinning  from  the  Philadelphia 
depot  to  the  Washington  depot,  the  two  being  about  a  mile 
apart.  Himself  and  the  regimental  officers  were  in  the  first 
car ;  others  followed,  and,  until  eight  cars  had  thus  passed, 
no  detention  or  demonstration  occurred.     But   an   excited 


/ 


WASHINGTON 
DEPOT 


Route  of  the  Massachusetts  Sixth  through  Baltimore, 


crowd  meanwhile  gathered  along  the  track ;  the  ninth  car 
was  received  with  hootings  and  insults,  was  detained  by 
slight  obstiTictions,  and,  before  it  finally  reached  the  Wash- 
;  ington  depot,  its  windows  were  smashed  by  stones  and 
bricks,  and  some  of  its  occupants  wounded  by  gun-  and 
pistol-shots,  the  soldiers  having  also  returned  the  scatteiing 
fire. 

By  this  time  the  crowd,  grown  to  formidable  proportions, 
and  fully  maddened,  succeeded  in  placing  more  permanent 


86  Tlir:  OUTBRKAK  OF  RF.TlELLTOy. 

obstructions  on  the  tmck — sand,  paving-stones,  hea^Tr  an- 
chors from  a  wharf  near  by,  and  in  one  place  had  partially 
torn  up  a  small  bridge.  Four  companies  still  remained  be- 
hind ;  and  these  were  now  notified  by  the  railroad  employees 
of  the  dangers  ahead,  and  the  impossibility  of  proceeding 
in  the  cars  as  the  preceding  companies  had  done.  The  offi- 
cers thereupon  consulted  together,  and  determined  to  under- 
take the  trip  on  foot ;  and,  j^lacing  Captain  Follansbee  in 
command,  they  descended  from  their  cars,  formed  deliber- 
ately on  the  sidewalk,  and  started  forward. 

Almost  at  the  outset  they  encountered  an  improvised  pro- 
cession of  the  mob  following  a  secession  flag,  and  in  an  in- 
stant there  was  a  quick  and  short  vielee.  Disentangling 
themselves  from  this,  the  officers  urged  the  men  into  a 
double-quick,  which,  however,  only  encouraged  the  riotei*s, 
who  looked  upon  it  as  a  sign  of  fear  and  flight.  New  and 
increased  crowds  were  soon  met ;  they  were  threatened  in 
rear  and  front,  and  a  discharge  of  firearms  began  from  side- 
walks and  windows.  Then  the  order  was  given  to  return 
the  fire.  There  was  struggle,  confusion,  smoke,  hooting, 
yells  of  "nigger  thieves,"  "ti-aitors,"  men  dropping  on  the 
sidewalk  and  falling  from  windows,  and  wounded  soldiere 
crawling  feebly  away  under  the  feet  of  the  i-ushiug,  howling 
mob. 

Into  the  midst  of  this  teiTor  there  suddenly  came  a  little 
ray  of  hoi:)o  and  help.  People  began  to  shout,  "  Here  comes 
the  Mayor !  "  The  city  authorities,  who  had  been  waiting  at 
the  "Washington  Depot,  had  heard  of  the  riot  and  were  has- 
tening to  the  rescue.  The  crowd  fell  back  ;  a  man  came  up, 
shook  hands  with  Captain  Follansbee,  sa^-ing,  "I  am  the 
Mayor  of  Baltimore."  Mayor  Brown  courageously  placed 
liimself  beside  the  captain,  and,  by  voice  and  gesture,  en- 
deavored to  quell  the  tumult,  but  to  little  pmi:)ose.     The 


BALTIMORE.  87 

struggling,  fighting  column  pushed  ahead  doggedly  a  square 
or  two  farther,  the  attack  increasing  rather  than  diminishing. 
The  Mayor's  own  patience  and  temper  was  exhausted,  and, 
seizing  a  gun  from  the  hands  of  a  soldier,  he  fired  at  and 
brought  down  one  of  the  rioters. 

At  this  point.  Captain  Follansbec  states,  the  Mayor  disap- 
peared— most  iwobably,  as  it  would  seem,  because  of  the 
fortunate  arrival  of  more  effective  help.  Marshal  Kane, 
chief  of  police,  also  hastening  to  the  relief,  here  anived  on 
the  scene  of  conflict  with  a  squad  of  fifty  policemen.  Tak- 
ing advantage  of  a  favorable  instant,  he  deployed  his  men  in  a 
line  across  the  street,  opened  their  ranks  to  allow  the  troops 
to  pass  thi'ough,  and  then,  closing  his  line  again,  confronted 
the  advancing  mob  wdth  di*awn  revolvers.  The  movement 
diverted  a  moment's  attention  and  checked  the  onward  rush  ; 
the  baiTier  held  fii-m,  the  column  of  soldiers  passed  quickly 
on,  and,  though  it  met  one  or  two  slight  additional  attacks, 
it  made  its  way  to  the  Washington  Depot.  Here  also  there 
was  a  great  crowd  and  excited  tumult ;  the  men  were  got 
into  cars,  and  the  train  put  into  motion  toward  Washington 
under  much  difficulty  ;  but  no  bloodshed  occuiTed  till  at  the 
last  moment,  when  a  shower  of  stones  or  a  pistol-shot  pro- 
voked a  return  volley  from  a  window  of  the  rear  car,  killing 
a  lirominent  citizen.  The  number  of  casualties  was  never 
correctly  ascertained.  The  soldiers  lost  four  killed  and  some 
thirty  wounded  ;  the  citizens  jirobably  two  or  three  times  as 
many. 

With  the  departure  of  the  Massachusetts  Sixth,  the  Chief 
of  Police  supposed  his  immediate  troubles  at  an  end.  But 
not  yet ;  he  was  again  notified  that  a  new  riot  was  beginning 
at  the  Philadelphia  Depot.  Huri-ying  there,  he  found  that 
the  regimental  band  had  been  left  behind ;  and  worse  still, 
that  a  large  number  of  cars  constituting  the  rear  end  of  the 


88        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

train,  yet  contained  Small's  Pennsylvania  Brigade,  number- 
ing some  thousand  men,  all  unai-med.  The  fonner  had 
already  been  driven  from  their  car  and  scattered ;  the  latter 
were  just  beginning  to  debark,  entirely  ignorant  of  what 
had  happened.  Gathering  such  of  his  policemen  as  were  in 
the  neighborhood.  Marshal  Kane  iutenened  actively  and 
with  success  for  their  temporal^  protection ;  and  a  hasty 
conference  having  been  held  with  the  railroad  officers,  the 
train  was,  by  common  consent,  backed  out  of  the  depot  and 
sjDeedily  despatched  on  its  return  toward  Philadelphia. 

These  events  took  place  in  the  forenoon,  between  ten  and 
twelve  o'clock.  As  the  intelligence  of  the  riot  and  its  blood- 
shed was  dififused  through  the  gi'eat  city,  it  called  into  im- 
mediate action  the  Avorst  passions  of  the  populace.  For  the 
remainder  of  the  day  the  city  was  virtually  at  the  mercy  of 
the  mob.  By  good  fortune  no  general  or  widespread  dam- 
age or  spoliation  occurred ;  but  many  minor  acts  of  injury 
and  law-breaking  were  perpetrated  with  impunity.  Persons 
were  maltreated,  newspai^ei-s  were  mobbed,  and  stores  and 
gunshops  were  broken  into  and  robbed  of  their  contents. 

The  secession  conspirators  were  prompt  in  their  endeavor 
to  turn  the  incident  to  their  own  advantage.  Under  their 
management  a  mass  meeting  was  called  to  meet  that  after- 
noon at  four  o'clock,  in  Monument  Square,  where,  at  the  ap- 
pointed hour,  an  immense  concourse  assembled.  All  the 
sweeping  tide  of  popular  sentiment  ran  against  the  Union 
and  the  North.  There  was  not  a  National  flag  to  be  seen. 
The  State  flag  of  Maryland  was  disj^layed  above  the  rostnim. 
In  substance,  most  of  the  speeches  were  secession  hai-angues. 
Denunciation  of  the  soldiers,  eulogies  of  the  South,  appeal 
and  protest  against  invasion  and  coercion,  met  stormy  ap- 
plause. Governor  Hicks  was  called  to  the  stand,  and  yield- 
ing to  the  torrent  of  treasonable  fuiy,  made  a  short  address 


BALTIMORE.  89 

wliicli  cliimed  in  witli  the  current  outburst  of  liostile  feeling. 
He  intimated  that  the  Union  was  broken,  and  that  he  was 
ready  to  bow  before  the  will  of  the  ijeoj^le.  He  would  rather 
lose  his  right  arm  than  raise  il;  to  strike  a  sister  State. 

Finding  the  Governor  thus  giving  way,  and  the  i^opulace 
of  Baltimore  rising  in  response  to  their  revolutionary 
promptings,  the  conspii-ators  pushed  forward  their  scheme 
of  insurrection  with  all  diligence,  and  succeeded  in  placing 
Maryland  in  a  state  of  thorough  revolt  against  the  General 
Government,  which  lasted  nearly  a  week.  They  i^revailed  on 
the  Governor  to  call  out  the  militia,  which,  under  officers 
mostly  inclined  to  secession,  put  all  military  acts  and  au- 
thority directly  against  the  Union.  They  induced  him  to 
call  a  special  session  of  the  Legislature,  and  under  the  revo- 
lutionary terror  of  the  hour,  at  a  special  election  held  in 
Baltimore  the  following  week,  a  farcical  minority  vote  was 
made  to  result  in  the  choice  of  a  city  delegation  to  the  Lower 
House,  from  among  the  rankest  disunionists.  They  con- 
trolled the  City  Council,  which,  under  plea  of  public  defence, 
ajjpropriated  half  a  million  to  purchase  and  manufacture 
arms  and  gather  the  material  of  Avar.  From  Baltimore  the 
furor  spread  to  the  country  towns,  where  companies  were 
raised  and  ijatrols  established  under  the  instructions  and 
command  of  the  secession  militia  general  of  Baltimore. 
Within  a  few  days  the  United  States  flag  practically  disap- 
peared from  Maiyland. 

Their  most  effective  act  remains  yet  to  be  noticed.  Near 
midnight  of  the  day  of  the  riot  (April  19,  1861),  the  Mayor 
and  jjolice  authorities  made  an  official  order  (secret  at  the 
time,  but  subsequently  avowed)  to  burn  the  nearest  bridges 
on  the  railroads  leading  into  Baltimore  from  the  Free  States, 
and  immediately  sent  out  different  parties  (the  Chief  of 
Police  himself  leading  one  of  them),   to  execute  the  order. 


MO  Till-:   OUTBREAK   OF  REBELLION. 

Before  daylight  next  morning,  the  bridges  at  Melvale,  Relay 
House,  and  Cockeysville,  on  the  Harrisburg  road,  and  over 
the  Bush  and  Gunjiowder  Eivers  and  Harris  Creek  on  the 
Pliiladelphia  road,  were  accordingly  destroyed  by  fire,  com- 
Ijletely  severing  railroad  communication  with  the  North. 
The  excuse  was  that  they  feared  reprisal  and  revenge  from 
the  Northern  armies  ;  the  real  motive  appears  to  have  been 
the  stronger  underlying  spirit  of  insuiTection.  Mayor 
Brown  claimed  that  Governor  Hicks  approved  the  order  ; 
the  Governor  soon  afterward  publicly  and  ofBcially  denied  it. 
Whether  Mayor  Brown  was  a  secession  conspirator  seems 
doubtful ;  but  it  is  hard  to  resist  the  inference  that  the  revo- 
lutionists influenced  his  action.  The  controlling  animus  of 
the  deed  is  clearly  enough  revealed  in  a  telegram  sent  out 
that  night  by  Marshal  Kane  : 

"  Thank  you  for  your  oflTer ;  bring  your  men  in  by  the  first 
train  and  we  will  arrange  with  the  railroad  aftenvard. 
Streets  red  with  Maiyland  blood.  Send  expresses  over  the 
mountains  and  valleys  of  Maryland  and  Virginia  for  the  rifle- 
men to  come  without  delay.  Fresh  hordes  Avill  be  dowTi  on 
us  to-morrow  (the  20th).  We  will  fight  them  and  whip  them, 
or  die."  This  language  at  night,  from  the  man  who  that 
morning  had  risked  liis  life  to  protect  the  Massachusetts  sol- 
diers, sufiiciently  shows  the  overmastering  outbreak  of  revo- 
lutionan'  madness. 


CHxiPTEK  Vm. 

WASHINGTON. 

In  celebrating  the  attack  and  the  fall  of  Snmtci-  at  Mont- 
gomery by  a  congratulatory  speech  and  an  official  salute, 
the  rebel  Secretaiy  of  War  ventured  to  predict  that  the  Con- 
federate flag  would  float  over  the  capitol  at  Washington 
before  the  first  of  May.  Whether  this  was  to  be  accom- 
IDlished  by  plot,  by  open  military  campaign,  or  through 
mere  insurrectionaiy  reversion,  he  did  not  explain.  The 
idea,  however,  by  long  nursing  and  repeating,  had  become 
one  of  the  fixed  hopes  of  the  rebellion.  Wlien  the  news 
of  the  Baltimore  riot  reached  the  South,  the  fulfilment  of 
the  i^rophecy  was  believed  to  be  at  hand.  The  revolt, 
which  for  a  few  days  continually  grew  until  it  spread  over 
all  Maryland,  served  to  deepen  the  universal  impression. 
The  Baltimore  conspirators  themselves  were  animated  to 
fresh  daring  by  their  flattering  local  j^rospects.  They  sent 
at  once  to  Richmond  for  a  sujiply  of  arms.  Governor 
Letcher  responded  with  alacrity  to  their  request.  Senator 
Mason  hastened  to  Baltimore  to  give  them  encouragement 
and  advice.  Two  thousand  muskets  were  forwarded  with 
all  possible  despatch  for  their  iise.  Twenty  heavy  guns 
were  also  ordered  to  be  sent  them  a  few  days  later,  though 
it  does  not  appear  that  the  order  could  be  fully  executed. 
Meanwhile  the  Virginia  rebels  had  possessed  themselves  of 


92         THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

Hai-per's  Feny  and  established  a  camp  there,  and  from  this 
vantage-ground  they  aiTanged  a  system  of  confidential  com- 
munication with  Baltimore.  Nor  was  Richmond  alone  hojie- 
ful.  Even  Montgomery  became  inspired  by  the  ajjparently 
favorable  opportunity.  Jeflferson  Davis  telegi-aphed  (Ajji-il 
22d)  to  Governor  Letcher  :  "  Sustain  Baltimore,  if  practica- 
ble. We  reinforce  you,"  and  ordered  thirteen  regiments  to 
be  concentrated  in  the  "  foreign  country "  of  Yii-ginia ;  and 
with  all  the  confidence  of  a  positive  secret  understanding, 
the  rebel  Secretary  of  War  issued  his  requisitions  upon  the 
non-seceded  Border  Slave  States  to  furnish  a  jjortion  of  this 
force. 

In  the  North  the  bloody  act  of  Baltimore  luised  the 
ah'eady  seething  war  excitement  to  a  pitch  bordeiing  on 
frenzy,  and  the  public  exjiressions  of  indignant  wi-ath  were 
in  many  instances  disfigured  by  intemperate  clamor  for 
sweeping  and  indiscrinaiuate  vengeance  upon  that  city. 
These  ebullitions  of  hot  blood  were,  however,  eveiywhere 
wisely  turned  into  increased  ardor  and  efi'ort  to  foi^ward 
speedy  relief  and  am^jle  reinforcement  to  the  Federal  cajji- 
tal.  The  monster  meeting  of  New  York  was  held  on  the  fol- 
lowing day,  at  which  a  Union  Defence  Committee  Avas  foimed 
from  the  foremost  citizens  of  the  gi'eat  metropolis ;  and  by 
this  committee,  money,  ships,  supplies,  and  marching  regi- 
ments were  provided  and  prepared  to  meet  the  thi-eatening 
requirements  of  the  hour. 

Troops  were,  however,  already  on  the  way.  Brigadier- 
Genei-al  Butler,  with  the  Eighth  Massachusetts  Regiment, 
reached  Philadelphia  on  the  afternoon  of  the  riot.  The 
famous  Seventh  Regiment  of  New  York,  under  Colonel  Lef- 
ferts,  also  anived  there  on  the  following  morning.  Here 
the  i-ailroad  officials  gave  the  two  commanders  certain  infor- 
mation of  the  burning  of  the  i-ailroad  bridges  and  the  im- 


WASHINGTON. 


93 


possibility  of  reaching  Wasliington,  or  even  Baltimore,  by 
the  ordinary  route,  advising  tliem,  as  an  alternative,  to  pro- 
ceed by  water  to  Annapolis,  and  thence  march  overland  to 


rfolk^i-C^ 


Routes  of  Approach  to  Washington 

the  capital.  Acting  as  yet  under  separate  State  authority, 
and  unable  to  agi-ee,  the  two  regiments  proceeded  there  by 
different  routes,  one  descending  and  the  other  ascending 
Chesapeake  Bay,  Butler  amving  in  Annapolis  harbor  before 


94        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

daylight,  on  Sunday  morning,  April  21st,  and  Lefferts  join- 
ing him  there  next  morning,  Monday,  April  22d. 

On  communicating  A\-ith  the  shore,  they  were  met  by  a 
protest  from  Governor  Hicks,  waiTung  them  not  to  land. 
With  all  his  stubborn  and  ingi-ained  loyalty,  the  Governor 
was  of  a  timid  and  somewhat  vacillating  nature,  and  for  the 
moment  the  clamor  of  the  Baltimore  mob  overawed  his 
cooler  judgment.  In  this  conflict  between  lawful  duty  and 
popular  pressure,  he,  too,  caught  at  the  flimsy  j^lea  of  "  State  " 
suj^remacy,  and,  in  addition  to  presuming  to  forbid  the 
national  flag  on  Maryland  soil,  wrote  a  letter  to  the  Presi- 
dent, asking  that  the  troops  be  ordered  elsewhere,  and 
suggesting  that  Lord  Lyons,  the  British  Minister,  be  re- 
quested to  mediate  between  the  Government  and  the  rebels, 
a  projiosal  which  was  at  once  answered  by  a  dignified  rebuke 
from  Mr.  Seward. 

The  administi-ation  at,  "Wasliington  had  not  been  unmind- 
ful of  the  dangerous  condition  of  Maiyland ;  but  great  reli- 
ance was  placed  upon  the  discretion  and  loyalty  of  Governor 
Hicks  to  avert  danger.  He  had  held  several  pei*sonal  con- 
sultations with  the  President  and  Secretaiy  of  War ;  had 
agreed  to  hold  his  people  in  check,  and  furnish  four  Mary- 
land regiments  of  picked  Union  men  under  the  call ;  and  to 
make  his  compliance  easier,  the  authorities  consented  that 
these  should  not  be  ordered  South,  but  kept  on  service  in 
their  own  State,  or  in  the  District  of  Cohimbia.  The  Gover- 
nor was  frank  enough  to  acknowledge  his  failure  to  keep  his 
engagement.  "We  were  an-anging  and  organizing  forces," 
he  wrote,  "  to  protect  the  city  and  preserve  order,  but  want 
of  organization,  of  arms,  prevented  success.  They  had  arms, 
they  had  the  principal  part  of  the  organized  militaiy  forces 
with  them  ;  and  for  us  to  have  made  the  effoi*t  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, would  have  had  the  effect  to  aid  the  disorderly 


WASHINGTON.  95 

element.  They  took  possession  of  the  ai-mories,  have  the  amis 
and  ammunition,  and  I  therefore  think  it  prudent  to  decline 
(for  the  present)  responding  affirmatively  to  the  requisition 
made  by  President  Lincoln  for  four  regiments  of  infantry." 

Unfortunately  the  disaster  at  Baltimore  did  not  come  sin- 
gle-handed. At  the  pictiu-esque  little  town  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  where  the  Potomac  Eiver  flows  through  one  of  the 
gateways  in  the  Blue  Ridge,  the  United  States  had  an  exten- 
sive armory,  containing  much  valuable  machinery  for  the 
manufacture  of  rifles  and  muskets,  originally  located  there 
because  of  the  convenient  and  cheap  water-power  which  the 
river  affords.  The  town  was  famous  as  the  scene  of  John 
Brown's  invasion  and  capture.  The  seizure  of  this  place 
with  its  works  and  its  supposed  strategical  importance  was 
an  essential  item  in  the  conspiracy.  A  small  company  of 
regulars  had  been  guarding  it  since  January.  One  of  Gen- 
eral Scott's  first  orders  was  to  have  a  volunteer  regiment 
detached  to  reinforce  it,  a  precaution  which  could  not  be 
taken  earlier  because  of  the  want  of  troops.  With  the  quick 
secession  of  Virginia,  however,  the  proposed  help  came  too 
late.  Governor  Letcher  pushed  forward  his  State  forces  to 
menace  the  place  with  such  haste,  that,  on  the  night  of  April 
18th,  Lieutenant  Jones  set  fire  to  the  establishment  and 
withdrew  his  sixty  men  through  Maryland  into  Pennsylva- 
nia. The  Eebels  immediately  took  possession,  and  though 
the  fire  had  done  much  damage,  the  principal  part  of  the 
machinery  was  rescued  by  them  and  afterward  sent  to  Rich- 
mond. As  already  mentioned,  a  rebel  camp  was  immedi- 
ately established,  and  its  force  in  a  few  days  augmented  to 
two  thousand  four  hundred  men — doubtless  with  a  view  to 
join  rebellious  Maiyland  in  a  descent  upon  Washington. 

Serious  as  was  the  loss  of  Haii)er's  Feny,  a  sacrifice  of 
infinitely  greater  proportions  almost  immediately  followed. 


96        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

Near  Noi-folk,  Ya.,  was  one  of  the  principal  naval  stations 
of  the  Government,  the  Gosjiort  Navy  Yard.  This,  too,  was 
one  of  the  piizes  coveted  by  the  conspiratoi-s  ;  its  build- 
ings, suijplies,  machinery-,  diy  dock,  and  especially  a  number 
of  valuable  ships,  constituted  a  money  value  amounting  to 
many  millions  ;  and  the  imjiortance  of  their  jiossession  and 
use  to  either  the  insurgents  or  the  Government,  in  a  rebel- 
lion, was  of  course  immeasurable.  Beyond  mere  occupancy 
by  a  few  oflBcers  and  a  little  handful  of  marines,  the  place 
was  without  substantial  protection.  The  Lincoln  adminis- 
tration had  fully  realized  its  exposure,  but  for  want  of  troops 
could  send  it  no  early  reinforcements.  Such  measures  of 
precaution  as  were  possible  had  long  since  been  taken.  The 
officers  had  been  admonished  to  vigilance,  and  preparation 
made  to  bring  away  the  more  valuable  ships.  It  was  Gen- 
eral Scott's  design  to  advance  trooj^s  to  its  sujiport  the 
moment  Fortress  Monroe  should  be  secure. 

Under  these  circumstances  occurred  the  sudden  fall  of 
Sumter,  the  President's  jiroclamation,  the  secession  of  Vir- 
ginia, and  the  immediate  movement  of  Governor  Letcher's 
State  forces  against  both  Harj)er's  Feriy  and  Gosport.  As  a 
preliminary  act,  he  thought  to  absolutely  prevent  the  escape 
of  the  shij^s  by  obstructing  Elizabeth  Biver  with  small 
sunken  vessels.  The  device  did  not  completely  succeed, 
though  it  greatly  enhanced  the  danger.  It  is  possible  that 
all  might  yet  have  been  ultimately  saved,  but  for  a  contin- 
gency against  which  foresight  was  impossible.  The  ships 
were  ready  to  move  out ;  the  most  valuable  of  them — the  Mer- 
rimack— had  steam  up  and  was  on  point  of  sailing,  when, 
by  the  treacheiy  and  false  counsel  of  his  subordinate  offi- 
cers. Commandant  McCauley,  of  the  navy  yardj  whose  loy- 
alty had  hitherto  not  been  suspected,  revoked  his  i)enni.ssion 
to  let  her  depart. 


WASHINGTON.  97 

The  officers  charged  with  the  removal  humed  to  "Washing- 
ton to  obtain  superior  orders  ;  but  their  absence  and  the 
necessaiy  delay  only  rendered  the  situation  worse.  When 
they  returned  with  a  ship-of-war  and  a  regiment,  they  found 
that,  through  a  repetition  of  treasonable  advice,  the  ships  had 
been  scuttled  and  were  sinking.  It  was  decided  that  neither 
rescue  nor  defence  was  now  possible  ;  and  on  the  night  of 
April  20th,  the  officers  of  the  relieving  exjoedition  undertook 
to  destroy  the  yard,  propei-ty,  and  all  the  ships,  except  one, 
in  a  great  conflagration,  to  prevent  their  falling  into  rebel 
hands — an  attempt,  however,  which  proved  only  partially 
successful.  Whether  or  not  the  actual  emergency  justified 
this  enormous  sacrifice,  will  perhaps  always  remain  an  open 
question  among  military  experts.  It  was  as  necessaiy  for 
the  Administration  to  confide  to  the  officers  this  discretion, 
as  similar  discretion  in  any  military  enterprise.  They  seem 
to  have  acted  in  good  faith  and  upon  their  best  judgment, 
and  their  action  was  accepted,  perhaps  with  regret,  but  with 
full  acquittal  of  duty  conscientiously  discharged. 

It  may  well  be  imagined  that  the  authorities  and  inhabi- 
tants of  the  national  cajDital  watched  the  development  of  re- 
bellion in  the  neighboring  States  of  Virginia  and  Maryland 
with  the  keenest  anxiety.  Washington,  in  tradition,  tone, 
and  aspiration,  was  essentially  a  Southern  city.  Slavery  ex- 
isted and  the  local  slave-trade  flourished  here  ;  in  latter 
times  the  maintenance  of  the  institution  in  the  District  of 
Columbia  formed  a  distinct  i^lank  in  Democratic  platforms. 
Southern  aiTOgance  and  Southern  ambition  had  long  domi- 
nated official  society.  All  the  cant  and  all  the  sneers  of  the 
haut  ton  of  the  capital  were  vented  against  mercenary  Yan- 
keedom,  and  the  rastic  and  provincial  West,  which  had  won 
the  late  presidential  election.  The  confusion  and  contro- 
versy of  faction  exhibited  during  the  winter  session  of  Con- 
7 


98         THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

gress  shook  the  faith  of  many  a  political  veteran.  The  se- 
cession harangues  of  conspicuous  fire-eaters  were  openly  ap- 
plauded from  the  House  and  Senate  galleries.  As  the  social 
lights  faded  one  by  one  from  the  Congressional  corridors 
and  the  promenades  of  Lafayette  Park  and  Pennsylvania 
Avenue,  the  social  sympathies  of  Washington  to  a  large  ex- 
tent followed  them  into  the  ecli^jse  of  their  "foreign"  con- 
federacy. These  too,  notwithstanding  their  complaints  and 
defiance,  departed  with  an  e\-ident  reluctance  and  regi-et 
into  a  countiy  without  a  capital,  and  whose  social  and  ofti- 
cial  circles  were  yet  in  embiyo.  A  few  were  so  unguarded 
as  to  distribute  confidential  nods  and  winks  that  they  ex- 
jjected  soon  to  return ;  while  no  doubt  all  nursed  the  long- 
ing hoi^e  that  at  no  distant  day  they  might  reclaim  and  re- 
enter the  city  as  theii*  projier  and  natiiral  heritage.  It  was 
this  almost  univei"sal  Soiithern  feeling  which  foiuid  expres- 
sion in  the  prediction  of  the  rebel  Secretaiy  of  War,  that  the 
rebel  flag  would  float  over  the  dome  of  the  cai^itol  before 
the  fii-st  of  May. 

There  was,  therefore,  great  doubt  about  the  disposition 
and  loyalty  of  the  resident  poi^ulation ;  and  the  startling 
succession  of  disasters  to  the  Union  cause  created  a  pro- 
found impression.  Virginia's  secession  on  the  17th ;  Har- 
per's Feny  lost  on  the  18th ;  Baltimore  in  arms,  and  the 
Norih  effectuaUy  cut  off  on  the  19th ;  the  Gosport  Navy 
Yard  sacrificed  on  the  20th — where  would  the  tide  of  misfor- 
tune stop?  Wavering  Unionists  found  no  gi-eat  difliculty 
in  forecasting  the  final  success  of  rebellion ;  sanguine  seces- 
sionists already  in  their  ^•isions  saw  the  stars  ancL  strijies 
banished  to  the  north  of  Mason  and  Dixon's  line. 

Whatever  the  doubt,  there  was  no  other  present  resource 
but  to  rely  largely  ujion  the  good  faith  and  order  of  Wash- 
ington City.     The  whole  matter  had  been  under  the  almost 


WASHINGTON.  99 

constant  investigation  of  General  Scott  and  his  subordinates 
since  Januaiy ;  and  officers  of  earnestness  and  good  judg- 
ment assured  liina  tliat  tlie  local  militia  would  stand  by  the 
Govemment  and  the  flag.  In  that  assurance  fifteen  compa- 
nies of  volunteers  had,  since  the  9th  of  April,  been  enlisted, 
equipped,  and  armed  for  the  defence  of  the  city.  A  few  in- 
di\-iduals  out  of  these  companies  refused,  at  the  last  moment, 
to  take  the  oath  of  enlistment,  and  were  i^ublicly  disgraced ; 
Init  the  remainder  went  into  the  service  cheerfully,  and,  so 
far  as  is  known,  sei-ved  their  term  loyally  and  honorably. 

Cliiefly,  however.  General  Scott  relied  on  some  six  com- 
jianies  of  troops  from  the  regular  anny,  which  he  had  con- 
centrated from  various  parts  of  the  country  in  scattering 
driblets,  among  them  being  two  light  batteries  of  exception- 
ally good  discipline  and  drill.  These,  together  with  a  small 
force  of  marines  to  guard  the  marine  barracks,  were  stationed 
at  the  critical  points  in  the  city ;  secret  instmctions  were 
issued  to  designated  officers  to  hurry,  in  case  of  alarm,  to 
the  charge  and  command  of  various  piiblic  buildings  sj^e- 
cially  prepared  to  resist  sudden  ingress  or  capture,  and 
stored  with  ammunition  and  provisions  against  tempoi-ary 
siege  ;  and  pickets  and  patrols  were  sent  out  to  watch  all  the 
leading  roads  and  bridges. 

1  To  aid  thes'te,  there  had  arrived  in  the  city  two  detach- 
ments of  volunteers  from  other  States ;  the  first,  some  three 
or  four  hundred  Pennsylvanians,  on  the  evening  of  April  18th, 
who  were  armed  and  equipped  after  their  arrival ;  the  second, 
the  compact  and  courageous  Massachusetts  Sixth  Regiment, 
on  the  evening  of  April  19th,  after  having,  as  already  de< 
tailed,  fought  its  way  through  Baltimore.  This  regiment 
was  at  once  quartered  in  the  Senate  Chamber  at  the  Capitol, 
which,  with  its  extemporized  barricades,  began  to  take  on 
the  frowning  aspect  of  a  fort. 


100  TIIE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

From  the  officers  and  men  of  tins  regiment  the  President 
and  other  authorities  learned  verbally  the  dangerous  charac- 
ter and  proportions  of  the  Baltimore  riot.  This  occurred  on 
Friday.  Saturday  brought  him  not  only  many  letters  and 
telegrams  setting  forth  the  details  and  increasing  signs  of 
disaffection,  but  a  committee  from  the  Baltimore  authorities, 
to  verbally  represent  the  iinrestrained  turbulence  of  the  city, 
and  to  urge  that  fui'ther  bloodshed  be  avoided  by  stopping 
the  transit  of  troops.  General  Scott,  to  whom  the  request 
■was  at  once  referred,  desii-ing  the  speedy  presence  of  volun- 
teers to  defend  Wasliington  rather  than  to  fight  a  battle  in 
Baltimore,  suggested  that  they  might  be  mai'ched  around, 
instead  of  being  brought  thi-ough,  that  city.  To  this  sugges- 
tion President  Lincoln  readOy  agreed,  and  the  committee 
assented  to  the  an-angement.  On  the  following  day,  Sunday, 
however,  local  riot  had  risen  to  general  insurrection  in  Maiy- 
land,  and  the  authorities  of  Baltimore,  called  to  Washington 
by  the  President,  now  put  forth  the  request  that  no  more 
troops  be  brought  through  Maiyland.  Tliis  demand  the 
President  and  Cabinet  summarily  rejected.  It  was  agreed, 
however,  that,  if  no  resistance  were  offered  to  their  march, 
either  aroiind  Baltimore  or  by  way  of  Annapolis,  they  would 
not  be  forced  through  the  city,  and  with  that  assurance  the 
committee  departed. 

Pending  this  discussion  rumors  came  that  a  j)ortion  of  the 
Pennsylvania  forces  were  advancing  on  Baltimore  by  way  of 
the  route  from  Harrisbiirg,  and  the  committee  soon  returned, 
reporting  a  fresh  tuiinoil  in  Baltimore,  and  an  arming  en 
mn.tae  to  resist  their  passage.  The  movement  was  unknown 
to  the  Pi'csident ;  and  to  disabuse  the  Baltimoreans  of  any 
possible  imputation  of  bad  faith,  Lincoln  ordered  that  the 
detachment  complained  of  s]iould  return  to  Han-isburg,  and 
come  round  by  way  of  Annapolis ;  also,  however,  giN-ing  tho 


WASHINGTON.  101 

committee  formal  notice  that  he  would  not  thereafter  again 
interfere  to  change  mere  military  details.  This  order  was, 
at  the  time,  the  occasion  of  much  outcry  against  the  Presi- 
dent fi-om  excited  critics  who  totally  misapprehended  its 
scojie  and  spirit.  It  simj)ly  changed  a  dangerous,  perhaps 
impossible  march,  to  one  pi-acticable  and  comparatively  se- 
cure ;  ifc  did  not  surrender  a  general  right,  but  only  yielded 
a  non-essential  point  to  gain  a  real  military  advantage  for 
Washington. 

The  burning  of  the  raih-oad  bridges  east  and  north  of  Bal- 
timore had  permanently  interrupted  communication  before 
daylight,  on  the  morning  of  Saturday,  April  20th ;  on  Sun- 
day night,  Apiil  21st,  the  insiuTectionary  authorities  in  the 
same  place  took  possession  of  the  telegrajDh  oflBces  and 
wires,  and  AVashington  went  into  the  condition  of  an  isolated 
and  blockaded  city.  Both  from  the  Virginia  and  the  Mary- 
land side  there  came  exaggerated  rumors  of  gathering  hos- 
tile forces,  and  preparations  for  a  coup  de  main  against  the 
capital ;  and,  though  not  actually  or  visibly  threatened,  the 
city  was  in  the  very  nature  of  things  forced  into  the  priva- 
tions and  inconveniences  of  a  siege.  Military  arrangements 
and  militaiy  regulations  became  everywhere  the  rule.  The 
public  buildings  were  hedged  with  barricades  and  guarded 
by  sentinels.  The  little  steamers  on  the  Potomac,  and  the 
stores  of  flour  and  grain  in  the  Georgeto'mi  mills  were 
seized  by  the  Government.  Squads  of  cavalry  dashed 
through  the  streets.  Business  practically  ceased;  the  life 
and  bustle  of  the  city  was  hushed.  Mere  sojourners,  and 
even  many  residents,  took  alarm,  and  hurried  away  by  pri- 
vate conveyance.  The  hotels,  which  had  a  week  before 
been  thronged  to  overflowing,  became  deserted,  or  were 
haunted  by  only  a  few  mute  and  white-faced  guests,  who 
looked  like  ajJiDaritions  in  contrast  with  their  recent  gayety. 


102       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

As  tlie  gloom  increased  there  began  to  be  talk  of  general 
inilitaiy  impressment  for  the  defence  of  the  city.  This  had 
the  effect  of  finally  exposing  the  loyalty  or  disloyalty  of 
many  Washington  officers,  clerks,  residents,  and  habitues 
who  had  maintained  a  dubious  silence.  On  Monday,  Apiil 
22d,  quite  a  stamj^ede  took  jjlace  into  Yu-ginia  and  the 
South;  some  hundreds  of  clerks  from  the  various  depart- 
ments of  Government,  and  a  considerable  number  of  officers 
of  the  army  and  navy,  hitherto  unable  to  decide  between 
their  treasonable  inclinations  and  the  atti-actions  of  their 
salaiies,  finally  resigned,  and  cast  their  fortunes  with  the 
Kebellion. 

The  routine  work  of  the  departments  went  on  with  its 
machine-like  monotony ;  the  cabinet  members  called  on  the 
President  and  discussed  chances  and  rumors ;  General  Scott 
conferred  with  his  subordinates,  and  made  daily  confidential 
reports  to  Lincoln.  The  situation,  however,  revealed  noth- 
ing certain  or  definite.  From  the  windows  of  the  Executive 
Mansion  a  rebel  flag  could  be  seen  flying  at  Alexandiia. 
One  mmor  asserted  that  a  hostile  detachment  was  being  as- 
sembled near  Mount  Vernon ;  a  second,  that  an  attack  on 
Fort  "Washington  was  imminent ;  a  third,  that  an  investing 
force  was  being  brought  doMTi  from  Hai-per's  Feny.  Per 
contra,  there  came  the  welcome  infonnation  that  there  were 
ships  and  voliinteers  at  Annapolis  ;  but  it  was  clouded  with 
the  rumor  that  their  landing  would  be  disputed  and  their 
march  obstructed  by  Baltimore  roughs  and  Maiyland  militia, 
A  pioneer  train  reported  the  railroad  safe  to  the  Junction, 
but  nothing  could  be  learned  of  its  contlition  beyond ;  while 
several  messengers,  despatched  to  reach  Annapolis,  had  re- 
turned unsuccessful.  What  was  transpiring  in  the  outer 
world  could  only  be  suiTuised;  whether  danger  liu-ked  far 
or  neai"  was  a  mystery  incapable  of  present  solution.     Never- 


WASHINGTON.  103 

tlieless,  tlie  President  and  Cabinet  were  not  only  calm,  biit 
liopefvil,  under  General  Scott's  assurance  that,  with  liis  pres- 
ent force,  the  city  and  all  the  public  buildings  were  entirely 
safe  against  ten  thousand  troops  not  better  than  the  District 
volunteers. 

In  point  of  fact,  after  some  diplomacy  with  the  Governor 
and  Mayor,  the  Massachusetts  Eighth  and  New  York  Seventh 
had  really  landed  at  Annapolis  on  Monday  afternoon,  Aj^ril 
22d ;  and,  after  still  further  delay  in  sifting  threatening  im- 
mors,  in  a  somewhat  deliberate  local  reconnoissance,  and  in 
repairing  a  disabled  locomotive,  the  two  regiments  started 
on  their  march  toward  Washington,  on  Wednesday,  the  24th. 
A  year  or  two  later  this  would  have  been  considered  tardy 
movement  under  the  requirements  of  urgent  danger;  but, 
considering  the  surprise,  the  anxiety,  the  suspicions  and  un- 
certainties, and  the  want  of  preparation  amid  which  they 
acted,  there  is  much  to  excuse  their  caution  and  delay. 
They  had  few  rations  and  no  transportation.  Full  of  high, 
patriotic  zeal,  they  were  new  to  the  trials  and  privations  of 
an  actual  campaign,  even  of  so  mild  a  type.  Once  started, 
however,  they  pushed  ahead  with  pluck  and  perseverance, 
and  by  daylight  next  morning  reached  Annapolis  Junction — 
a  distance  of  some  twenty  miles — without  opposition,  ha\dng 
repaired  the  railroad  track  as  they  advanced.  At  the  Junc- 
tion they  found  a  raih'oad  train  in  waiting,  which,  two  hotu-s 
later,  landed  the  famous  "  Seventh "  at  the  capital.  Then 
came  their  hour  of  i^eaceful  triumph,  in  which  they  forgot 
their  hunger  and  thirst,  their  bridge-building  in  the  broiling 
sun,  and  their  foot-sore  scouting  through  the  tedious  mid- 
night hours.  Debarking  from  the  cars  amid  the  welcome- 
shouts  of  an  assembled  throng,  and  forming  with  all  the 
ready  precision  of  their  holiday  drill,  they  marched  with  ex- 
ultant music  and  gayly  fluttering  banners  up  Pennsylvania 


lai       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

Avenue  to  the  Executive  Mansion,  to  receive  the  President's 
thankful  salute.  "With  theii*  arrival,  about  noon  of  the  25th 
of  Ai)ril,  all  the  gloom,  and  doubt,  and  feeling  of  danger  to 
tho  capital,  vanished.  In  compai-ison  with  the  unmurmuring 
endurance  that  t nidged  through  the  Yazoo  swamp.s,  and  tho 
unflinching  courage  that  faced  the  dreadful  carnage  of  the 
Wilderness,  later  in  the  war,  this  march  of  the  "Seventh" 
was  the  merest  regimental  i)icnic  ;  but  it  has  become  historic 
because  it  mai'ked  a  turning-point  in  the  national  destiny, 
and  signified  the  will  of  the  i>eople  that  the  cai)ital  of  the 
Union  should  remain  where  George  Washington  planted  it. 


CHAPTEE  IX. 

ELLSWORTH. 

It  has  akeady  been  related  in  a  previous  chapter  how 
the  incidents  immediately  following  the  fall  of  Sumter  and 
the  President's  Proclamation — the  secession  of  Virginia  and 
the  adhesion  of  other  Border  States — had  doubled  the 
strength  and  augmented  the  war  preparations  of  the  Eebel- 
lion.  Upon  the  Government  and  the  people  of  the  North 
the  experience  of  those  eventful  days  was  even  more  deci- 
sive. Whatever  hope  President  Lincoln  and  his  Cabinet  may 
have  entertained  at  the  beginning,  that  secession  could  be 
controlled  by  the  suppression  of  sporadic  insurrections  and 
the  reawakening  of  the  slumbering  or  intimidated  loyalty  of 
the  South,  necessarily  faded  out  before  the  loss  of  Virginia, 
North  Carolina,  Tennessee,  and  Ai-lsansas,  and  the  dangerous 
uprising  in  Maiyland.  Not  alone  promj)t  measures  to  save 
the  capital  of  the  nation  were  imperatively  dictated  by  the 
sudden  blockade  and  isolation  of  Washington,  but  wide- 
sj)read  civil  war,  Avaged  by  a  gigantic  army  and  nav}%  must 
become  the  inevitable  price  of  maintaining  the  Union.  For 
this  work  the  seventy-five  thousand  three-months  militia 
were  clearly  inadequate.  It  marks  President  Lincoln's 
accurate  diagnosis  of  the  public  danger,  and  his  jirompt 
courage  and  action  to  avert  it,  that,  as  early  as  April  26th, 
ten  days  after  the  fii'st  jsroclamation,  the  formation  of  a  new 


106  THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION. 

army  had  already  been  resolved  upon  ;  and  the  "War  Depart- 
ment began  giving  official  notice  that  volunteers  in  excess  of 
the  first  call  could  only  be  received  for  three  yeai-s  or  during 
the  war,  the  details  of  the  new  organizations,  to  consist  of 
42,034  volunteers,  22,714  regulars,  and  18,000  seamen,  being 
publicly  announced  on  May  3d.  No  express  jirovision  of  law 
existed  for  these  measures,  but  Lincoln  ordered  them  with- 
out hesitation,  because  the  exigency  did  not  admit  of  even 
the  short  delay  of  awaiting  the  assemblage  of  Congi-ess.  He 
was  too  tiTie  a  tyi^e  and  representative  of  the  peojDle  to  doubt 
one  instant  their  sure  support  and  apjiroval  of  a  step  which 
the  Constitution  covered  with  its  pammount  authority,  and 
its  impei-ative  personal  mandate  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States  to  "  j^reserve,  protect,  and  defend  the  Consti- 
tution of  the  United  States." 

Following  the  march  of  the  Seventh  Kegiment,  the  An- 
najiolis  route  remained  i)ei*manently  open  to  the  Union 
troojjs  from  the  North.  Day  by  day  vessels  anived  in  An- 
napolis Harbor  with  volunteer  regiments,  with  j^rovisions 
and  supplies  for  their  maintenance,  with  war  material  for 
their  equipment.  These  were  transfeiTed  rapidly  over  the 
repaired  railroad  to  Wasliington  City,  and  it  was  not  long 
before  the  National  Cajntal  resembled  a  gi-eat  militaiy  camp. 
Troops  found  temporaiy  lodgment  in  the  various  public 
buildings ;  citizen  recniits  wrote  lettei-s  home  on  the  sen- 
ators' desks,  spouted  buncombe  for  j^astime  from  the  mem- 
bers' seats  in  the  House  of  Bepresentatives,  spread  their 
lilankets  for  bivouac  in  the  ample  coiTidoi's  of  the  Patent 
Office  ;  clusters  of  tents  filled  the  public  squares  ;  regimental 
tactics,  practice  in  platoon-firing  and  artilleiy-drill  went  on 
in  the  sun-ouuding  fields ;  inspection  and  dress  parade  be- 
came fashionable  entertainments ;  military  bands  furnished 
unceasing  open-air  concerts ;  the  city  bloomed  with  national 


ELLSWORTH.  107 

flags.  Tlae  presence  of  an  army  brought  an  influx  of  ci^^l- 
ians  that  at  once  perceptibly  augmented  the  floating  popula- 
tion; and  this  Yankee  invasion  of  a  sleepy  Southern  city 
gave  Washington  a  baptism  of  Northern  life,  activity,  busi- 
ness, trade,  and  enterprise,  which,  for  the  first  time  after 
haK  a  century  of  sickly  pining,  made  the  metrojjolitan  dreams 
of  its  founder  a  substantial  hope  and  possibility. 

Under  the  vast  enlargement  of  militaiy  oi^erations  to 
which  the  defence  and  maintenance  of  the  Government  was 
now  driven  by  inexorable  events,  the  utility  and  employment 
of  the  three-months  vohmteers  became  necessarily  limited 
and  confined  to  a  few  local  objects.  The  mature  exijerience 
and  judgment  of  General  Scott  decided  that  it  would  be 
useless,  considering  their  very  short  term  of  sei'v'ice,  to 
undertake  with  their  help  more  than  the  ganisoning  of  Fort 
Monroe,  the  j^rotection  of  the  Potomac,  the  defence  of  Wash- 
ington City,  the  restoi-ation  of  the  militaiy  routes  through 
Baltimore  to  the  North  and  West,  the  political  control  of 
Man-land,  and  possibly  the  recaptui'e  of  Haii^er's  Ferry — a 
progTamme  forming  practically  one  combined  measure — the 
defence  of  the  militaiy  frontier  or  line  of  the  Potomac,  fi'om 
the  sea  to  the  mountains.  Larger  projects  must  be  post- 
poned for  preparation ;  ships  must  be  improvised  or  built  to 
enforce  the  blockade  ;  a  new  army  must  be  gathered  to  oj)en 
the  Mississi^jpi  and  restore  authority  in  the  South. 

The  rebels,  though  now  seriously  checked,  were  yet  indus- 
triously working  theii*  local  consjiii-acy  in  Maryland  to  secure 
the  final  com^jlete  insun-ection  and  adhesion  of  that  State. 
The  Legislature,  apparently  under  their  control,  had  met  at 
Frederick,  and  was  devising  legislation  under  which  to  set 
up  a  militaiy  dictatorshii).  But  the  Administration  at  Wash- 
ington allowed  them  no  time  to  gather  strength  at  home,  or 
draw  any  considerable  supplies  or  help  from  Vii'ginia.     The 


108       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

President  authorized  General  Scott  to  suspend  tlie  privilege 
of  the  writ  of  habeas  corj^us  within  certain  limits,  and  em- 
powered hini  to  aiTcst  or  disperse  the  Legislature  in  case 
they  attempted  treason.  Annapolis  was  ganisoned  and 
lightly  fortified  ;  a  militaiy  guard  was  pushed  along  the  rail- 
roads toward  Baltimore  simultaneously  from  the  South  and 
the  North ;  and,  on  May  13th,  General  Butler,  by  a  bold, 
though  entii'ely  unauthorized  movement,  entered  the  city  in 
the  dusk  of  evening,  while  a  convenient  thunder-storm  was 
raging,  with  less  than  a  thousand  men,  pai-t  of  whom  were 
the  now  famous  Massachusetts  Sixth,  and  during  the  night 
entrenched  himself  on  Federal  Hill.  General  Scott  rojiri- 
mauded  the  "hazardous"  movement ;  nevertheless,  the  little 
garrison  met  no  further  molestation  or  attack,  and  soon, 
supported  by  other  detachments,  open  resistance  to  the 
Govenmient  disappeared  from  the  entii'e  State.  Indepen- 
dent regiments  of  Maiyland  volunteers  entered  the  Federal 
service ;  a  sweeping  political  reaction  also  set  in,  demonstrat- 
ing that  the  Union  sentiment  was  largely  predominant ;  be- 
tween which  and  the  presence  of  Union  troops  the  legisla- 
tive intrigue  was  blighted,  and  the  persistent  secession 
minority  and  almost  iiTepressible  local  conspiracy  were  ef- 
fectually baffled,  though  not  without  constant  -s-igilance  and 
severe  discipline  throughout  the  remainder  of  the  year. 

While  the  Government  was  thus  mainly  occupied  in  re- 
storing its  authority  in  Maryland,  the  rebels  were  busy  in 
militaiy  organization  in  various  parts  of  Virginia.  Among 
the  resignations  from  the  Federal  army  were  two  officers  of 
especial  prominence — Joseph  E.  Johnston,  Quartermaster- 
General,  of  the  rank  of  Brigadier-General,  and  Kobert  E. 
Lee,  lately  promoted  to  bo  Colonel  of  the  Fii-st  Cavaliy. 
Lee  was  an  oflScer  of  great  promise,  and  a  personal  favorite 
of  General  Scott,  who  at  once  conceived  the  idea  of  putting 


ELLSWORTH.  109 

Lim  at  the  head  of  the  Union  army  about  to  take  the  field ; 
and,  on  Saturday,  April  20th,  an  infoimal  and  unofficial  ten- 
der of  this  honor  appears  to  have  been  made  to  him  by 
Francis  P.  Blair,  senior,  as  coming  from  Pi'esident  Lincoln. 
In  a  letter  written  subsequent  to  the  war,  Lee  says  that  he 
declined  tliis  offer.  That  same  evening  he  wi'ote  a  resigna- 
tion from  Ai-lington,  and  on  Monday  hurried  off  to  Rich- 
mond, where  he  was  appointed  by  Governor  Letcher,  and, 
on  April  23d,  publicly  installed  to  command  the  military 
forces  of  Virginia. 

Lee  did  not  share  the  radical  clamor  of  many  of  the  Rich- 
mond conspirators  for  an  immediate  advance  to  capture 
Washington.  He  discouraged  mere  reckless  enthusiasm, 
and  urged  a  defensive  policy  and  methodical  and  thorough 
military  preparation.  CaiTying  out  this  policy  in  his  orders, 
directions  were  issued,  and  officers  sent  to  different  localities 
to  call  out  and  organize  the  State  militia,  to  diill  recruits, 
and  collect  materials  and  stores.  Under  his  management 
companies  and  regiments  soon  sprang  up,  and  Virginia,  like 
the  other  Southern  States,  gi'adually  became  a  general  camp. 
It  was  not  a  gi-eat  while  before  the  jiresence  of  a  military 
force  at  the  principal  points  along  the  Potomac  became  evi- 
dent. Its  concentration  and  offensive  action  either  to  close 
the  river  to  navigation,  or,  when  sufficiently  strong,  against 
"Washington,  was,  of  coiu-se,  only  a  question  of  time.  The 
contact  of  hostile  armies  unavoidably  provokes  conflict. 

These  changing  conditions  of  Virginia  required  new  jn'e- 
cautions  for  the  defence  of  Washington.  As  early  as  May 
.  3d  it  was  ascertained  by  the  local  officers  and  engineers  that 
the  Cai)itol  building  was  only  three  and  a  half  miles  from 
Arlington  Heights  on  the  Virginia  side  of  the  liver,  the 
Execiitive  Mansion  and  various  department  buildings  but 
two  and  a  half,  and  Georgetown  within  one  mile.     The  en- 


no        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

emy  ah-eady  had  a  detacliment  quartered  at  Alexandria ;  re- 
inforcements from  the  South  might,  in  a  single  night,  oceuiiy 
the  heights  and  destroy  the  Virginia  end  of  the  bridges, 
and,  speedily  erecting  mortar  batteries,  could  destroy  the 
city  with  bombs,  unless  they  ■were  attacked  at  a  disad\-antttge 
and  dislodged.  It  was,  therefore,  decided  that  the  Union 
forces  must  occupy  Ai-lington  Heights  to  insure  the  safety 
of  the  city,  though  the  necessaiy  troops  could  not  as  yet 
be  spared  from  the  operations  to  secure  Maiyland;  and 
by  reason  of  various  delays,  three  weeks  more  passed  away 
before  the  full  preparations  for  the  entei-prise  were  eom- 
l)leted. 

Finally,  at  two  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  May  24th,  three 
columns  crossed  the  Potomac  and  entered  on  the  "  sacred 
soil "  of  the  Old  Dominion :  three  regiments  by  the  Aque- 
duct at  Georgetown,  four  regiments  by  the  Long  Bridge 
from  Washington,  and  one  regiment,  Ellsworth's  Zouaves, 
from  their  camp  below  the  city  directly  by  steamer  to 
Alexandria,  the  war  steamer  Pawnee  being  anchored  off 
shore  to  protect  the  landing.  The  movement  met  no  oppo- 
sition ;  no  considerable  rebel  force  was  stationed  at  the 
bridges,  and  the  detachment  at  Alexandria,  excepting  a  small 
troop  of  cavaliy,  which  was  captured,  evacuated  that  place 
on  recei\'ing  a  notice,  sent  without  authority  by  the  com- 
mander of  the  Pawnee,  to  surrender  or  retire. 

It  had  been  a  beautiful  moonlight  night ;  all  the  regi- 
ments were  filled  with  an  eager  enthusiasm  for  the  march ; 
the  preparations  were  careful,  the  officers  to  supervise  it 
intelligent  and  competent,  the  movements  promi>tly  begun 
and  successfully  completed.  The  whole  entei-i)rise  seemed 
on  the  very  point  of  conclusion  without  an  accident,  when 
sudden  news  of  the  assassination  of  Colonel  Ellsworth  not 
only  saddened  the  camjis  on  both  sides  of  the  Potomac,  but 


ELLSWORTH.  Ill 

east  a  new  gloom,  and  spread  a  feeling  of  bitter  ^•indictive- 
ness  throughout  every  loyal  State. 

Colonel  Ellsworth  was  a  young  man  of  twenty -four,  who, 
by  the  possession  of  a  phenomenal  combination  of  genius, 
energy,  and  self-confidence,  had  won  the  attention  and  ad- 
miration of  the  whole  country.  But  a  few  years  ago,  foiled 
by  misfortune  in  an  attempt  to  begin  professional  Hfe  in 
Chicago,  he  had  suddenly  found  himself  without  money  or 
friends — almost  without  bread.  By  the  endurance  of  ex- 
treme privations,  the  pittance  which  he  managed  to  earn 
with  some  temi^orai-y  writing  kept  ofi"  stai-vation.  His  ener- 
getic natui-e  made  active  occuijation  a  necessity  ;  and  per- 
hai^s  as  much  to  consume  the  evening  hours,  as  with  any 
other  fixed  iiurjjose,  he  became  interested  in  studying  and 
teaching  others  the  manual  of  military  drill.  This  led  to  the 
fonnation  of  a  little  volunteer  company  of  about  sixty  Chi- 
cago youths — clerks  and  business  emj)loyees — under  his  com- 
mand. Into  their  instruction  he  threw  such  a  degree  of 
enthusiasm,  such  originality  in  remodelling  and  adajDtiug  old 
methods,  such  a  grasji  of  purpose,  and  such  a  genius  of  con- 
trol, that,  after  about  a  year's  training,  he  not  only  carried 
ofif  the  i^rizes  for  drill  at  the  fairs  and  exhibitions  in  the 
neighboring  counties,  but  confidently  formed  the  bold  jn-o- 
ject  of  showing  to  the  public  of  the  great  cities  that  he  had 
the  best-di'illed  company  in  America. 

They  had  no  money,  no  commissariat,  no  transportation, 
but  a  friendly  railroad  gave  them  free  tickets  from  Chicago 
to  Detroit ;  from  there  the  proceeds  of  an  exhibition  diill 
carried  them  to  the  next  city,  and  so  on.  At  every  step  of 
their  progi-ess,  their  actual  dexterity  in  the  maniial  of  anns 
can-ied  admii-ation  and  applause  by  storm.  AiTived  at  New 
York,  they  achieved  a  double  triumph  ;  first  before  the  uni- 
formed city  militia  in  the  open  field,  and  afterward  at  night 


112  THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELUON. 

on  the  stage  of  the  Academy  of  Music,  before  as  fasliionablo 
an  andience  as  ever  iDackecI  the  walls  or  sjilit  their  kid  gloves 
to  encore  the  most  famous  jjrima  donna.  For  three  days  the 
metropolitan  newspapers  were  full  of  descriptions  of  their 
perfoimance  and  their  personal  appearance  and  history — 
above  all,  of  their  youthful  commander,  Ellsworth,  the  visible 
creator,  embodiment,  and  inspii'ation  of  their  admii'able 
accomplishment.  Determined  to  leave  no  test  imchallenged, 
they  went  even  to  show  their  proficiency  to  the  military 
school  at  West  Point,  where  the  only  criticism  that  could  be 
passed  iipon  them  was  that  they  did  not  follow  the  "  regu- 
lar "  drill  of  the  text-books.  TMien  they  finally  returned  to 
Chicago,  after  a  full  tour,  in  which  they  had  reaped  uninter- 
nipted  encouragement  and  acclaim,  the  name  and  fame  of 
Ellsworth  and  his  "  Chicago  Zouaves  "  were  a  part  of  the 
just  interest  and  pi-ide  of  the  whole  country. 

Nevertheless,  no  one  appreciated  better  than  Ellsworth 
himself  that  this  was  but  a  possible  beginning  of  better 
things.  He  had  no  ambition  to  remain  either  a  mere  drill- 
master  or  a  raree  showman,  though  his  necessities  had  com- 
pelled him  to  make  a  somewhat  spectacular  beginning. 
There  is  not  room  here  to  trace  his  higher  purposes  and 
ideals  of  a  general  militia  reform ;  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that 
for  the  bi-ain  of  a  boy  of  twenty-four  they  were  serious  and 
comprehensive.  There  was  then  no  thought  of  war ;  and 
when  Lincoln  l)ecame  President,  Ellsworth  sought  his  favor 
and  was  readily  permitted  to  accompany  him  to  Washington 
as  one  of  his  suite.  The  inauguration  over,  the  President 
made  him  a  second  lieutenant  of  dragoons.  Then  came 
Huniter  and  the  call  for  volunteers,  and  Ellsworth  saw  his 
opportunity.  Hastening  to  the  city  of  New  York,  he  called 
together  and  harangued  the  fire  companies  of  the  metropo- 
lis ;   in  three  days   he  had  twenty-two  hundred  names  in- 


ELLSWORTH.  113 

scribed  on  liis  recruiting  lists ;  ont  of  these  he  carefully 
selected  a  regiment  of  eleven  hundred  men,  who  chose  him 
their  colonel,  and,  bearing  half  a  dozen  beautiful  presenta- 
tion flags,  one  of  them  publicly  donated  by  Mrs.  Astor, 
followed  him  to  Washington,  where  they  were  mustered  into 
the  service  among  the  earliest  three  years  volunteers. 

It  was  at  the  head  of  this  regiment  that  Colonel  Ellsworth 
entered  Alexandria  at  daylight  of  May  24th.  The  rebels 
received  notice  of  his  coming,  and  most  of  them  retired  with 
sufficient  promptness  to  escape  capture.  Having  seen  the 
town  securely  occuioied  and  pickets  posted  to  prevent  sur- 
prise, Colonel  Ellsworth  remembered  the  rebel  flag  which 
had  been  for  weeks  flaunting  an  insulting  defiance  to  the 
national  capital.  It  was  hoisted  over  the  Marshall  House, 
the  principal  hotel  of  Alexandria,  and  the  Colonel  was  seized 
with  the  whim  to  take  it  down  with  his  own  hands — a  foolish 
fancy,  perhaps,  when  considered  in  cool  judgment,  bu.t  one 
very  natural  to  the  heated  enthusiasm  of  those  early  days  of 
burning  patriotic  ardor.  "  Whose  flag  is  that  flying  over 
this  house?"  demanded  he,  as  he  entered  and  ascended  the 
stairs.  "  I  don't  Icnow,"  Avas  the  only  response  he  could  ob- 
tain ;  but  the  demon  of  a  hellish  purpose  lurked  under  the 
answer.  He  mounted  to  the  roof  with  one  or  two  compan- 
ions, cut  the  halyards,  and  started  down  with  the  treasonable 
emblem  on  his  arm.  The  stairs  were  narrow  and  winding — 
they  could  descend  only  in  single  file — a  soldier  preceded 
and  followed  him.  As  he  reached  the  third  step  above  the 
landing  on  the  second  floor,  a  side  door  flew  open,  and  the 
owner  of  the  house,  a  man  named  Jackson,  who  had  been 
lurking  there  in  concealment  like  a  tiger  for  his  prey,  sijrang 
out,  and  levelling  a  double-baiTelled  shotgun,  discharged  ij 
full  in  the  Colonel's  breast — the  fatal  charge  driving  almost 
into  his  very  heart  a  gold  presentation  badge  inscribed  "Non 


114  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

nobis  sed  pro  patria."  Ellsworth  fell  forward  in  death  with- 
out even  a  groan  ;  but  the  murder  tlid  not  go  unavenged,  for 
in  that  same  instant  his  assa-ssin  also  expu-ed  by  the  double 
effect  of  a  musket-charge  and  a  bayonet-thrust  from  Ells- 
worth's foremost  comimnion. 

If  there  remained  a  jjossibility  of  a  sensational  cUmas  of 
deeper  imjjort  than  Sumter  and  Baltimore,  it  was  furnished 
by  this  hideous  tragedy  at  Alexambia.  The  North  had  sup- 
posed that  the  first  exhausted  the  cold-blooded  recklessness 
of  conspiracy.  The  second  manifested  the  sudden  fury  of 
sectional  excitement.  But  this  last  opened  an  unlooked-for 
depth  of  indiWdual  hatred,  into  which  the  i)obtical  animosi- 
ties of  years  between  the  North  and  South  had  finally 
ripened  after  four  months  of  unintemii)ted  manipulation  by 
the  consiiLracy.  Under  tliis  unwelcome  revelation  there  was 
no  longer  room  to  doubt  the  existence  of  widely  pervading 
elements  of  an  enduring  civil  war.  Ellsworth  was  buried 
with  imposing  honors,  from  the  famous  East  Room  of  the 
Executive  Mansion,  the  President,  Cabinet,  and  high  officers 
of  Government  attending  as  mourners  ;  and  as  the  telegraph 
filled  the  newspapers  with  details  of  the  sad  event,  every 
household  in  the  North  felt  as  if  the  dark  shadow  of  a 
funeral  had  lowered  over  its  own  hearthstone. 


CHAPTEE  X. 
MISSOURI. 

CoxspiKACX  bad  been  ■working  witli  untii'ing  persistence  in 
every  Slave  State  since,  and  even  before,  the  formal  seces- 
sion of  the  Cotton  States  in  January,  and  had  cveiywhere 
made  considerable  advances,  notably  in  the  State  of  Mis- 
souri. Governor  Jackson,  of  that  State,  had  leagued  himself 
with  the  secession  plot,  though  still  concealing  his  pui-jDose 
with  outwai-d  jirofessions  of  loyalty.  Many  subordinate  of- 
ficers and  members  of  the  Legislature  were  secretly  aiding 
him.  Together  they  were  leading  jMissouri  through  the 
usual  and  well-established  jiaths  to  ultimate  treason,  by 
means  of  official  recommendations  from  the  Governor  and 
various  shrewdly  devised  laws  jiassed  by  the  Legislature. 
They  made  a  serious  miscalculation,  however,  in  the  stereo- 
tyi)ed  and  hitherto  always  successfiil  expedient  of  a  State 
Convention.  When  that  body  was  elected  and  met  (Febra- 
aiy  28th),  it  showed  such  an  overwhelming  majority  of  Union 
members,  that  the  jjlotters  of  treason  were  quite  willing  to 
hide  their  defeat  in  joining  certain  jiointed  declarations  by 
the  convention  against  secession,  and  adjourning  its  sittings 
to  the  following  December,  tnisting  their  chances  to  a  more 
pliant  and  treasonable  legislatiire ;  hoijing  to  bring  about 
a  policy  of  arming  the  State  under  jn-etence  of  local  de- 
fence, and  committing  it  to  a  neutral  attitude  under  j^lea  of 


nc,        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

local  security.  In  all  their  efforts,  however,  they  met  the 
constant  and  cletermined  watchfulness  and  opposition  of 
zealous  and  fearless  Unionists,  among  whom  Frank  P.  Blair, 
junior,  was  a  consj^icuous  leader. 

It  so  happened,  also,  that  in  this  State  a  small  detachment 
of  the  regular  army  was,  for  the  first  time,  rendered  useful 
in  thwarting  the  local  development  of  di.sunion.  At  tho 
city  of  St.  Louis  was  an  arsenal  belonging  to  the  United 
States,  containing  a  considerable  quantity  of  aims  and  am- 
munition. To  obtain  these  was  from  the  beginning,  as  in 
other  States,  a  prime  object  of  Governor  Jackson  and  his 
co-conspirators.  They  had  in  Januaiy,  as  they  believed, 
perfected  an  intrigue  for  the  surrender  of  the  arsenal,  by 
the  officer  in  charge,  into  their  hands  and  control.  That 
aiTangement  was  soon  blighted  by  the  amval  of  reinforce- 
ments ordered  there  by  General  Scott  to  i^rotect  the  place, 
under  command  of  an  officer  afterward  famous — Captain 
Nathaniel  Lyon,  of  the  Second  United  States  Infantry. 

Lyon  was  a  man  of  outspoken  anti-slavery  principles,  of 
unswerving  loyalty  to  his  flag,  and  of  unsleeping  vigilance 
over  his  post  and  the  Government  interests.  By  the  middle 
of  February  enough  recruits  had  been  added  by  General 
Scott  to  his  own  comimny  of  eighty  ti-ained  regulars  to  raise 
his  force  to  four  hundred  and  eighty -eight  men. 

Holding  the  same  political  convictions  and  patriotic  im- 
pulses, Lyon  and  Blair  became  quickly  united  in  an  inti- 
mate personal  friendship  ;  and  very  soon,  also,  Lyon's  regu- 
lars and  Blair's  "  Home  Guards "  sustained  each  other  in  a 
mutual  reliance  and  protection.  Their  common  watchful- 
ness over  the  arsenal  was  by  no  means  wasted.  Governor 
Jackson  was  detennined  to  establish  by  force  wliat  he  had 
failed  to  accomplish  by  intrigue.  He  sent  two  tnisty  agents 
to  the  Rebel  President  to  solicit  help  in  arms  and  ammuni- 


MISSOURI.  117 

tion.  "After  learning,"  wrote  Jefferson  Davis,  in  reply, 
April  23cl,  "  as  well  as  I  could  from  the  gentlemen  accred- 
ited to  me,  wliat  was  most  needful  for  the  attack  on  the  ar- 
senal, I  have  directed  that  Captains  Green  and  Duke  should 
be  furnished  with  two  twelve-pounder  howitzei's  and  two 
thirty-two-pounder  guns,  with  the  proper  ammunition  for 
each.  These,  from  the  commanding  hills,  will  be  effective, 
both  against  the  ganison,  and  to  breach  the  enclosing  walls 
of  the  place." 

Encouraged  by  this  co-operation,  the  Governor,  as  his 
next  step,  instructed  one  of  his  militia  generals,  D.  M. 
Frost,  a  West  Point  graduate,  to  assemble  the  available  or- 
ganized and  equipped  volunteer  companies  of  the  State  in 
a  camp  of  instruction  at  St.  Louis.  The  Governor  had  also 
convened  his  Rebel  Legislature  to  meet  in  extra  session  on 
May  2d.  The  day  following,  May  3d,  began  the  assembling 
of  the  militia  in  "  Camj)  Jackson,"  so  named  in  honor  of  the 
Governor.  Two  regiments  and  j^art  of  a  third  soon  amved ; 
and  though  some  of  the  companies  were  either  without  po- 
litical bias,  or  of  Union  sentiment,  a  general  spirit  of  seces- 
sion pervaded  the  camp,  and  its  avenues  were  christened 
"Davis"  and  "Beauregard."  The  object  of  the  organiza- 
tion soon  became  unmistakably  linown  to  Lyon,  Blair,  and 
the  Union  Safety  Committee,  who,  by  the  aid  of  skilful  de- 
tectives, gained  information  of  all  its  movements.  On  the 
night  of  May  8th,  the  cannon,  ammunition,  and  some  mus- 
kets furnished  by  Jefferson  Da\'is,  were  landed  from  a  Now 
Orleans  steamer,  in  boxes  marked  "marble,"  and  immedi- 
ately loaded  upon  di'ays  and  hauled  out  to  the  camp. 

Under  this  threatening  disclosure,  the  Unionists  felt  they 
could  no  longer  daily  with  the  conspiracy.  Ah-eady  three 
weeks  before,  the  United  States  Arsenal  at  Liberty,  Mo., 
had  been  robbed  of  its  arms  by  the  disunionists,  and  Jeff. 


118        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

Thompson  was  known  to  be  actively  drilling  rebel  com- 
panies at  St.  Joseph.  They  could  not  aflford  to  allow  a  con- 
centration of  these  and  other  treasonable  forces.  In  the 
meanwhile  the  Washington  authorities,  receiWng  Govomcr 
Jackson's  insulting  refusal  to  furnish  troops,  had  ordered 
the  enlistment  of  Blair's  "  Home  Guards "  into  the  United 
States  service,  to  the  number  of  four  regiments,  which  order 
was  soon  increased  to  ten  thousand  men. 

With  this  force  Lyon  felt  himself  strong  enough  to  crush 
the  budding  insurrection.  On  the  morning  of  May  9th  he 
disguised  himself  in  female  garb,  and,  seating  himself  be- 
side a  friend  in  a  barouche,  was  driven  out  into  Camp  Jack- 
son, personally  and  leisurely  inspecting  its  strength,  situa- 
tion, and  militaiy  aiiproaches.  The  next  day  the  arsenal 
and  the  various  volunteer  anuories  were  alive  with  military 
preparation,  and,  at  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  Lyon,  at 
the  head  of  his  battalion  of  regulars,  with  six  pieces  of  ar- 
tilleiy  and  six  regiments  from  the  lately  organized  Missouii 
Volunteers  and  Reserve  Coii^s  (as  they  were  respectively 
called),  marched  rapidly  through  various  streets  of  St.  Louis, 
in  two  columns,  concentrating  at  Camp  Jackson.  Before 
General  Frost  was  well  aware  of  the  coming  event,  these 
regiments  had  surrounded  his  camj)  and  posted  the  batteries 
on  commanding  elevations.  The  camp  thus  invested,  with 
batteries  and  arms  ready  for  instant  action,  Lyon  sent  Frost 
a  note,  stating  that  his  command  was  regarded  as  hostile  to 
the  United  States,  and  demanding  an  immediate  surrender, 
"with  no  other  conditions  than  that  all  persons  surrendering 
under  tliis  demand  shall  be  humanely  and  kindly  treated," 
and  allowing  half  an  hour's  time  for  compliance.  The  cir- 
cumstances left  Frost  no  alternative,  and  before  the  expira- 
tion of  the  half-hour  he  gave  notice  of  his  unconditional 
surrender. 


MISSOURI.  119 

So  far  eveiytliing  had  gone  as  harmlessly  as  if  the  affair 
■wei'e  Bierelj  a  gala  parade  ;  biit  now  a  most  deplorable  oe- 
cuiTence  succeeded.  The  march,  the  halt,  and  the  capture 
greatly  excited  a  vast  crowd  which  the  occasion  di*ew  to- 
gether; and  scarcely  had  the  homeward  march  with  the 
prisoners  begun,  when  the  troojjs  were  assailed  by  secession 
rowdies  with  abusive  language,  stones,  missiles,  and  finally  a 
pistol  shot  or  two.  This  last  provoked  a  return  volley  with- 
out orders  from  one  or  two  companies,  by  which,  and  the 
desultoiT  shots  succeeding,  fifteen  to  twenty  innocent  by- 
standers and  several  soldiers  were  instantly  killed.  The 
untoward  incident  caused  a  dangerous  fennent  in  the  city, 
but  the  courageous  efforts  of  the  police  prevented  a  general 
riot. 

The  telegi'aphic  news  of  the  capture  of  Camg  Jackson 
threw  the  Governor's  revolutionaiy  cabal  and  disloyal  legis- 
lature sitting  at  Jefferson  City  into  the  utmost  consternation. 
The  Governor  immediately  sent  out  and  caused  a  bridge  on 
the  i-ailroad  from  St.  Louis  to  be  bumed,  to  prevent  any 
sudden  descent  by  Lyon  upon  the  capital ;  and  during  the 
afternoon  and  night,  the  Legislature  in  secret  session  rushed 
through  several  acts  specially  designed  to  j)romote  rebellion, 
which  they  had  before  been  concocting  with  more  circum- 
spection. A  few  days  later,  a  militaiy  bill,  viriually  making 
the  Governor  an  iiTesponsible  military  dictator,  was  formally 
passed ;  and  having  thus,  as  the  conspirators  thought,  made 
all  necessai-y  legal  preparations,  the  session  was  finally  ad- 
journed on  May  15th. 

General  Harney,  the  ranking  officer  in  the  Department  of 
the  West,  who  had  been  temporarily  called  away,  returned 
to  St.  Louis  the  day  after  the  Camp  Jackson  affair,  thus  super- 
seding Lyon  in  command.  It  must  be  explained  that  events, 
and  particularly  antecedent  conditions,  had   most  unfortu- 


120  THE  OUTBRE^VK  OF  REBELLION. 

nately  divided  the  Missouri  Unionists  into  two  bitterly  an- 
tagonistic factions,  which,  indeed,  continued  throughout  the 
whole  four  years'  war.  The  Radicals,  embracing  the  largo 
Gei-man  jiopulation  of  St.  Louis,  and  who  foi-med  the  bulk 
of  the  Home  Guard,  were  mainly  of  democi-atic  antecedents, 
and  strong  anti-slaveiy  sentiment ;  these  followed  the  leader- 
shij)  of  Blair  and  Lyon.  The  Conservatives,  more  generally 
of  American  natiWty,  belonging  rather  to  the  wealthy  and 
the  business  classes  of  the  city,  largely  of  Whig  antecedents 
and  strongly  tinged  with  the  "  Know-Nothing  "  prejudices  of 
former  years,  and  holding  veiy  tolerant  if  not  actually 
favorable  sentiments  toward  slaverv*,  grouped  themselves 
about  General  Harney.  The  Radicals  believed  in  defending 
the  Government  with  steel  and  lead ;  the  Conservatives 
trusted  tc>  reclaim  their'ening  brethren  with  forbearance  and 
moral  suasion.  Cold  after-criticism  finds  both  factions 
chargeable  with  extremes  of  feeling  and  speech ;  but  if  the 
former  were  prone  to  excessive  zeal,  the  latter  were  yet  more 
culpable  in  a  stupid  over-caution.  Such  deep  local  antago- 
nisms, however,  of  nationality,  class,  and  life-long  political 
iwejudice,  can  hardly  be  expected  to  act  with  moderation  in 
the  blinding  atmosphere  of  revolution. 

Harney  was  a  loyal  and  courageous  soldier,  but  lacked  the 
quick,  instinctive  judgment  of  the  statesman.  Beset  by  noisy 
clamor  on  both  sides,  he  vibrated  to  acts  of  conflicting 
rather  than  consistent  administration.  His  first  impulse  was 
to  order  the  disbandment  of  the  Home  Guards.  Convinced 
that  this  was  beyond  his  power,  he  soon  after  (May  1-tth) 
issued  his  proclamation  justifying  the  capture  of  Camp 
Jackson,  denouncing  the  Military  Bill  as  an  indirect  seces- 
sion ordinance,  and  declaring  that  "  Missouri  must  share  the 
destiny  of  the  Union."  He  also  announced  bis  determina- 
tion to  uphold  the  Government  of  the  United  States  "  at  all 


MISSOURL  121 

times  and  tmder  all  circtunstances ; "  but  his  measures  to 
carry  out  this  loyal  policy  were  not  chosen  with  wisdom. 

Governor  Jackson  had  at  once  proceeded  to  organize  the 
militia  of  Missouri  under  his  dictatorial  military  bill ;  and 
Frost's  military  laurels  having  withered  at  Camp  Jackson, 
the  Governor  made  ex-Governor  Sterling  Price  his  general- 
in-chief.  Price  was  less  scrupulous  in  political  strategy 
than  Harney,  and  within  a  week  he  had  enti*apped  the  un- 
wary Union  commander  into  an  agreement  which  tied  up 
the  Government  forces  in  a  role  of  mere  idle  lookers-on, 
while  Governor  Jackson's  Missouri  militia  should  without 
hinderance  i3lace  the  State  in  active  insurrection. 

"  General  Price,"  so  ran  the  agreement,  signed  on  May 
21st,  "  having  by  commission  full  authority  over  the  militia 
of  the  State  of  Missouri,  undertakes,  with  the  sanction  of 
the  Governor  of  the  State,  already  declared,  to  direct  the 
whole  power  of  the  State  officers  to  maintain  order  within 
the  State  among  the  people  thereof;  and  General  Harney 
publicly  declares  that,  this  object  being  thus  assured,  he 
can  have  no  occasion,  as  he  has  no  wish,  to  make  military 
movements  which  might  otherwise  create  excitements  and 
jealousies,  which  he  most  earnestly  desires  to  avoid." 

This  was  to  be  done  *'  in  subordination  to  the  laws  of  the 
General  and  State  Governments ;  "  but  it  gave  the  conspira- 
tors the  right  of  initiative,  and  left  them  for  a  season  the  un- 
controlled, and  even  unobserved  masters  of  the  whole  State 
.outside  of  St.  Louis.  Governor  Jackson  and  General  Price 
made  such  prompt  use  of  their  time,  that  before  the  end  of 
the  month  reports  of  outrageous  indignities  upon  Union 
men  came  from  all  parts  of  the  State,  and  finally  the  threat- 
ening rumor  that  a  rebel  invasion  from  the  Arkansas  border 
was  being  encouraged  and  rapidly  formed;  and  as  fast  as 
Harney  broxight  the  facts  to  the  notice  of  Price,  that  dis- 


122       THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION. 

Bembling  conspirator  waved  them  aside  with  an  iinvaning, 
deliberate,  and  mendacious  denial. 

This  state  of  affairs  was  terminated  on  May  30th.  ]Mis- 
Bouri  matters  had  been  watched  with  intense  and  daily  solici- 
tude at  "Washington.  Each  of  the  Union  factions  of  that 
State  had  a  siDokesman  in  the  Cabinet,  Postmaster-General 
Blaii"  favoring  Lyon  and  his  friends,  Attorney-General 
Bates  those  of  Harney ;  and  the  President  therefore  heard 
the  complaints  and  justifications  of  both  sides.  Acting  thus 
on  full  information,  Lincoln,  on  May  18th,  entrusted  Fi*ank 
P.  Blair,  junior,  with  a  confidential  discretionaiy  order  to 
relieve  Harney  whenever  he  might  deem  it  necessary.  On 
May  30th,  amid  the  thickening  jjerils  from  the  conspiracy, 
Blair  felt  himself  justified  in  acting  upon  this  discretion ; 
Harney  was  relieved,  and  Lyon  once  more  placed  in  com- 
mand under  a  newly  issued  commission  as  brigadier-general 
of  volunteers,  a  jjosition  to  which  the  first  four  Missouri 
regiments  had  unanimously  chosen  him. 

With  Lyon  once  more  in  jiower,  the  conspirators  felt  that 
the  crisis  of  theu*  intrigues  liad  come.  Governor  Jackson 
and  General  Price  therefore  solicited  an  intenaew  with  the 
new  commander,  which  being  gi-anted,  and  a  safeguard  be- 
ing furnished  them,  they  visited  St.  Louis  on  June  11th,  and 
were  met  by  Lyon  and  Blair,  in  a  conference  of  several  hours' 
duration.  As  might  have  been  expected,  their  A-iews  and 
objects  were  utterly  at  variance.  The  Governor  proposed  to 
neutralize  Missouri  by  excluding  United  States  troops  and 
disbanding  the  Home  Guards  ;  Lyon,  on  the  contraiy,  insist- 
ed that  the  Governor  should  disband  his  Missovui  militia,  and 
give  the  Government  forces  full  liberty  of  movement  and  con- 
trol throughout  the  State.  Sejiarating  ujion  these  irrecon- 
cilable propositions,  Governor  Jackson  and  General  Pi-ice 
hastened  back  to  Jefferson  City  that  same  night,  burning  the 


MISSOURI.  123 

railroad  bridges  beliind  them  to  prevent  j^ursiiit ;  and  on  tlie 
following  day,  June  12th,  the  Governor  issued  a  revolution- 
ary proclamation,  calling  fifty  thousand  militia  into  active 
service  to  "repel  invasion." 

Lyon  evidently  expected  little  else  from  the  rebellious 
Governor,  for  he  seems  to  have  been  ready  with  plans  and 
preparations  to  act  against  the  open  insurrection  that  func- 
tionaiy  so  defiantly  proclaimed.  The  Missouri  Eiver  fur- 
nished a  convenient  military  highway  to  the  capital  of  the 
State  ;  and  by  the  afternoon  of  June  13th,  Lyon  had  an  ex- 
pedition of  three  swift  river  steamers,  containing  a  company 
of  his  regulars  and  several  battalions  of  volunteers,  in  mo- 
tion. They  anived  before  Jefferson  City  on  the  15th  of 
June,  landed  without  opi)osition,  occupied  the  town,  and 
once  more  raised  the  Union  flag  over  the  State  House. 
Governor  Jackson  and  his  Secretaiy  of  State  precipitately 
fled,  caiTying  with  them  only  the  gi-eat  seal  of  the  State,  to 
use  in  certifying  their  future  publications  under  the  pre- 
tended aiithority  of  Missouri. 

Learning  at  Jefferson  City  that  the  Governor  and  General 
Price  were  gathering  a  force  and  preparing  to  make  a  stand 
at  Boonville,  a  town  fifty  miles  faiiher  uj)  the  Missouri 
River,  Lyon,  on  June  16th,  the  day  following  his  anival, 
leav'ing  but  a  small  guard  at  the  capital,  again  hurriedly 
embarked  his  men,  numbering  about  two  thousand,  and 
pushed  energetically  ahead,  detennined  to  leave  the  enemy 
no  time  to  recruit  an  army.  The  steamers  passed  over  the 
intervening  distance  during  the  night,  and  early  next  morn- 
ing (June  17th)  Lyon  made  an  unopposed  landing  four  miles 
below  Boomdlle.  The  Governor's  rallying  call  had  indeed 
already  been  responded  to  by  several  thousand  Missoimans, 
being,  however,  almost  totally  without  organization,  and 
veiy  poorly  armed.     Half-way  from  his  landing-place  to  the 


124       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

town  Lvon  found  a  rebel  line  strongly  jjostod ;  a  r.pinted 
fusillade  quickly  ensued,  and  for  about  twenty  minutes  the 
Union  advance,  composed  of  perhaps  five  hundred  men,  was 
held  iu  check.  The  enemy  could,  however,  not  long  with- 
stand the  fire  of  a  regular  batterj'  which  was  brought  up, 
and  which,  with  the  well-delivered  volleys  of  the  better- 
drilled  Union  volunteers,  soon  routed  them  in  a  general 
panic  and  flight.  General  Price  early  retired  from  Boon- 
■ville  on  jilea  of  illness  ;  while  Governor  Jackson,  who  viewed 
the  battle  from  a  convenient  hill  some  two  miles  off,  seeing 
the  disastrous  result,  once  more  betook  himself  to  flight. 
Two  on  the  Union,  and  fifteen  on  the  rebel  side,  were  re- 
ported killed,  with  the  usual  corresponding  number  of 
wounded.  Twenty  prisoners,  two  six-pounder  guns,  two  se- 
cession flags,  and  the  various  suiii)lies  of  the  rebel  camp, 
furnished  the  Union  force  substantial  trophies  of  victory. 
JIo\-ing  cautiously  foi-ward,  Lyon  occupied  the  town  of  Boon- 
ville,  and  issued  a  quieting  jn-oclamation  to  its  terror-stricken 
inhabitants,  while  the  immature  and  boyish  prisoners  he  had 
cai^tured  were  released  on  parole.  This  battle  of  Boonville 
ends  the  administration  of  Governor  Jackson — he  had  long 
before  forfeited  his  honor  and  authority  by  covei-t  treason ; 
from  henceforth  his  role  is  not  only  that  of  an  oi>en  traitor, 
but  also  of  a  mere  fugitive  pretender. 

The  insurrection  and  flight  of  the  Stat«  officers  left  Mis- 
souii  without  local  government.  It  happened,  fortunately, 
that  the  State  Convention,  when  in  March  it  took  a  recess  to 
the  following  DecemV>er,  empowered  a  select  committee  to 
call  it  together  at  any  time  upon  a  pressing  emergency. 
The  emergency  having  thus  come,  the  committee  issued  its 
call ;  and  the  convention,  minus  some  of  its  disloyal  mem- 
bers, but  yet  baring  a  full  constitutional  (piorum,  met  onco 
more  in  Jeflei-sou  City,  on  the  2l2d  of  July.     It  proceeded  by 


MISSOURI  125 

ordinance  to  declare  the  State  offices  vacant,  to  abrogate  tlie 
Militaiy  Bill  and  other  treasonable  legislation,  and  provide 
for  new  elections ;  and  finallv,  on  the  31st  of  July,  it  elected 
and  inaugurated  a  pro%-isional  government,  whicli  thereafter 
made  the  city  of  St.  Louis  its  official  headquarters.  Hamil- 
ton E.  Gamble,  a  Conseivative,  was  made  Governor ;  he  an- 
nounced his  unconditional  adherence  to  the  Union,  and  his 
authority  was  duly  recognized  by  all  those  i:»oi'tions  of  the 
State  which  were  not  under  militaiy  control  of  the  rebels 
during  the  fluctuating  fortunes  of  the  local  guerilla  warfare 
by  which  Missouri  was  so  long  tonuented  and  desolated. 


CHAPTER  XL 

KENTUCKY. 

The  Allegliany  or  Api>alacliian  mountain  cliain,  a  linndred 
miles  broad  and  a  tliousand  miles  long,  extending  from  New 
York  to  Alabama,  naturally  sepai-ated  the  countiy  into  two 
2)rincipal  militaiy  di\'isions  :  that  of  the  East,  comprising 
the  Atlantic  Coast  and  the  Atlantic  States  ;  that  of  the  West, 
comprising  the  Mississippi  River  and  its  tributaries,  and  the 
"whole  immense  ten-itoiy  of  the  Mississippi  Valley.  In  the 
East,  the  line  of  hostility  quickly  established  itself  along 
the  Potomac  E-iyer,  with  "Washington  as  its  strategical  cen- 
tre ;  this  grew  partly  out  of  the  jiaramount  necessity  of  de- 
fending the  capital,  but  also  largely  from  the  fact  that  the 
line  from  the  sea  to  the  mountains  was  not  more  than  a  hun- 
dred miles  long,  and  could  therefore  be  occupied  and  ob- 
.seiTed  without  delay.  In  the  "West  the  distance  from  the 
mountains  to  the  Mississippi  River  was  nearly  ten  times  as 
great.  This  alone  would  have  retarded  the  definition  of  the 
militaiy  frontier ;  but  the  chief  element  of  uncertainty  and 
delay  was  furnished  by  the  peculiar  jiolitical  contlition  of 
the  State  of  Kentucky,  which  of  itself  extends  the  whole 
distance  from  Virginia  to  Missoiui. 

It  cannot  i)erhai)s  be  afflnned  with  certainty  that  Governor 
Magoffin  of  Kentucky  was  a  secession  conspirator ;  but  his 
own  language  leaves  no  doubt  that  in  opinion  and  expecta- 


KENTUCKY.  127 

tion  lio  was  a  disimionist.  He  had  remonstrated  against  tlie 
rash  and  separate  movements  of  Sotith  Carolina  and  the 
Cotton  States ;  but  since  their  movement  was  made,  he 
looked  upon  it  as  final  and  irrevocable,  and  committed  him- 
self unqualifiedly  against  coercing  them  back  to  obedience. 
More  than  this,  he  argued  that  Kentucky  was  no  longer 
safe  in  the  Union,  and  declared  she  "will  not  and  ought 
not  to  submit  to  the  principles  and  policy  avowed  by  the 
Republican  party,  but  Tvill  resist,  and  resist  to  the  death,  if 
necessary." 

In  this  view,  he  recommended  to  the  Legislature,  which 
met  in  January  under  his  call,  the  project  of  a  "Sover- 
eignty "  State  Convention,  aiipropriations  to  purchase  arms, 
and  the  immediate  and  active  organization  of  the  militia. 
None  of  these  suggestions  were,  however,  adopted  by  the 
Legislature,  which  contented  itself  for  the  present  by  pro- 
testing against  coercion  as  unwise  and  inexpedient,  and  rec- 
ommending a  call  for  a  national  convention.  "While  Ken- 
tucky sentiment  was  deeply  pro-slaveiy,  and  business  and 
commerce  bound  her  strongly  to  the  South,  the  patriotic 
example  and  teachings  of  Heniy  Chiy  had  impressed  upon 
her  people  a  love  and  reverence  for  the  Union  higher  and 
purer  than  any  mere  passing  interest  or  selfish  advantage. 

Nevertheless,  as  rebellion  progressed,  the  State  became 
seriously  agitated  and  divided.  When  Sumter  fell  and  the 
President  issued  his  call  for  troops.  Governor  Magofiin  in- 
sultingly refused  comxiliance.  This  action  in  turn  greatly 
excited  the  people  of  the  three  Border  Free  States  of  Ohio, 
Indiana,  and  Illinois,  who  thus  beheld  a  not  remote  pros- 
pect of  ha\'ing  civil  war  brought  to  their  own  doors.  They 
therefore  looked  immediately  to  the  protection  and  control 
of  the  Ohio  River.  Their  enthusiastic  response  to  the  Presi- 
dent's call  had  filled  their  capitals  with  volunteers,  which 


128  THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION. 

were  being  armed  and  equipped  by  the  Government.  Ohio 
hurried  oflf  her  earliest  levies  to  Cincinnati ;  those  of  Indi- 
ana were  sent  to  her  several  exposed  river  towns.  At  the 
extreme  southern  point  of  Illinois  was  the  city  of  Cairo, 
small  in  poinilation  and  commerce,  but  in  a  military  point 
of  view  the  commanding  centre  and  key  of  the  whole  west- 
em  river  system.  Its  value  was  comprehended  both  east 
and  west.  No  sooner  had  the  Border  Slave  State  Governors 
foi-wardod  their  disloyal  refusals,  than  Secretary  Cameron 
(April  19th),  by  telegraph  requested  the  Governor  of  Illinois 
to  send  a  brigade  of  four  regiments  to  occupy  it.  There 
was  not  yet  that  total  of  militia  in  the  Avhole  State ;  but 
within  forty-eight  hours  an  improvised  expedition,  nimiber- 
ing  five  hundred  and  ninety-five  men  and  foiu-  six-pounders, 
started  from  Chicago  to  caiTy  out  the  Secretaiy's  ordei-s, 
arriving  at  Cairo  on  the  morning  of  Apiil  23d,  where  they 
were  speedily  reinforced  to  the  required  numbers. 

Under  the  Sumter  bombardment,  the  President's  call,  and 
Magofiin's  refusal,  Kentucky  was,  for  the  moment,  simply 
in  a  hopeless  bewilderment,  irresolution,  and  conflict  of 
opinion.  A  strong  minority,  arrogating  to  itself  much  more 
than  its  numerical  importance  through  noise  and  self-asser- 
tion, labored  with  zeal  and  energy  for  secession,  but  could 
make  no  substantial  progress  against  the  overv\"helming  un- 
dercurrent of  Union  sentiment ;  and  these  opposing  factions, 
with  the  ultimate  hope  of  influencing  and  gaining  the  waver- 
ing or  undecided,  joined  somewhat  unavoidably  in  an  en- 
deavor to  commit  the  State  to  an  attitude  of  strict  neutrality. 

Governor  Magoffin  and  his  personal  adherents  were  ready 
to  lend  their  official  influence  to  cany  the  State  into  rebel- 
lion. The  Governor  sent  an  agent  to  the  Governors  of 
Arkansas  and  Louisiana  to  solicit  arms ;  and  by  way  of 
justifying  the   act,   he  made  a  similar  application  to  the 


KENTUCKY.  129 

Governors  of  Indiana  and  of  Missouri.  No  substantial  suc- 
cess, however,  attended  these  efforts ;  and  the  Governor's 
application  to  the  banks  for  money  also  resulted,  in  the 
main,  in  a  discouraging  refusal,  largely  due  to  the  domi- 
nating Union  sentiment,  which  suspected  him  of  treasonable 
designs.  A  second  endeavor  to  influence  the  Legislature 
remained  equally  barren.  That  body,  which  had  only  ad- 
journed on  the  5th  of  April,  was  by  proclamation  once  more 
called  to  meet  in  a  second  special  session,  beginning  May 
2d.  The  Governor's  message,  reciting  the  stai-tling  events 
which  had  occun-ed,  stigmatized  the  President's  defence  of 
the  Government  as  "  extraordinaiy  usuii^ations,"  the  enthusi- 
astic patriotism  of  the  loyal  States  as  "the  frenzy  of  fanati- 
cism," and  asserted  with  dogmatic  stubbornness  that  "  the 
late  American  Union  is  dissolved ; "  recommending,  as  be- 
fore, a  State  convention,  militaiy  apiDroi^riations,  and  organ- 
ization of  the  militia.  He  also  sent  a  messenger  to  ask  the 
Governors  of  Ohio  and  Indiana  to  join  him  "  in  an  effort  to 
bring  about  a  tmce  between  the  General  Government  and 
the  seceded  States;"  to  which  Governor  Moiion  woi-thily 
responded,  "I  do  not  recognize  the  right  of  any  State  to 
act  as  mediator  between  the  Federal  Government  and  a  re- 
bellious State." 

The  Unionists  had  a  controlling  majoxity  in  the  Legisla- 
ture, and,  considering  the  deep  agitation  and  serious  di\i- 
sions  in  Kentucky,  used  their  power  with  gi-eat  moderation 
and  tact,  doing  as  much  both  to  aid  the  Government  and  to 
embarrass  the  conspirators"  as  was  perhaps  practicable  under 
the  circumstances.  To  still  the  prevailing  neutrality  clamor, 
the  House  of  Eepresentatives,  on  May  IGth,  passed  resolu- 
tions declaring  that  Kentucky  "  should,  during  the  contest, 
occupy  the  position  of  strict  neutrality,"  and  also  approving 
Governor  Magoffin's  refusal  to  furnish  troops.  In  substan- 
9 


1  :0        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

tial  legislation,  however,  the  Governor  received  little  aid  or 
comfort.  His  most  active  lieutenant  in  contemplated  trea- 
son was  Simon  B.  Buckner,  who  about  a  vear  before  had 
succeeded  in  obtaining  the  passage  of  a  rather  energetic  mili- 
tia law,  under  which  the  Governor  appointed  him  Inspector- 
General  and  ranking  commander  in  the  State.  It  was  liis 
and  the  Governor's  project  to  put  into  the  field  and  manip- 
ulate the  "  State  Guard  "  which  this  law  authorized,  so  as  to 
precipitate  Kentucky  into  rebellion. 

The  Legislature,  ignoring  the  Governor's  request  for  a 
State  Convention,  addi*essed  itself  mainly  to  the  task  of 
turning  the  influence  and  support  of  the  militia  system  from 
secession  to  union.  A  bill  was  framed  and  became  a  law 
May  24th,  authorizing  a  loan  of  one  million  to  jmrchase 
amis  and  munitions,  but  associating  a  controlling  Union 
Board  of  Commissioners  with  the  Governor  to  regulate  its 
disbursement  and  the  distribution  of  arms ;  authorizing 
the  formation  of  Home  Guards  for  local  defence  ;  and  while 
it  provided  that  the  arms  and  munitions  should  not  be  used 
against  the  United  States,  nor  against  the  Confederate 
States,  unless  to  protect  Kentucky  against  invasion — it  re- 
quired that  both  officers  and  men  of  the  Home  Guards  and 
State  Guards  should  alike  swear  to  support  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  and  of  Kentucky — the  former  law  hav- 
ing required  such  an  oath  from  the  officere  alone. 

"While  Kentucky  was  thus  settling  down  into  an  attitude 
of  official  neutrality,  active  popular  undercurrents  were  busy 
in  contrary  tlirections.  The  more  ardent  secession  leaders 
who  raised  companies  to  sen^e  in  the  field,  despairing  of  ob- 
taining commissions,  arms,  and  active  duty  fi-om  Governor 
Magoffin,  quietly  departed  to  obtain  enlistment  in  the 
various  rebel  camps  of  tlic  South.  On  the  other  hand,  there 
were    many    unconditional    Unionists    in    Kentuckv    who 


KENTUCKY.  131 

oi)enly  scouted  the  policy  of  neutrality,  and  wlio  from  the 
fii-st  were  eager  that  the  Government  should  begin  enlist- 
ments and  gather  an  anned  force  to  support  the  Union  sen- 
timent in  the  State.  Colonels  Guthiie  and  Woodruff  opened 
a  recmiting  office  on  the  Ohio  side  of  the  river,  and  as  early 
as  May  6th  mustered  two  regiments  into  service,  nominally 
as  the  First  and  Second  Kentucky  Volunteers,  though  in 
reality  the  men  were  principally  from  Ohio  and  Indiana. 

Notwithstanding  the  contumacious  refusals  of  the  Gover- 
nors of  the  Border  Slave  States,  President  Lincoln  was  not 
disposed  to  give  up  those  States  as  lost.  We  have  seen  that, 
both  in  Maiyland  and  Missouri,  he  authorized  direct  enlist- 
ments under  the  supei-vision  of  United  States  officers.  Lead- 
ing men  having  infoiTued  him  of  the  actual  state  of  Ken- 
tucky sentiment,  he,  on  May  7th,  siiecially  commissioned 
Major  Anderson,  of  Fort  Sumter  fame,  to  proceed  to  Cincin- 
nati and  muster  into  sei'vice  all  loyal  volunteers  who  might 
offer  themselves  from  Kentucky  and  West  Virginia.  Nor 
was  he  content  with  such  merely  negative  encouragement. 
He  felt  a  deep  solicitude  to  retain  Kentucky  on  the  Union 
side.  Veiy  soon  also  the  leading  Kentuckians,  who  at  the 
beginning  had  been  most  pertinacious  to  insist  on  neutrality, 
saw  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  State  to  maintain 
such  an  utterly  absurd  attitude.  Mr.  Lincoln,  therefore, 
with  their  knowledge  and  consent,  by  the  middle  of  May 
sent  five  thousand  muskets  to  Kentucky  in  charge  of 
Lieutenant  William  Nelson,  and  a  committee  of  prominent 
Union  leaders  superintended  their  distribution  to  companies 
of  loyal  Kentucky  volunteers  which  were  being  secretly 
formed  in  various  parts  of  the  State  ;  and  since  this  venture 
proved  successful,  larger  shipments  soon  followed.  As  yet 
all  this  was  done  quietly  and  secretly ;  for  an  election 
was  pending  in  the  State,  and  the  Unionists  wished  to  avoid 


132       THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION'. 

the  animosities  wbich  open  warlike  preparations  would  be 
sure  to  create.  The  elections  once  over,  however,  further 
disguise  was  thrown  off,  and  at  the  beginning  of  July  Lieu- 
tenant Nelson  oi)enly  established  "Camp  Dick  Bobinson" 
in  Central  Kentucky.  Into  this  he  quickly  gathered  several 
thousand  Union  volunteei*s  already  previously  recruited.  Be- 
fore Secessionists  or  neutral  Conservatives  were  well  aMare 
of  the  fact,  he  had  formed  a  self-sustaining  militaiy  post  af- 
fording a  secure  rall}'ing-place  and  suppoil  to  Kentucky 
loyalists.  Governor  Magoffin  ■WTote  an  official  letter  to 
President  Lincoln,  urging  the  removal  of  this  and  other 
Union  camps  from  the  State  ;  but  the  President  replied  that 
the  force  was  composed  exclusively  of  Kentuckians  defend- 
ing their  o^"n  homes,  and  that,  in  accordance  with  the  e^•i- 
dent  popular  sentiment  of  the  State,  he  must  decline  to 
order  them  away. 

Under  these  vaiious  influences  the  hopes  and  schemes  of 
Governor  Magoffin  and  his  consjiiiing  secession  adherents 
withered  and  failed.  The  "State  Guard"  of  Buckner  lan- 
guished, and  the  loyal  "Home  Guai-ds"  gi-ew  in  numbers 
and  effective  militai-y  strength.  So  far  it  had  been  a  contest 
of  quiet,  but  very  earnest  political  strategy,  and  the  result 
was  in  exact  conformity  to  the  dominant  popular  sentiment 
manifested  in  the  late  elections  by  decisive  Union  majorities. 
Sustained  by  this  sentiment,  the  effort  could  not  well  have 
failed ;  but  failure  was  rendered  impossible,  and  the  result 
greatly  hastened,  l)y  the  constant  presence  of  a  considerable 
number  of  Northern  troops  at  Cairo,  Cincinnati,  and  inter- 
mediate towns  on  the  border,  ready  to  intervene  with  active 
and  decisive  force,  had  the  necessity  at  any  time  become 
imminent. 

Meanwhile  suiToiinding  events  were  rapidly  matm-ing  to 
force  Kentucky  from   her  neutral  attitude.     Not  onlv  had 


KENTUCKY.  133 

hostilities  commenced  east  of  the  Alieghanies,  but  active 
minor  campaigns,  closing  with  somewhat  important  battles, 
had  taken  place  on  each  side  of  Kentucky.  Eastward  the 
rebels  were  driven  out  of  West  Virginia  with  disaster  dui-ing 
July ;  while,  to  the  west,  a  serious  invasion  of  Missouri  was 
checked  in  August  by  the  hardy,  though  over-daring  courage 
of  Lyon,  who  threw  back  a  combined  rebel  column  moving 
fi'om  Ai-kansas  northward,  unfortunately  at  the  costly  sacri- 
fice of  his  own  life.  Unlooked-for  success  at  Bull  Eun  had 
gi'catly  encouraged  the  rebellion,  but  it  felt  the  menace  of 
growing  danger  in  the  West.  Fremont  had  been  sent  to  St. 
Louis,  and,  with  a  just  pride  in  his  former  fame,  the  whole 
Northwest  was  eager  to  respond  to  liis  summons,  and  follow 
■  his  lead  in  a  grand  and  iiTesistible  expedition  down  the 
Mississippi  River  in  the  coming  autumn,  which  should 
open  the  Father  of  Waters  to  the  Union  flag  and  sever  the 
tenitory  of  the  Confederacy — a  cherished  plan  of  General 
Scott. 

The  rebel  General  Pillow — somewhat  wordy,  but  exceed- 
ingly active,  and  as  yet  the  principal  military  authority  in 
Tennessee — had  long  been  warning  Jefferson  Davis  to  pve- 
pare  against  such  an  enterprise.  He  had  been  working  with 
great  energy  to  fortify  Memi^his,  and,  by  the  middle  of 
May,  reported  that  he  would  soon  have  twenty  pieces  in  bat- 
teiy.  But  at  the  same  time  he  prophesied  that  "  an  effort 
will  be  made  to  effect  a  lodgment  at  Columbus,  fortify  that 
place,  and,  with  a  strong  invading  column,  turn  my  works, 
attack  them  in  reverse,  cmsh  my  supporting  force,  capture 
the  guns,  and  open  the  river.  The  northern  portion  of  Ten- 
nessee is  unfavorable,  from  the  extent  of  oi3en  countiy." 
He  said  he  had  asked  Governor  MagoflBn  for  permission  to 
fortify  Columbus,  adding :  "  If  he  should  withhold  his  con- 
sent, my  present  impression  is  that  I  shall  go  forward  and 


134       THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION. 

occupy  the  work  npon  the  ground  of  its  necessity  for  pro- 
tecting Tennessee." 

But  Jeflfersou  DaA-is  had  too  great  hopes  of  Kentucky  to 
create  enmity  by  forcing  her  neutrality,  and  Pillow's  scheme 
was  necessarily  postponed.  As  the  autumn  approached, 
however,  Kentucky  was  clearly  lost  to  the  "  Confederates." 
Of  the  members  of  Congress  chosen  at  the  election  held 
Juno  20th,  nine  out  of  ten  were  loyal.  At  the  general  elec- 
tion held  on  the  first  Monday  of  August,  the  Unionists 
gained  three-fourths  of  the  members  of  each  branch  of  the 
Legislature.  Meanwhile  the  danger  of  a  great  Missis.sippi 
expedition  from  the  North  grew  formidable.  The  lower 
Mississippi  flows  generally  between  level  shores,  and  oflfers 
few  points  where  the  stream  may  be  effectually  obstructed 
by  foi-titications.  It  was,  therefore,  desirable  to  secure  all 
that  were  available,  and  the  Kichmond  authorities  now  re- 
solved to  seize  and  hold  Columbus,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  it  lay  in  "  neutral "  Kentucky. 

Since  July  4th  the  defence  of  the  Mississippi  River  had 
been  specially  entmsted  to  Genei*al  Leonidas  Polk,  fonuerly 
a  bishop  in  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church,  but  who,  since 
the  outbreak  of  the  rebellion,  i)refen'ed  to  utilize  his  early 
West  Point  education,  by  laying  aside  his  clerical  fimctions 
and  accepting  a  major-genei-al's  commission  in  the  Confed- 
erate sen-ice.  On  September  5th  he  began  moving  his 
forces  northward,  N-iolatiug  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky  by 
occupj-ing  the  town  of  Hickman,  on  the  Mississippi,  within 
that  State.  The  movement  did  not  pass  unobserved ;  the 
Union  commander  at  Cairo  had,  with  eipial  >'igilance,  been 
stiulying  the  possibilities  of  the  river  system  in  his  neigh- 
borhood. On  the  following  day,  Brigadier-General  Grant 
jjroceeded,  with  two  gunboats  and  an  infantry  force,  to  take 
possession  of  the  town  of  Paducah,  at  the  confluence  of  the 


KENTUCKY,  135 

Cumberland  and  Tennessee  Bivers  witli  the  Ohio — a  move- 
ment which  bore  important  fimit  a  few  months  later.  Gen- 
eral Polk,  on  his  pai-t  still  marching  northward,  reached  and 
occupied  Columbus,  on  the  Mississipi^i,  on  September  7th. 
Having  hastily  procured  the  endorsement  of  this  step  from 
Jetferson  Davis,  General  Polk,  on  the  9th,  formally  notified 
Governor  Magoffin  of  his  presence  in  Kentucky. 

By  this  time  also,  the  Unionists  of  the  State  had  com- 
pleted and  compacted  their  organization  and  authority,  and 
demonstrated  their  strength  and  predominance.  A  new  mili- 
tary dejjartment,  consisting  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee, 
and  named  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland,  was,  on 
Aug-ust  15th,  created  at  Washington  and  placed  under  the 
command  of  General  Anderson,  and  since  September  1st 
that  officer  had  made  Louisville  his  headquarters.  On  the 
other  hand,  Buckner  had  abandoned  his  jn-ofessed  neutrality 
and  his  militia  command,  and  formally  entered  the  rebel 
senice  as  a  brigadier-general.  Stationing  himself  just 
within  Tennessee,  south  of  Middle  Kentucky,  he  was  collect- 
ing the  rebel  members  of  his  "  State  Guard"  for  a  hostile 
expedition  against  the  liomes  of  his  former  friends  and 
neighbors.  Another  rebel  force  gathering  under  Zollicoffer, 
in  East  Tennessee,  was  watching  its  opportunity  to  advance 
into  Kentucky  through  Cumberland  Gap. 

Under  these  threatening  aspects  Governor  Magoffin  com- 
municated to  the  Legislature,  then  in  session,  General  Polk's 
announcement  of  his  arrival  at  Columbus.  The  altogether 
illogical  and  false  role  of  Kentucky  neutrality  was  necessari- 
ly at  an  end.  The  Legislature,  by  express  resolutions  under 
da,te  of  Sei)tember  14th,  instracted  the  Governor  to  demand 
the  unconditional  withdrawal  of  the  rebel  forces  from  Ken- 
tucky, while  other  resolutions  called  on  General  Anderson  to 
enter  at  once  upon  the  active  defence  of  his  native  State.     A 


136       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

little  later,  Kentucky  still  further  and  finally  identified  her- 
self with  the  loyal  North.  Enlistment  under  the  Confede- 
rate flag  was  by  law  declared  a  misdemeanor,  and  the  inva- 
sion of  Kentucky  by  Confederate  soldiei-s  a  felony,  and 
hea\y  i5unishment.s  were  prescribed  for  both  offences.  And 
since  the  Home  Guards  had  only  been  organized  for  local 
protection,  the  Legislature  now  formally  authorized  the  en- 
listment of  forty  thousand  volunteers  to  "  repel  invasion," 
providing  that  they  should  be  mustered  into  the  ser\'ice  of 
the  United  States,  and  co-operate  ^^ith  the  annies  of  the 
Union. 


CHAPTER  Xn. 

WEST  VIRGINIA. 

Prior  to  1861,  the  State  of  Virginia— the  "  Old  Dominion" 
— extended  from  Chesapeake  Bay  westward  to  the  Ohio 
River.  This  broad  limit,  however,  gave  her  a  defective 
boundary.  The  Alleghany  Mountains,  running  through  the 
very  middle  of  the  State,  from  northeast  to  southwest,  com- 
pletely bisected  her  ten-itoiy  into  two  divisions  somewhat 
unequal  in  size,  and  greatly  different  in  topographical  fea- 
tui'es  and  character.  East  of  the  mountains,  the  land  rises 
from  a  broad,  low  tide-water  belt  on  the  sea-coast,  in  a  tolera- 
bly regular  gradation  of  plains  and  plateaus,  first  to  the 
Blue  Ridge,  then  to  the  main  Aijpalachian  chain ;  west  of 
the  dividing  crest,  the  country  retains  its  mountainous 
characteristics,  a  succession  of  lidges  and  a  medley  of  hills, 
till  it  reaches  the  Ohio  River.  Not  alone  through  earlier 
settlement,  but  also  by  reason  of  climate,  soil,  and  situation, 
East  Virginia  remained  the  region  of  large  plantations,  heavy 
slave  population,  and  profitable  agriculture,  especially  in 
production  of  tobacco ;  West  Virginia,  on  the  other  hand, 
became  the  home  of  hunters,  pioneers,  lumbermen,  miners, 
and  in  latter  times  the  seat  of  a  busy  manufacturing  indus- 
try— developing  a  diversified  agriculture  for  local  consump- 
tion, rather  than  the  production  of  gi'eat  staples  for  export. 
With  preponderant  population  and  wealth,  East  Virginia 


138  THE  OCTTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

absorbed  political  power,  and  selfishly  laid  and  expended 
taxes  to  her  local  advantage,  so  that  "West  Vii'ginia  was  made 
to  stand  in  the  relation  of  a  triljutary  province,  rather  tlian 
an  integral  and  equally  favored  part  of  the  commonwealth. 

So  too  gi-ew  up  essential  diflFerences  in  social  tradition  and 
aspiration.  The  tide-water  population  develoi)ed  family 
estates,  pretentious  manor-homes,  aristocratic  exclusiveness, 
ancestral  piide — peculiarities  which  could  not  tlirive  in 
hunters'  camps,  or  the  shanties  of  miners  and  lumbermen. 
The  whole  world  over,  and  in  all  ages,  mountain  and  forest 
life  has  bred  a  sjiirit  of  self-reliance,  of  personal  indepen- 
dence, of  the  recognition  of  individual  equality,  and  rights 
of  simple  manhood. 

More  than  anything  else,  however,  the  system  of  slavery 
antagonized  the  two  sections  of  the  State.  By  the  census  of 
1860,  East  Virginia  contained  472,4:94  slaves ;  while  West 
Vii'ginia,  with  half  as  much  free  poimlation,  embraced  a  total 
of  only  18,371  slaves.  It  is  therefore  not  surpiising  that  se- 
cessionism  was  rampant  in  the  east,  and  that  unionism  pre- 
vailed in  the  west.  Of  the  55  final  votes  against  the  secret 
Ordinance  of  Secession  in  the  Virginia  Convention,  32  were 
cast  by  the  West  Virginia  delegates,  14  others  were  con- 
tril)uted  from  other  mountain  counties  ;  the  jiopulous  plains 
and  lowlands  of  the  east  supplied  only  9.  As  in  other  parts 
of  the  South,  the  fungus  of  treason  grew  rankest  in  the  hot- 
beds of  the  heavy  slave  counties ;  the  poison  of  conspiracy 
infected  the  centres  of  accumulated  wealth,  of  inherited 
family  pride,  of  over-fattened  political  ambition  ;  it  was  the 
Tylers,  the  Wises,  the  Floyds,  the  Masons,  who,  stuflfed  to 
repletion  with  political  benefits,  turned  with  ungrateful 
hearts  to  destroy  the  temple  of  government,  wherein  as 
selfish  and  hypocritical  priests  they  had  conducted  a  dis- 
sembling and  perverted  worship. 


WEST  VIRGINIA.  139 

Wliile  the  Convention  of  Virginia  was  earning  on  its  ec- 
centric and  fluctuating  political  intrigues  under  guise  of 
public  deliberation,  one  of  tlie  West  Virginia  members  of- 
fered resolutions  making  a  somewliat  startling,  but  entirely 
geiTQane  application  of  the  heretical  theoiy  of  secession. 
"The  right  of  revohition,"  he  AVTote,  "can  be  exercised  as 
well  by  a  portion  of  the  citizens  of  a  State  against  their  State 
government,  as  it  can  be  exercised  by  the  whole  people  of  a 
State  against  their  Federal  Government."  "And  that  any 
change  of  the  relation  Virginia  now  sustains  to  the  Federal 
Government,  against  the  "washes  of  even  a  respectable 
minority  of  her  people,  would  be  such  an  act  of  injustice 
perpetrated  itpon  the  rights  of  that  minority  as  to  justify 
them  in  changing  their  relation  to  the  State  Government  by 
separating  themselves  from  that  section  of  the  State  that 
had  thus  wantonly  disregarded  theii*  interests  and  defied 
their  will." 

The  conspirators  in  the  convention  wilfully  shut  their 
eyes  to  the  iieiiinency  of  this  logic,  but  among  the  people 
of  West  Virginia  it  remained  a  quick  and  pei'vading  princi- 
ple of  action.  The  Convention  at  Richmond  passed  its 
secret  Ordinance  of  Secession  on  April  17th ;  within  a  week 
popular  movements  were  already  on  foot  in  the  towns  and 
populous  counties  of  West  Virginia,  looking  to  a  division  of 
the  State.  Numerous  causes  contributed  to  this  result. 
Political  jealousy  and  injustice,  though  a  powerful  influ- 
ence, was  not  eveiything.  Geogi-aphy  had  already  ordained 
separation  by  a  formidable  mountain-bamer.  Her  peoi^le 
felt  themselves  an  integral  part  of  the  Great  West.  They 
responded  to  the  impulse  of  its  commercial  ambition,  its 
material  development,  its  expansive  business  energy.  Wheel- 
ing aspired  to  rival  Pittsburg  and  Cincinnati,  not  Richmond. 
They  acknowledged  neither  tobacco  nor  cotton  as  kings ; 


UO  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

lumber,  coal,  iron,  salt,  petroleum,  were  their  candidates 
for  supremacy  in  trade.  Their  commerce  followed  their 
streams  into  the  Oliio.  The  Miasissippi  Valley  was  a 
broader  market  than  the  Atlantic  sea-coast.  Their  busi- 
ness reached  out  for  St.  Louis,  St.  Paul,  and  Denver,  as 
well  as  Memi)his  and  New  Orleans. 

The  eflfort,  therefore,  of  the  tide-water  slaveholding  aristo- 
crats to  carry  them  into  a  cotton  confedei"acy,,met  an  in- 
stantaneous and  almost  unanimous  protest.  The  jiroiio-si- 
tiou  was  hardly  a  subject  for  discussion.  To  secede  from 
secession  was  the  common  wish  and  determination.  The 
only  question  was  how  to  put  their  negative  into  effective 
operation.  Eapid  popular  organization  followed ;  the  Gor- 
emment  at  Washington  was  appealed  to,  and  promised 
countenance  and  suppox't ;  and  on  May  13th,  delegates  from 
twenty-five  counties  met  at  Wheeling  to  consiilt  and  de\'ise 
further  action  whereby  they  might  fully  and  finally  reinitli- 
ate  the  treasonable  revolt  of  East  Virginia. 

Circumstances  favored  their  design.  Under  President 
Lincoln's  call,  the  large  and  poijulous  State  of  Ohio,  West 
Vii'ginia's  nearest  neighbor,  was  organizing  thirteen  regi- 
ments of  three  months  volunteei-s.  This  quota  entitled  her 
to  a  major-general ;  and  to  tliis  important  command  Gov- 
ernor Dennison  appointed  a  young  officer  of  thorough  West 
Point  training  and  varied  experience — Captain  George  B. 
McClellan.  He  was  also  a  personal  favorite  of  General 
Scott,  who  had  such  confidence  in  his  ability  that  he  soon 
(May  3d)  placed  him  in  command  of  the  Militai-y  Depart- 
ment of  the  Ohio,  created  to  include  the  three  States  of 
Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois,  with  headquarters  at  Cincin- 
nati, and  to  which  West  Virginia  was  not  long  after  attached. 
The  blockade  of  Washington,  and  other  incidents,  had  sen-ed 
to  keep  Western  quotas  of  troops  oh  the  Ohio  line,  and  the 


WEST  VIRGINIA.  141 

Unionists  of  West  Virginia  tlins  found  a  substantial  militaiy 
force  at  once  in  their  immediate  vicinity,  with  a  command- 
ing officer  insti-ucted  to  give  them  encouragement  and  sup- 
port, and  carefully  studying  the  possible  oijportunities  of 
service  in  their  midst. 

Although  the  convention  proceedings  must  have  made 
the  Eichmond  authorities  acquainted  with  the  prevailing 
union  sentiment  of  West  Virginia,  it  is  probable  that  they 
did  not  anticipate  a  general  disaffection ;  not  only  did 
Governor  Letcher's  proclamations  for  State  militia  include 
that  section  with  apparent  confidence,  but  he  at  an  early 
day  despaitched  officers  there  to  collect  and  organize  it. 
Relatively,  population  was  sparse  and  the  country  moun- 
tainous and  hilly ;  there  were,  therefore,  two  princii^al 
localities,  or  lines  of  transit,  ti-avel,  and  business,  where 
concentration  could  be  best  effected — one  the  line  of  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Eailroad,  the  other  the  valley  of  the 
Great  Kanawha  Eiver — and  to  these  districts  Governor 
Letcher  sent  his  agents.  Discouraging  reporis  were,  how- 
ever, soon  returned :  that  feeling  was  veiy  bitter ;  that 
union  organizations  existed  in  most  of  the  counties ;  that 
that  section  of  the  State  was  "  verging  on  actixal  rebellion." 
Fragments  of  rebel  companies  were  indeed  here  and  there 
springing  up,  but  it  became  e^^dent  that  no  local  force  suffi- 
cient to  hold  the  country  would  respond  to  the  Confederate 
appeal.  On  the  other  hand,  the  open  disaffection,  and  the 
ominous  gathering  of  forces  at  several  points  along  the  Ohio 
side  of  the  river,  pointed  to  a  short  tenure  of  Confederate 
authority. 

The  Eichmond  officials  were,  however,  unwilling  to  lose 
their  control  without  a  straggle,  and,  in  default  of  local 
military  support,  determined  to  maintain  themselves  with 
forces  from   East  Vii'ginia.     To  that  end  they  now  sent  a 


142  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

few  available  companies,  with  some  extra  arms  and  supplies, 
from  Staunton  at  the  southern  end  of  the  Shenandoah  Val- 
ley, by  the  Staunton  and  Parkei-sburg  turnpike,  a  tolerably 
direct  route,  over  the  mountains,  a  distance  of  seventy-tive 
to  a  hundi-ed  miles  to  Beverly,  from  which  j)oint  they  might 
menace  and  overawe  Grafton,  the  junction  of  the  main  stem 
of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Kaih'oad  with  its  branches  to 
Parkersburg  and  Wheeling. 

But  the  reaction  against  secession,  the  reawakening  of 
union  feeling,  the  growth  and  organization  of  the  party 
which  favored  a  permanent  division  of  the  State,  lai-gely 
outran  all  the  conspirators'  eiforts  and  measures.  Coun- 
ter-revolution being  positive  and  aggi-essive,  was  not  only 
stronger,  but  more  active  than  the  revolution  which  had 
given  it  birth  and  opportunity.  The  inhabitants  showed 
more  alacrity  to  take  up  anns  for  the  Government  than  for 
Letcher  and  Lee.  A  West  Vii'ginia  regiment,  fonned  by 
Colonel  Kelly  to  fight  for  the  Union,  gathered  recruits 
more  raj^idly  at  Wheeling,  than  the  rebel  camps  which 
Colonel  Portei-field  had  been  sent  to  command  and  con- 
centrate between  Beverly  and  Grafton. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Richmond  Convention 
had  appointed  the  23d  of  May  (that  being  also  a  general 
election  for  members  of  the  Legislature)  as  the  day  on 
which  the  people  of  Virginia  should  vote  to  ratify  or  reject 
the  Ordinance  of  Secession.  A  curiously  soi)histical  and 
Pharisaical  argument  and  appeal,  published  by  Senator 
Mason  in  behalf  of  ratification,  shows  conclusively  that 
the  conspirators  were  in  great  apprehension  lest  their 
treason  should  be  repudiated  at  the  polls.  But,  with  the 
State  transfoiTued  to  a  camp,  and  filled  with  Jeffei*son 
Davis'  "foreign"  regiments,  the  result  could  hardly  be  in 
doubt.     Under  complete  militaiy  domination,  East  Virginia 


WEST  VIRGINIA.  143 

voted  to  ratify ;  West  Virginia,  comparatively  free,  voted  to 
reject  the  Secession  Ordinance. 

This  event  both  justified  and  sustained  the  movements 
of  the  West  Vii"ginia  Unionists  and  the  Government.  If 
General  McClellan  had  needed  any  further  reasons  for  an 
active  militaiy  interference,  they  were  furnished  by  the  fact 
that  Porterfield  began  burning  bridges  on  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  Railroad.  Bealizing  that  delay  was  becoming 
dangerous,  and  prompted  by  directions  from  Washington, 
McClellan,  on  the  26th,  ordered  two  regiments  to  cross  the 
river  at  Wheeling,  and  two  others  at  Parkersburg,  and  to 
simultaneously  move  fonvard  by  the  branch  railroads  from 
each  of  these  points  to  their  junction  at  Grafton.  Owing  to 
the  necessity  of  repairing  burnt  bridges,  their  progTess  was 
cautious  and  slow.  This  gave  ample  time  for  Porterfield 
to  become  fujly  informed  of  the  movement  ;  whereupon 
he  retired  with  his  small  command,  stores  and  spare  arms, 
to  Philippa,  on  a  country  road,  about  fifteen  miles  directly 
south  of  Grafton,  hoping  to  find  there  a  secure  retreat 
about  which  to  gather  a  sufficient  force  to  return  and  more 
thoroughly  cut,  harass,  or  control,  the  railroad. 

But  the  Union  forces,  being  in  superior  numbers,  and  as- 
sisted with  ready  information  by  friendly  local  sentiment, 
gave  the  rebels  little  respite.  General  McClellan  had  for- 
warded additional  regiments  to  Grafton,  with  Brigadier- 
General  Mollis,  an  educated  West  Point  officer,  to  command  ; 
and  he  now  adojited  and  completed  an  expedition  already 
projected  before  his  arrival  by  Colonel  Kelly,  who,  with  his 
West  Virginia  regiment,  had  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
country.  Under  i>retence  of  an  advance  on  Harper's  Ferry, 
Colonel  Kelly,  at  the  head  of  about  two  regiments,  started 
eastward  by  rail  on  the  morning  of  June  2d ;  that  evening  a 
similar  detachment  under   Colonel  Dumont   started  west- 


144       THH  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

ward ;  both  columns,  however,  soon  left  the  cars,  and  by  dif- 
ferent roads  began  a  rapid  march  southward  against  Philip- 
pa.  A  fm-ious  rain-storm  during  the  night  greatly  impeded, 
but  also  comi)letely  concealed,  their  unexpected  advance. 
They  arrived  on  opposite  hills  commanding  the  town,  almost 
simultaneously  at  daylight  of  June  3d,  though,  by  a  mistake 
of  the  proper  route,  not  in  a  position  to  cut  oflF  retreat 
Here  they  found  Porterfield's  command,  something  over  a 
thousand  strong,  carelessly  awaiting  the  anival  of  morning 
and  the  abatement  of  the  storm,  to  begin  a  retreat  which  the 
rebel  officers  had  informally  resolved  on  the  previous  even- 
ing. The  surjjrise  was  complete,  and  the  attack  so  sudden 
and  sharp  as  to  force  the  rebels  to  disperse  in  utter  rout 
and  disorganization.  Their  loss  in  killed  and  captured  was 
small,  owing  to  the  fatiguing  night  march  which  left  the 
Union  troops  too  thoroughly  exhausted  to  make  pursuit. 

The  complete  success  of  this  fii-st  dash  at  the  enemy  not 
only  had  the  haj^piest  effect  in  inspii-iting  the  Union  troops, 
but  it  also  encouraged  and  fortified  the  West  Virginia 
Unionists  in  their  political  scheme  of  forming  a  new  State. 
On  the  day  after  the  "  Philippa  races,"  as  the  skirmish  was 
facetiously  nicknamed,  a  previously  concerted  agreement  to 
elect  delegates  was  carried  out.  These,  representing  about 
forty  counties  lying  between  the  crest  of  the  Alleghanies  and 
the  Ohio  Eiver,  met  in  a  formal  convention  at  Wheeling,  on 
June  11th.  Its  first  step  (June  13th),  was  to  repudiate  the 
treasonable  usurpations  of  the  Richmond  Convention  and 
Governor  Letcher,  to  pronounce  their  acts  without  authority 
and  void,  and  to  declare  as  vacated  all  executive,  legislative, 
and  judicial  offices  in  the  State  held  by  those  "  who  adhere 
to  said  convention  and  Executive."  The  second  step  was 
the  adoption  of  an  ordinance  (June  19th)  reorganizing  the 
State  government.     On  the  following   day   the  convention 


WEST  VIRGINIA.  1^ 

appointed  F.  H.  Piei-poinfc  Governor,  with  iiu  advisory 
council  of  five,  to  wield  executive  authority.  A  legislatiu'e 
was  constituted  by  calling  together,  on  July  1st,  at  Wheeling, 
such  members  chosen  at  the  election  of  May  23d  as  would 
take  a  prescribed  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  Unitrl  States  and 
the  restored  government  of  Virginia,  and  larovidi  u  for  filling 
the  vacancies  of  those  who  refused.  A  similar  provision  con- 
tinued or  substituted  other  State  and  county  officers.  After 
adding  sundiy  ordinances  of  urgent  necessity  to  this 
groundwork  of  restoration,  the  convention  on  the  25th  took 
a  recess  till  August.  The  Legislature,  however,  met  ac- 
cording to  call,  and  took  up  the  difficult  task  of  devising 
legal  enactments  suitable  to  the  revolutionary  crisis  ;  and 
on  July  9th,  it  chose  two  United  States  Senate:  ,  who,  four 
days  later,  were  admitted  and  took  part  in  the  nr.rlonal  legis- 
lation. 

So  far,  the  work  was  siinj)ly  a  repudiation  ol  secession, 
and  a  restoration  of  the  usurped  government  of  the  whole 
State.  But  the  main  motive  and  piirpose  of  the  counter- 
revolution was  not  allowed  to  halt  or  fail.  In  August  the 
Wheeling  Convention  reassembled,  and  on  the  20th  adojited 
an  ordinance  creating  the  new  State  of  Kanawha,  and  pro- 
^'iding  for  a  ratifying  popular  vote  to  be  taken  mi  the  ques- 
tion in  the  following  Ocfcol^er.  It  is  not  the  province  of  this 
volume  to  follow  further  the  political  transformation  of  the 
"  Old  Dominion,"  thus  inaugurated,  except  to  add  that  the 
proposed  "  State  of  Kanawha  "  became  the  "  State  of  West 
Virginia,"  and  was  duly  admitted  to  the  Union  about  two 
years  later. 

Governor  Piei-point,  the  head  of  the  pro%isional  govern- 
ment thus  organized  at  Wheeling,  made  a  formal  applica- 
tion under  the  Constitution,  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  for  aid  to  suppress  rebellion  and  protect  the 
10 


146  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

people  against  domestic  violence  ;  and  in  furtherance  of  this 
object  General  McClellan  ordered  additional  forces  into  the 
State  from  liis  Department.  Local  enlistments  had  also  by 
this  time  increased  West  Vii'ginia's  own  contingent  to  three 
regiments  nnder  his  command.  In  addition  to  affording 
protection  to  Union  sentiment,  this  militaiy  occupation  was 
designed  to  insure  the  safety  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroatl,  not  alone  of  Grafton  as  a  strategical  point,  hut 
also  of  the  valuable  railroad  bridge  across  the  Cheat  River, 
and  numerous  important  tunnels  in  the  mountains  imme- 
diately east  of  it.  Tlie  precaution  was  nowise  supei-fluous  ; 
for  the  Rebel  Government  had  some  weeks  before  ordered 
a  sj)ecial  expedition  to  destroy  them  and  permanently  break 
this  important  line  of  communication.  General  Lee  still  had 
his  eye  on  such  a  possibility,  and  wrote  to  his  new  com- 
mander, under  date  of  July  1st,  "  the  rupture  of  the  railroad 
ai  Cheat  River  would  be  worth  to  us  an  army." 

To  effect  this,  and  to  hold  West  Vii-ginia — or  at  least  to 
prevent  the  Union  forces  from  penetrating  thi-ough  the 
mountains  in  the  direction  of  Staunton — the  rebel  authori- 
ties now  sought  to  repair  the  Philippi  disaster  by  sending 
two  new  commanders  to  that  region  :  Ex-Govemor  Henry  A. 
Wise,  invested  with  the  rank  of  brigadier-general,  to  the 
Kanawha  Valley,  and  General  Gamett,  formerly  a  major  in 
the  Federal  Army,  to  Beverly,  to  g-ather  uj)  and  reorganize 
the  dcbiis  of  Portertield's  command,  which  they  also  took 
immediate  measures  to  reinforce. 

(Jamett,  arriving  near  the  end  of  June,  found  that  Poi-ter- 
field  had  retreated  across  an  outlying  mountain  range  into 
the  Cheat  River  yalley,  in  which  Beverly  is  situated.  The 
turnpike  from  Staunton  to  Beverly  is  the  central  and  prin- 
cipal mountain  route  within  a  Jong  distance,  both  to  the 
north  and  to  the  south.    From  Beverly  northwestward  the 


WEST  VIRGINIA.  147 

turnpike  branches,  one  line  going  to  Buckhannon  through  a 
pass  over  Eich  Mountain,  the  other  going  to  Philippi 
through  a  pass  in  the  same  range,  but  which  is  there  named 
Laurel  Hill,  the  latter  being  some  seventeen  miles  farther 
north.  "  I  regard  these  two  passes,"  wrote  Garnett,  "as  the 
gates  to  the  northwestern  country."  Here,  then,  he  proposed 
to  fortify  himself,  to  forage  on  the  country  beyond,  and  to 
leisurely  watch  his  chance  of  breaking  the  railroad.  His 
circumstances  were  not  the  most  favorable.  The  troops 
which  he  found  at  Huttonsville  on  his  arrival  were  "in  a 
miserable  condition  as  to  arms,  clothing,  equipments,  in- 
struction, and  discipline."  "  The  Union  men,"  he  also 
wrote,  "  are  greatly  in  the  ascendancy  here,  and  are  much 
more  zealous  and  active  in  their  cause  than  the  Secession- 
ists. The  enemy  are  kept  fully  advised  of  our  movements, 
even  to  the  strength  of  our  scouts  and  pickets,  by  the  coun- 
try people,  while  we  are  compelled  to  grope  in  the  dark  as 
much  as  if  we  were  invading  a  foreign  and  hostile  country." 
Nevertheless,  he  began  a  vigorous  reorganization ;  Lee  im- 
mediately sent  him  reinforcements.  In  a  short  time  he  had 
Colonel  Pegi'am  established  in  the  pass  at  Rich  Mountain, 
with  a  regiment  and  six  guns,  while  he  himself  held  the 
pass  at  Laurel  Hill  with  three  or  four  regiments,  leaving  a 
detachment  at  Beverly. 

This  was  the  situation  when,  early  in  July,  General  McClel- 
lan  resolved  to  take  the  offensive  and  drive  the  rebels  from 
West  Virginia.  He  had  arrived  on  the  scene  of  action  about 
the  same  time  with  Gamett ;  and  though  he  had  a  largely 
preponderating  force  in  the  State,  it  was  considerably  de- 
l^leted  by  the  local  garrisons  necessary  to  i^rotect  the  rail- 
road, and  to  give  confidence  to  Unionists  in  exposed  towns. 
For  the  immediate  work  in  hand  General  Morris  had  five  or 
six  regiments  at  Philijipi,  confronting  Garnett ;  McClellau 


118 


THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION, 


Field  of  the  West  Virginia  Butties. 


WEST  VIRGINIA.  149 

dii-ectecT  liiin  to  take  an  advanced  position  within  two  miles 
of  the  enemy's  works  at  Laurel  Hill,  to  give  an  impressipu 
that  he  intended  the  main  attack,  and  to  be  ready  to  pursue, 
should  they  retreat. 

Meanwhile  McClellan  himself  moved  to  Buckhannon  with 
some  seven  regiments,  with  the  design  of  turning  the 
enemy's  position  on  Eich  Mountain.  On  the  evening  of 
Jxdj  9th  he  pushed  forward  to  Roaring  Creek,  two  miles 
from  Pegram's  entrenched  camp.  A  reconnoissance  on  the 
10th  showed  the  enemy  strongly  posted  in  a  mountain  defile, 
where,  with  the  large  force  he  was  supposed  to  have,  a  direct 
attack  in  front  could  only  be  made  at  great  sacrifice.  That 
evening  Brigadier-General  Eosecrans  proposed  a  plan  to 
turn  the  position,  and  McClellan  (with  some  reluctance,  it 
is  said)  iDermitted  him  to  attempt  it. 

At  daylight  of  Jiily  11th,  Eosecrans,  with  portions  of  four 
regiments — a  total  of  nineteen  hundi-ed  men — set  out,  and, 
amid  a  well-nigh  continuous  rain-storm,  by  eleven  o'clock 
cut  and  climbed  their  way  through  a  palhless  forest  and 
thicket  to  the  very  crest  of  Eich  Mountain.  Their  ascent 
was  made  south  of  the  turnpike,  while  Pegram  was  expect- 
ing the  attemjit  on  the  north.  To  guard  against  either  con- 
tingency, however,  as  his  own  camj^  and  entrenchments  were 
near  the  west  base  of  the  mountain,  Pegram  had  sent  a  de- 
tachment of  three  hundi'ed  and  ten  men  and  two  guns  back 
to  where  the  turnpike  crosses  the  summit,  two  miles  in  his 
rear.  There,  at  the  farm  of  a  man  named  Hai-t,  they  had 
scarcely  had  time  to  throw  up  some  slight  entrenchments 
for  their  guns,  when  Eosecrans'  force,  advancing  toward  the 
road  from  the  south,  encountered  them.  The  rebels  made  a 
plucky  resistance,  but  the  Unionists  had  such  advantage  in 
numbers  that  the  contest  was  quickly  decided.  "  We  formed 
at  about  three  o'clock,"  reports  Eosecrans,  "  under  cover  of 


150  THK  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

our  skinniKhers,  gnanling  well  against  a  flank  attack  from 
the  diivt'tion  of  the  rebels'  position,  and  after  a  biisk  fire 
which  tlu-ew  the  rebels  into  confusion,  carried  their  position 
by  a  charge,  driving  them  from  behind  some  log  breast- 
works, and  pni-sued  them  iixto  the  thickets  on  the  mountain. 
We  captureil  twenty-one  prisoners,  two  brass  six-pounders, 
fifty  stand  of  arms,  and  some  com  and  provisions.  Our  loss 
was  twelve  killed  and  forty-nine  wounded."  He  also  places 
the  reported  burials  of  the  rebels  killed  at  one  hundred  and 
thirty-five,  with  about  twenty  wounded. 

McClellan  had  moved  all  his  force  up  to  Pegram's  front, 
and  was  waiting  to  begin  a  direct  assault  when  he  should 
leam  that  Rosecrans  had  commenced  the  attack  on  the  rear. 
But  Rosecrans'  fight  on  the  very  top  of  Rich  Mountain  dis- 
concerted the  aiTaugenient.  The  messenger  sent  to  com- 
municate between  McClellan  and  himself  rode  unsus- 
pectingly up  to  a  rebel  jucket-guard,  and  was  cajitured. 
McClellan  waited  all  day  in  vain  for  the  rear  attack  to  be- 
pcin  ;  for  when  the  engagement  on  the  mountain  was  over, 
the  day  was  already  so  far  advanced,  and  Rosecrans'  men 
were  so  thoroughly  worn  out  with  theii*  toilsome  ascent  pre- 
ceding the  fight,  that  it  was  deemed  most  j)i"udent  to  go 
into  bivouac  on  the  field  of  battle.  McClellan  was  not  in- 
formed of  the  fight  and  its  result  until  the  following  day, 
July  I'ith,  when  it  was  also  ascertained  that  the  whole  rebel 
camj)  and  position  had  been  i)recii)itately  evacuated  ;  he 
was  therefore  now  able,  not  only  to  secure  their  abandoned 
guns  and  supi^lies,  but  to  push  withoiit  opposition  along  the 
turnpike  entirely  over  the  mountain  and  occupy  Beverly. 

Pegmni  had,  on  the  11th,  personally  gone  to  the  moun- 
tain-top— only,  however,  to  witness  the  defeat  and  disper- 
sion of  his  little  detachment.  Seeing  himself  thus  in  a  trap, 
with  McClellan  in  front  and  Rosecrans  in  secure  possession 


WEST  VTRGINIA.  151 

of  tlie  road  beliind  liim,  lie  retiimed  to  his  camp,  and  spiking 
Lis  four  guns,  abandoned  bis  camj}  and  equijjage  and  under- 
took to  escape,  witli  the  remainder  of  his  command — about 
six  hundred  men — l)y  mart;hing  northward  along  the  moun- 
tain to  join  Garnett  at  Laiirel  Hill.  For  the  moment  he  suc- 
ceeded in  ekiding  both  the  Federal  commanders,  and  after 
a  laborious  eighteen  hours'  march  over  an  almost  impassable 
route,  found  himself  within  three  miles  of  Leedsville.  Here, 
however,  he  received  news  that  Garnett  had  also  retreated, 
and  that  a  strong  Union  column  was  in  pursuit.  Thus  he 
was  once  more  caught  between  two  Union  armies  ;  and  see- 
ing no  further  avenue  of  escape,  he  that  night,  July  12th, 
sent  a  proposal  of  surrender  to  General  McClellan,  who,  on 
the  following  morning  (July  13th),  received  Pegram  and  his 
command,  a  total  remainder  of  five  hundi'ed  and  sixty  men 
and  thirty-three  officers,  as  prisoners  of  war,  at  Beverly, 
where  the  half-famished  rebel  fugitives  were  only  too  glad 
to  once  more  receive  comfortable  quarters  and  rations. 

The  earliest  fugitives  who  escaped  from  the  battle  of  Eich 
Mountain,  on  the  afternoon  of  July  11th,  carried  the  news 
of  that  disaster  to  Beverly,  enabling  the  rebel  regiments 
stationed  there  to  reti-eat  southward,  and  also,  as  is  prob- 
able, communicating  the  intelligence  to  Garnett  at  Laurel 
Hill.  That  officer,  already  seiiously  threatened  by  General 
Morris  in  his  immediate  front,  thereupon  perceived  that  his 
position  was  no  longer  tenable,  and  ordered  an  immediate 
retreat.  When  Garnett  reached  Leedsville  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  12th,  and  heard  that  McClellan  was  at  Beverly,  he 
saw  that  his  own  further  retreat  to  the  south  was  also  cut 
off.  There  was  now  no  resource  left  but  to  adopt  the  i-ather 
desperate  alternative  of  turning  to  the  north  and  attempting 
to  reach  St.  George  and  "West  Union  by  a  rough  and  difficult 
mountain  road.     His  command  of  thirty-three  hundred  men 


152       THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION. 

and  cnmbrons  trains  thereby  necessarily  became  very  much 
scattered  and  disorganized.  Although  he  had  some  fifteen 
hours  the  start  of  the  Union  pursuit,  an  advance  column  of 
three  Federal  regiments,  led  by  Captain  Benham  of  the  En- 
gineers, gained  rai)idly  on  the  fugitives.  Notwithstanding 
every  effort  of  the  rebels  to  impede  them  by  felling  trees  in 
the  nan-ow  mountain  defiles,  the  Union  advance  came  up 
with  theii-  v  agon-ti-ain  at  Carrick's  Ford,  one  of  the  crossings 
of  Cheat  la'.er,  twenty -six  miles  northwest  of  Lairrel  Hill, 
about  noon  of  July  13th.  Here  Gamett  in  person  faced 
about  his  rear-guard  (a  single  regiment,  according  to  the 
rebel  report),  and  taking  i^ost  on  a  favorable  and  precipi- 
tous elevarion  of  the  right  liver  bank,  fifty  to  eighty  feet 
high,  jjlanted  three  guns  to  command  the  ford  and  approach- 
ing road,  and  prepared  to  defend  his  retreat. 

Steediiiju's  regiment,  with  two  guns,  was  leading  the  Union 
advance,  ;  ul  came  up  on  the  low,  naiTow  a^jproach,  within 
close  mu.Si:efc-range,  before  they  discovered  the  rebel  line. 
A  brisk  engagement  at  once  ensued,  and  the  other  two  regi- 
ments soon  aiiived.  Owing  to  the  restricted  space,  Milroy's 
regiment  was  obliged  to  take  position  where  it  could  only 
deliver  an  oblique  fire  and  at  a  greater  distance.  Dumont's 
regiment  was  thereupon  ordered  to  advance  and  scale  a  diffi- 
cult heiglit  in  order  to  tvmi  the  enemy's  left  flank.  Two 
companies  had  well-nigh  gained  the  coveted  position,  when 
Benham  received  a  mistaken  report  that  the  ascent  was  im- 
pi-acticable.  He  therefore  ordered  Dumont  to  retiuTi,  to 
march  his  regiment  along  the  veiy  base  of  the  hill  on  which 
the  rebels  were  posted,  to  their  right  flank,  and  make  the 
ascent  the  The  manoeuvre  was  gallantly  executed,  and 
scarcely  ha  J  Dumont  begun  mounting  the  height,  when  the 
rebel  line  Vnoke  and  fled,  abandoning  one  of  their  gims. 

Betreat  and  pursuit  were  once  more  commenced ;  and  at 


WEST  VIRGINIA.  153 

the  next  ford,  iierliajis  a  quarter  of  a  mile  fai-tlier  on,  there 
occnri'ed  an  intercliange  of  desultory  skirmisli-fire  between 
small  parties  of  shai"pshooters,  in  which  Gramett  himself  was 
killed. 

At  this  result  the  Federals  abandoned  further  pui'suit, 
satisfied  with  the  capture  of  the  baggage-train,  one  gun,  two 
stands  of  colors,  and  fifty  i?risoners ;  the  casualties  being  thir- 
teen killed  and  forty  wounded  of  the  Federals,  and  twenty 
killed  and  ten  wounded  of  the  rebels.  McClellan  had 
ordered  yet  another  column  to  be  gathered  u^j  along  the 
raili-oad  to  intercejjt  the  flying  enemy  at  West  Union ;  but 
no  substantial  result  followed  the  effort,  and  the  remainder 
of  Garnett's  command  escaped. 

Counted  according  to  mere  numbers,  the  battles  of  Eich 
Mountain  and  Can-ick's  Ford  fall  into  a  ridiculous  insigni- 
ficance in  contrast  with  the  gi'eat  battles  of  the  rebellion 
during  the  next  three  years.  Hundreds  of  engagements,  of 
gi-eater  magnitude  and  much  more  serious  loss  of  life,  pre- 
ceded or  followed  the  main  contests  of  the  war,  of  which 
histoiy  will  hardly  make  a  note.  But  this  petty  skirmish 
with  thi*ee  hundi-ed  rebels  on  Rich  Mountain,  and  this  rout 
of  a  little  rear-guard  at  Canick's  Ford,  were  sj)eedily  fol- 
lowed by  large  political  and  military  results.  They  closed 
a  camjiaign,  dispersed  a  rebel  army,  recovered  a  disputed 
State,  permanently  flushed  back  the  military  frontier.  They 
enabled  McClellan  to  send  a  laconic  telegram,  combining  in 
one  report  *  the  scattered  and  disconnected   incidents   of 

*  "  IIUTTONSVILLE,  YA.,  Julj  14,  1861. 

'"CoLOKEL  Towssesd: 

"  Garnett  and  forces  routed  ;  his  baggage  and  one  gun  taken ;  his  army  demoral- 
ized ;  Giirnett  killed.  We  have  annihilated  the  enemy  in  Western  Virginia,  and 
have  lost  thirteen  killed,  and  not  more  than  forty  wounded.  We  have  in  all 
killed  at  least  two  hundred  of  the  enemy,  and  their  prisoners  will  amount  to  at 


151  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

thi'ee  diflferent  days  and  happening  forty  miles  apart,  which 
(without  exaggerating  literal  truth  except  as  to  the  Union 
losses  and  number  of  prisoners)  gave  such  a  general  imijres- 
sion  of  professional  skill  and  achievement  as  to  make  him 
the  hero  of  the  hour,  and  which  started  a  train  of  circum- 
stances that,  without  further  victories,  made  him  General-in- 
Chief  of  all  the  Armies  of  the  United  States,  on  the  first 
day  of  November  follo^\•ing. 

McClellan's  campaign  in  West  Virginia  ends  with  the 
death  of  Garnett  and  the  dispersion  of  his  army.  About  a 
week  afterward  he  was  called  to  a  new  field  of  duty  at  Wash- 
ington City.  There  is  not  room  in  this  volume  to  further 
describe  militaiy  operations  in  West  Virginia  during  the 
remainder  of  the  year  1861.  Various  movements  and  enter- 
prises occurred"  under  command  of  Wise,  Floyd,  and  Lee,  on 
the  rebel  side ;  and  under  Cox,  Rosecrans,  Milroy,  and  other 
gallant  officers  of  the  Union  army.  With  somewhat  fluctu- 
ating changes,  the  rebels  were  gradually  forced  back  out  of 
the  Great  Kanawha  Valley;  and  the  aggregate  result  left 
West  Virginia  in  possession  of  the  Federal  troops,  her  own 
inherent  loyalty  having  contributed  largely  to  this  condi- 
tion. The  union  sentiment  of  the  people  was  eveiywhei-e 
made  more  and  more  manifest,  and  the  new  State  govern- 
ment was  consolidated  and  heartily  sustained,  ending,  as 
has  already  been  mentioned,  by  her  ultimate  admission  as  a 
sepai-ate  member  of  the  Federal  Union,  in  June,  1863. 

least  one  thousand.  Have  taken  seven  guns  in  all.  I  still  look  for  the  capture 
of  the  remnant  of  Garnett's  army  by  General  Hill.  The  troops  defeated  are  the 
crack  regiments  of  Eastern  Virginia,  aided  by  Georgians,  Tennesseeans,  and  Ciiro- 
liuians.    Our  success  is  complete,  and  secession  is  killed  in  this  country. 

"Geo.  B.  McClellan, 

"Major-General  Commanding." 


CHAPTEE  Xm. 

PATTERSON'S  CAMPAIGN. 

Under  tlie  President's  tkree  montlis  call  the  State  of  Peim- 
svlvania  was  required  to  furuisli  sixteen  regiments.  This 
entitled  her  to  two  major-generals,  and  one  of  these,  aj)- 
pointed  by  the  Governor,  was  Robert  Patterson.  He  had 
served  with  credit  as  a  lieutenant  and  cajitain  in  the  war  of 
1812,  and  as  a  major-general  in  the  Mexican  War ;  General 
Scott  regarded  him  as  "an  excellent  second  in  command;" 
his  selection  seemed,  therefore,  natural  and  proper.  Not- 
^\ithstanding  he  had  now  reached  the  age  of  sixty-nine,  he 
entered  at  once  with  alacrity  on  the  task  of  organizing  the 
three  months  volunteers  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia.  After 
the  Baltimore  riot  and  the  Maryland  uimsing,  it  became 
necessary  to  create  the  military  "  Dei^artment  of  Pennsylva- 
nia," comprising  Pennsylvania,  Delaware,  and  part  of  Mary- 
land, and  Patterson  was  assigned  to  its  command,  with  direc- 
tions to  co-opeiate  in  restoring  Union  authority  in  Maryland. 

Sundry  joint  military  movements  j)rojected  to  accomplish 
this  object,  were  happily  soon  rendered  unnecessary  by  the 
rapid  accumulation  of  troops  at  Washington,  Butler's  occu- 
pation of  Baltimore,  and  the  sweeping  political  reaction  in 
Mainland.  But,  meanwhile,  the  rebels  had  established  a 
strong  camp  at  Harper's  Feny,  and  Patterson's  close  atten- 
tion was  thus  very  naturally  transfeiTed  to  that  point.     The 


15C)  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

three  months  troops  couhl  not  be  used  in  distant  undertak- 
ings. Hero,  however,  was  a  worthy  enterjirise  at  the  very 
threshokl  of  Pennsylvania,  which,  sticcessfully  prosecuted, 
would  protect  Maryland,  relieve  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail- 
road, encourage  Virginia  Unionists,  and  recover  lost  jirestige. 
Patriotic  pride,  political  security,  and  military  advantage 
seemed,  to  the  minds  of  both  Pattei-son  and  Scott,  to  ijresent 
combined  reasons  for  an  early  recapture  of  Harper's  Fei'iy. 

For  tLi  j  purpose,  Patterson,  about  the  first  of  June,  con- 
centrated his  available  troops  at  Chambersburg,  Pa.,  and 
on  the  third  of  that  month  issued  an  address  to  the  regi- 
ments under  his  command,  announcing  that  "you  will 
soon  meet  the  insurgents."  Orders  from  Geneml  Scott, 
however,  held  him  back  until  strong  reinforcements  could 
be  sent,  and  an  important  diversion  organized  to  aid  him ; 
and  while  thus  assisting,  the  General  also  admonished  him 
to  every  prudence,  reminding  him  that  his  expedition  was 
"  well  projected,  and  that  success  in  it  would  be  an  impor- 
tant stej}  in  the  war ;  but,  there  must  be  no  reverse." 

With  the  increase  of  his  force,  and  a  closer  survey  of  his 
task,  Patterson's  own  estimate  of  his  enteiinise  gi'ew  in  mag- 
nitude. "  Eemember,  I  beseech  you,"  he  wi-ote  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  War,  under  date  of  June  10th,  "  that  Harper's  Feny 
is  (as  I  hiive  said  fi'om  the  fir.st)  the  place  where  the  fii-st 
gi-eat  bii'-tle  will  be  fought,  and  the  result  will  be  decisive  of 
the  future.  The  insurgents  are  strongly  intrenched,  have 
an  immense  number  of  guns,  and  will  contest  eveiy  inch  of 

ground The  importance  of  a  victoiy  at  Harper's 

Feny  cannot  be  estimated.    I  cannot  sleep  for  thinking  about 

it I   beseech   you,   therefore,   by   our  ancient 

friendship,  give  me  the  means  of  success.  You  have  the 
means ;  place  them  at  my  disposal,  and  shoot  me  if  I  do  not 
use  them  to  advantage." 


PATTERSON'S  CAMPAIGN.  157 

With  such  professions  of  a  fighting  spirit,  the  Administra- 
tion looked  with  some  confidence  for  an  ofi"ensive  campaign, 
and  sent  its  best  regiments  and  ofiicers  to  take  part  in  it. 
Both  General  Scott  and  General  Patterson  were,  however,  de- 
ceived in  their  expectation  that  the  rebels  meant  to  risk  a  bat- 
tle at  that  point.  With  a  total  force  of  something  over  seven- 
teen regiments,  Patterson  at  length  began  his  forward  move- 
ment via  Hagerstown  and  Williamsport.  But  so  leisurely 
were  his  preparations  and  advance,  that  the  rebels  had  every 
knowledge  of  his  coming;  and  when,  on  June  15th,  he 
finally  reached  the  Potomac  River,  he  found,  instead  of  the 
"desperate  resistance"  which  had  been  looked  for,  that 
Johnston  had  hastily  evacuated  Harper's  Feri-y  after  destroy- 
ing the  raih-oad  bridge  and  si^iking  his  heavy  gTins,  and  had 
retreated  upon  Winchester. 

Patterson  and  his  officers  were  greatly  mystified  by  this 
withdrawal  of  the  enemy.  "I  believe  it  is  designed  for  a 
decoy,"  wrote  Fitz  John  Porter,  Chief  of  Stafi",  to  Cadwala- 
der,  second  in  command.  "  There  may  be  a  deep-laid  plot 
to  deceive  us."  "  The  whole  aff'air  is  to  me  a  riddle,"  wrote 
Cadwalader  back  to  Porter.  Advancing  with  a  painful  over- 
cftution,  as  if  Johnston  were  the  invader,  a  i^art  of  the  army 
crossed  the  Potomac  on  the  16th  of  June. 

Finding  the  rumor  of  the  evacuation  true,  Patterson  took 
sufficient  courage  to  report  a  victory.  "  They  have  fled,  and 
in  confusion,"  he  wrote.  "  Their  retreat  is  as  demoralizing 
as  a  defeat ;  and,  as  the  leaders  will  never  be  caught,  more 
beneficial  to  our  cause.  Hai-per's  Feny  has  been  retaken 
without  firing  a  gun." 

"What  movement,  if  any,  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  do  you 
propose  to  make,  consequent  on  the  evacuation  of  Harper's 
Feny  ?  "  asked  General  Scott  by  telegi-aph.  "  Design  no 
pursuit ;  cannot  make  it,"  replied  Patterson.     That  deter- 


158       THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION. 

mination  necessarily  ended  this  first  part  of  the  campaign  ; 
and  Genei-al  Scott  thereupon  ordered  the  extra  reinforce- 
ments back  to  Washington. 

If  the  evacuation  of  Harrier's  Ferry  was  a  mystery  to  Pat- 
terson, it  was  a  j^lain  and  common-sense  necessity  to  the 
rebel  commander.  Occasionally  an  idea  finds  a  tenacious  and 
almost  ineradicable  lodgment  in  the  public  mind,  without 
a  shadow  of  reason  or  truth  to  justify  it.  Because  the  fan- 
atic John  Brown  selected  Harijer's  Ferry  as  the  scene  of  his 
wild  exploit,  the  public  mind  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that 
that  spot  was  a  natui-al  stronghold,  a  Gibraltarfa  Thei-mo- 
pylse.  Now,  the  single  mountain-line  called  the  Blue  Eidge, 
crossing  the  Potomac  Kiver  at  Harjier's  Ferry,  is  as  far  from 
being  a  mountain  stronghold  as  a  sti-aight  line  of  picket- 
fence  across  a  brook  is  from  being  a  block-house.  John 
Brown  was  as  unsound  in  war  as  in  politics.  But  it  would 
seem  that,  even  in  highly  ci\dlized  nations,  there  lingers  a 
remnant  of  the  savage  superstition  that  insanity  is  inspira- 
tion ;  for  strong  minds  caught  at  the  suggestion  that  he  had 
recognized  in  Harper's  Ferry  a  negi-o  Thermopylae. 

This  was  apparently  the  light  in  which  the  rebel  authori- 
ties regarded  the  place,  and  its  occupancy  and  retention  was 
made  a  jjrime  object  at  the  beginning.  Jefierson  Davis  him- 
self sent  Johnston,  one  of  his  best  officers,  to  command  it. 
"My  conversations  with  General  Lee,  in  Eichmond,"  says 
Johnston,  '^and  the  President's  [Jefferson  Davis]  oral  in- 
structions to  me  in  Montgomery,  had  infoimed  me  distinctly 
that  they  regarded  Harper's  Ferry  as  a  natui-al  fortress,  com- 
manding the  entrance  into  the  Valley  of  Virginia  from  Penn- 
sylvania and  Maiyland,  and  that  it  was  occupied  in  that  idea, 
and  my  command  not  that  of  a  militaiy  district  and  active 
army,  bat  of  a  fortress  and  its  garrison." 

When  Johnston  arrived,  however,  and  made  a  personal  in- 


PATTERSON'S  CAMPAIGN. 


159 


Patterson's  Campaigu. 


160       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

spection  of  the  neighborhood,  he  at  once  recognized  the 
eiTor  of  this  assumption.  "There  is  no  danger  of  attack  in 
front,"  he  \\T.-ote  (May  26thj,  "  but  the  position  is  easily 
turned  by  crossing  the  river  above  or  below.  The  present 
force  is  not  sufficient  for  defence  against  a  superior  one  at- 
tacking from  the  Virginia  side.  Belief,  in  case  of  invest- 
ment, could  not  be  furnished.  Considered  as  a  position,  I 
regard  Harper's  Feny  as  untenable  against  a  strong  enemy. 
We  have  outposts  at  the  Point  of  Eocks,  near  the  feny  at 
Williamsport,  and  the  bridge  at  Shepherdstown,  the  extreme 
points  being  at  least  thirty  miles  ajDart."  Two  days  later  he 
repeated  his  statement,  his  engineer  reporting  that  "to  hold 
this  post,  then,  either  as  a  fortress,  a  point  d'ajyptd,  or  as  a 
condition  of  the  defence  of  the  Virginia  Valley,  we  require  a 
force  of  from  twelve  to  fifteen  thousand  men." 

Lee  did  not  relish  the  alternative  ;  he  sent  him  two  addi- 
tional regiments,  and  wi'ote  him  that  the  abandonment  of 
Harper's  Feny  "  would  be  depressing  to  the  cause  of  the 
South."  But  Johnston  held  stubbornly  to  his  oi^inion,  and 
wrote  on  June  6th,  that,  though  the  abandonment  of  Haiijer's 
Ferry  might  be  depressing  to  the  cause  of  the  South,  the  loss 
of  five  or  six  thousand  men  would  be  more  so.  "  And  if 
they  remain  here,"  he  added,  "  they  must  be  captured  or 
destroyed  very  soon  after  General  McClellan's  an-ival  in  the 
valley."  The  opinion  was  evidently  based  on  the  current 
i-umors  that  McClellan  would  bring  Western  troops  to  join 
Patterson. 

This  decided  warning  had  its  effect  on  the  rebel  authori- 
ties, and  under  date  of  June  13th  they  authorized  Johnston 
to  retire  upon  Winchester,  after  destroying  everything  at 
Harper's  Feny,  "whenever  the  position  of  the  enemy  shall 
convince  you  that  he  is  about  to  turn  your  position."  But 
they  coupled  the  permission  with  another  strong  reminder ; 


PATTERSON'S  CAMPAIGN.  161 

"The  position  of  Hai-per's  Ferry,  as  has  been  heretofore 
stated,  is  deemed  vahiable  beqause  of  its  relation  to  Mary- 
land and  as  the  entrance  to  the  Valley  of  Virginia,  the  jjos- 
session  of  which  by  the  enemy  will  separate  the  eastern  and 
western  sections  of  the  State  from  each  other,  deprive  us  of 
the  agricultural  resoui-ces  of  that  fertile  region,  and  bring  in 
its  train  political  consequences  which  it  is  well  believed  you 
cannot  contemplate  without  the  most  painful  emotions." 
With  Patterson  on  the  point  of  moving  against  him,  how- 
ever, Johnston  allowed  political  consequences  to  take  care  of 
themselves,  destroyed  Harper's  FeiTy  on  June  13th  and  14th, 
and  retired  even  before  his  permission  was  received.  "  We 
are  twelve  miles  in  advance  of  Winchester,"  he  reported  on 
the  17th  ;  "  my  only  hope  fi-om  this  movement  is  a  slight 
delay  in  the  enemy's  advance.  I  believe  his  force  to  be 
about  eighteen  thousand  ;  oui's  is  six  thousand  five  hundi'ed." 
Patterson  admits  that  he  had  seventeen  regiments — a  force 
fully  capable  of  the  brilKant  and  important  blow  he  had 
been  ambitious  to  strike,  but  which  he  had  neither  the  skill 
nor  courtage  to  dii-ect. 

The  succeeding  two  weeks  furnish  no  incidents  worthy  of 
note  in  this  connection.  Practically  the  two  armies  re- 
mained in  observation,  inactive,  and  without  definite  plans. 
WTien  General  Scott  withdi-ew  the  temporaiy  reinforcements 
he  had  given  Patterson  to  enable  him  to  fight  a  battle,  the 
latter  once  more  retired  to  the  north  bank  of  the  Potomac. 
For  the  moment  militaiy  attention  was  dii'ected  elsewhere. 
McClellan  was  preparing  his  campaign  in  W^est  Vii'ginia ; 
McDowell  was  strengthening  the  Federal  occupation  of 
Arlington  Heights  and  Alexandi-ia ;  the  President  and 
General  Scott  were  deliberating  upon  possible  operations 
against  Manassas.  In  this  inteiim  Johnston  remained  in 
camj)  about  Winchester,  iDushing  his  picket-line  close  up 
11 


162       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

to  the  Potomac,  and  keeping  himself  well  informed  by  scouts 
and  spies.  Meanwhile  the  Confederate  authorities,  still 
anxious  to  hold  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  having  also  in 
view  a  possible  junction  with  Beauregard  at  Manassas,  sent 
foi"ward  reinforcements  which  raised  Johnston's  army  to  the 
effective  strength  of  nine  thousand,  besides  twenty-five  hun- 
dred local  militia  in  process  of  organization. 

Toward  the  end  of  June  a  movement  against  Manassas  was 
resolved  on  at  Washington.  As  a  preliminaiy,  General  Scott 
once  more  suggested  a  definite  task  to  Patterson.  "Re-" 
main  in  front  of  the  enemy,"  he  telegraphed  on  June  25th, 
"  wliile  he  continues  in  force  between  Winchester  and  the 
Potomac.  If  you  are  in  superior  or  equal  force,  you  may 
cross  and  offer  him  battle."  Two  days  later  he  gave  further 
emphasis  to  the  suggestion  by  saying,  "  I  had  expected  your 
crossing  the  river  to-day  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy."  But 
Patterson  complained  that  Johnston  outnumbered  him,  and 
clamored  for  reinforcements  and  batteries.  Reinforcements 
and  batteries  were  ordered  to  join  him,  and  he  was  also  in- 
formed of  the  intended  movement  on  Manassas  ;  upon  which 
he  again  put  on  a  bold  fi-ont  and  crossed  the  Potomac  at 
Williamsport,  moving  to  ]Martinsburg,  with  sufficient  oppo- 
sition to  biing  on  a  smart  skirmish  at  Falling  Waters,  the 
enemy  retiring  toward  Winchester  as  he  advanced. 

From  this  point,  during  the  short  time  he  yet  remained  in 
command,  Patterson's  militaiy  conduct  becomes  the  subject 
of  criticism  and  controversy.  It  is  military  usage — perhaps 
military  necessity  establishes  the  usage — that  orders  and  di- 
rections from  superior  to  subordinate  officers  are  conveyed  in 
brief  words  expressing  or  suggesting  only  the  objects  to  be 
accomplished,  and  leaving  methods  largely  at  the  discretion 
of  him  who  has  to  perform  the  task.  Following  this  estab- 
lished usage,  General   Scott,  by  his  orders  and  directions 


PATTERSON'S  CAMPAIGN.  163 

from  July  1st  to  tlie  IStli,  informed  Patterson  that  McDowell 
•would  make  an  advance  against  Beauregard,  and  that  John- 
ston must  be  defeated  or  detained  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
in  order  that  their  two  armies  might  not  unite  and  defeat 
McDowell.  "I  telegi-aphed  to  you  yesterday,"  was  Scott's 
language,  "  if  not  strong  enough  to  beat  the  enemy  early 
next  week,  make  demonstrations  so  as  to  detain  him  in  the 
valley  of  Winchester ;  but  if  he  retreats  in  force  toward 
Manassas,  and  it  be  too  hazardous  to  follow  him,  then  con- 
sider the  route  via  Key's  Ferry,  Leesburg,  etc."  That  Pat- 
terson correctly  understood  the  order  is  shown  by  his  reply  : 
"  I  have  thus  far  succeeded  in  keeping  in  this  vicinity  the 
command  under  Genei-al  Johnston,  who  is  now  i^retending 
to  be  engaged  in  fortifying  at  Winchester,  but  prejiared  to 
retire  beyond  striking  distance  if  I  should  advance  too  far. 
To-morrow  I  advance  to  Bunker  Hill  i^reparatoiy  to  the  other 
movement.  If  an  opiiortunity  offei*s,  I  shall  attack  ;  but,  un- 
less I  can  rout,  shall  be  careful  not  to  set  him  in  full  retreat 
upon  Sti-asburg." 

But  the  wishes  of  the  Administration  and  General  Scott 
were  not  allowed  to  depend  alone  on  the  customaiy  orders. 
Patterson's  former  indecision  and  hesitancy  had  created  a 
doubt  of  his  disposition  to  fight ;  and  a  similar  hesitancy 
was  once  more  manifesting  itself  in  his  complaints,  requests, 
and  especially  in  his  growing  exaggeration  of  his  antago- 
nist's strength.  It  is  always  deemed  hazardous  to  change 
commanders  on  the  eve  of  battle,  and  therefore  the  alterna- 
tive was  adopted  of  sending  General  Sandford  to  him  with 
additional  reinforcements ;  who,  wai^'ing  his  rank,  should 
take  command  under  Pattei-son,  and  prompt  him  in  pushing 
forward  the  army.  Sandford,  accepting  the  duty,  rejDorted  to 
Patterson  with  four  regiments  from  Washington,  about  July 
10th ;  the  independent  column  under  General  Stone  also 


1G4  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

joined  him  immediately  afterward,  so  that  Patterson's  army 
now  numbered  eighteen  thousand  two  hundred  according 
to  his  own  estimate,  or  over  twenty-two  thousand  according 
to  the  estimate  of  others,  opposed  to  the  rebel  ai-my,  which, 
altogether,  Johnston  states  to  have  been  less  than  twelve 
thousand  men. 

It  would  appear  that  at  this  time  two  impulses  struggled 
for  mastery  in  Patterson's  mind.  Apparently  he  was  both 
seeking  and  avoiding  a  battle.  He  had  called  a  council  of 
war  at  Martinsburg  on  the  9th  ;  and  verifying  the  military 
adage  that  a  council  of  war  never  fights,  his  officers  had  ad- 
vised him  that  he  was  on  a  "  false  line,"  and  that  he  could 
most  advantageously  threaten  Johnston  from  Charlestown. 
Accordingly,  on  July  12th,  Patterson  asked  permission  to 
transfer  his  forces  to  that  line  ;  while  a  dispatch  from  Gene- 
ral Scott  of  the  same  date,  in  reply  to  a  former  letter,  in  sub- 
stance accorded  him  the  j^ennission,  but  accomjjanied  it 
with  the  significant  reminder  :  "  Consider  this  suggestion 
well,  and  excejit  in  an  extreme  case  do  not  recross  the  Poto- 
mac with  more  than  a  sufficient  detachment  for  your  sup- 
plies on  the  canal." 

Such  a  movement  upon  Charlestown,  made  promptly  at 
that  date  and  under  the  then  existing  conditions,  might  have 
been  judicious.  But  Patterson's  dispatches  show  that  fi'om 
this  on  he  found  nothing  but  reasons  for  fear  and  justifica- 
tion for  inaction  and  retreat.  He  wanted  a  regiment  of  reg- 
ulars ;  he  said  the  time  of  the  three  months  regiments  was 
about  to  exjjire ;  that  his  men  were  barefooted ;  that  the 
enemy  was  reinforced  and  fortified ;  that  "  to  attack  under 
such  circumstances,  against  the  greatly  superior  force  at 
"Winchester,  is  most  hazardous." 

Under  these  renewed  manifestations  of  timidity  General 
Scott's  patience  began  to  give  way,  and  he  now  sent  Patter- 


PATTERSON'S  CAMPAIGN.  165 

sou  two  prompting  telegrams,  which  ought  to  have  waiTued 
the  sluggish  blood  of  even  sixty-nine  years  to  action.  "  Do 
not  let  the  enemy  amuse  and  delay  you  with  a  small  force  in 
front,"  he  telegi-aphed  July  17th,  "  whilst  he  reinforces  the 
pVIanassas]  Junction  with  his  main  body.  McDowell's  fii'st 
day's  work  has  driven  the  enemy  beyond  Fairfax  Court 
House.  The  Junction  will  probably  be  carried  to-morrow." 
And  again  on  the  following  day  :  "  I  have  cei-tainly  been  ex- 
pecting you  to  beat  the  enemy.  If  not,  to  hear  that  you  had 
felt  him  strongly,  or,  at  least,  had  occupied  him  by  threats 
and  demonstrations.  You  have  been  at  least  his  equal,  and 
I  suppose  superior  in  numbers.  Has  he  not  stolen  a  march 
and  sent  reinforcements  toward  Manassas  Junction  ?  A 
week  is  enough  to  win  victories."  Unfoi-tunately,  Patterson, 
even  before  he  received  the  first  of  these,  had  ah'eady  com- 
mitted the  fatal  militaiy  blunder  of  a  retreat.  But  the 
questions  were  so  searching,  and  so  plainly  conveyed  a  rep- 
rimand, that  he  replied  in  a  tone  of  offended  dignity  :  "  The 
enemy  has  stolen  no  march  upon  me.  I  have  kept  him 
actively  employed,  and,  by  threats  and  reconnoissances  in 
force,  caused  him  to  be  re-enforced.  I  have  accomplished  in 
this  respect  more  than  the  General-in-Chief  asked,  or  could 
well  be  expected  in  face  of  an  enemy  far  superior  in  num- 
bers, with  no  line  of  communication  to  protect."  The 
answer  was  admirable  in  form  and  spirit,  but  it  lacked  the 
essential  element  of  correctness.  The  enemy  did  not  out- 
number him — was,  in  fact,  only  two-thirds  as  strong — and 
was  at  that  moment  actually  making  a  rapid  "  stolen  march  " 
to  Manassas,  which  Patterson  did  not  discover  till  two  days 
afterward. 

Understanding  fully,  both  from  General  Scott's  telegrams 
and  General  Sandford's  personal  explanations,  that  an  ad- 
vance agauist  Manassas  Junction  was  in  progress,  which 


166       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

would  lead  to  a  heavy  battle  between  McDowell  and  Beaure- 
gard, Pattei*son  bad  moved  from  Martinsburg  on  July  lotb, 
directly  toward  Johnston  at  Winchester,  as  far  as  Bunker 
Hill,  within  nine  miles  of  the  enemy.  On  the  following  day 
he  ordered  a  slight  reconnoissance.  Until  the  night  of  the 
16th  it  was  believed  by  his  officers  that  the  advance  meant 
fight.  Every  one  understood  that  the  critical  moment  had 
come,  or  was  at  hand.  The  time  for  elaboi-ate  strategy  or 
new  combinations  had  j^assed.  Confronting  the  enemy 
there  were  but  thi'ee  alternatives  admissible  under  his  im- 
perative duty  :  to  hold  him,  to  fight  him,  or  to  follow  him. 

It  is  sad  to  relate  that,  with  the  complete  advantage  of 
numbei^  and.  position,  he  did  neither.  In  justice  to  him, 
however,  it  should  always  be  remembered  that  his  personal 
instinct  was  right,  and  that  he  was  led  into  his  fatal  error 
mainly  by  the  influence  of  his  chief-of-stafl",  Fitz  John  Por- 
ter. His  senior  aid-de-camp,  in  his  testimony  before  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  relates  the  circum- 
stances under  which  he  took  his  final  decision  : 

"At  one  time.  General  Patterson  had  given  an  order  to 
move  from  Bunker  Hill  to  Winchester.  He  was  very  unwil- 
ling to  leave  Johnston,  even  at  Winchester,  without  attacking 
him ;  and  on  the  afternoon  before  we  left  Bunker  Hill  he 
decided  to  attack  him,  notwithstanding  his  strong  force. 

"  Question.     Behind  his  intrenchments  ? 

"  Answer.  Yes,  sir ;  it  went  so  far  that  his  order  was 
waitten  by  liis  assistant  adjutant-general,  Colonel  Poi-ter. 
It  was  very  much  against  the  wishes  of  Colonel  Porter,  and 
he  asked  General  Patterson  if  he  would  send  for  Colonel 
Abercrombie  and  Colonel  Thomas,  and  consult  them  on  the 
movement.  General  Patterson  replied :  '  No,  sir ;  for  I 
know  they  will  attemjit  to  dissuade  me  from  it,  and  I  have 
made  up   my   mind  to   fight  Johnston   under  all   circum- 


PATTERSON'S  CAMPAIGN.  167 

stances.'  That  was  the  day  before  we  left  Blinker  Hill. 
Then  Colonel  Porter  asked  to  have  Colonel  Abercrombie 
and  Colonel  Thomas  sent  for  and  consulted  as  to  the  best 
manner  to  cany  out  his  wishes.  He  consented,  and  they 
came,  and  after  half  an  hour  they  dissuaded  him  from  it." 

"With  his  intentions  thus  changed,  Patterson  late  that 
night  ordered  a  retrogi-ade  movement;  and  the  next  day, 
July  17th,  his  anny  marched  to  Chaiiestown — nominally  as  a 
flank  movement,  but  practically  in  retreat,  since  it  about 
doubled  the  distance  between  himself  and  the  enemy.  It 
adds  neither  excuse  nor  credit  to  himself  or  his  advising 
subordinates  that,  as  a  partial  justification,  they  had  gulped 
down  an  absurd  mmor  about  the  enemy  being  forty  thou- 
sand strong,  without  taking  any  efficient  means  to  ascertain 
its  coiTectness.  And  so  lifeless  and  inefficient  had  the 
whole  army  become  under  such  influences  and  management, 
tliat  not  till  July  20th  did  Patterson  leam  the  humiliating 
fact  that  he  had  wrecked  the  fair  military  rei^iitation  of  a 
lifetime  by  peiTaitting  the  enemy  to  escape  through  utterly 
inexcusable  lack  of  energy  and  want  of  judgment.  And  if 
that  reflection  could  be  still  further  embittered,  it  was  done 
by  the  early  realization  that  his  stupendous  blunder  had  lost 
to  the  Union  cause  the  first  important  battle  of  the  war. 

Johnston  was  at  "Winchester,  in  daily  anticipation  of  Pat- 
terson's attack,  when,  a  little  aftpr  midnight  of  July  17th, 
he  received  orders  from  the  Confederate  authorities  to  go  at 
once  to  the  help  of  Beauregard.  Just  twenty- foiu"  hours  had 
elapsed  since  Patterson's  order  to  retreat,  and  the  Union 
r.rmy  was  already  at  Charlestown.  By  nine  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  July  18th,  Johnston's  scouts  brought  him  reports 
indicating  clearly  the  actual  situation.  At  noon  of  that  day 
he  had  his  whole  efi'ective  force  of  nine  thousand  men  on 
the  march ;  at  nightfall  his  advance  passed  through  Ashby's 


168        THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION. 

Gap  of  the  Blue  Eidge;  b^  eight  o'clock  on  the  19th  it 
was  at  Piedmont,  the  nearest  station  of  the  Manassas  CJap 
llailroad,  and  embarking  here  in  cars,  seven  regiments  were 
in  Beauregard's  camp,  at  Manassas,  that  afternoon.  John- 
ston himself,  with  another  detachment,  anived  at  Manassas 
at  noon  of  Saturday,  July  20th ;  and  most  of  the  remainder 
of  his  force  reached  the  battle-field  of  Bull  Eun  in  the  nick 
of  time  to  take  a  decisive  part  in  that  famous  conflict,  about 
three  o'clock  on  Sunday,  July  21st.  It  was  these  nine  thou- 
sand men  of  Johnston's  army  which  not  merely  decided,  but 
jirincipally  fought  the  battle.  Patterson  could  and  ought 
either  to  have  defeated  or  held  them  at  Winchester.  Only 
a  little  more  than  a  month  had  elapsed  since  he  had  written 
to  the  Secretary  of  War,  "Give  me  the  means  of  success. 
You  have  the  means ;  j^lace  them  at  my  disposal,  and  shoot 
me  if  I  do  not  use  them  to  advantage."  He  would  have 
fared  ill  under  a  literal  enforcement  of  his  own  ofler. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

MANASSAS. 

Ox  tlie  23(1  of  Mav,  1861,  according  to  the  conspirators' 
programme,  Virginia  was  put  tlirougli  the  dumb  show  of 
indorsing  the  Secession  Ordinance  by  a  nominal  popular 
vote;  and  ahnost  immediately  thereafter,  about  June  1st, 
the  Confederate  seat  of  government  was  transferred  from 
Montgomeiy  to  Richmond.  The  reasons  for  this  course 
were  palpable;  it  gi-atified  the  local  pride  of  the  Old 
Dominion  secessionists;  it  gave  the  reins  of  local  military 
domination  definitely  into  Jefiferson  Davis'  personal  gi-asp ; 
ii  placed  him  on  the  most  advantageous  frontier  to  meet  the 
expected  Union  advance  from  Washington.  This,  as  previ- 
ously related,  had  already  seized  upon  Alexandria  and  Ai*- 
lington  Heights,  which  were  now  being  extensively  fortified. 
Making  a  short  speech  to  a  serenade  on  the  evening  of  June 
1st,  the  rebel  chief  announced  that  Virginia  Avas  "to  become 
the  theatre  of  a  gi-eat  central  camp,  fi-om  which  will  pour 
forth  thousands  of  brave  hearts  to  roll  back  the  tide  of  this 
despotism." 

The  local  campaign  had  ah'eady  taken  shape  before  his 
aiTival.  Since  Lee  was  placed  in  command  he  had  followed 
a  ijolicy  which  looked  less  to  the  caj^ture  of  Baltimore  than 
to  the  obstruction  of  the  Potomac.  His  first  and  pilncipal 
task  had  been  to   organize   the   volunteers    which    Govei'- 


170        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

nor  Letcher  called  into  sen-ice;  and  the  earliest  levies  of 
Northern  Viiginia  were  i)Osted  at  Manassas  Junction,  where 
railroads  from  Pdchmond,  from  Alexandiia,  and  from  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  met.  On  examination,  its  sti*ategical 
vahie  was  found  to  be  much  gi-eater  than  was  suspected  at 
the  beginning ;  Colonel  Cocke,  the  local  commander,  fii-st 
pointed  out  to  Lee  its  important  relation  to  the  Shenandoah 
Valley.  "  These  two  columns,"  he  writes,  under  date  of  May 
15th,  "one  at  Manassas  and  one  at  Winchester,  could  readily 
co-opei-ate  and  concentrate  upon  the  one  point  or  the  other, 
cither  to  make  head  against  the  enemy's  columns  advancing 
down  the  valley,  should  he  force  Harper's  Ferry ;  or,  in  case 
we  repulse  him  at  Hai-jier's  Feny,  the  Winchester  sniiport- 
ing  column  could  throw  itself  on  this  side  of  the  mountains, 
to  co-operate  with  the  column  at  Manassas." 

With  the  gi'eat  increase  of  Federal  troops  at  Washington, 
and  their  seizure  of  Alexandria  and  Ai-liugton  Heights,  the 
jiost  at  Manassas  Junction  became  of  such  prominence  and 
importance,  that  Beauregard  was  sent  to  take  command  of  it 
about  June  Ist.  Beauregard  was  an  officer  of  curiously  un- 
equal merit :  thoroughly  educated,  and  highly  skilful  in  the 
science  and  art  of  militaiy  engineering,  he  had  little  capacity 
for  administration,  or  sound  judgment  in  the  conception  of 
large  field-operations.  Giddy  to  intoxication  with  laudation 
for  his  cheap  \-ictoiy  at  Sumter,  he  now  inWted  upon  his 
own  head  the  contempt  of  the  world,  and  of  histoiy,  by  pub- 
lishing a  proclamation  in  which,  without  provocation,  he 
"charged  the  Union  aiinies  to  have  abandoned  "  all  rules  of 
civilized  waiiare,"  and  to  have  made  "  Beauty  and  Booty " 
their  war-ciy.  His  next  exi)loit  was  to  excite  the  distni.st  of 
the  Richmond  authorities  upon  his  military  abilit}-,  by  pro- 
posing a  series  of  aggressive  movements  intended  to  annihi- 
late the  Union  armies  and  capture  Washington  ;  liable,  how- 


MANASSAS.  171 

ever,  to  tlie  objection,  noted  thereon  by  Jefferson  Davis,  tliat 
"  the  plan  was  based  on  the  improbable  and  inadmissible 
supposition  that  the  enemy  was  to  await  everywhere,  isolated 
and  motionless,  until  our  forces  could  effect  jimctions  to 
attack  them  in  detail."  Meanwhile  he  rendered  his  sujieri- 
ors  a  real  service  in  pointing  out  that  the  defence  of  his 
l^osition  should  be  made,  not  with  earthworks  at  Manassas, 
but  with  troops  on  the  line  of  Bull  Run,  and  for  this  he  was 
urgent  in  demanding  large  reinforcements. 

As  has  been  already  mentioned,  it  was  General  Scott's 
oiiinion  that  the  Government  ought  not  to  engage  in  any 
military  undei-taldngs  with  the  three  months  volunteers,  be- 
yond those  to  which  these  forces  had  been  already  assigned 
and  distributed,  namely :  to  protect  Washington  and  fortify 
Arlington  Heights  ;  to  garrison  Fort  Monroe  and,  if  chance 
should  offer,  recapture  tha  Gosport  Navy  Yard  at  Norfolk ; 
to  hold  Baltimore  and  Maryland  ;  to  prosecute  Patterson's 
campaign  against  Harper's  Ferry ;  to  recover  West  Virginia 
through  McClellan's  campaign  ;  to  guard  the  Ohio  line,  and 
control  Kentucky  and  Missouri.  Larger  and  more  distant 
operations,  he  believed,  ought  to  be  undertaken  only  with 
new  armies  formed  of  the  three  years  volunteers,  giving  the 
summer  to  drill  and  preparation,  and  entering  on  combined 
movements  in  the  favorable  autumn  weather. 

Important  reasons,  partly  military,  partly  political,  con- 
flicted with  so  deliberate  a  progi'amme.  As  events  had 
shaped  themselves,  it  seemed  necessary  to  aid  Patterson. 
The  possibility  that  Beauregard  and  Johnston  might  unite 
their  annies  was  clearly  enough  perceived  ;  hence,  a  column 
to  threaten  Manassas  was  proposed.  Indications  were  also 
manifesting  themselves  that  rebel  batteries  at  narrow  places 
might  soon  seriously  embarrass  the  navigation  of  the  Poto- 
mac.    Chiefly,  however,  the  highly  excited  patriotism  of  the 


172  THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION. 

North,  eager  to  wipe  out  national  insult  and  vindicate 
national  authority,  was  impatient  of  what  seemed  tedious 
delay.  The  echoes  of  the  Sumter  bombaidment  were  yet  in 
the  air ;  the  blood  on  the  Baltimore  i^aving-stones  was  cry- 
ing loudly  to  heaven.  For  half  a  centiuy  the  nation  had 
felt  no  close  experience  of  war.  The  concjuests  of  peace  had 
gi-own  almost  miracalous  in  speed  and  certainty.  Rivers 
and  mountains,  distance  and  time,  had  become  the  obedient 
ministers  of  creative  ingenuity  and  bold  enterjjrise.  Forget- 
ting that  the  achievements  of  peace  encountered  the  opjjos- 
ing  obstacles,  not  of  man,  but  of  nature  alone,  the  North  de- 
manded speedy  as  well  as  signal  redress.  It  saw  rebellion 
enthroned  in  the  capital  of  Virginia;  it  saw  a  numerous 
Union  army  gathered  at  "Washington  ;  the  newspapers  raised 
the  cry  of  "  On  to  Richmond ;  "  and  the  p'opulai"  heart  beat 
in  quick  and  well-nigh  unanimous  response  to  the  slogan. 
Latterly  a  detachment  sent  out  by  General  Butler  from 
Fortress  Monroe  had  met  a  repulse  at  Great  Bethel,  and  near 
Washington  a  railroad-train  under  General  Schenck  had  rtm 
into  an  ambush  at  Vienna  station ;  both  were  trifling  losses, 
but  at  the  moment  supremely  irritating  to  the  pride  of  the 
North,  and  the  fu-es  of  patriotic  resentment  once  more 
blazed  up  with  fi-esh  intensity. 

General  Scott's  first  project  of  an  expedition  against 
Manassas  was  made  about  the  l)eginmng  of  June,  the  object 
then  being  not  to  fight  a  battle,  but  merely  make  a  threaten- 
ing diversion  to  aid  Patterson.  There  were  at  that  time  only 
s^me  six  thousand  rebels  at  Manassas,  according  to  Beaure- 
gard's report.  Before  the  design  could  take  final  shape, 
Johnston  had  evacuated  Harper's  FeiTy,  and  Patterson's 
first  movement  was  thereby  terminated.  This  occun-ed 
about  the  middle  of  June. 

From  that  time  on,  the  i)lan  grew  into  the  idea  of  a  larger 


MANASSAS.  173 

aud  more  decisive  movement.  Beauregard  was  receiving 
large  reinforcements ;  nevertheless,  the  strength  of  the 
Union  army  at  Washington  was  such  that  it  seemed  entirely 
possible  to  provide  every  chance  of  success.  McDowell, 
raised  in  rank  from  the  grade  of  major  to  that  of  brigadier- 
general,  and  placed  in  command  at  Arlington  Heights,  sub- 
mitted a  formal  plan,  at  the  request  of  the  General-in-Chief, 
about  June  2ith.  His  plan  assumed  that  the  secession  forces 
at  Mana'^sas  and  its  dependencies  would  number  twenty-five 
thousand ;  that  they  would  unavoidably  become  apprised  of 
the  movement,  and  every  effort  would  be  made  to  increase 
Beauregard's  strength ;  but  that  "  if  General  J.  E.  John- 
ston's force  is  kept  engaged  by  Major-General  Patterson, 
and  Major-Gcueral  Butler  occupies  the  force  now  in  his 
vicinity  (Fortress  Monroe),  I  think  they  will  not  be  able  to 
bring  up  more  than  ten  thousand  men."  Against  such  an 
array  he  proposed  to  move  with  a  force  of  thirty  thousand  of 
all  arms,  and  a  reserve  of  ten  thousand. 

The  project  was  elaborately  discussed,  and  finally  agreed 
upon,  at  a  council  of  war  at  the  Executive  Mansion,  on  June 
29th,  in  which  President  Lincoln,  his  Cabinet,  and  the  prin- 
cipal military  officers  took  part.  As  ah-eady  mentioned. 
General  Scott  was  opposed  to  the  undertaking  ;  but,  after  it 
was  once  resolved  upon,  he  joined  with  hearty  good-will  in 
every  effort  to  make  it  a  success.  McDowell  was  emphatic 
in  his  protest  that  he  could  not  hope  to  beat  the  combined 
armies  of  Johnston  and  Beauregard;  upon  which  Scott  gave 
him  the  distinct  assurance  :  "  If  Johnston  joins  Beauregard, 
he  shall  have  Patterson  on  his  heels."  With  this  understand- 
ing, the  movement  was  ordered  to  begin  a  week  from  that 
day. 

The  enterprise  did  not  escape  the  usual  fate  of  unforeseen 
delay  ;  it  marks  gi'eat  energy  in  McDowell  that  his  expedi- 


174       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

tion  was  only  deferred  a  little  over  a  week  beyond  the  ap- 
pointed time.  On  the  16tL  of  July  he  issued  his  orders  to 
march  that  afternoon.     His  anny  was  organized  as  follows : 

Fii-st  Division,  commanded  by  Tyler:  an  aggregate  of 
9,936  men,  divided  into  foui'  brigades,  respectively  under 
Keyes,  Schenck,  SheiTuan,  and  Kiehardson. 

Second  Division,  commanded  by  Huntee  :  an  aggregate  of 
2,648  men,  divided  into  two  brigades,  under  Porter  and 
Biumside. 

Thii'd  Division,  commanded  by  Hetxtzelsian  :  an  aggie- 
gate  of  9,777  men,  divided  into  thi-ee  brigades,  under  Frank- 
lin, "Wilcox,  and  Howard. 

Foiu-th  Division,  commanded  by  Kunvon  :  an  aggi'egate  of 
5,752  men  ;  no  brigade  commanders. 

Fifth  Division,  commanded  by  Miles  :  an  aggregate  of  6,207 
men,  di^dded  into  two  brigades,  under  Blenker  and  Davies. 

Thus,  the  total  of  his  command,  not  including  four  regi- 
ments left  in  the  Alexandiia  and  Aiiington  forts,  was  34,320 
men.  Fi'om  this  number,  however,  Eunyon's  division  may 
at  once  be  deducted ;  it  was  left  behind  to  guard  his  com- 
munications, its  most  advanced  regiment  being  seven  miles 
in  rear  of  Centreville.  McDowell's  actual  moving  column 
may  therefore  be  said  to  have  consisted  of  28,568  *  men,  in- 
cluding artilleiy,  a  total  of  forty-nine  guns,  and  a  single  bat- 
talion of  cavahy. 

*  From  this  number  it  is  entirely  just  to  make  yet  another  deduction.  The 
period  of  enlistment  of  the  Fourth  Tennsylvania  Regiment,  and  of  Captain  Va- 
rian"s  Battery  of  (New  York)  Light  Artillery  having  expired,  they  were  dis- 
charged by  official  order  at  Centreville,  July  20th,  the  day  before  the  battle. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that,  insteal  of  the  thirty  thousand  he  asked  for,  McDowell 
had,  perhaps,  less  than  twenty-eight  thousand  nion,  with  forty-nine  guns ;  and 
official  reports  show  that,  instead  of  the  thirty-five  thousand  rebels  he  expected 
to  meet  at  ilanassjis,  there  were  on  the  field  thirty-two  thousand  men,  with 
fifty-seven  guns  -less  than  his  estimate,  but  about  three  thousand  more  than  Lis 
own  army. 


MANASSAS.  175 

Of  all  machines,  an  army  develops,  perhaps,  the  greatest 
inefficiency  from  mere  friction,  or  the  greatest  usefulness 
fi'om  action  and  thoroughness  of  organization.  The  value 
of  a  veteran  consists  as  much  of  his  habitual  expertness  in 
the  routine  of  camp  and  march,  as  of  coolness  and  confidence 
under  fire.  Two  principal  causes  rendered  the  advance 
very  slow.  The  first  was  the  want  of  practice  in  marching. 
"  They  stopped  every  moment  to  pick  blackberries  or  get 
water,"  says  McDowell ;  "  they  would  not  keep  in  the  ranks, 
order  as  much  as  you  pleased ;  when  they  came  where  water 
was  fresh,  they  would  pour  the  old  water  out  of  theii-  can- 
teens, and  fill  them  with  fresh  water ;  they  were  not  used  to 
denying  themselves  much ;  they  were  not  used  to  journeys 
on  foot."  The  second  cause  was,  j)erhaps,  yet  more  potent. 
"  The  affair  of  Big  Bethel  and  Vienna  had  created  a  great 
outcry  against  rushing  into  places  that  people  did  not  know 
anything  about.  I  think  the  idea  of  every  one  was  that  we 
were  to  go  into  no  such  things  as  that — that  we  were  to  feel 
our  way,"  again  says  McDowell.  Precaution  on  this  point 
was  j)articularly  emphasized  in  his  instructions.  "  The  three 
following  things,"  says  his  marching  order,  "  will  not  be  par- 
donable in  any  commander :  1st,  to  come  upon  a  battery  or 
breastwork  without  a  knowledge  of  its  position;  2d,  to  be 
surprised;  3d,  to  fall  back."  Moving  forward  with  such 
isainful  wariness,  a  surpiise  of  the  enemy  was,  of  course, 
equally  out  of  the  question.  In  obedience  to  Beauregard's 
orders,  his  outposts  everywhere  retired,  though,  in  several 
instances,  with  such  precipitation  as  to  leave  their  tents, 
knapsacks,  and  even  their  freshly  cooked  rations  behind. 

Manassas  Junction  lies  thirty-five  miles  southwest  of 
Washington,  on  a  high,  open  jjlateau ;  there  the  rebels  had 
some  slight  field-works,  armed  with  fourteen  or  fifteen 
heavy  guns,  and  garrisoned  by  about  two  thousand  men. 


176       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

Bull  Pwun  flows  iu  a  southeasterly  direction,  some  three 
miles  east  of  Manassas,  with  wooded  heights  coming  gen- 
erally close  up  to  its  west  bank.  The  stream  is  winding  and 
sluggish,  and,  though  here  and  there  it  has  steep,  sometimes 
precipitous  and  rocky  banks,  it  is  fordable  in  many  places. 
Beauregard's  main  army,  increased  now  to  over  twenty  thou- 
sand, was  posted  at  the  various  fords  of  Bull  Run,  in  a  line 
some  eight  miles  long,  and  extending  from  the  Manassa*: 
Kaih'oad  to  the  Stone  Bridge  on  the  WaiTenton  turnpike.* 

*  At  Union  iti'.ls  Ford,  E'veU's  brigade  of  thre?  reRiraents  :  at  McLean's  Ford, 
Jones'  brigade  of  three  regiments;  at  B'.actburn's  Ford,  Longstreet's  brigade 
of  five  regiments ;  above  MilcJielCx  Ford,  Bonham's  brigade  of  Ave  regiments ; 
at  LewiH'  Fcrd,  Cocke's  brigade  of  portions  of  six  regiments ;  at  Stone  Bi  idge, 
Evans'  demi-brigade  of  a  regiment  and  a  half ;  Early's  brigade  of  four  regiments 
was  posted  as  a  reserve  in  reur  and  support  of  Longstrcet  and  Jones.  All  the 
above,  together  with  some  seven  other  regiments  and  portions,  not  brigaded,  con- 
stituted Beauregard's  "Army  of  the  Potomac."  His  official  report  states  the 
total  effective,  on  the  morning  of  the  battle  (July  21st),  to  have  been  21,S33,  and 
29  guns. 

Holmes'  brigade,  an  independent  command  ordered  up  from  Acquia  Creek, 
consisted  of  two  regiments,  reported  by  Beauregard  at  a  total  of  l,o55,  and  6 
guns.     It  was  posted  as  a  support  for  Ewell. 

Johnston's  ''Army  of  the  Shenandoah"  consisted  of  Jackson's  brigade  of  five 
regiments,  posted  as  a  support  for  Bonham ;  and  Bee's  brigade  of  four  regiments, 
posted  as  a  support  for  Cocke.  These  had  arrived  and  were  in  camp  on  the 
morning  of  the  battle  (July  21st).  Beauregard  reports  their  round  number?, 
ready  for  action,  at  6,000  men  and  20  guns.  In  addition,  there  arrived  at 
Manassas  about  noon,  and  on  the  battle-field  between  two  and  four  o'clock, 
Fisher's  Sixth  North  Carolina,  Ki4,  and  Kirby  Smith's  brigade  (afterward  led  by 
Elzey),  of  1,700  men  and  2  guns  ;  and  also  Hill's  Virginia  Regiment,  550. 

Men.  Guns. 

Recapitulation:   Beauregard's  array 21.S.33  29 

Johnston's  army 8,884  22 

Holmes'  brigade  1,355  6 

32,073  57 

To  which  may  be  added  sundry  detachments,  the  numbers  of  which  are  not  given 
in  official  reports. 


MANASSAS. 


177 


It  was  McDowell's  intention  to  turn  this  position  on  tlie 
South.  To  conceal  his  pui-pose,  and  create  the  impression 
of  a  contemplated  attack  in  front,  he  directed  his  march  upon 
Centreville  on  the  Warrenton  turninke.    On  Thursday  morn- 


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Manassas               In 

Bull  Run— The  Field  of  Strategy. 

ing,  July  18th,  Tyler  moved  upon  Centreville,  but,  arriving 
there  at  nine  o'clock,  he  found  that  it,  too,  had  been  evacu- 
ated, and  that  Beauregard's  entire  amiy  was  behind  Bull 
Eun.  Centreville  being  situated  on  a  hill,  Tyler  could  see 
the  whole  valley  spread  out  before  him,  with  Manassas  on 
13 


178       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

the  high  jJateau  beyond.  The  main  body  of  the  enemy,  ho 
learned,  had  retired  down  the  road  i-uuniug  dii-ectly  toward 
that  jjoint,  crossing  the  stream  at  Mitchell's  and  Blackbuni'^ 
fords. 

Tyler's  unopi^osed  advance  had  jaerhaps  inspii*ed  him  and 
his  offieei"s  with  an  over-confidence  or  undue  elation ;  per- 
haps it  suggested  the  belief  that  the  enemy  did  not  feel 
strong  enough  to  make  a  stand.  Under  instnictions  to 
"  obsen'e  well  the  roads,"  but  to  biing  on  no  engagement, 
it  occurred  to  him  to  make  a  reconnoissance  in  the  direction 
of  the  retreat. 

As  often  hapjjens  under  such  circumstances,  the  spiiit  of 
combat  overcame  discretion.  Accompanied  by  Bichardson, 
one  of  his  brigade  commanders,  Tyler  fii-st  went  out  with 
a  squadron  of  cavalry  and  two  companies  of  light  infantry. 
Finding  a  favorable  situation  to  try  artillery,  they  sent  back 
for  a  batteiy,  and  EicharcLson's  brigade  to  support  it.  Aboub 
noon  of  the  18th  they  were  within  a  mile  of  Blackburn's  ford. 
Then  followed  the  ever-recuning  experience  of  such  aifuirs. 
First,  an  exiDeiimental  cannonade  fi'om  a  couple  of  field- 
pieces,  before  which  the  enemy's  giuis  retii'ed;  next  the 
advance  of  a  skii-mish-line,  before  which  the  enemy's  skir- 
mishers retired ;  then  an  advance  of  some  of  the  field-pieces 
and  the  planting  of  a  stronger  battery ;  the  posting  of  a 
regiment  to  support  the  skirmishers,  and,  soon  after,  the 
posting  of  the  eutu-e  brigade  to  support  the  regiment,  fol- 
lowed by  calling  up  a  resei-ve  brigade  to  supjiort  the  first. 
Thus  the  afternoon's  work  drifted  quickly  from  a  reconnois- 
sance to  a  skiimish,  and  from  a  skiimish  to  a  preliminaiy 
battle.  It  was  not  until  some  sixty  men  had  fallen,  until 
the  two  exposed  field-pieces  were  with  ililliculty  extricated, 
until  one  regiment  had  retreated  in  confusion  and  the  other 


MANASSAS.  179 

three  were  deployed  iu  line  of  battle  to  make  a  new  cliarge, 
that  Tyler  heeded  his  instructions,  and  withdrew  his  reluc- 
tant officers  and  men  from  the  fight,  partly  demoralized  and 
generally  exasperated,  and  returned  to  Centreville.  In  point 
of  fact,  the  loss,  the  damage,  the  demoralization,  had  been 
eqiial  on  both  sides.  The  rebel  reports  show  that  three  regi- 
ments of  Longstreet's  brigade,  which  bore  the  first  assault, 
were  so  much  shaken  that  Early's  reserve  brigade  of  three 
fresh  regiments  was  called  uj)  and  relieved  them,  that  one  of 
these  regiments  was  thrown  into  confusion,  and  that  the  rebel 
loss  was  sixty-three  killed  and  wounded.  Undecisive  as  it  was, 
the  battle  of  Blackburn's  Ford  had  an  important  effect.  It 
confirmed  Beauregard  in  his  previous  impression  that  the 
Ijrincipal  Union  attack  would  be  made  at  that  point  on  the 
centre  of  his  long  line.  On  the  other  hand,  McDowell,  receiv- 
ing from  his  officers  reports  of  rifle-pits  and  breastworks,  be- 
came convinced  that  a  direct  assault  was  unwise.  The  affair  of 
Blackburn's  Ford  thus  proved  something  more  than  a  pre- 
liminary defeat ;  it  augmented  the  causes  of  a  gi-eat  disaster. 
Upon  hearing  the  cannonade,  McDowell  had  immediately 
ordered  all  the  divisions  forward  to  Centreville.  He  had 
already  in  his  own  mind  given  up  the  plan  of  turning  the 
enemy's  right,  because  of  the  unfavorable  nature  of  the  ground 
and  roads.  The  necessity  of  finding  an  unfortified  crossing 
seemed  now  also  demonstrated.  Meeting  his  division  com- 
manders at  Centreville,  that  same  night  of  Thursday,  July 
18th,  McDowell  informed  them  confidentially  that  he  had 
abandoned  his  original  plan,  and  had  resolved  to  make  the 
attack  by  marching  northward  and  turning  Beauregard's  left 
flank  instead  of  his  right. 

As  an  incident  of  this  resolve,  however,  it  was  even  more 
essential  than  before  to  contiaue  to  threaten  the  enemy's 


180  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

centre ;  and  thus  Eichardson's  brigade  was  once  more  posted 
in  the  direction  of  Blackbnm's  Ford.  Meanwliile  the  engi- 
neers were  busy  all  of  Friday  and  Saturday  in  efforts  to  find 
an  unfortified  ford  over  Bull  Run.  They  were  not  success- 
ful till  a  late  hour  on  Saturday  ;  and  this  delay  deferred  the 
main  battle  till  Sunday,  July  21st.  Could  a  similar  attack 
have  been  made  a  day  earlier,  the  result  would  probably 
have  been  altogether  different. 


CHAPTEE  XV. 

BULL  RUX. 

At  CentreTille,  on  Satiu'dav  niglit,  McDowell  called  his 
officers  together  and  announced  to  them  his  jDlan  of  battle 
for  the  following  day.  The  Wai-renton  turnpike  i-an  almost 
dii'ectly  west  fi-om  Centre-s-ille  to  Gaines\dlle  station  on  the 
railroad.  He  was  yet  unaware  that  Johnston  had  joined 
Beaiu'egard,  and  sought  to  prevent  such  junction  by  seizing 
Gainesville.  Beauregard's  army  lay  in  detachments  behind 
Bull  Run,  at  five  different  fords,  along  a  line  of  eight  miles. 
His  left  and  northernmost  flank  was  at  the  stone  bridge 
where  Wan-enton  turnpike  crosses  Bull  Eun,  though  Mc- 
Dowell supj)osed  it  to  extend  to  the  first  ford  above.  The 
bridge  was  a  solid  stone  stmcture  of  two  arches,  of  consider- 
able size  and  height,  connecting  the  precipitous  and  rocky 
eastern  bank  of  the  stream  with  a  broad  jiiece  of  level  bottom- 
land on  the  west.  The  bridge  was  thought  to  be  defended 
in  force,  and  said  to  be  prej)ared  for  blovring  up.  The  en- 
gineers had  infonnation,  however,  that  Sudley  Ford,  two  or 
three  miles  above,  could  be  readily  earned  and  crossed  by 
an  attacking  column.  McDowell  therefore  ordered  that 
Tyler,  with  the  heaviest  division,  should  advance  fi'om  Cen- 
treville  directly  to  Stone  Bridge,  thi-ee  and  a  haK  miles  dis- 
tant, and  make  a  feigned  attack ;  while  Hunter  and  Heintzel- 
man  should  make  a  secret  and  circuitous  night  march  north- 


182  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

ward,  cross  Suclley  Ford,  and,  rapidly  descending  on  the 
enemy's  side  of  Bull  Eiin,  should  clear  away  the  batteries  at 
the  stone  bridge  by  a  rear  attack,  and  thus  enable  Tylei-'s 
di^'ision  to  cross  and  join  in  the  combined  march  on  Gaines- 
ville, or  continue  the  attack  on  Beauregard's  left.  If  the 
stone  bridge  were  blown  up,  the  engineers  had  timbers 
ready  to  repair  it.  The  di%-ision  of  Miles  should  remain  in 
reserve  at  Centreville,  and  the  brigade  of  Eichardson  con- 
tinue to  threaten  Blackburn's  Ford. 

In  the  rebel  camji,  the  Confederate  commanders  were  at 
the  same  time  equally  intent  on  a  scheme  of  their  own  to 
attack  and  surprise  McDowell.  No  sooner  had  Johnston 
arrived  at  Manassas  with  the  second  detachment  of  the  Ai-my 
of  the  Shenandoah,  about  noon  of  Satiu-day,  July  20th,  than 
Beauregard  explained  to  him  the  character  and  course  of 
Bull  Eun,  and  the  situation  of  the  five  principal  fords  be- 
hind which  his  various  brigades  were  posted ;  and  since  a 
l^racticable  road  from  each  of  these  five  fords  converged  upon 
Centreville,  he  i^roposed  a  simultaneous  advance  and  attack 
on  the  Union  army,  in  its  camj^s,  early  Sunday  morning, 

Johnston,  who  now  as  ranking  officer  assumed  command, 
adopted  Beauregard's  plan.  Part  of  the  Ai-my  of  the  Shen- 
andoah had  anived  before  and  with  him  ;  the  remainder  was 
expected  that  night.  He  had  every  reason  to  sujjpose  that 
Patterson  would  promptly  follow  him  to  join  McDowell. 
To  secure  the  fniit  of  his  own  movement,  he  miist  therefore 
crush  McDowell  before  Patterson  could  arrive.  The  orders 
for  such  an  advance  and  attack  were  duly  MTitten  out,  and 
Johnston  signed  his  approval  of  them  in  the  gi'ay  twilight 
of  Sunday  morning. 

An  hour  or  two,  however,  revealed  to  him  the  uselessness 
of  these  orders,  on  which  the  ink  was  scarcely  dry.  At  sun- 
rise he  heai'd  Tyler's  signal-guns,  and  soon  received  notice 


BULL  RUN.  183 

that  McDowell  had  taken  the  offensive.  The  remainder  of 
his  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  had  not  arrived,  as  he  hoped. 
Under  these  circumstances  his  plan  of  attack  must  be  aban- 
doned. Beauregard  thereupon  proposed  a  modification  of 
the  plan — to  attack  with  theii*  right  from  the  region  of 
Blackburn's  Ford,  and  to  stand  on  the  defensive  with  their 
left  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  stone  bridge.  This  sugges- 
tion, again,  Johnston  adopted  and  ordered  to  be  carried  out. 

But  the  Union  forces  had  already  taken  the  initiative.  A 
little  past  midnight  McDowell's  army  was  astii-,  and  the 
three  designated  divisions  started.  Unluckily,  at  the  very 
outset,  Hunter  and  Heintzelman  were  delayed  two  or  three 
hours  by  the  first  division  not  getting  out  of  its  camps  in 
time,  and  failing  to  clear  the  road  for  them.  The  route 
proved  unexpectedly  long  ;  it  was  nine  o'elbck  when  the  ad- 
vance reached  Sudley  Ford.  The  crossing,  however,  was 
not  opiDOsed,  and  was  easily  efiected.  From  the  ford  the 
Sudley  road  ran  south  toward  Manassas,  crossing  the  "War- 
renton  turnpike  at  right  angles  about  a  mile  and  a  quarter 
west  of  the  stone  bridge.  A  little  stream,  called  Young's 
Branch,  also  crosses  both  roads  at  this  intersection,  makes  a 
circle  to  the  northeast,  and,  returning,  flows  to  the  southeast 
into  Bull  Eun.     This  was  the  destined  battle-field. 

It  happened  that  the  stone  bridge  was  but  slenderly  de- 
fended. The  timber  had  been  felled  to  form  a  hea'vy  abattis 
behind  the  bridge ;  but  Evans,  the  rebel  officer  in  charge, 
had  only  a  regiment  and  a  half,  with  foiir  guns,  for  his  en- 
tii-e  guard.  Tyler  api^eared  in  force  before  the  bridge,  and 
began  his  demonstration  ;  but  made  it  so  feebly  that  Evans 
soon  became  convinced  no  real  assault  was  intended ;  and 
haidng  learned  the  actual  crossing  at  Sudley  Ford,  he  at 
about  nine  o'clock  withdrew  all  but  foiu-  companies  and  two 
guns  from  the  bridge,  and  hastened   to  the  rear  to  throw 


184 


THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 


liimself  across  Hunter's  path.  The  Union  ajjproach  having 
become  plainly  discernible,  Evans  posted  his  eleven  com- 
panies on  the  ridge  immediately  north  of  the  Warrenton 
turni^ike  and  Young's  Branch,  his  left  resting  on  the  Sud- 
ley  road,  with  one  gun  at  his  left,  and  the  other  some  dis- 


BuU  Run — Battle  of  the  Forenoon.* 


tance  behind  his  right,   on  the   point   of   a  hill   south   of 
Young's  Branch. 


*  In  these  maps  the  topographical  features  are  copied  from  the  accurate  ofHcial 
maps  published  by  the  Engineer  Bureau  of  the  War  Department.  The  position 
of  the  troops  is  of  course  only  conjectural,  but  based  on  the  defecriptions  and 
inferences  in  the  official  reports  of  both  armies. 


BULL  RUN.  185 

At  ten  o'clock  Hunter's  advance  emerged  from  tlie  woods 
into  open  fields,  abont  a  mile  north  of  the  Wan'enton  turn- 
pike, the  scattering  shots  of  the  skirmishers  ha\TJig  already 
opened  the  conflict.  On  both  sides  evei-ything  was  raw  and 
awkward — officers  and  men,  staft'  and  line.  There  was 
undue  excitement  and  impetuosity,  mixed  with  unnecessaiy 
confusion  and  delay.  None  of  the  reports  specify  how  the 
battle  began ;  the  mere  momentum  of  the  march  seems  to 
have  carried  the  advance  regiments  under  the  first  shower  of 
rebel  shells  and  bullets  at  distances  varying  from  five  hun- 
dred to  one  thousand  yards.  A  preliminary  artillery  duel 
sjjrang  up,  under  which  Burnside  led  his  four  regiments 
after  his  battery  into  the  fields  to  the  left  of  the  Sudley 
road.  With  a  little  more  deliberation  and  a  united  onset, 
these  would  easily  have  brushed  away  Evans'  thin  line  ;  but, 
in  the  delay  incident  to  the  first  actual  exiDeriment  of  battle, 
the  rebels  gained  opportunity  to  bring  up  substantial  rein- 
forcements. Four  regiments  and  two  companies  of  John- 
ston's Ai'my  of  the  Shenandoah,  under  General  Bee,  hurried 
up  and  formed  to  the  right  and  a  little  in  advance  of  Evans' 
original  line,  while  Imboden's  battery  of  four  guns  took 
l^osition  on  a  hill  in  the  rear,  south  of  the  Warrenton  turn- 
j)ike.  Thus  disi^osed,  with  little  disparity  in  strength  be- 
tween attack  and  defence,  the  first  stubborn  contest  of  the 
day  appears  to  have  taken  place,  lasting  perhaps  from  eleven 
o'clock  till  noon.  The  Union  troojjs  pressed  foi-ward  with 
determined  courage ;  the  rebels  resisted  with  such  spirit 
that  Burnside  became  aj^prehensive  for  his  Rhode  Island 
battery,  and  Sykes'  battalion  of  regulars  was  sent  to 
strengthen  his  left.  By  this  time  Hunter  had  sent  Porter's 
brigade  into  the  fields  to  the  right  of  the  Sudley  road, 
where  Griffin's  battery  could  engage  the  rebel  field-pieces  ; 
Heintzelman  was  hurrying  uj)  with  an  advance  regiment  and 


186       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

Kicketts'  battery.  Under  this  combined  pressure  the  Con- 
federate line  wavered,  yielded,  and  finally  broke.  Their  left 
retreated  stubbornly  down  the  hill,  and,  rallying  again, 
endeavored  to  make  a  stand  behind  a  stone  house  at  the 
intersection  of  the  two  roads ;  but  a  vigorous  Union  charge 
down  the  Sudley  road  completed  their  dispei-sion.  The 
whole  first  formation  of  the  enemy  was  swept  southward 
more  than  half  a  mile,  entirely  across  and  out  of  the  valley 
of  Young's  Branch.  But  the  advantage  was  not  won  with- 
out considerable  damage  to  the  Union  troops,  the  demoraliza- 
tion of  several  regiments,  and  the  serious  loss  of  valuable  offi- 
cers. General  Hunter  himself  was  wounded  by  a  shell  at  the 
veiy  beginning  of  the  action,  compelling  his  retirement  from 
the  front,  and  devohTJig  the  command  of  his  di\"ision  on  Porter. 
McDowell,  who  came  upon  the  field  by  way  of  Sudley  Ford 
as  the  battle  began,  had  already  sent  back  word  to  Tyler  to 
press  his  attack  at  the  stone  bridge.  Such  an  attack,  ho-n'^ 
ever,  was  now  no  longer  necessaiy.  We  have  seen  how  Evans 
had  withdrawn  to  oppose  Hunter ;  and  the  four  companies 
he  left  behind  had  also  retired  southward.  Avoiding  the 
bridge  with  its  abattis,  Tyler  led  Sherman's  and  Keyes'  bri- 
gades across  Bull  Run  half  a  mile  above,  where  the  stream 
"was  fordable  for  infantiy,  and,  marching  over  a  mile  of  level 
bottom-land,  so  directed  their  course  by  the  filling  that  they 
efi'ected  a  safe  junction  with  Hunter's  division,  Keyes  remain- 
ing on  the  extreme  left.  They  approached  the  morning's  bat- 
tle-field from  the  northeast ;  Sherman  reported  to  McDowell, 
and  joined  the  general  pursuit,  directing  his  march  to  the  right. 
Keyes  remained  on  the  left,  and  under  Tyler's  personal  orders ; 
and  thus  it  turned  out  that  this  single  brigade  became  and  re- 
mained an  indejiendent  detachment  during  the  whole  day,  sep- 
amted  by  a  wide  intei-val  from  the  main  battle  in  the  afternoon, 
and  not  being  in  a  position  to  receive  orders  from  McDowell. 


BULL  RUN.  187 

It  has  been  explained  that  the  first  rebel  line  was  com- 
posed mainly  of  Johnston's  troops.  As  they  retreated  np 
the  hill  south  of  Young's  Branch,  Jackson's  brigade  of  five 
regiments,  also  of  Johnston's  army,  'svas  just  arriving  there 
on  its  Avay  to  guard  the  stone  bridge,  and  only  at  that  mo- 
ment learning  the  tme  state  of  afi'airs.  This  hill  south  of 
Young's  Branch  was  a  higher  and  stronger  position  than 
that  from  which  Evans  and  Bee  had  been  driven.  Its  crest 
ran  in  a  westerly  cui-ve  from  the  Robinson  house,  near  the 
Wan-enton  turnpike,  past  the  Henry  house  near  the  Sudley 
road,  both  being  within  the  southeastern  angle  of  the  inter- 
section. The  two  roads  cross  in  the  valley  at  Young's  Branch, 
and  from  their  crossing  ascend  gently  to  the  east,  west, 
north,  and  south. 

On  this  crest,  Jackson,  with  the  ready  instinct  of  combat, 
formed  a  new  line.  His  five  regiments  and  two  batteiies, 
stretched  from  the  Bobinson  to  the  Heniy  houses,  formed 
a  solid-looking  protection,  behind  which  some  of  the  flying 
rebels  gathered  coui'age  and  rallied  in  little  driblets.  Bee's 
five  regiments  had  shiTink  to  about  foui"  companies,  and  the 
remaining  fugitives  were  moving  in  hoj^eless  panic  down  the 
Sudley  road  toward  Manassas,  spreading  dii-eful  tidings  of 
disaster.  Jackson's  line  was  rendered  yet  stronger  by  hav- 
ing Hampton's  battalion — that  morning  an-ived  fi-om  Rich- 
mond— on  its  extreme  right  in  the  turnpike  before  the 
Robinson  house ;  and  behind  these,  Bee's  fragments  were 
gathered  into  a  sheltering  ra\Tne. 

At  this  period  of  the  day,  a  little  after  noon,  the  advan- 
cing Union  columns  had  theii'  best  co-operation  and  strong- 
est momentum.  Keyes'  brigade  was  advancing  on  the  left 
toward  the  Robinson  hill.  Sherman  was  moving  diagonally 
across  the  centre  of  the  morning's  field.  Porter's  still 
aggressive  brigade  was  j)ushing   down  the   Sudley  road. 


188  THE  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION. 

The  compact  bi-igades  of  Franklin  and  "Wilcox  were  coming 
to  the  fi-out  on  the  right.  Moreover,  Griffin's  and  Ricketts' 
batteries  had  obtained  favorable  positions  near  the  Dogan 
house,  with  an  enfilading  fii'e  against  Hampton.  Toward 
two  o'clock  two  regiments  of  Keyes'  brigade  made  a  charge 
UY)  the  Eobinson  hill  and  drove  Hampton  out  of  the  tangle 
of  fences  and  hedges  about  the  Robinson  House,  though 
newly  planted  rebel  batteries  farther  to  the  rear  made  it 
impossible  to  hold  the  i^osition.  The  whole  Union  line 
swung  forward  to  the  Warrenton  tui-npike ;  and  while  the 
rebel  reports  pass  it  over  with  the  merest  allusions,  it  seems 
probable  that,  like  Hamilton,  other  portions  of  Jackson's  line 
were  moved  somewhat  farther  back,  to  find  better  shelter 
from  the  annoying  fire  of  the  Union  batteries.  This  mid- 
day Union  success  seemed,  and  was,  sweeping  and  complete  ; 
but  it  proved  seriously  deceptive  in  the  further  operations 
of  the  afternoon,  which  it  natui'ally  suggested  and  provoked. 

A  little  before  this  time  the  Confederate  commanders  woke 
U15  to  the  true  nature  of  the  conflict.  Beauregard  was  yet 
waiting  im^iatiently  to  hear  that  his  right  was  advancing  on 
Centreville,  when,  toward  eleven  o'clock,  word  came  that, 
through  a  miscarriage  of  orders,  that  enterprise  was  just 
being  commenced.  Realizing  now  that  McDowell's  attack 
was  not  a  mere  feint,  they  countermanded  the  Centreville 
movement,  ordered  all  available  reserves  forward  to  the 
main  battle,  and  themselves  huniedly  galloped  to  the  front. 
Here  they  now  put  their  personal  exertions,  encoui'agement, 
and  example,  into  the  somewhat  unpromising  task  of  miti- 
gating a  disastrous  defeat,  rather  than  •with  even  remote 
hope  of  turning  the  scale  to  victory. 

The  Confederates  had  been  literally  driven  into  the  woods, 
the  edge  of  which  formed  a  sort  of  semicircle  on  the  second 
ridge  south  of  Warrenton  turnpike  and  east  of  the  Sudley 


BULL  RUN. 


189 


road.  But  this  reverse  brought  certain  important  advan- 
tages. Their  retreat  not  only  concentrated  their  regiments  ; 
it  also,  for  the  first  time  during  the  day,  concentrated  their 
artillery,  thirteen  pieces  of  which  were  posted  near  together 
to  the  centre  and  right,  so  as  to  give  a  partial  cross-fire  at 


Bull  Run — Battle  of  the  Afternoon. 

a  distance  of  three  hundred  to  six  hundred  yards  over  the 
whole  open  plateau  or  hill  about  the  Henry  house  and  to- 
ward the  Robinson  house.  Under  the  personal  directions 
of  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  they  now  formed  their  line 
along  this  semicircular  edge  of  woods,  with  the  advantage 
of  a  fiinge  of  second-gi'owth  pines  in  their  fi-ont  to  afford 


100        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

lliem  almost  perfect  concealment.  Their  right  extended 
to  where  the  hill  descends  to  Young's  Branch ;  their  left 
reached  nearly  to  the  Sudley  road.  It  is  needless  to  specify 
the  several  corps  in  detail ;  the  nearest  reinforcements  were 
already  aniving ;  Johnston's  report  sums  up  the  strength  of 
this  completed  line  at  twelve  regiments,  twenty-two  giins, 
and  two  companies  of  cavaliy.  The  formation  well  begun, 
Beauregard  took  j^ersonal  command,  while  Johnston,  as 
chief,  returned  to  the  rebel  headquai'ters  to  keep  his  eye  on 
the  entire  field. 

Eeduced  by  losses,  McDowell's  numbers  were  now  little, 
if  auy,  superior  to  the  enemy ;  for  the  brigade  of  Keyes  was 
separated  from  him,  working  its  way  southward  along 
Young's  Branch  in  the  hope  to  make  a  flank  attack  on  the 
rebel  right ;  in  reality  it  rendered  no  further  sxibstautial 
helji.  Howard's  brigade,  held  back  as  a  reserve,  was  not 
yet  at  hand.  McDowell's  effective  force  consisted  of  the 
brigades  of  Porter,  Franklin,  Wilcox,  and  Sherman,  a  total 
of  fourteen  regiments,  but  several  of  which  were  akeady 
seriously  demoralized  ;  these  were  massed  in  sheltered  situ- 
ations in  the  valley  along  the  turnpike  and  Young's  Branch, 
mainly  west  of  the  intersection  of  the  roads.  All  the  advan- 
tages of  position  diiring  the  day  had  been  with  McDowell ; 
now  they  were  suddenly  tiu'ued  against  him  by  the  very 
success  he  had  gained.  The  enemy  was  on  the  height,  he 
at  the  foot  of  the  hill.  The  enemy  needed  only  to  defend  a 
stationary  line  ;  he  must  move  forward  under  a  prepared 
fire.  They  were  concealed  in  chosen  jjositions ;  he  must 
mount  into  open  view.  They  could  repel  in  combination  ; 
he  must  risk  successive  assaults.  His  men  had  been  under 
anns  since  midnight — most  of  them  had  made  a  march  of 
ten  miles  tlu-ough  the  swelteiing  July  heat.  They  were 
flushed  with  vietoiy,  but  also  lulled  thereby  into  the  false 


BULL  RUN.  191 

seciuity  of  thinking  tlieir  work  accomi^lished,  when  in  reality 
its  sternest  effort  was  merely  about  to  begin. 

The  situation  naturally  dictated  an  attack  on  the  rebel 
centre  and  left  flank,  and,  had  this  been  unitedly  and  solidly 
made,  it  must  unquestionably  have  succeeded  even  against 
the  disadvantage  ah-eady  mentioned.  But  right  here  the 
want  of  proiDer  staff  organization  and  discipline,  and  the 
rawness  of  the  troo^is  in  manoeuvi-e,  i:)roved  a  fatal  defect ; 
and  the  severe  conflict  of  the  next  hour  and  a  half  resolved 
itself  into  a  somewhat  spasmodic  and  intermittent  struggle 
on  both  sides. 

^Tien,  at  about  half-jiast  two  o'clock,  the  batteries  of 
Eicketts  and  Giifiin  were  ordered  to  move  forward  fi'om  the 
Dogan  heights  across  the  valley  to  the  top  of  the  Heruy  hill, 
they  did  so  with  the  feeling  that  the  two  regiments  ordered 
to  follow  and  supi^ori  them  were  tardy,  inadequate,  and  un- 
reliable. Other  regiments,  moving  forward  to  the  flank  at- 
tack, could  not  well  be  observed,  because  of  the  uneven 
ground  and  the  intervening  woods  and  bushes.  The  rebels 
had  disappeared  ;  there  was  a  complete  lull  in  the  battle. 
But  danger  was  no  less  at  hand.  Hardly  had  Ricketts  taken 
his  post  before  his  cannoneers  and  horses  began  to  fall 
under  the  accurate  fij-e  of  near  and  well-concealed  rebel 
shai-jishooters.  Death  j)uffed  from  bushes,  fences,  build- 
ings ;  and  yet  the  jets  of  flame  and  wreaths  of  smoke  were 
the  only  visible  enemy  to  assail.  Ofiicers  and  cannoneers 
held  on  with  a  desperate  courage  ;  some  moved  to  new  po- 
sitions to  foil  the  rebel  range.  Giiflin's  battery  came  and 
took  place  alongside  ;  eleven  Union  guns  and  thirteen  Con- 
federate guns  were  confronted  at  short  range  in  a  stubborn 
and  exciting  duel.  But  now  the  rebel  regiments,  seeing  the 
dangerous  exposiu-e  of  the  Union  batteries,  were  tempted  to 
swarm   out   of  theii*   cover.     They   pressed   cautiously  but 


192        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

tenaciously  upon  Eicketts.  Griffin,  absorbed  in  directing 
the  fire  of  two  of  his  guns  against  tlie  rebel  battei-ies,  was 
suddenly  startled  at  seeing  a  regiment  advancing  boldly  on 
bis  riglit,  in  open  view.  Their  vei"y  audacity  puzzled  him. 
They  could  hardly  be  friends,  he  thought ;  yet  was  it  pos- 
sible that  foes  were  so  near  and  would  take  such  a  risk  ? 
Instinctively  he  ordered  his  guns  to  be  charged  with  canister 
and  trained  upon  them.  Yet  at  the  di-eadful  thought  of 
pouring  such  a  volley  upon  a  Union  regiment,  he  once  more 
hesitated,  and  held  a  brief  colloquy  with  Major  Bany,  chief 
of  artilleiy.  "  Captain,"  said  Barry,  "  they  are  your  battery 
support."  "  They  are  Confedei-ates,"  rejilied  Griffin,  in  in- 
tense excitement ;  "  as  certain  as  the  world,  they  are  Confed- 
erates." "  No,"  answered  BaiTy ;  "  I  know  they  are  your 
batteiT  support."  Giiffin  spurred  forward,  and  told  his 
officer  not  to  fire.  The  mistake  proved  fatal.  During  this 
intei-val  of  doubt  the  Confederate  regiment  had  approached 
to  point-blank  range,  and  levelled  theii-  muskets  just  as 
Griffin  gave  his  order  to  desist.  Griffin's  canister  would 
have  annihilated  the  regiment  ;  but  now  the  tables  were 
turned,  and  in  an  instant  the  regiment's  volley  had  annihi- 
lated Griffin's  and  Eicketts'  batteries.  Officers  and  men  fell 
smitten  with  death  and  wounds,  and  horses  and  caissons 
went  tearing  in  wild  disorder  down  the  hill,  brealdng  and 
scatteiing  the  ascending  line  of  battle.  Under  this  sudden 
catastrophe  the  supporting  regiment  stood  a  while  spell- 
bound with  mingled  astonishment  and  terror.  They  were 
urged  forward  to  repel  the  advance  on  the  guns  ;  but  the  un- 
expected disaster  ovemwed  them  ;  under  the  continued  and 
still  advancing  volleys  of  the  same  rebel  regiment,  they  fired 
their  muskets,  turned,  and  fled. 

These  disabled  batteries,  visible  to  both  aimies,  now  be- 
came the  centre  and  coveted  prize  of  an  iiTegular  contest, 


BULL  RUN.  193 

wliicli  surged  back  and  forth  over  tlie  plateau  of  tlie  Henry 
hill ;  but,  whether  because  of  confusion  of  ordei"s,  or  the 
broken  surface  of  the  ground,  or  more  probably  the  mere 
reciprocal  eagerness  of  captui-e  and  rescue,  the  contest  was 
carried  on,  not  by  the  whole  line,  biit  by  single  regiments, 
or  at  most  by  two  or  three  regiments  moving  accidentally 
rather  than  designedly  in  concert.  Several  times  the  fight 
raged  past  and  over  the  ^jrostrate  body  of  Ricketts,  lying 
wounded  among  his  guns,  and  who  was  finally  carried  away 
a  prisoner  to  Richmond.  The  rebels  would  dash  forward, 
capture  the  batteries,  and  endeavor  to  turn  the  pieces  on  the 
Union  lines ;  then  a  Union  regiment  would  sweep  up  the 
hill,  drive  them  back,  and  essay  to  drag  the  guns  down  into 
safe  ijossession.  And  a  similar  shifting  and  intennitting 
fight  went  on,  not  merely  on  this  single  spot,  but  also 
among  the  low  concealing  pines  of  the  middle  groxind  in 
front,  as  well  as  in  the  oak-woods  on  the  Union  right,  where 
at  times  friend  became  intermingled  with  foe,  and  where 
both  sides  took  occasional  ijrisoners  near  the  same  place. 

In  this  prolonged  and  wasteful  stmggle  the  Union  strength 
was  slowly  and  steadily  consumed.  Ai'nold's  battery  crossed 
the  valley  to  the  support  of  Griffin  and  Ricketts,  but  found 
itself  obliged  to  again  withdraw.  The  Rhode  Island  battery 
took  part  in  the  contest  as  well  as  it  might  from  the  hill 
north  of  Young's  Branch.  Brigade  after  brigade — Sher- 
man's, Franklin's,  Wilcox's,  and  finally  Howard's  reserve, 
jwere  brought  forward — regiment  after  regiment  was  sent  up 
the  hill — three  times  the  batteries  were  recovered  and 
again  lost.  It  speaks  volumes  for  the  courage  of  the  raw, 
undisciplined  volunteers,  that,  in  the  face  of  these  rejDeated 
failures,  they  continued  to  go  perseveringly  against  what 
seemed  to  them  a  hidden  and  unattainable  banier,  until  a 
stronger  wav^  of  rebel  bullets  or  bayonets,  surging  suddenly 
13 


194        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

forward  in  the  pine  thicket,  would  meet  and  force  them 
back. 

In  the  endeavor  to  outflank  and  envelop  the  rebel  left, 
the  Union  right  had  become  so  strongly  turned  southward 
that  it  was  nearly  parallel  to  the  Sudley  road.  Near  the 
beginning  of  this  final  contest,  Johnston  received  notice  that 
the  long-expected  remainder  of  his  Ai'my  of  the  Shenan- 
doah had  at  length  come ;  and  before  it  was  half  over,  Elzey, 
"with  Kirby  Smith's  brigade  of  three  regiments,  arrived  near 
the  battle-field  fi'om  Manassas  by  the  Sudley  road.  By 
this  time,  too,  four  other  regiments,  two  from  Cocke's  and 
two  from  Bonham's  brigades,  also  came  up  from  the  nearer 
fords.  These  seven  fresh  regiments,  thi'own  opportunely  by 
the  rebel  commander  into  the  woods  west  of  the  Sudley 
road,  directly  against  the  exposed  Union  right  flank,  created 
a  numerical  overweight,  which  affords  sufficient  explanation 
of  the  Union  repulse  at  that  point. 

But  now,  at  half -past  foui-  in  the  afternoon,  when  the 
Union  reinforcements  were  exhausted,  the  rebel  accessions 
still  continued  :  Early  with  thi'ee  regiments  arrived  from  the 
lower  fords ;  Holmes  with  two  regiments,  and  Ewell  with 
three  others,  were  rapidly  approaching.  Before  the  anival 
of  these  last  the  battle  was  ali-eady  decided.  Early's  brigade 
was  sent  cautiously  thi-ough  the  woods,  still  farther  to  the 
rebel  left,  and  suddenly  ajipeared  with  Beckham's  battery 
on  the  heights  near  the  Chinn  house,  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
west  of  the  Sudley  road,  and  entirely  beyond  and  in  the  rear 
of  the  Union  right. 

The  Union  troops,  having  approached  the  second  stage  of 
the  battle  in  such  a  flush  of  success,  and  with  such  an  appar- 
ent assurance  of  victoiy,  could  not  for  a  time  realize  the 
stem  fact  that  the  contest  was  turning  against  them.  Offi- 
cers of  experience  and  sagacity,  indeed,  became  seriously 


BULL  RUN.  195 

alarmed  for  tlie  fimal  result,  when  Griffin's  and  Ricketts' 
batteries  were  destroyed ;  but  for  the  greater  part  it  was 
looked  upon  as  an  untoward  accident,  and  operated  rather 
to  inspire  the  already  related  eiforts  for  their  recovery.  The 
feeling  of  course  gradually  changed  with  the  successive  fail- 
ures to  gain  and  permanently  hold  the  hill.  As  brigade 
after  brigade  melted  away  in  the  rejjeated  efforts,  even  the 
men  in  the  ranks  could  not  omit  to  note  the  rapid  dimiiiu- 
tion  of  the  available  strength.  Some  of  the  repulsed  regi- 
ments kept  their  organization  and  returned  heroically  to  the 
charge.  Others,  on  the  contrary,  not  having  that  slowly 
acquired  force  of  discipline  which  makes  cohesion  a  second 
nature  of  the  soldier  and  creates  an  instinctive  reliance  on 
mutual  support  as  the  surest  means  of  safety,  considered 
theii'  duty  done  with  a  single  charge,  and,  once  diiven  back, 
went  to  pieces  like  the  adjournment  of  a  mass  meeting.  In 
this  shortcoming,  officers  were  as  culpable  as  the  men,  for 
war  combines  art  with  science,  and  the  superior  work  of  the 
veteran  comes  through  long  years  of  ju-aetice.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  these  were  only  tlu-ee  months  volunteers, 
and  besides,  as  such,  the  most  impulsive  and  independent 
men  in  their  several  communities,  whose  innate  promptness 
of  thought  and  action  had  brought  them-  to  the  very  fore- 
front of  the  civil  war.  Lacking  long  di-ill  and  discipline, 
they  acted  uijon  individual  judgment  and  impulse,  rather 
than  as  organized  bodies  merely  executing  the  orders  of 
their  officers.  This  explains  to  us  the  remarkable  statement 
of  CaiJtain  Woodbury,  that  ,"at  four  o'clock,  on  the  21st, 
there  were  more  than  twelve  thousand  vohmteers  on  the 
battle-field  of  Bull  Run  who  had  entirely  lost  their  regi- 
mental organization.  They  could  no  longer  be  handled  as 
troops,  for  the  officers  and  men  were  not  together.  Men 
and   officers   mingled    together    liromiscuously ;    and   it   is 


196        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

worthy  of  remark  that  this  disorganization  did  not  result 
from  defeat  or  fear."  One  other  fact  miist  be  remembered 
in  extenuation :  that  with  the  long  night  march,  the  burning 
heat  of  the  day,  and  the  new  and  intense  excitements  of  the 
battle-field,  the  men,  famished  with  hunger  and  thii-st,  were 
becoming  physically  exhausted. 

When,  therefore,  at  half-past  four  o'clock,  the  two  fresi 
Confederate  brigades  had  repulsed  the  Union  flank  attack 
west  of  the  Sudley  road,  and  Early's  rebel  brigade  with 
Beckham's  battery  suddenly  burst  through  the  woods  near 
the  Chinn  house,  still  farther  to  the  west,  with  a  vigorous 
and  startling  attack  on  the  Union  flank  and  rear,  thi'owing 
into  quick  confusion  and  retreat  a  detachment  of  Union 
cavalry  stationed  in  apparent  retirement  and  safety,  the 
battle  came  to  a  speedy  termination  by  a  sori  of  universal 
consent ;  a  realization  and  acknowledgment  of  coming  de- 
feat pervaded  the  whole  army,  and  found  instant  expression 
in  increased  disorganization  and  immediate  movement  to- 
ward a  general  retreat.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  other 
discouragements,  the  main  impulse  of  this  movement  came 
from  the  universal  belief  that  Johnston's  anny  had  now 
anived,  and  that  success  had  thereby  become  hopeless. 
The  question  of  Johnston's  possible  presence  in  the  battle 
had  mn  thi'oiigh  the  Centreville  camj^s,  and  there  were 
rumors  of  his  coming  on  Saturday  night;  but  the  ai-my 
ai:)15arently  had  no  suspicion  that  it  was  fighting  him  all 
day  Sunday,  till  the  moment  of  the  attack  on  the  extreme 
left  by  one  of  Beauregard's  brigades.  That  attack  from  an 
unexpected  quarter  seemed  convincing  proof  of  the  j^resence^ 
of  a  new  and  additional  force,  and  therefore  roused  the 
quick  instinct  of  retreat,  not  so  much  in  acknowledgment  of 
actual  defeat,  as  in  prudent  avoidance  of  iiTesistible  slaugh- 
ter or  capture  by  overwhelming  numbei"s. 


CHAPTEE  XVI. 

THE  RETREAT. 

The  suddenness  of  tlieir  victory  vraa  entii-ely  unexpected 
by  tlie  rebels.  Signs  of  disaster  to  themselves  were  as 
strong  as  to  the  Federals  to  the  very  last.  Intense  curiosity 
and  solicitude  had  brought  Jefferson  Davis  from  Richmond. 
It  is  related  that,  as  he  was  riding  to  the  battle-field  from 
Manassas,  at  about  four  o'clock  that  afternoon,  he  met  such 
a  stream  of  panic-stricken  rebel  soldiers,  and  heard  such 
direful  tidings  from  the  front,  that  his  companions  were 
thoroughly  con-sdneed  the  Confederates  had  lost  the  day,  and 
implored  him  to  turn  back  for  j^ersonal  safety.  He  went  on, 
against  their  advice,  to  find  that  the  conflict  was  ah'eady 
over,  and  to  learn,  with  mingled  amazement  and  joy,  that 
the  Union  army  had,  by  a  sudden  and  unexplained  impulse, 
ceased  fighting,  and  half  marched,  half  run  from  the  field. 

McDowell  was  no  less  astounded  at  his  own  overwhelming 
reverse.  A  little  before  Elzey  and  Early  appeared  on  his 
right  to  outflank  him,  there  had  been  a  lull  in  the  Confed- 
erate firing  that  led  him  to  hope  the  enemy  was  giving  way. 
At  the  very  worst  there  seemed  no  doubt  of  his  ability  to 
"hold  the  Warrenton  turnpike  and  stone  bridge  and.  main- 
tain free  communication  with  Centreville.  For  this  abun- 
dant resources  were  yet  available.  Biu-nside's  brigade  had 
remained  in  reserve  on  the  morning's  battle-field,  and,  after 


103        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

four  hours'  rest,  was  vet  capable  of  effective  service.  Keyes' 
brigade  beyond  the  hiU,  on  his  left,  was  substantially  un- 
hamied.  Schenck  had  an  almost  fresh  brigade  at  the  stone 
bridge.  Miles  had  a  brigade  at  Centre\ille,  which  could  be 
replaced  from  Eunyon's  division  near  Vienna.  The  engi- 
neei-s  had  cleared  away  the  ahattis  at  the  stone  bridge.  The 
hills  north  of  the  TVarrenton  turnpike  were  excellent  defen- 
sive positions.  It  needed  but  morale  among  the  troops  to 
hold  the  battle-gi'ound,  and  holding  this  would  have  com- 
l^elled  the  enemy  to  retreat. 

Unfortunately  the  Union  army  had  lost  its  morale.  The 
mere  disorder  of  the  final  repulse  was  slight ;  but  the  de- 
moi-alization  and  loss  of  discipline  had  been  growing  during 
tho  whole  afternoon,  until,  of  a  sudden,  the  army  was  half- 
dissolved.  The  impulse  of  retreat  once  started,  there  was 
no  checking  or  controlling  it.  Despite  the  efforts  and  ap- 
peals of  McDowell  and  his  officei-s,  the  various  detachments 
began  moving  from  the  field.  The  commander  yielded  to 
necessity,  made  the  best  dispositions  he  could  to  cover  the 
retreat,  and  passed  the  word  to  reassemble  in  the  old  camps 
at  Centre^'ille,  not  doubting  that  he  could  there  make  a 
i-ally. 

The  way  thither  by  the  Wanenton  turnpike  was  open  and 
straight ;  the  distance  four  and  a  half  miles.  But,  through 
the  perversity  of  fate,  each  detachment  now  retreated  by  the 
same  road  over  which  it  had  come.  Thus  the  bulk  of  the 
anny — the  brigades  of  Porter,  Burnside,  Franklin,  Wilcox, 
and  Howard — went  back  over  the  long  detoiir  of  ten  miles 
round  by  Sudley  Ford;  these  had  with  them,  as  yet,  two 
batteries — a  total  of  ten  field-pieces ;  for  only  the  batteries 
of  Ricketts  and  Griffin  were  lost  in  the  main  battle.  Sher- 
man's brigade,  on  the  other  hand,  marched  eastward,  over 
the  ground  of   the  morning's  conflict,  and  recrossed  Bull 


THE  RETREAT.  199 

Bun  at  the  ford,  half  a  mile  above  the  stone  bxidge,  by 
which  they  had  approached.  Keyes'  brigade,  becoming 
aware  of  the  general  retreat,  also  returned  by  that  route. 
These  two,  with  Schenck's  brigade,  soon  reached  the  War- 
renton  road,  making  a  comparatively  easy  march  to  Centre- 
vUle. 

It  also  becomes  necessary  to  mention  here  that,  while  the 
main  battle  of  the  afternoon  was  going  on,  a  second  engage- 
ment had  been  fought  at  Blackburn's  Ford.  The  brigades 
of  Bichardson  and  of  Davies  were  sent  there  in  the  morning, 
to  make  such  demonstrations  as  would  mask  McDowell's 
real  movement.  In  the  afternoon,  however,  their  pui'pose 
became  ajiparent ;  and  to  relieve  the  stress  of  the  main  bat- 
tle, the  Confederate  commander  sent  orders  to  Jones'  bri- 
gade to  cross  Bull  Bun  and  make  a  demonstration.  At  about 
four  o'clock,  Jones,  with  his  three  regiments,  crossed  at 
McLean's  Ford,  and  endeavored,  by  a  flank  movement,  to 
capture  Hunt's  battery  stationed  with  Davies'  brigade.  Da- 
vies  quietly  watched  the  oncoming  rebel  regiments,  rear- 
ranged his  lines,  and  held  his  fire  in  resei-ve  till  the  enemy 
were  deploying  to  form  line  of  battle.  They  had  advanced 
within  five  hundred  yards,  only,  however,  to  fijid  themselves 
emban-assed  by  woods  and  broken  ground.  In  this  situa- 
tion and  dilemma  Davies  ordered  Hunt's  battery  of  six  guns 
to  open  upon  them  with  grape  and  canister.  The  rebel  of- 
ficial report  characteiizes  it  as  a  "  murderous  shower,"  and, 
no  doubt,  correctly.  It  scattered  the  attacldng  column  as  if 
by  enchantment ;  in  thirty  minutes  there  was  not  a  soldier 
of  them  to  be  seen,  and  Jones  modestly  reports  a  loss  in  the 
affair  of  fourteen  killed  and  sixty-two  wounded. 

It  was  now  near  sundown.  Miles,  commanding  at  Centre- 
ville,  either  through  illness  or  drunkermess,  had  become  in- 
capable of  duty — a  situation  whose   serious   consequences 


200       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

were  averted  by  the  prudence  and  good  behavior  of  the 
three  brigade  commanders.  But,  from  this  cause,  prema- 
ture orders  were  received  by  the  two  brigades  of  Dalies  and 
Richardson  to  fall  back  on  Centre\Tlle ;  while  to  Blenker 
the  more  judicious  order  was  given  to  advance  his  brigade 
toward  Stone  Bridge,  which  he  did,  deploying  it  in  line  of 
battle  across  the  "Warrenton  turnpike,  half-way  between 
Centreville  and  Cub  Run. 

As  soon  as  Jolinston  and  Beauregard  had  suflBciently  re- 
covered from  their  astonishment  at  seeing  the  Union  army 
in  unmistakable  retreat,  they  ordered  pui-suit  to  be  made, 
but,  as  it  would  seem,  with  the  greatest  caution.  In  tnith, 
McDowell's  vanquished  brigades  marched  from  the  imme- 
diate battle-field  only  half -disbanded ;  there  remained,  in 
most  instances,  a  little  nucleus  at  least  of  each  organization, 
which  yet,  for  a  time,  held  together,  while  several  of  the 
brigades  were  nearly  intact.  Thus  it  happened  that,  while 
the  battalion  of  rebel  cavalry  under  Sttiait  was  ordered  to 
piirsue  along  the  Sudley  road,  they  found  the  Union  forces 
generally  so  compact,  and  the  rear  so  well  protected,  that 
they  could  only  dash  in  here  and  there  and  pick  up  or  scat- 
ter isolated  squads  of  stragglers.  Another  resei-ve  battalion 
of  rebel  cavalry  under  Radford  was  sent  in  jiursuit  from  the 
vicinity  of  Ball's  Ford  up  toward  the  turnpike  ;  while  John- 
ston also  sent  orders  to  Bonham  to  take  the  remainder  of 
liis  own  and  Longstreet's  brigades,  and  move  against  the  line 
of  retreat  at  Centreville.  Radford,  like  Stuai-t,  saw  that  the 
retreating  brigades  of  Sherman,  Keyes,  and  Schenck  were 
too  formidable  to  attack ;  and  Bonham,  on  nearing  Centre- 
\'ille,  found  the  brigades  of  Blenker,  Richardson,  and  Davies 
so  well  posted,  and  so  superior  in  numbers,  that  he  was  quite 
content  to  stop  with  a  mere  reconnoissance,  and  at  nightfall 
returned  to  his  camps  behind  Mitchell's  and  Blackburn's 


THE  RETREAT.  201 

Fords.  Meanwhile,  though  the  Confederate  pursuit  coukl 
nowhere  venture  a  serious  assault,  an  accident  served  to 
greatly  enlarge  their  harvest  of  trophies. 

The  business  of  war  was  such  a  novelty,  that  McDowell's 
army  accumulated  an  extraordinary  number  of  camp-fol- 
lowers and  non-combatants.  The  vigilant  newspapers  of  the 
chief  cities  sent  a  cloud  of  correspondents  to  chronicle  the 
incidents  of  the  march  and  conflict.  The  volunteer  regi- 
ments carried  with  them  j)ersonal  sympathies  and  compan- 
ionships unknown  to  regular  armies.  Congress  had  met  in 
special  session ;  and  senators  and  representatives,  full  of  the 
patriotic  hope  and  i^ride  of  their  several  States,  no  less  than 
their  own  eager  political  solicitude,  in  several  instances 
joined  in  what  many  rashly  assumed  would  be  a  mere  tri- 
umphal parade.  McDowell's  unoi^posed  and  api^arently  ir- 
resistible advance  through  the  enemy's  outposts  lured  them 
on  to  Centreville  in  a  false  security ;  and  the  unifonnly 
favorable  reports  w^hich  went  back  to  Washington  even 
brought  out  a  fresh  accession  of  the  same  material  on  Sun- 
day morning  of  the  battle. 

By  that  time,  however,  the  situation  had  become  more 
serious,  and  generally  made  the  non-combatants  somewhat 
circiimsj)ect.  Only  a  few  of  hardier  courage  followed  to 
the  battle-field ;  most  of  them  remained  at  Centreville  until 
the  cannonade  announced  the  beginning  of  the  fight,  and 
then  drifted  gradually  down  the  turnjoike  toward  the  stone 
bridge,  not  nearer  than  a  mile  and  a  half  to  the  actual  fight- 
ing, but  where  they  could  hear  the  volleys,  see  the  smoke 
and  dust,  and  perhaps  the  occasional  mancEuvres  of  Schenck's 
and  Keyes'  brigades.  In  a  certain  sense  they  were  under 
fire,  because  the  long-range  shells  of  the  field-pieces  ren- 
dered even  that  locality  somewhat  dangerous.  From  this 
situation  were  wiitten  many  highly  sensational,  but  purely 


C02        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

iinaginarr  and  most  gi'otesquelv  confused  accounts  of  the 
battle,  first  publislied  in  the  newsjiapers.  A  famous  corre- 
spondent of  the  London  Times,  who  earned  the  sobriquet  of 
"Bull  Eun  Eussell,"  WTote  his  description  of  the  affair  for 
Euroj^ean  readers,  after  a  leism-ely  lunch  at  Centrevilie,  and 
a  stroll  of  perhaps  a  mile  toward  Stone  Bridge,  taking  his 
departure  with  the  earliest  fugitives. 

It  also  happened  that  on  the  afternoon  of  the  battle  a 
considerable  number  of  provision,  baggage,  and  ammuni- 
tion wagons,  together  with  some  private  vehicles  of  the 
non-combatants  heretofore  mentioned,  had  been  sent  down 
the  Warrenton  turnpike  from  Centrevilie,  toward  the  stone 
bridge.  When  finallv  the  fii'st  wave  of  fugitives  brought 
unfavorable  news  from  the  front,  these  began  a  general 
movement  in  return,  which  unavoidably  produced  quick 
confusion  and  blockade ;  and  it  was  chiefly  among  these 
that  the  disgracefvd  panic  and  flight,  which  has  furnished 
the  nearly  universal  theme  of  criticism  of  the  battle,  first 
broke  out.  Naturally  the  tide  of  disaster  rose  qiiick  and 
high ;  the  retreating  brigades,  and  nearer  approach  of  can- 
nonade and  musketiy,  soon  confirmed  the  worst  fears  of 
overwhelming  defeat  and  pressing  pursuit,  and  started  a 
veritable  scramble  and  stampede  for  safety.  Ai-ms  and 
clothing  were  thrown  away  by  those  on  foot ;  wagons  were 
abandoned,  and  even  ambulances  with  wounded  soldiers 
left  standing  in  the  road,  while  the  frightened  teamstera 
rode  away  at  headlong  speed,  on  horses  unhitched  or  cut 
out  of  their  harness. 

It  would  seem  that  things  had  already  come  to  this  pass 
before  the  columns  which  were  retreating  around  the  long 
detour  by  way  of  Sudley  Springs  and  Ford  once  more  came 
in  sight  of  the  WaiTenton  turnpike,  at  a  point  between 
Stone  Bridge  and  Cub  Bun.     Cub  Eun  seems  to  have  been 


THE  RETREAT.  203 

a  difficult  little  stream,  ijrovided  with  a  "  suspension  bridge" 
of  some  kind  where  the  turnpike  crosses  it.  Radford's  cav- 
alry had  not  only  been  hovering  along  and  occasionally  dash- 
ing in  on  the  turnpike,  but  a  rebel  light  battery  succeeded 
in  establishing  itself  where  it  commanded  the  "  suspension 
bridge."  When  the  retreating  column  from  Sudley  Ford 
came  in  sight,  they  found  to  their  consternation  that  it  was 
necessary  to  iim  the  gauntlet  of  this  artillery  fii-e.  "  The 
enemy  opened  fire,"  says  Bumside's  report,  "upon  the  re- 
treating mass  of  men.  Upon  the  bridge  crossing  Cub  Run, 
a  shot  took  effect  upon  the  horses  of  a  team  that  was  cross- 
ing. The  wagon  was  overiurned  directly  in  the  centre  of 
the  bridge,  and  the  i^assage  was  completely  obstructed. 
The  enemy  continued  to  play  his  ariilleiy  upon  the  train, 
can'iages,  ambulances,  and  artillery  wagons  that  filled  up 
the  road,  and  these  were  reduced  to  ruin.  The  artillery 
could  not  possibly  pass,  and  five  pieces  of  the  Rhode  Island 
battery,  which  had  been  safely  brought  off  the  field,  were 
here  lost."  The  four  pieces  of  Ar'nold's  battery  were  also 
abandoned  here  from  this  cause.  Four  pieces  of  Carlisle's 
batteiy  were  apjjarently  lost  in  the  same  neighborhood, 
though  from  a  charge  of  Radford's  cavalry.  This  "  suspen- 
sion bridge "  over  Cub  Run  was  distant  some  three  miles 
from  the  main  battle-field,  and  it  was  here  that  the  enemy 
made  his  largest  caj^ture  of  guns  and  wagons. 

It  may  ba  imagined  that  at  Confederate  headc[uarters  that 
night  the  measure  of  satisfaction  was  well-nigh  lull.  Yet 
that  their  rejoicing  was  tempered  with  a  serious  alloy  of 
rebel  danger  and  losses,  is  also  clearly  enough  revealed  in 
Jefferson  Da\ds'  telegraphic  bulletins.  "  A  terrible  battle  is 
ragmg,"  said  his  first.  "We  have  won  a  glorious,"  though 
dear-bought  victory,"  was  the  language  of  his  second.  In 
his  third   he  repeated,   "Night   has   closed  upon  a  hard- 


204  TirE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION 

fought  field.  Our  forces  have  won  a  glorious  ^'ictory."  He 
forbore  to  add,  what  the  oflScial  reports  and  correspondence 
afterward  developed,  namely :  that  not  only  was  the  field 
"hard-fought"  and  the  victorj^  "dear-bought,"  but  they 
were  by  no  means  confident  it  was  final.  On  the  conti-ary, 
the  rebel  headquartei*s  was  in  serious  api^rehension  lest 
McDowell  should  turn  from  Centre\ille  and  once  more 
assail  the  Confedei-ate  right  flank  at  or  below  Blackburn's 
Ford.  To  meet  this  reported  danger,  Ewell  and  Holmes 
were  that  night  ordered  jjost-haste  back  to  Union  Mills. 
"You  will  not  fail  to  remember,"  afterward  wTote  Jefferson 
Da\'is  to  Beauregard,  "that,  so  far  fi-om  knowing  the  enemy 
was  routed,  a  large  part  of  om*  forces  was  moved  by  you,  in 
the  night  of  the  21st,  to  repel  a  supposed  attack  u^^on  our 
right,  and  the  next  day's  operations  did  not  fully  reveal  what 
lias  since  been  reported  of  the  enemy's  panic." 

"When  McDowell  left  the  battle-field  his  intention  and 
orders  were  to  rally  at  Centreville.  But,  alTi^-ing  there,  he 
found  the  conditions  less  favorable  than  he  anticipated.  It 
had  been  designed  that  Blenker's  brigade  should,  during 
the  day,  throw  up  intrenchnients  ;  this  was  not  done,  because 
the  necessary  tools  did  not  get  forward  as  expected.  Next 
he  found  that  DaWes  and  Bichardson  had  left  their  stations 
at  Blackbiu'u's  Ford  and  were  falling  back.  "  Great  God ! 
Richardson,"  exclaimed  IMcDowell,  on  meeting  that  officer, 
"why  didn't  you  hold  on  to  the  position  at  Blackburn's 
Ford?"  "Colonel  Miles  ordered  me  to  retreat  to  Centre- 
\-ille,  and  I  obeyed  the  order  ;  Colonel  Miles  is  continually 
iuterfeiing  with  me,  and  he  is  drunk,  and  is  not  fit  to  com- 
mand," was  the  reply.  The  officer  stood  justified,  for  Mc- 
Dowell had  ah-eady  susi^ended  Miles  from  command.  The 
retrogi-ade  movement  was  stopi)ed,  the  biigades  were  faced 
about  and  put  in  the  best  possible   line  of  defence,  with 


THE  RETREAT.  205 

orders  to  hold  the  position.  Repairing  again  to  Centreville, 
McDowell  found  still  further  discouragement  in  the  loss  of 
the  thirteen  guns  at  Cub  Rim  and  the  increased  disorder 
among  the  trooj)s.  When,  toward  nine  o'clock — just  about 
night-fall  for  that  season — the  last  brigade  reached  Centre- 
ville, and  the  various  commanders  were  called  together,  it 
was  generally  agreed  that  it  was  unwise  to  undertake  to 
make  a  stand,  as  contemi)lated.  "  The  condition  of  our 
artillery  and  its  ammunition,"  says  McDowell's  report, 
"  and  the  want  of  food  for  the  men,  who  had  generally 
abandoned  or  thrown  away  all  that  had  been  issued  the  day 
before,  and  the  utter  disorganization  and  consequent  de- 
moralization of  the  mass  of  the  army,  seemed  to  all  who 
were  near  enough  to  be  consulted — division  and  brigade 
commanders  and  staff — -to  admit  of  no  alternative  but  to  fall 
back."  If  these  reasons  might  be  questioned,  there  was 
still  another  absolutely  conclusive.  The  enlistment  of  the 
thi'ee  months  men  was  exijiring.  The  Pennsylvania  Fourth, 
which  had  insisted  upon  and  received  its  discharge  that  very 
mornhig,  while  the  army  was  advancing  to  battle,  "  moved  to 
the  rear  to  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  cannon."  "In  the  next 
few  days,"  continues  McDowell,  "  day  by  day  I  should  have 
lost  ten  thousand  of  the  best  armed,  drilled,  officered,  and 
disciplined  troops  in  the  army."  The  i^ractical  logic  of  war 
is  stern  and  swift.  Even  while  the  officers  were  deliberating, 
the  disorganized  fugitives,  in  a  contagious  and  increasing 
panic,  were  already  on  the  march.  Toward  ten  o'clock  Mc- 
Dowell began  to  distribute  his  orders  to  retire  from  Centre- 
ville ;  and  a  little  after  midnight  Richardson's  and  Blenker's 
brigades  marched  away  from  that  village  in  a  deliberate  and 
orderly  retreat,  maintaining  their  organization  as  a  steady 
and  effective  rear-guard  till  they  once  more  reached  the 
Potomac  camps. 


CHAPTER  XVn. 

CONCLUSION. 

The  official  reports  show  a  loss  to  the  Union  side  in  the 
battle  of  Bull  Run  of  25  guns  (the  Confederates  claim  28), 
4S1  men  killed,  1,011  men  wounded,  and  1,460  wounded  and 
o';her  Union  soldiers  sent  as  jirisoners  to  Eichmond.  On 
the  Confederate  side  the  loss  was  387  killed,  1,582  wounded," 
and  a  few  prisoners  taken. 

These  simple  figures  prove  the  engagement  to  have  been 
well  contested  and  fought  with  equal  courage  and  persist- 
ence by  both  sides.  Greatly  ridiculed  and  denounced 
when  it  occurred,  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  is  gradually  find- 
ing its  vindication.  General  Sherman  says  ib  was  "  one  of 
the  best-planned  battles  of  the  war,  but  one  of  the  worst- 
fought,"  and  that  "  both  armies  were  fairly  defeated."  Gen- 
eral Johnston  says  :  "  If  the  tactics  of  the  Federals  had  been 
equal  to  their  strategy,  we  should  have  been  beaten."  To 
the  military  student,  Bull  Run,  with  its  extended  field  of 
strategy,  its  quick  changes  of  plan,  its  fl.uctuating  chances 
and  combinations,  and  i':s  rapidly  shifting  incidents  and  ac- 
cidents, is  a  most  interesting,  and  likely  to  become  a  typical, 
"  game  of  war  "  between  volunteer  armies. 

The  loyal  people  in  Washington  were  rejoicing  over  a  ^'ic- 
toiy,  steadily  reported  during  the  greater  part  of  the  day, 
when  suddenly,  at  about  five  o'clock,  came  the  stai'tling  tele- 


CONCLUSION.  207 

gram :  "  Genei-al  McDowell's  army  in  hill  retreat  through 
Centreville.  The  day  is  lost.  Save  Washington  and  the 
remnants  of  this  army."  General  Scott  refused  to  credit  the 
astounding  and  unwelcome  intelligence.  Nevertheless  he 
jnit  the  Alexandria  and  Arlington  camps  into  actiWty,  sent 
confidential  notice  to  Baltimore,  called  reinforcements  from 
Harrisburg  and  New  York,  and  suggested  to  McClellan  to 
"  come  down  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley  with  such  troops  as 
can  be  spared  from  Western  Virginia."  By  midnight,  officers 
and  civilians  who  were  lucky  enough  to  have  retained 
horses  began  to  arrive,  and  the  api^arent  proportions  of  the 
defeat  to  increase.  It  was  a  gloomy  night,  but  yet  gloomier 
days  followed.  Next  day,  Monday,  the  rain  commenced 
falling  in  torrents,  and  continued  for  thii-ty-six  hours  with 
but  slight  intermission.  Thi'ough  this  rain  the  disbanded 
soldiers  began  to  pour  into  Washington  City,  fagged  out, 
himgry,  and  dejected,  and  ha^-ing  literally  nowhere  to  turn 
their  feet  or  lay  their  head.  Histoiy  owes  a  page  of  honor- 
able mention  to  the  Federal  cajiital  for  its  unselfish  gener- 
osity on  this  occasion.  The  rich  and  poor,  the  high  and  low 
of  her  loyal  people,  with  one  quick  and  entirely  unprompted 
impulse  opened  their  doors  and  dealt  out  food  and  refresh- 
ment to  the  footsore,  haggard,  and  half-starved  men,  whom 
ill-luck  rather  than  their  own  delinquency  had  so  unexpect- 
edly reduced  to  tramps  and  fugitives. 

The  evil  was,  however,  quickly  remedied.  By  Monday 
noon  the  full  extent  of  the  disaster,  though  not  yet  certainly 
known,  could  be  reasonably  estimated,  since  indications  be- 
gan to  show  that  the  enemy  had  not  pressed  their  pursuit 
in  force.  But,  in  due  preparation  for  the  worst,  and  in  addi- 
tion to  all  possible  precautions  for  local  defence.  General 
McClellan  was  called  to  Washington  to  take  command,  Mc- 
Dowell being  continued  in  charge  of  the  defenses  on  the 


208  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

Virginia  side  of  the  Potomac.  Patterson's  time  having  ex- 
pired, he  was  mnstered  out  of  the  service  ;  Banks  was  sent 
to  Harper's  Ferry,  Dix  put  in  command  at  Baltimore,  and 
Bosecrans  in  West  Virginia. 

Coming  to  Washington  under  the  favoi-able  acquaintance- 
ship and  estimate  of  General  Scott,  and  with  the  prestige  of 
his  recent  success  in  "West  Virginia,  McClellan's  arrival  was 
hailed  by  officials  and  citizens  with  something  more  than 
ordinary  waimth  and  satisfaction.  This  good  opinion  was 
'greatly  augmented  by  the  General's  own  personal  conduct. 
He  exhibited  at  once  a  promising  energy  and  industry  in 
repaiiing  the  shattered  anny  organization ;  cleared  "Wash- 
ington City  of  stragglers  ;  established  a  more  perfect  military 
discipline  than  had  hitherto  been  maintained ;  displayed 
great  tact  in  his  first  intercourse  with  both  junior  and  senior 
officers  ;  was  free,  aflfable,  kind,  patient,  and  attentive  to  all ; 
manifested  great  talent  and  unceasing  watchfulness  in  the 
details  of  military  admioisti-ation ;  and  being  young,  vigi- 
lant, cheerful,  intelligent,  and  apparently  possessed  of  gi-eat 
professional  skill,  he  reaped,  almost  at  a  single  hanest,  a 
well-nigh  universal  popularity. 

It  is  in  its  political  aspects  that  BuD  Run  becomes  a  gi-eat 
historical  landmark.  To  say  that  the  hope  and  enthusiasm 
of  the  North  received  a  painful  shock  of  humiliation  and 
disappointment,  is  to  use  but  a  mild  description  of  the  popu- 
lar feeling.  This  fii-st  experience  of  defeat — or  recognition 
of  even  the  possibility  of  defeat — was  inexpressibly  bitter. 
Stifling  the  shaii^  son-ow,  however,  the  great  public  of  the 
Free  States  sent  up  its  prompt  and  united  demand  that  the 
contest  should  be  continued  and  the  disgrace  wiped  out. 
Impatience  and  over  eagerness  were  chastened  and  repressed  ; 
and  the  North  reconciled  itself  to  the  painful  prospect  of  a 
tedious  civil  war  all  the  more  readily  because  of  the  necessity 


CONCLUSION.  209 

of  bending  every  energy  to  immediate  preparation  on  a 
•widely  extended  scale. 

If  the  North  was  cast  down  by  the  result  of  Bull  Eun,  the 
South  was  in  even  a  gi-eater  ratio  encouraged  and  strength- 
ened. Vanity  of  pei-sonal  prowess  is  a  weakness  of  Southern 
character ;  and  Bull  Eun  became  to  the  unthinking  a  demon- 
stration of  Southern  invincibility.  To  the  more  cautious 
leadei-s  the  event  was  yet  sufficiently  flattering  to  inspire 
them  with  full  confidence  in  ultimate  success.  Perhaps  the 
most  jjotent  influence  of  the  battle  was  upon  foreign  nations, 
who  now  looked  upon  the  Confedei-ate  States  as  a  belligerent 
of  "  great  expectations  ; "  while  sijeculative  foreign  capital 
turned  somewhat  eagerly  to  this  promising  new  field  of  con- 
traband trade. 

An  important  event,  so  silent  in  its  operation  that  the 
public  was  scarcely  conscious  it  was  occunlng,  now  became 
the  pivot  and  controlling  force  of  militaiy  operations. 
This  was  the  disbandment  of  the  thiee  months  volunteers. 
Within  a  few  weeks  almost  the  whole  seventy-five  thou- 
sand men  were  mustered  out  and  returned  to  their  homes. 
Only  a  few  regiments  re-enlisted  with  organizations  even 
approximately  unbroken ;  but  out  of  the  whole  number  of 
troops  thus  suddenly  dissolved  a  considerable  proportion 
immediately  entered  the  three  years  service  as  individuals, 
and  in  many  instances  theii-  drill  and  experience  seciu-ed 
them  election  or  appointment  as  officers  in  the  new  regi- 
ments. Thus  the  disappearance  of  an  army  brought  a  cer- 
tain compensation ;  it  not  only  fiu-nished  the  new  volunteers 
a  quickening  leaven,  but  that  portion  which  went  home  to 
every  Free  State,  and  to  some  of  the  Border  Slave  States, 
served  to  greatly  strengthen  and  correct  public  opinion  in 
their  several  localities. 

The  three  years  quota,  and  the  increase  of  the  regular 
14 


210       THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

army,  called  by  President  Lincoln  in  advance  of  strict  au- 
thority of  law  at  the  beginning  of  May,  had  so  far  progressed 
that  garrisons  and  camps  suffered  no  serious  diminution. 
Congi-ess,  being  convened  in  special  session,  now  legalized 
their  enlistment,  perfected  their  organization,  and  made 
libei*al  jjrovision  for  their  equipment  and  supply.  It  author- 
ized an  amiy  of  tive  hundi-ed  thousand  men,  and  a  national 
loan  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  millions  of  dollars ;  it  pro- 
vided an  increase  of  the  navy  to  render  the  blockade  vigi- 
lant and  rigorous ;  and  enforcement,  revenue,  confiscation, 
and  piracy  laws  were  enacted  or  amended  to  meet  the  exi- 
gencies of  active  rebellion. 

Pending  the  change  and  transfonnation  of  the  volunteer 
forces  from  the  three  months  to  the  thi-ee  yeai's  service, 
military  operations  necessarily  came  to  a  general  cessation. 
Washington  City,  especially,  and  the  fortified  strip  of  terri- 
toiy  held  by  the  Union  armies  on  the  Virginia  side  of  the 
Potomac,  once  more  became  a  gi-eat  military  camp.  Here, 
under  McClellan's  personal  supei-vision,  grew  up  that  famous 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  about  which  future  volumes  of  this 
series  will  have  much  to  say.  But  in  its  formation,  organi- 
zation, comi)lete  equipment,  and  thorough  drill  the  second 
half  of  the  year  1861  jiassed  away.  A  few  intensely  exciting 
incidents  occuiTed,  of  which  the  Ball's  Bluff  disaster  wa.s, 
perhaps,  the  chief;  but  their  consideration  in  detail  does 
not  fall  wdthin  the  scope  of  the  present  volume. 

In  the  rebel  camps,  also,  inaction  was  both  a  policy  and  a 
necessity  during  the  remainder  of  the  year.  The  trophies  of 
Bull  Run  ha^dng  been  gathered  up,  and  its  glorj'  vaunted  in 
Southern  newspajjers  and  stump  speeches,  the  rebel  com- 
mander once  more  advanced  his  outposts  to  the  positions 
held  before  the  battle,  while  the  bulk  of  his  army  turned 
Manassas  into  a  fortified  camp.     Some  of  the  earliest  rea- 


CONCLUSION.  211 

sons  for  this  course  are  explained  by  Johnston  with  bhmt 
frankness.  "  The  Confederate  army,"  he  -writes,  "  was  more 
disorganized  by  victory  than  that  of  the  United  States  by 
defeat.  The  Southern  volunteers  believed  that  the  objects 
of  the  war  had  been  accomplished  by  their  victory,  and  that 
they  had  achieved  all  that  their  country  required  of  them. 
Many,  therefore,  in  ignorance  of  theii-  military  obligations, 
left  the  army,  not  to  return.  Some  hastened  home  to  exhibit 
the  troi^hies  picked  up  on  the  field ;  others  left  their  regi- 
ments without  ceremony  to  attend  to  wounded  friends,  fre- 
quently accompanying  them  to  hospitals  in  distant  towns. 
Such  were  the  rejiorts  of  general  and  staff  officers  and  rail- 
road officials.  Exaggerated  ideas  of  victory  prevailing 
among  our  troops  cost  us  more  men  than  the  Federal  army 
lost  by  defeat." 

It  would  ajjpear  that,  about  a  month  after  the  battle  of 
Bull  Eun,  the  rebel  commanders  in\dted  Jefferson  Da\T[s  to 
Manassas  to  discuss  a  plan  of  active  operations  for  the 
autumn.  Generals  Johnston,  Beauregard,  and  G.  W.  Smith 
proposed  "the  concentration  there  of  all  the  available  forces 
of  the  Confederate  States,  crossing  the  Potomac  ii^to  Mary- 
land at  the  nearest  ford  with  this  army,  and  jilacing  it  in  rear 
of  Washington.  This,"  wi-ites  Johnston,  "  we  thoixght  would 
compel  McClellan  to  fight  with  the  chances  of  battle  against 
him.  Success  would  bring  Marshland  into  the  Confederacy, 
we  thought,  and  enable  us  to  transfer  the  war  to  the  north- 
em  border  of  that  State,  where  the  defensive  should  be  re- 
sumed." Da^ds'  conclusive  re^Dly  was,  "  that  the  whole  coun- 
try was  applying  for  arms  and  troops ;  that  he  could  take 
none  from  other  points  for  that  army." 

Of  the  larger  aspects  of  the  civil  war  during  the  fall  and 
winter  of  1861,  this  volume  does  not  afford  further  room  to 
give  even  a  summary.     Starting  with  a  series  of  favorable 


212        THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION. 

accidents  in  the  spring,  the  rebellion  had  confidently  ex- 
pected to  hold  every  slave-holding  State.  So  far  from  real- 
izing this  hope,  the  end  of  the  year  witnessed  the  substantial 
loss  to  the  conspiracy  of  the  foiu-  imijoilant  Border  States  of 
Maryland,  West  Virginia,  Kentucky,  and  ^Missouri.  This, 
together  with  the  effective  blockade  instituted  on  the  sea- 
board, and  the  lodgment  gained  by  the  brilliant  naval  vic- 
tories at  Hatteras  and  Port  Koyal,  already  presaged  the  fate 
of  disunion.  In  a  rough  and  hasty  measurement  of  strength 
and  unity,  political  and  military,  the  relative  proportions  of 
population,  wealth,  and  skill,  and  the  no  less  potent  elements 
of  devotion  to  fi-eedom,  justice,  and  humanity,  had  ali-eady 
so  far  turned  the  scale  as  to  foreshadow,  with  unening  cer- 
tainty, that  the  seceding  States  would  ultimately  fail  in  their 
desperate  appeal  from  the  ballot  to  the  bullet.  For  the 
present,  however,  both  the  contestants  remained  confident, 
determined,  and  unceasingly  active  in  gatheiing  the  huge 
annies  destined,  in  the  coming  spring,  to  renew  the  mighty 
conflict. 


END. 


INDEX. 


Aberckombie,  Colonel,  166 
Alabama,  attitude  of  with  regard 
to  secession,  2,  8  ;  secession  of, 
14 
Alexandria,  Va.,  103  ;  fortified,  167 
Alleghany  Mountains,  126,  137 
Anderson,     Major      Robert,     22 ; 
transfers    his    forces  to  Fort 
Surnter,  28  et  seq. ;  his  letter 
to  Governor  Pickens,  35  ;  his 
reply  to    President    Lincoln's 
letter,   58 ;  his  reply  to   Con- 
federate   authorities,   61,   131, 
135 
Annapolis,  100,  102  et  seq.;  route 

by,  to  the  capital,  106  et  seq. 
Arkansas,  80,  121 
Arlington  Heights,  Va.,  occupied 
by   Union  forces,   110 ;   forti- 
fied, 169 
Ashby's  Gap,  1G8 

Baker,  Edward  D.,76 
Ball's  Bluff,  engagement  at,  210 
Baltimore,  83 ;  attack  on  the  Mas- 
sachusetts   soldiers  in,    85  et 
seq.,  98 ;  authorities  burn  R.R. 
bridges,  89 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  1-11 
Bates,  Attorney-General,  122 


Banks,  General  N.  P.,  208 

Barrancas,  Fort,  38 

Beauregard,  General  G.  T.,  56 ;  di- 
rects operations  against  Fort 
Sumter,  57, 59  ;  placed  in  com- 
mand at  Manassas,  170 ;  his 
first  measures,  170,  171  ;  his 
plan  for  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  176  et  seq.  ;  composition 
of  his  army,  176,  note 

Beckham,  Captain,  198 

Bee,  General,  185 

Bell,  adherents  of,  8 

Benham,  Captain,  153 

Beverly,  142,  146,  151 

Black,  Secretary,  26,  33 

Blackburn's  Ford,  176,  note ;  en- 
gagement at,  178 

Blair,  Francis  P. ,  109 

Blair,  Frank  P.,  Jr.,  116  et  seq., 
122 

Blair,  Montgomery,  123 

Blair's  Home  Guards,  118 

Blenker,  General  L.,  174 

Boonville,  battle  of,  133 

Border  Slave  States,  80 

Breckenridge,  John  C,  Southern 
electoral  votes  cast  for,  4,  8 

Breckenridge  party,  character  of,  8 

Brown,  John,  158 


2U 


INDEX. 


Brown,  Governor,  of  Georgia,  13 

Brown,  Mayor,  of  Baltimore,  86, 
8'.)  et  seq. 

Buchanan,  James,  President,  char- 
acter of,  17  et  seq..  Southern 
sympathy  of,  IS  ;  his  message 
to  Congress,  19,  23  et  seq. ;  in- 
terview with  the  South  Caro- 
lina Commissioner.s,  28,  30,  ol ; 
correspondence  with  the  Wash- 
ington Cabal,  o7  ;  justifies  the 
revolution  of  the  South,  69 ; 
his  Union  sentiment  as  ex- 
president,  76 

Buckhannon,  147 

Buckner,  Simon  B.,  130,  133,  ia5 

Bull  Run,  Ui3  ;  position  and  course 
of,  176;  battle  of,  181  et  seq.  ; 
its  effects,  2(6,  208 

Burnside,  General  A.  E.,  174 

Bunker  Hill,  Va.,  163 

Butler,  General  B.  P.,  93  et  seq  , 
108 

Cabinet,  decision  of,  with  regard 
to  Fort  Sumter,  51 

Cadwalader,  General,  157 

Cairo.  128,  182,  134 

Campbell,  Justice,  54 ;  his  treach- 
ery, 3."),  57,  69 

Carrick's  Ford,  152  et  seq. 

Cass,  General,  Secretary  of  State, 
24;  resigns,  26;  supports  the 
Union  cause,  76 

Centre ville,  Va.,  177 

Charleston,  S.  C,  situation  of,  30, 
79 

Cheat  River,  146,  153 

Chinn  House,  the,  194 

Chanibersbnrg,  Pa.,  156 

Cincinnati,  132,  140 

Clay,  Henry,  127 


Cobb,  Secretary  Howell,  13, 17,  20, 
26,43 

Cockeys ville,  90 

Columbia,  District  of,  83 

Columbus,  134  et  seq. 

Confederacy,  Southern,  first  for- 
mal proposal  of,  26 ;  estab- 
lished, 41  ;  military  resources 
of,  79 ;  sends  diplomatic  agent3 
to  Europe,  79  ;  natural  resour- 
ces of,  81 

Confederates  resolve  to  begin  the 
war,  60 

Constitution  of  the  Confederate 
States  adopted,  41 

Cox,  General  J.  D.,  1.54 

Crawford,  Commissioner,  57 

Crittenden,  John  J. ,  70 

Cub  Hun,  200 

Cumberland,  Department  of  the, 
135 

Cumberland  Gap,  135 

Cummings  Point,  63  et  seq. 

Gushing,  Caleb,  76 

Davies,  General  T.  A.,  174 

Davis,  Jefferson,  25  et  seq. ,  40 ; 
elected  President  of  the  Con- 
federacy, 41  ;  opposes  the  at- 
tack on  Fort  Sumter,  50  ;  be- 
lief of  Northern  aid,  71  ;  offers 
letters  of  marque  and  reprisal, 
78  ;  call  for  volunteers,  79  ;  his 
message  to  Governor  Letcher, 
92 ;  letter  to  Governor  Jackson, 
117,  158;  speech  of,  at  Rich- 
mond, 169 

"  Declaration  of  Causes  "  by  South 
Carolina,  5  et  seq. 

Dennison,  Governor,  140 

Dix,  Secretary  John  A.,  33,  76, 
208 


INDEX. 


215 


Doubleday,  Captain  (afterward 
General)  Abner,  29,  64 

Douglas,  Stephen  A.,  adherents  of, 
8 ;  his  interview  with  Presi- 
dent Lincoln,  76 

Dogan  Heights,  191 

Drake,  Captain,  117 

Dumont,  Colonel,  143, 153 

Ellsworth,  Col.  E.  E.,  110  et 
Beq. ;  shot  at  Alexandria,  1 13  ; 
buried  from  the  White  House, 
114 

Ellsworth's  Zouaves,  110 

Elzey,  General,  194 

Evans,  Colonel,  183 

Evarts,  Wm.  M.,  76 

Everett,  Edward,  76 

Falling  Waters,  W.  Va.,  skir- 
ruish  at,  103 

Federal  Hill,  Baltimore,  108 

Field,  David  Dudley,  76 

Fitzpatrick,  Senator,  37 

Florida,  attitude  of,  with  regard  to 
secession,  2,  8 ;  secession  of,  14 

Floyd,  Secretary,  6,  17,  20,  23  et 
seq.,  20,  30;  his  malfeasance 
in  office,  31  ;  resigns,  33 

Pollansbee,  Captain,  80  et  seq. 

Foster,  Captain,  28,  03 

Fox,  Captain  G.  V.,  .51  ;  sails  in 
command  of  expedition  for  re- 
lief of  Fort  Sumter,  59 

Franklin,  General  W.  B.,  174 

Fremont,  General  J.  C,  133 

Frost,  D.  M.,  117  et  seq. 

Gainesville,  Va.,  181 
Gamble,  Hamilton  R.,  125 
Gamett,  General,  146,  154 


Georgia,  attitude  of,  with  regard 
to  secession,  2,  8,  12 ;  seces- 
sion of,  13  et  seq. 

Gist,  Governor  of  South  Carolina, 
his  circular  letter,  1,  8,  27 

Gosport  Navy  Yard,  destruction 
of,  96  et  seq. 

Grafton,  142  et  seq.,  146 

Grant,  General  U.  S.,  134 

Great  Bethel,  Va.,  engagement  at, 
173 

Green,  Captain,  117 

Griffin,  Captain,  188,  191,  192 

Guthrie,  Colonel,  131 

Hagerstown,  Md.,  157 

Hamlin,  Hannibal,  76 

Harney,  General,  119  et  seq. 

Harper's  Ferry,  United  States  Ar- 
mory at,  83  ;  capture  of,  by 
rebels,  95,  98 ;  retaken  from 
the  rebels,  157;  weakness  of, 
158 ;  destroyed  by  Johnston, 
161 

Harrisburg,  100 

Hayne,  I.  W.,  35,  37 

Heintzelman,  General  S.  P.,  com- 
mands Third  Division  on  ad- 
vance to  Manassas,  174 

Henry  House,  the,  187 

Hickman,  Ky.,  l.'J4 

Hicks,  Governor,  83,  88  et  seq. ,  94 

Houston,  Governor,  his  scheme  of 
independent  sovereignty  for 
Texas,  13  ;  deposed  from  office, 
14 

Holt,  Secretary,  .33,  37,  84 

Howard,  General  O.  O..  174 

Hughes,  Archbishop,  76 

Hunter,  General  David,  25 ;  com- 
mands Second  Division  in  the 
advance  oa  Manassas,  174 


216 


INDEX. 


Huttonaville,  147 

Illinois,  127 
Imboden,  General,  185 
Indiana,  127  ;  volunteers,  128 
Iverson,  Secretary,  12 

Jackson,  Camp,  117;  captured  by 
General  Lyon,  118  et  seq.  : 

Jackson,  Fort,  79  j 

Jackson,   General  T.  J.   ("Stone- 
wall"). 187  i 

Jackson,    Governor,    llo  ct    seq., 
119,  121  et  seq.,  124 

Jackson,    murderer  of   Ellsworth, 
113 

Jefferson  City,  1 23 

Jefferson,  Fort,  on  Tortugas  Island, 
16 

Johnston,   General  Joseph  E.,  re-  i 
signs  from  Federal  army,  108  ; 
in  command  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
158 ;  destroys  Harper's  FeiTy,  ; 
161;  movements  of,  before  Pat-  ' 
terson,  in  the  Shenandoah  Val-  j 
ley,  1(52  et  seq.  ;  his  march  to  ' 
Manassas,  108  ;  in  command  at 
Bull  Run,  182  et  seq.  ;  opinion 
of,  on  the  battle  of  Bull  Run, 
211 

Jones,  Colonel  (of  the  Massachu- 
setts Sixth),  84 

Jones.  Lieuteuant,  95 

Kan.\wha,  proposed  State  of,  146 
Kanawha  River,  the  Great,  141 ; 

valley,  140 
Kane,  Marshal,  87,  88  et  seq. 
Kelly,  Colonel,  142  et  seq. 
Kentucky,   80 ;    attitude   of,   with 

regard  to  secession,  52,  129  ct 


seq.  ;    Union    Legislature    of, 

130  et  seq.,  UU 
Keyes,  General  E.  D.,  174 
Key's  Ferry,  Va.,  103 

Laukel  Hill,  147, 151  et  seq. 

Lee,  General  Robert  E. ,  108 ;  ap- 
pointed to  command  of  Vir- 
ginia forces,  lot);  his  plans  in 
W.  Va.,  146;  plans  of,  109, 170 

Leedsville,  151 

Leesburg,  Va.,  103 

Lefferts,  Colonel,  {^2  et  seq. 

Letcher,  Governor,  82.  91,  109,  141 

Lewis'  Ford,  17(5,  note 

Liberty.  Mo.,  United  States  Arse- 
nal at,  117 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  election  of,  4; 
his  progress  to  Washington, 
45  et  seq.;  his  early  career, 
4(5  ;  his  character  and  per- 
son, 47  et  seq. ;  his  speeches 
before  inauguration,  48 ;  in- 
auguration of,  49  ;  anxiety 
about  Fort  Sumter,  .50  et  seq. ; 
orders  the  relief  of  Forts  Sum- 
ter and  Pickens,  53 ;  his  final 
resolution  with  regard  to  Fort 
Sumter,  55  ;  his  letter  to  Ma- 
jor Anderson,  58 ;  communi- 
cation to  Gov.  Pickens,  59 
his  first  war  proclamation.  73 
interviews  with  Douglas,  70 
blockades  the  insurgent  ports, 
78  ;  interview  with  Baltimore 
committee,  100 ;  issues  a  sec- 
ond call  for  volunteers.  100; 
his  orders  to  P.  F.  Blair,  Jr. , 
122  ;  his  measures  to  sive  the 
Border  States.  131 

Liverpool  cotton  merchants,  79 

Longstreet,  General,  179 


INDEX. 


217 


Louisiana,  attitude  of,  with  regard 
to  secession,  3,  8  ;  secession  of, 
14 

Louisville,  135 

Lyon,  Captain  Nathaniel,  116  et 
seq.,  123  et  seq.,  123 

Lyons,  Lord,  94 

Magoffix,  Governor,  126  et  seq., 

132,  184  et  seq. 
Mallory,  Senator,  37  et  seq.,  40 
Manassas,  first  movement  against, 
162  et  seq.  ;  description  of,  175 
et  seq. 
Manchester,    Eng.,    cotton   opera- 
tors of,  79 
Martinsburg,  W.  Va..  163,  163 
Maryland,  attitude  of,  with  regard 
to  secession,  53,  S3,  80 ;  rebel 
conspiracies  to  gain,  107,  108  ; 
Union  enlistments  in,  131 
Mason,  Senator,  25,  91,  143 
Massachusetts    Eighth    Infantry, 

92,  103 
Massachusetts  Sixth  Infantrj',  84  ; 
attack  upon,  in  Baltimore,  85 
et     seq.  ;    map     of    its  route 
through  Baltimore,  85,  99 
McCauley,  Commandant,  96 
McClellan,  Gen.  George  B. ,  placed 
in  command  of  Dept.   of  the 
Ohio,  140;  in  West  Va.,  143, 
146  et  seq.,   1.53  et  seq.  ;    ap- 
pointed to  command  the  army 
of  the  Potomac,  207,  208 
McDowell,  General  Irvin,  in  com- 
mand at  Arlington    Heights, 
173 ;  his  plan  and  movements, 
173  et  seq.  ;  his  report  cited, 
175 ;    plan   of  battle    at   Bull 
Run,  177  ;  change  in  his  plans, 
179,    181 ;    his    action    during 


and  after  the  battle,  181-205  ; 
in  charge  of  the  Virginia  de- 
fences, 208 

McLane's  Ford,  176,  note 

McRee,  Fort,  38 

Memphis,  133 

MUes,  General  D.  S.,  commands 
Fifth  Division  on  advance  to 
Manassas,  174  ;  misconduct 
and  suspension  of,  199,  204 

Militia,  first  call  for,  73  et  seq. 

Milroj%  Colonel,  153  et  seq. 

Milvale,  90 

Mississippi,  attitude  of,  with  re- 
gard to  secession,  2,  8 ;  seces- 
sion of,  14 

Missouri,  attitude  of,  with  regard 
to  secession,  52,  80,  115  ; 
Unionists  of,  120 ;  without  lo- 
cal government,  124 ;  rescued 
from  secessionists,  135, 131, 133 

Mitchell's  Ford,  176,  note 

Montgomery,  93 

Morgan,  Fort,  79 

Morris,  General,  143,  147,  151 

Morton,  Governor,  129 

Moultrie,  Fort,  31  et  seq.,  28; 
seizure  of,  33 

National  property  in  the  South- 
ern States,  15  ;  seizure  of,  by 
secessionists,  16  ;  S.  Carolina 
Commissioners  treat  for  deliv- 
ery of,  27 

Nelson,  Lieutenant  WUliam,  131 
et  seq. 

New  York  City,  proposition  for 
secession  of,  71  ;  war  meeting 
in,  92 

New  York  Seventh  Infantr}',  103 

Norfolk  Navy  Yard,  83 ;  destroyed, 
96 


218 


INDEX. 


North  Carolina,  attitude  of,  with  Provincial  Congress  of  the  rebel 
regard  to  secession,  1,  80  States,  37,  o'J  et  seq. 

North,     its     misapprehension    of  Pulaski,  Fort,  80 

Southern  opinion,  71  et  seq.  Pierpont,  F.  H.,  Governor,  145 


Ohio  levies,  128 

Ohio,  Military  Department  of  the, 

140 
Ohio  River,  127 

Paducah,  134 

Palmetto  flag,  32 

Parkersburg,  142 

Patterson,  General  Robert,  155 ; 
map  of  his  campaign,  1.59; 
indecision  of,  101  ;  Scott's  or- 
ders to,  103  et  seq. 

Pawnee,  the,  110 

Pegram,  Colonel,  147 

Pensacola,  38,  79 

Pennsylvania,  Military  Depart- 
ment of,  155 

Philippa,  143  et  seq.  ;  battle  of, 
144,  140  et  seq. 

Phillips,  Wendell,  76 

Pickens,  Fort,  at  Pensacola,  16, 
38,  51,  53 

Pickens,  Francis  W.,  Governor  of 
South  Carolina,  5,  32 ;  de- 
mands surrender  of  Fort  Sum- 
ter, 35,  .50  et  seq. ,  59 

Pierce,  ex-President,  7G 

PUlow,  General,  133,  134 

Pinckney,  Castle,  20  ;  seizure  of,  32 

Polk,  General  Leonidas,  134  et  seq. 

Porter,  General  Andrew,  174 

Porter,  General  Fitz-John,  157, 166 

Porterfield,  Colonel,  142  et  seq., 
146 

Potomac  River,  126 

Price,  Sterling,  121  et  seq.,  124 


Rebellion,  the  beginning  of,  1 ; 
first  formal  proposal  of,  26 

Relay  House,  90 

Richardson,  Generjl  J.  B.,  174, 
178 

Richmond,  92;  Confederate  seat  of 
government  transferred  to, 
169 

Rich  Mountain,  147,  151,  153 

Ricketts,  Captain,  188, 191,  192 

Roaring  Creek,  149 

Robinson,  Camp  Dick,  132 

Robinson  House,  the,  187 

Rosecrans,  General  W.  S.,  149, 154, 
208 

Rxmyon,  General  Theodore,  com- 
mands Fourth  Division  in  ad- 
vance to  Manassas,  174 

Russell,  Dr.  W.  H.,  202 

Sandford,  General.  1C3 

Santa  Rosa  Island,  38 

Schenck,  General  R.  C,  74 

Scott,  General  Winfield,  at  Wash- 
ington, 24,  49 ;  views  on  the 
relief  of  Fort  Sumlier,  51 ;  or- 
ders the  reinforcement  of  Har- 
per's Ferry,  95  et  seq.;  concen- 
trates troops  in  Washington, 
99  et  seq.;  protects  St.  Louis, 
110  ;  orders  and  suggestions  to 
Patterson,  162  et  seq.  ;  his 
campaign  plans,  171,  173 

St.  George,  W.  Va.,  151 

St.  Louis,  1 10 

St.  Philip,  Fort,  79 


INDEX. 


219 


Secession,  causes  of,  1  et  seq. ; 
passage  of  ordinance  of,  in 
Soutli  Carolina,  5  et  seq.,  14  ; 
true  character  of,  8  ;  cabal  in 
Washington,  17,  23,  36 

Seventh  Regiment  of  New  York, 
9"2  et  seq. 

Seward,  Secretary,  opposes  reliev- 
ing Fort  Sumter,  51  ;  his  idea 
of  the  conspiracy,  52  ;  his  re- 
ply to  the  rebel  commission- 
ers, 54  ;  interview  with  Judge 
Campbell,  54,  94 

Shepherdstown,  IGO 

Sherman,  General  W.  T.,  174 

Slavery,  false  assumption  of  the 
South  with  regard  to,  7 ;  the 
corner-stone  of  the  Confeder- 
acy, 43 

Slidell,  Senator.  37,  40 

Slemmer,  Lieutenant,  38 

Small's  Pennsylvania  Brigade,  88 

Smith,  General  G.  W.,  211 

Smith,  General  Kirby,  194 

South  Carolina,  attitude  of,  with 
regard  to  secession,  1 ;  seces- 
sion of,  5,  14 

South  Carolina  Commissioners 
have  an  interview  with  Presi- 
dent Buchanan,  30 ;  their 
blindness  to  their  opportunity, 
31 

Southern  States,  their  differences 
of  territory,  etc.,  10  et  seq. 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  26,  33 

"  Star  of  the  West,"  33 

State  supremacy,  doctrine  of,  6 

Staunton,  Va.,  142,  146 

Steedman,  Colonel,  152 

Stephens.  Alexander  H. ,  12; 
elected  Vice-President  of  the 
Confederacy,  42 


Stone  Bridge,  the,  over  Bull  Run, 
176  and  note 

Stone,  General,  163 

Strasburg,  Va. ,  163 

Sudley  Ford,  Bull  Run,  183 

Sudley  road,  the,  187 

Sullivan's  Island,  21  et  seq. 

Sumter,  Fort,  21  et  seq.  ;  expedi- 
tion for  the  relief  of,  53 ;  Pres- 
•  ident  Lincoln's  decision  with 
regard  to,  55  ;  preparations  for 
the  siege  of,  56 ;  its  evacua- 
tion demanded,  60  ;  siege  be- 
gun, 62  ;  strength  of,  63  ;  its 
disadvantages  in  the  siege,  65  ; 
surrender  of,  68  ;  the  effect  at 
the  North  of  the  attack  on,  72 

Taylor,  Fort,  at  Key  West,  16 

Tennessee,  80,  133  et  seq.  ;  East, 
135 

Texas,  course  of  the  conspirators 
in,  13  ;  ordinance  of  secession 
submitted  to  popular  vote,  13  ; 
attitude  of,  with  regard  to  se- 
cession, 13  et  seq.  ;  secession 
of,  14 

Thomas,  Secretary,  26 

Thomas,  Colonel,  166 

Thompson,  Jeff.,  118 

Thompson,  Secretary,  17,  20,  30, 
33 

Toombs,  Senator,  12,  43 

Toucey,  Secretary,  ^ 

Townsend,  Colonel,  153 

Twiggs,  General,  treachery  of,  14 

Tyler,  General  Daniel,  commands 
First  Division  in  the  advance 
on  Manassas,  174 ;  his  advance, 
177,  178 

Union  Mills  Ford,  176,  note 


220 


INDEX. 


Vakian,  Captain,  174 

Vernon,  Mount,  Va.,  103 

Vienna  Station,  Va.,  ambush  at, 
173 

Virginia,  attitude  of,  with  regard  to 
secession,  51  et  seq.,  80;  seces- 
sion, 98 ;  extent  and  character 
of,  137  et  seq.,  109 

Virginia,  East,  137  ;  vote  on  Seces- 
sion Ordinance,  143 

Virginia,  West,  131,  133,  137,  141  ; 
vote  on  Secession  Ordinance, 
143 ;  organized  as  separate 
State,  144  et  seq.  ;  map  of 
West  Virginia  battles,  148 ; 
admitted  into  the  Union,  154 

Volnnteers,  first  enlistment  of,  75 ; 
new,  called  for,  106 

Walker,  Secretary,  57,  91 
Walker,  Robert  J.,  76 
Ward,  Captain,  38 
Warrenton  Turnpike,  the,  176 
Washington,  83  ;  character  of,  97 ; 


defence  of,  98  et  seq.  ;  threat- 
ened, 101  ;  arrival  of  the  Mas- 
sachusetts Sixth  and  New 
York  Seventh  regiments  at, 
103  et  seq.  ;  becomes  a  camp, 
106  et  seq. 

Washington,  Fort,  103 

West  Union,  W.  Va.,  151 

Wheeling,  139,  143  et  seq. 

Wigfall,  Senator,  08 

Wilcox,  General  O.  B.,  174 

Williamsport,  Pa.,  157 

Williamsport,  W.  Va.,  163 

Winchester,  Va.,  157,  160 

Wise,  ex-Governor  Henry  A.,  146, 
154 

Wood,  Mayor  Fernando,  71,  76 

Woodbury,  Captain,  cited,  195 

Woodruff,  Colonel,  131 

Young's  Branch,  183 

ZoLLicOFFER,  General,  135 
Zouaves,  Ellsworth's,  110 


MESSRS.  CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

have  much  pleasure  in  announcing  that  an  undertaking  which 
they  have  had  in  progress  for  several  years  is  now  completed  ; 
and  that  they  have  begun  the  publication  of  a  work  which  they 
believe  will  prove  the  most  important  of  recent  contributions 
to  American  History. 

Under  the  general  title  of  the 

Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War, 

they  will  issue  a  series  of  volumes,  contributed  at  their  soli- 
ciation  by  a  number  of  leading  actors  in  and  students  of  the 
great  conflict  of  i86i-6^,  with  a  view  to  bringing  together, 
for  the  first  time,  a  full  and  authoritative  military  history  of 
the  suppression  of  the  Rebellion. 


The  final  and  exhaustive  form  of  this  great  narrative,  in  which  every 
doubt  shall  be  settled  and  every  detail  covered,  may  be  a  possibility 
only  of  the  future.  But  it  is  a  matter  for  surprise  that  twenty  years 
after  the  beginning  of  the  Rebellion,  and  when  a  whole  generation 
lias  grown  up  needing  such  knowledge,  there  is  no  authority  which  is 
at  the  same  time  of  the  highest  rank,  intelligible  and  trustworthy,  and 
to  which  a  reader  can  turn  for  any  general  view  of  the  field — for  a 
strong,  vivid,  concise  but  truly  proportioned  stoiy  of  the  great  salient 
events. 

The  many  reports,  regimental  histories,  memoirs,  and  other  materi- 
als of  value  for  special  passages,  require,  for  their  intelligent  reading, 
an  ability  to  combine  and  proportion  them  which  the  ordinary  reader 
does  not  possess.  There  have  been  no  attempts  at  general  histories 
which  have  supplied  this  satisfactorily  to  any  large  part  of  the  public. 
Undoubtedly  there  has  been  no  such  narrative  as  would  be  especially 
welcome  to  men  of  the  new  generation,  and  would  be  valued  by  a  very 
great  class  of  readers; — and  there  has  seemed  to  be  great  danger  that 


the  time  would  be  allowed  to  jiass  when  it  would  be  possible  to  give 
to  such  a  work  the  vividness  and  accuracy  that  come  from  personal 
recollection. 

These  facts  led  to  the  conception  of  the  present  work.  Its  possi- 
bility depended  first  of  all  on  the  consent  of  the  circle  of  authors  to 
whom,  only,  the  publishers  could  look  to  carry  it  out  worthily  : — but 
the  cordial  reception  which  the  suggestion  at  once  received  from  them 
and  from  all  others  consulted,  speedily  removed  all  doubt  upon  this 
subject. 

From  every  department  of  the  Government,  from  the  officers  of  the 
army,  and  from  a  great  number  of  custodians  of  records  and  special 
information  everywhere,  both  authors  and  publishers  have  received 
every  aid  that  could  be  asked  in  this  undertaking;  and  in  announcing 
the  issue  of  the  work  the  publishers  take  this  occasion  to  convey  the 
thanks  which  the  authors  have  had  individual  opportunities  to  express 
elsewhere. 


The  volumes  of  the  series  will  be  duodecimos  of  about  250 
pages  each,  illustrated  by  maps  and  plans  prepared  under 
the  direction  of  the  authors.  They  will  appear,  as  far  as 
possible,  in  the  chronological  order  of  the  Campaigns  of 
which  they  treat;  and  by  their  preliminary  and  concluding 
chapters  will  be  so  far  connected  that  the  completed  work 
will  practically  cover  the  entire  field  of  the  war.  The  price 
of  each  volume  will  be  $1.00. 


The  followmg  voltwics  are  now  ready,  or  far  advanced  in 
preparation,  and  will  appear  at  short  intervals  : 

I.— THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION.  By  JOH>r  G. 
NicoLAY,  Esq.,  Private  Secretary  to  Picsident  Lincoln;  late 
Consul-General  to  France,  etc.      A'ozv  ready, 

A  preliminary  volume,  describing  the  opening   of  the   war,   and  rovcring  the 
period  Item  the  election  of  Lincoln  to  the  end  of  the  first  Uattle  of  Bull  Run. 


II.— FROM  FORT  HENRY  TO  CORINTH.  By  the  Hon. 
M.  F.  Force,  Justice  of  the  Superior  Court,  Cincinnati ;  late 
Brigadier-General  and  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.V.,  commanding 
First  Division,  17th  Corps  :  in  1862,  Lieut.  Colonel  of  the 
20th  Ohio,  commanding  the  regiment  at  Shiloh  ;  Treasurer  of 
the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.     Now  ready. 

The  narrative  of  events  in  the  West  from  the  Summer  of  1861  to  May,  1862 ; 
covering  the  capture  of  Fts.  Henry  and  Donelson,  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  etc.,  etc. 


III.— THE  PENINSULA.     By  Alexander   S.  Webb,  LL.D., 

President  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York;  Assistant 
Chief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  i86i-'62;  Inspector 
General  Fifth  Army  Corps;  General  Commanding  2d  Div., 
2d  Corps ;  Major-General  Assigned,  and  Chief  of  Staff,  Army 
of  the  Potomac.     Ready  November  20. 

The  history  of  McCIellan's  Peninsula   Campaign,  from  his  appointment  to   the 
end  of  the  Seven  Days'  Fight. 

IV.— THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE.  By  Johx  C.  Ropes, 
Esq.,  of  the  Military  Society  of  Massachusetts,  the  Massa- 
chusetts Historical  Society,    etc.      Ready  November  20. 

From  the  appointment  of  Pope,  to  command  the  Army  of  Virginia,  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  McClellan  to  the  general  command  in  September,  1S62. 


v.— THE  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG.  By 
Francis  Winthrop  Palfrey,  late  Colonel  20th  Mass.  In- 
fantry, and  Bvt.  Brigadier  Gen'l  U.S.V. ;  Lieut.  Col.  of  the 
20th  Massachusetts  at  the  battle  of  the  Antietam ;  Member  of 
Military  Society  of  Massachusetts,  of  the  Massachusetts  His- 
torical Society,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  McClellan  to  the  general  command,  Sept.  1862,  to  the 
end  of  the  Battle  of  Fredericksburg. 


VI.— CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG.  By 
Abner  DoubledaY,  late  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.A. ;  and  Major 
Gen'l,  U.S. v.;  commanding  the  First  Corps  at  Gettysburg, 
etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  Hooker,  throuah  the  campaigns  of  Chancellorsville  and 
Gettysburg,  to  the  retreat  of  Lee  after  the  latter  battle. 


VII.— THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND.     By  Henry 

M.   Cist,  Brevet  Brig   Gen'l  U.S.V.;  A.A.G.  on  the  staff  of 

Major  Gen'l  Rosecrans,  and  afterward  on  that  of  Major  Gen'l 

Thomas,  Corresponding  Secretary  of  the, Society  of  the  Army 

of  the  Cumberland. 

From  the  formation  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  the  end  of  the  battles  at 
Chattanooga,  November,  1863. 

IX.— THE     CAMPAIGN     OF    ATLANTA.       By   the    Hon. 

Jacob  D.  Cox,  Ex-(jovernor  of  Ohio  ;  late  Secretary  of  the 
Interior  of  the  United  States;  Major  General  U.S. V.,  com- 
manding Twenty-third  Corps  during  the  campaigns  of  Atlanta 
and  the  Carolinas,  etc.,  etc. 

From  Sherman's  first  advance  into  Georgia  in  May,  1864,  to' the  beginning  of 
the  March  to  the  Sea. 

X.— THE    MARCH    TO    THE    SEA— FRANKLIN    AND 
NASHVILLE.     By  the  Hon.  Jacob  D.  Cox. 

From   the  beginning  of  the   March  to  the  Sea  to  the  Surrender  of  Johnston — 
including  also  the  operaiions  of  Thomas  in  Tennessee. 

XI.— THE    CAMPAIGNS    OF    GRANT    IN    VIRGINIA. 

By   Andrew   A.    Humphreys,  Brigadier  General  and  Bvt. 
Major-General,    U.S.A.;    late  Chief  of  Engineers;    Chief  of 
Staff,   Army  of  the  Potomac,    i863-'64;  commanding  Second 
Corps,  i864-'65,  etc.,  etc. 
Covering  the  Virginia  Campaigns  of  1S64  and  '65,  to  Lee's  surrender. 


VIII.— THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

and  one  otiier  volume,  completing  the  series,  are  in  course  of 
preparation,  and  their  contents  and  authors  will  be  announced 
in  a  short  time. 


*if*  The  above  hooks  for  sale  by  all  booksellers,  or  ivillbe  sent,  f>ost-/>aiii,  uf>on 
receipt  0/ price  by 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS, 

743  AND  745  Broadway,  New  York. 


